The opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: T. M., A/K/A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
T.J.M., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: M.I., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1091 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Dated August 17, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Orphans' Court at
No(s): No. 63-23-0548
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: June 18, 2024
M.I. (Father) appeals the decision of the Washington County Orphans’
Court, which granted the petition filed by Washington County Children and
Youth Services (CYS) and terminated his rights to his 9-year-old daughter,
T.M. (the Child), pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), (b). After review, we affirm.1
The record discloses the following factual and procedural history. The
Child was born in 2013. She came to the attention of CYS during the summer
of 2021. The Child was living with Father’s former paramour, K.R., who is the
mother of Father’s other children – i.e., the Child’s half-siblings. The Child
had not been in the care of either parent for some time. Father was a resident
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The court also involuntarily terminated the rights of V.M. (Mother), who did
not appeal.
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of New Jersey, while Mother was a resident of Texas. The Child had lived with
Mother until the age of 5, when she was removed from Mother’s care and
placed with Father. How the Child came to live with K.R. was unclear, but by
2020, K.R. relocated from New Jersey to Pennsylvania with the Child and the
Child’s half-siblings.
During the Summer of 2021, CYS received reports that K.R. was not
properly caring for the children in her home. The CYS intake worker contacted
Mother and Father. What became of these initial contacts is unclear. In
September 2021, CYS learned of additional allegations against K.R.,
specifically that she was leaving the children unattended for days. CYS also
learned Father was prohibited from having contact with the Child, because of
a New Jersey protective order obtained by K.R. that same month.2 CYS
arranged for the Child and her half-siblings to live with P.R., the mother of
K.R.; but K.R. was allowed to have contact with the children so long as she
was not under the influence.
In October 2021, the Child was admitted to a local psychiatric hospital
after threats of self-harm. A couple weeks later, CYS learned that K.R.
allegedly abused her children, which caused CYS to petition for dependency.
Upon the Child’s release from the hospital, CYS obtained a shelter order to
formally remove the Child from K.R. and her parents. The Child’s placement
remained with P.R. Given that both parents resided outside of the
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2 The order also prohibited Father from having contact with K.R. or K.R.’s
daughter.
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Commonwealth, CYS evidently had difficulty obtaining proper service. At one
point, CYS had to obtain a second reauthorization for the shelter care order.
The Child was ultimately adjudicated dependent in February 2022. The
dependency petition alleged that Father had a criminal history, which included
pending charges in New Jersey for simple assault, threat of serious bodily
injury, harassment, aggravated sexual assault to a child older than 13 and
less than 16, and endangering the welfare of a child. Father was denied
visitation with the Child due to the protection order. The adjudicatory order
directed Father to complete several objectives to aid with reunification. Father
had to complete a sex offender evaluation; a drug and alcohol evaluation; and
a mental health assessment. He had to refrain from drugs and alcohol, obtain
housing, and resolve the pending criminal matters.
The juvenile court conducted three permanency review hearings prior
to the termination hearing. At the first hearing, in August 2022, Father alleged
that he participated in some of the required evaluations, but the court noted
Father did not provide any verification. Father did not appear for the second
hearing, which occurred in January 2023. Apparently, Father was incarcerated
because of new criminal charges, separate from the pending charges
regarding sexual abuse of a minor. At the third permanency review hearing,
in June 2023, Father indicated that he hoped to “fast track” his criminal
matters. The court concluded that Father continued to make no progress
toward his reunification goals.
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The orphans’ court held a termination hearing on August 17, 2023. In
its thorough opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the orphans’ court
summarized the testimony:
At the TPR hearing, the Agency first presented testimony
from caseworker Tenisha Brown. Brown testified that she
has been the caseworker for [the Child], who was [nearly]
10 years of age at the time of the hearing, since
approximately the end of 2021 to the beginning of 2022.
