Paraco Gas Corporation v. Ironshore Indemnity, Inc.

23-1069-cv

Paraco Gas Corporation v. Ironshore Indemnity, Inc.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.

CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS

PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER

THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER

MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,

in the City of New York, on the 17th day of June, two thousand twenty-four.

Present:

EUNICE C. LEE,

SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,

MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

PARACO GAS CORPORATION, JOSEPH ARMENTANO,

CHRISTINA ARMENTANO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. 23-1069-cv

IRONSHORE INDEMNITY, INC.

Defendant-Appellee.

_____________________________________

For Plaintiff-Appellant: ANDREA H. MARCUS, The

Deiorio Law Group,

PLLC, Rye Brook, NY.

For Defendant-Appellee: MELISSA A. MURPHY-

PETROS, Wilson Elser

Moskowitz Edelman &

Dicker LLP, Chicago, IL.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Seibel, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

Paraco Gas Corporation (“Paraco”), a closely-held family corporation that

distributes propane fuel and equipment, appeals a June 22, 2023 judgment of the

district court dismissing its breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims

against Ironshore Indemnity, Inc. (“Ironshore”), an insurance company that issued

Paraco the liability insurance policy at the heart of this dispute. Paraco

purchased an insurance policy for Directors, Officers, and Private Company

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Liability coverage (the “D&O Policy” or “Policy”) from Ironshore for the relevant

period. As its name suggests, the D&O Policy provided insurance coverage for

certain acts of Paraco’s officers and directors. After a suit was brought against

Joseph and Christina Armentano, who were Paraco officers, 1 alleging that Joseph

had transferred shares in violation of the terms of two Paraco Shareholder

Agreements, Paraco sought to invoke coverage benefits under the Policy for the

suit (the “Underlying Action”). Paraco, Joseph, and Christina (collectively,

“Appellants”) allege that despite proper notification and requests, Ironshore

refused to defend or indemnify Appellants in the Underlying Action as required

by the Policy.

Appellants brought suit seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that Ironshore

was obligated under the Policy (i) to indemnify and compensate them for losses

sustained in the Underlying Action, and (ii) to provide them with a defense in that

action; and (2) damages for breach of contract. 2 The district court dismissed the

1 At the relevant time, Joseph Armentano was the Chief Executive Officer of Paraco, Chairman

of Paraco’s Board of Directors, and owner of a majority of both Paraco Class A Voting Stock and

Class B Non-Voting Stock; and Christina Armentano was a corporate officer of Paraco, a member

of the Board, and an owner of Paraco Class A and Class B stock.

2 The parties eventually settled the Underlying Action.

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suit because it determined that the exclusion provision of the insurance policy

unambiguously excluded liability coverage for the Underlying Action. On

appeal, Paraco argues that the coverage exclusion in the insurance policy did not

preclude all the claims in the Underlying Action from D&O coverage.

For the reasons below, we find that all the claims in the Underlying Action

arose out of obligations under the Shareholder Agreements, and thus, all fell

within the Policy’s coverage exclusion. We assume the parties’ familiarity with

the remaining underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which

we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

* * *

We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true

and construing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. See Melendez v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 50 F.4th 294, 298 (2d Cir.

2022). The parties agree that New York law governs the interpretation of the

Policy’s terms. When interpreting contracts under New York law, courts focus

on deciphering “the objective manifestations of the intent of the parties as gathered

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by their expressed words and deeds.” Res. Grp. Int’l Ltd. v. Chishti, 91 F.4th 107,

112 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Brown Bros. Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Beam Constr. Corp.,

41 N.Y.2d 397, 399 (1977)).

The D&O Policy here provides a blanket statement of coverage, followed

later by an exclusionary provision for certain acts. Section III.N.’s exclusion

provision reads as follows:

Section III. The Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for

Loss in connection with any Claim made against any Insured: . . . N.

alleging, arising out of, based upon or attributable to any actual or

alleged contractual liability or obligation of the Company or an Insured

Person under any contract, agreement, employment contract or

employment agreement to pay money, wages or any employee

benefits of any kind.

J. App’x at 57, 59 (emphasis added). This provision exempts from coverage any

claim against persons covered under the Policy that “aris[e] out of” contractual

liability or obligations under contracts and agreements. 3 Id. The scope of the

“arising out of” language in this provision is our focus in addressing Paraco’s

appeal. New York courts have historically interpreted “arising out of” language

3 “Insured Person” under the Policy means “Directors, Officers and Employees.” J. App’x at 54

(Policy § II.M.). The parties do not dispute that Joseph and Christina are covered persons under

the terms of the Policy.

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in insurance contracts broadly. See Maroney v. N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,

5 N.Y.3d 467, 472 (2005) (“The words ‘arising out of’ have ‘broader significance

and are ordinarily understood to mean originating from, incident to, or having

connection with.’” (alterations omitted) (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 459 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161 (App. Div. 1983))).

As an initial matter, Paraco concedes that nine out of the ten claims in the

Underlying Action “arise out of” alleged breaches of the two Paraco Shareholder

Agreements. This means that these claims fall within the Section III.N. exclusion

and do not benefit from liability coverage under the Policy. Thus, we narrow our

focus to the only claim from the Underlying Action that remains in dispute—

Count IV. Specifically, the question is whether Count IV is based on an alleged

contractual liability of Paraco, such that coverage is excluded.