Brown testified that at the time of Agency involvement, [the
Child] was in Pennsylvania under the care of Father's former
paramour, [K.R], with whom there were reported concerns
of substance abuse. Brown testified that [the Child] was
hospitalized and couldn't be released due to custody
concerns. At that time, the Agency learned that [the Child]
was in the care of her Mother until age 5 and then removed
from Mother's care and placed with Father. At some point
there was a report of sexual maltreatment by Father against
one of [K.R.’s] other children and [K.R.] obtained custody
of the children through a September 2021 final protection
order.
Brown continued to detail that in August of 2021, the
Agency initially sought a shelter petition due to excessive
drinking by [K.R.], who also reportedly hit her children.
Consistent with the history stated above, Brown testified
that [the Child] was adjudicated dependent in February of
2022. The adjudication was challenged by Father who
requested reconsideration, however the adjudication was
confirmed on March 7, 2022. Brown testified that the
Agency had several concerns with Father, including the
protection order preventing contact, the pending sexual
assault on a minor charges and domestic violence concerns.
Brown testified that the Agency had no evidence of Father
engaging in a sexual offender evaluation. Similarly, Brown
said the Agency had no evidence of Father engaging in
Batterer's Intervention Counseling. Brown was aware of a
mental health evaluation completed by Father and was
further aware of a drug and alcohol assessment completed,
resulting in a mental health treatment recommendation.
Brown testified that the Agency was unable to obtain
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accurate releases from Father to confirm information from
mental health treatment and no drug tests for Father have
been received by the Agency. Brown testified that Father
continued to have outstanding criminal matters and failed
to refrain from criminality, facing new 2023 burglary,
unlawful possession and property damage charges.
Furthermore, Brown testified that Father has not established
safe and stable housing and in fact was incarcerated in
January 2023, where he remained at the time of the
hearing. The Caseworker testified that Father's current
incarceration length is unknown and he continues to have
two outstanding criminal matters.
Testifying as to [the Child’s] contact with Father, Brown
testified that contact was prohibited as a result of the
outstanding PFA and the no contact order remained
throughout the history of the dependency matter. Brown
testified that Father provided no financial support for [the
Child], sent no gifts, cards or letters to [the Child], failed to
provide for the daily needs of [the Child] and did not make
[the Child] a priority. The Caseworker reported that neither
Mother or Father actively participates with [the Child’s]
medical and/or educational needs and at the time of the
hearing [the Child] was out of parental care twenty-two (22)
months. In the present matter, [the Child] was adjudicated
dependent on February 16, 2022 and the TPR petition was
filed by the Agency on March 29, 2023. The hearing on the
TPR was conducted on August 17, 2023. (Eighteen months
after adjudication).
According to Brown, while Father failed to perform these
basic functions, [the Child] remained and remains in an
undisclosed foster home where she engages in therapy,
performs well in school and continues to thrive. The
Caseworker testified that [the Child] is able to verbalize her
wants and has indicated that, although she wishes to have
some contact with Mother, she wants to be adopted, and
stay in her foster home.
Through additional testimony, Brown testified that when
[the Child] was adjudicated dependent in February of 2022,
Father was not incarcerated. Brown acknowledged that
Father had nearly a year to work on court-ordered services
when he was incarcerated in January of 2023 and failed to
do so. Additionally, while the record supports some mental
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health treatment for Father, documentation evidencing such
treatment consists of information regarding two, one-hour
sessions, not the weekly mental health counseling
recommended and court ordered.
Testimony was next received from [an] expert in forensic
psychology, Dr. Neil Rosenblum. Dr. Rosenblum testified
that he did an evaluation with [the Child] on January 11,
2023. [The Child] gave him background information
indicating that she did not remember a lot about her birth
Mother. The Child knew that her Mother had gone to jail
and she was removed from her care.
Rosenblum testified that [the Child] described her time with
Father as “unpleasant.” Rosenblum characterized the time
as being a “struggle for the child.” By way of further
explanation, Rosenblum testified regarding [the Child’s]
relationship with [K.R.], who treated her own children better
and [the Child’s] witnessing fighting between her Father and
[K.R.]. According to Rosenblum, [the Child] moved to
Pennsylvania sometime in 2020 and/or 2021.
Rosenblum performed an interactional evaluation between
[the Child] and her Foster family. At the time of the
evaluation, [the Child] was in the foster home for a year and
was reportedly safe and secure with the foster family.
Rosenblum testified that the Child had a “low understanding
of family.” Rosenblum also completed a virtual interactional
with [the Child] and her Mother, but was unable to do an
individual and/or interactional evaluation with Father.
Nevertheless, based on the evaluations completed,
Rosenblum offered a permanency recommendation of
adoption. In support of his recommendation, Rosenblum
testified that, [the Child], at 9 years of age, has had a series
of disruptions in her life and has lived in multiple states and
locations. Rosenblum testified that the Child has trauma, a
rule out of Reactive Attachment Disorder, difficulty trusting
people and suicidal ideations. Additionally, Rosenblum
testified that [the Child] verbalizes the desire to be adopted
and the Child's identity is established here in Pennsylvania
with the foster family.
Rosenblum opined that continued contact should occur with
birth mother, but that is not a stable placement. Rosenblum
recognized that Mother had no in-person visitation with [the
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Child] during the dependency matter and Mother said that
in-person visits were cost prohibitive. While Rosenblum did
not evaluate Father, he opined that Father was also not a
valid reunification option considering [the Child]'s emotional
needs and Father's circumstances. Rosenblum testified that
[the Child] did not speak about Father, except for describing
trauma in the home environment between Father and her
step-mother. Rosenblum did not completely dismiss the
ability of Father having a relationship with [the Child] in the
future, but opined that presently, Father is not a placement
option and further noted, although only hypothetically, that
it was unlikely that [the Child] had an attachment with
Father.
Rosenblum testified that [the Child] has the most trusting
relationship with her foster parents and the benefits of
adoption outweigh any detriment of terminating parental
rights. Rosenblum testified that [the Child] is fortunate to
have connected with her foster family and finds any
alternative for the Child “very risky.” Rosenblum
emphasized trust, belonging and identity throughout his
testimony.
Father, although incarcerated, appeared and provided
testimony virtually through the video Polycom.
Father testified that he last saw [the Child] on July 19, 2020
and then the protection order was put into place. Despite
the protection order, Father testified that he believes that
[the Child’s] statements are confused when she was
“alienated from him.”
Father was specifically questioned regarding the
requirements in the dependency matter and although
littered with narratives involving court actions in other
jurisdictions, Father provided responses to each of the
specific services listed. When asked if he completed the
sexual offender counseling, Father indicated that he had not
but agreed with his counsel that he thought this requirement
was stayed by the Court pending the adjudication of his
other matters. Father provided a similar response with
regard to batterer's counseling. In response to whether he
participated in a mental health evaluation, Father responded
that he did a drug and alcohol evaluation through his pre-
trial services that recommended mental health treatment.
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Father testified that he received services from an
organization named Mind Your Mind. Father indicated that
he engaged with these services weekly, even seeing
counselors while incarcerated.
Father submitted documentation supporting two meetings
with Mind Your Mind on August 12 and August 15, 2022.
Father testified that he did drug testing in New Jersey. In
response to whether he had safe and stable housing, Father
indicated that he once had a two-bedroom place but was
unaware if his kids were coming back to New Jersey or
staying in Pennsylvania. Father acknowledged that there
was a period of approximately fourteen months where he
was not incarcerated and available to complete services, but
failed to do so.