Count IV of the Underlying Action sought declaratory relief stating that the

Class A Shareholder Agreement remained in effect and governed the rights of

Paraco shareholders, and that an agreement signed by Joseph purporting to

terminate the Class A Shareholder Agreement was invalid. In Paraco’s view, this

claim is based on the Board’s corporate powers and fiduciary duties, not on

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obligations under the Shareholder Agreements that sustain the rest of the claims

in the Underlying Action. Paraco argues that this means Count IV cannot fall

within the Policy’s exclusion because it was based not on “contractual liability or

obligation,” but on the Board’s abdication of its corporate and fiduciary duties to

shareholders by allegedly rubberstamping Joseph’s actions and/or wrongfully

concealing them. J. App’x at 59. Thus, Paraco contends that such claims against

the Board would exist regardless of Appellants’ obligations under the Shareholder

Agreements, and as such, Ironshore had a duty to defend or indemnify Appellants

against those claims.

To assess the boundaries of coverage under the exclusionary clause of the

Policy, we apply a but-for test. See Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Creative Hous.

Ltd., 88 N.Y.2d 347, 352–53 (1996). While Paraco accepts the application of a but-

for test to adjudicate whether the claims arise out of contractual liability or

obligations, it neglects to engage with any analysis in earnest. Ironshore argues

that because Count IV “alleges that Joseph breached the Class A shareholder

agreement by purporting to end it through his unilateral execution of the

termination agreement” approved by the Board, the claim “could not exist but for

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the contractual obligations created by the Class A shareholder agreement”—

precluding it from coverage. Appellee’s Br. at 40 (emphasis added). We agree.

Count IV not only alleges the existence of facts showing that Appellants

violated the terms of the Class A Shareholder Agreement, but the claim relies on

that agreement for its theory of harm—demonstrating that the claim could not

exist but for Joseph’s alleged violation of the agreement’s right of first refusal and

stock transfer provisions. Thus, the claim is clearly positioned within the Policy

exclusion. The allegations in Count IV of the Underlying Action are replete with

references to Joseph’s breach of his obligations under the Class A Shareholder

Agreement. See J. App’x at 30 (“The Paraco Class ‘A’ Stock improperly

transferred by Joseph . . . in violation of the Class ‘A’ ROFR 4 . . . would have been

returned to Paraco and its shareholders if the Class ‘A’ ROFR was complied

with.”); see also id. (“The improper Class ‘A’ Stock transfers made by Joseph . . .

including the Purported Termination Agreement, signed only by Joseph—the

invalidity of which is blatant due to the explicit provision in the Class ‘A’ Stock

Agreement requiring that any modification or amendment to [it] must be in

4 A contractual term indicating a right of first refusal.

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writing signed by all parties, was the cornerstone of Joseph’s Succession Plan.”).

So while Count IV is not a breach of contract claim per se, it certainly has a causal

relationship to Appellants’ contractual obligations arising out of the Class A

Shareholder Agreement. See Maroney, 5 N.Y.3d at 472 (“We conclude that, in the

uninsured premises realm, the phrase arising out of [] requires only that there be

some causal relationship[.]” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This places

Count IV squarely within the orbit of the D&O Policy’s exclusion from coverage.

Last, Paraco’s characterization of Count IV as arising out of the Board’s

obligations under its general corporate duties is flawed for another distinct

reason—that is, that the allegations related to the Board functioned to satisfy the

pleading requirements for derivative actions. As the district court correctly

determined, the allegations related to the Board in Count IV “were made with

respect to demand futility for the derivative claims, to explain why requesting that

the Board sue Joseph would be pointless.” Paraco Gas Corp. v. Ironshore Indem.,

Inc., No. 22-CV-5557 (CS), 2023 WL 4134661, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2023).

“Demand futility” pleading allows shareholders who bring derivative actions to

explain why they did not demand the Board bring the action instead. See Marx

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v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189, 193–94 (1996) (“[New York] Business Corporation Law

§ 626 (c) provides that in any shareholders’ derivative action, ‘the complaint shall

set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure the initiation of such

action by the board or the reasons for not making such effort.’” (quoting N.Y. Bus.

Corp. Law § 626(c))). The allegations in Count IV that directly invoke the Board

are clearly designed to meet this pleading requirement. See J. App’x at 30

(explaining that Board’s close entanglement with Joseph’s actions made it

“incapable of making a disinterested decision to institute and vigorously

prosecute the Plaintiffs’ derivative claims on behalf of Paraco shareholders” and

thus “a demand upon the Paraco Board to commence Plaintiffs’ derivative claims

is futile”). While a demand futility statement may imply that a board abdicated

its corporate duties, it does not, without more, transform the nature of the

Underlying Action or the claim itself, and therefore does not impact our

consideration.

We conclude that each claim in the Underlying Action arose from an “actual

or alleged contractual liability or obligation of” Paraco, Joseph, or Christina, under

the relevant shareholder agreements. J. App’x at 59. Thus, any legal duty

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Ironshore had under the D&O Policy to defend and/or indemnify Paraco was not

triggered because the entirety of the Underlying Action falls within the Policy’s

exclusion clause.

* * *

Because all of the claims fall within the exclusion, we need not consider

Paraco’s remaining arguments. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

district court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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