Father was asked about the best interests of Child,
inasmuch as quite amount of time has passed since he has
last seen [the Child.] To demonstrate his relationship with
[the Child], Father described the time when she lived with
him indicating that he was a “stay at home dad” and would
be home all day and they would “just hang out” and do
“snack and homework after school.” When he was asked
his opinion on whether a termination of his parental rights
would be detrimental to [the Child], Father responded that
he absolutely believed it would be detrimental indicating
that, “when I am done here, I will be back with my other
children and she is going to see that and it will be hurtful to
[the Child].” Nevertheless, Father acknowledged that he
last saw [the Child] on July 19, 2020 with the protection
order preventing contact after that time. In later testimony
it was established that Father's time with [the Child] started
when she was approximately 5 years of age. Father
testified, “[the Child] was five when she came into the
picture.... When she came into my household.” Father later
testified that she was with him for a little over a year and
went through kindergarten while living with him.
Father testified that his trial regarding the sexual assaults is
scheduled for September 11, 2023 and no trial is scheduled
to date on his burglary charges. Father acknowledged that
his sexual assault charges involve sexual penetration of a
victim under the age of thirteen for activity alleged to have
occurred from 2015 through 2019, however Father indicates
that his plea agreement only involves his use of alcohol.
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Father testified that he was willing to come to Pennsylvania,
however he never did and Father agreed it was unfair for
[the Child] to be in limbo while he handled his pending and
outstanding criminal charges, but declined to acknowledge
that his present incarceration would continue to prevent
reunification with [the Child] even in the absence of the
protection order.
T.C.O., 10/19/23, at 15-21 (footnotes omitted) (style adjusted).
The orphans’ court issued its termination order the same day, August
17, 2023. Specifically, the court determined that CYS proved grounds for
termination existed under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8),
(b).
Father timely filed this appeal. He presents the following issue for our
review:
Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental
rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) when the trial court
failed to give the proper weight of [sic] Appellant’s evidence
and testimony.
Father’s Brief at 7.
We begin with our well-settled standard of review:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record. If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
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often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of
Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section
2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the
child[.]
In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-62 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
Father does not challenge the orphans’ court’s decision under Section
2511(a), thereby conceding the first prong of the bifurcated termination
analysis. Rather, Father opts to present a narrow challenge under Section
2511(b). That subsection provides:
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
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of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
On appeal, Father argues that the orphans’ court should have weighed
more heavily his testimony that he completed the court-ordered evaluations,
and that he provided documentation of the same to CYS. He maintains that
he was approved for a home loan, that he only had to pick out a suitable place
for the Child, and that he notes that he had exercised custody of the Child in
the past – the apparent inference being that he could provide appropriate care
again. Additionally, Father argues that “the Agency never moved on his
sister’s submission [to be a placement resource] and therefore the evidence
was not given any weight in the court’s decision in terminating Father’s
parental rights.” See Father’s Brief at 11-12, 13.
These arguments fail for several reasons. First, Father cannot dictate
how much weight the orphans’ court places on the evidence, which includes
his testimony. See, e.g., A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 820 (Pa. Super. 2014).
To that end, issues of witness credibility are directly within the trial court’s
purview. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Additionally, it is not the role of this Court
to search the record for evidence that would support a contrary result. See
id. But more to the point, these arguments largely concern Section 2511(a),
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which focuses on the parent’s conduct. The focus of a Section 2511(b)
analysis is on the Child. C.M.K., 203 A.3d at 261-62.3
Father presents only one argument relevant to the Section 2511(b)
analysis – namely, that the court should have continued the matter so that he
could be evaluated by Dr. Rosenblum. According to Father, the evaluation
would show he has a bond with the Child. Father maintains that without his
participation, Dr. Rosenblum’s report should not have been given so much
weight. See Father’s Brief at 11-12.
Preliminarily, however, we conclude that Father did not preserve this
argument for our review. Neither his concise statement of matters complained
of on appeal, nor his statement of questions involved challenge the expert
report and expert testimony, either explicitly or implicitly, in contravention of
Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).4 Moreover, this argument is presented without any citation
to relevant legal authorities, in contravention of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). As such,
Father waived this challenge.
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3 The propriety of Father’s housing is relevant to Section 2511(b), but only
insofar as the court may not terminate his rights based solely on inadequate
housing. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The court did not do so here, and we
need not discuss the point further.
4 We do not find that this claim constitutes a subsidiary question of, or a
question fairly suggested by, the issue Father presented in his statement of
questions involved section of his brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question
will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or
is fairly suggested thereby.”). Frankly, the statement of questions involved
is, itself, a subsidiary of the issue presented in Father’s concise statement.
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Even if we addressed this argument, we would conclude it merits no
relief. First, the court did not even need to consider Dr. Rosenblum’s
testimony or report to conduct a proper Section 2511(b) analysis. “When
conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to use expert
testimony.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations
omitted). Put plainly, because expert testimony is not required, Father’s lack
of participation in the expert evaluation does not render the court’s Section
2511(b) analysis erroneous. Father did not need an interactional evaluation
by Dr. Rosenblum to demonstrate he had a bond with the Child. Moreover,
when it considered Dr. Rosenblum’s evaluation, the orphans’ court
appropriately accounted for Father’s absence. Indeed, Dr. Rosenblum also
accounted for Father’s absence by hedging his recommendation.
Significantly, the question under Section 2511(b) is not merely whether
a bond exists. As the Supreme Court explained, trial courts must determine
whether the child has a bond with the biological parent, the nature of that
bond, and effect that severance of the bond would have on the child. In the
Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1109 (Pa. 2023) (citing T.S.M., 71 A.3d at
267, 269). Thus, the question for the court is whether termination would
sever a necessary and beneficial bond. “[T]o grant termination when a
parental bond exists, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the
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bond is not necessary and beneficial.” Id. at 1114.5 The Supreme Court held
that the trial court “must not truncate its analysis and preclude severance
based solely on evidence of an ‘adverse’ or ‘detrimental’ impact to the child.”
Id.
Moreover, our Supreme Court cautioned the parent-child bond inquiry
is but one factor to consider under a proper Section 2511(b) analysis. Id. at
1111 (citing In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)). “[B]ond,
plus permanency, stability and all ‘intangible’ factors may contribute equally
to the determination of a child’s specific developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of ‘primary’ importance in the
Section 2511(b) analysis.” Id. at 1109 (emphasis added). The Supreme
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5 The Court recognized that severance of any bond could have an “adverse
impact” and upset the child. Therefore, courts must focus on the nature of
the bond commensurate with the impact of severing that bond:
Severance of a “necessary and beneficial” bond would
predictably cause more than the “adverse” impact that,
unfortunately, may occur whenever a bond is present. By
contrast, severance of a necessary and beneficial
relationship is the kind of loss that would predictably cause
“extreme emotional consequences” or significant,
irreparable harm. Moreover, by evaluating the impact of
severance to determine if it will impose more than an
adverse or detrimental impact, courts correctly refine their
focus on the child's development and mental and emotional
health rather than considering only the child's “feelings” or
“affection” for the parent, which even badly abused and
neglected children will retain.
K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109-1110 (footnotes and internal citations omitted).
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Court held that trial courts have discretion to place appropriate weight on each
factor before making a decision under Section 2511(b). Id. at 1113.
Here, the orphans’ court determined – as part of its more general
Section 2511(b) analysis – that there was no evidence of a parental bond
worth preserving. The record supports this determination. Thus, even if we
were to consider Father’s argument regarding his lack of participation in the
forensic evaluation, we would conclude the argument merits no relief.
In sum, we conclude the orphans’ court did not err or abuse its discretion
when it terminated Father’s rights under Section 2511(b). The orphans’ court
was within its discretion to afford little weight to Father’s reasons why his
rights should not be terminated.
Order affirmed.
6/18/2024
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