Opinion

The Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. Idexx Laboratories, Inc.

Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
Jun 14, 2024
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.8%

“A contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree about its meaning . . . .”

How later courts described this case

  • “A contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree about its meaning . . . .”
  • stating that “‘ambiguous’ and ‘ambiguity’ . . . are often used to denote a simple lack of clarity in language but that is not the sense in which we use them [for determining whether instruments are ambiguous]”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Supreme Court of Texas

══════════

No. 22-0844

══════════

The Board of Regents of the University of Texas System,

Petitioner,

v.

IDEXX Laboratories, Inc.,

Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas

═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued January 10, 2024

CHIEF JUSTICE HECHT delivered the opinion of the Court.

A contract is a written expression of the parties’ intent. When that

intent is in question, the text must be read “as a whole in light of the

circumstances present when the contract was entered.” 1 In this case, the

court of appeals concluded that two royalty provisions in the parties’

licensing agreement, one for 1% and the other for 2.5%, considered

separately and in the abstract, could logically be read to apply to the

1 Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d

587, 589 (Tex. 1996).

same sales of goods. Viewing both interpretations as “equally

reasonable”, the court held the agreement to be ambiguous. 2

But obviously, in negotiating their agreement, the parties must

have intended that the provisions, for very different royalties, would

apply in different and mutually exclusive situations. The differing

interpretations are, as we recently described in another context, “merely

the competing theories that the parties advanced about how to read the

text”. 3 Examining the royalty provisions in context and in light of the

circumstances that produced them, we find no ambiguity. We therefore

reverse and remand to the court of appeals to address the remaining

issues.

I

Lyme disease in humans is caused by the bacterium Borrelia

burgdorferi, which is carried by certain ticks. A skin rash near the tick

bite may indicate infection. Early symptoms include joint and muscle

pain, headaches, fever, and fatigue. The disease isn’t contagious; it’s

spread only through a tick bite. Most cases can be treated successfully

with antibiotics. Without treatment, the disease can worsen and result

in severe pain and impairment. Dogs can contract Lyme disease, but

most cases are routine and asymptomatic, not requiring treatment.

Heartworm is a serious and often fatal disease in pets, mostly

dogs, caused by a parasitic worm, Dirofilaria immitis, carried by

mosquitoes. When an animal is infected, the worm resides in blood

2 683 S.W.3d 108, 110-111 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022).

3 U.S. Polyco, Inc. v. Tex. Cent. Bus. Lines Corp., 681 S.W.3d 383, 385

(Tex. 2023).

2

vessels near the heart and lungs and multiplies, inhibiting breathing

and blood flow. The disease isn’t contagious; it’s spread only through a

mosquito bite.

Regularly administered prescription preventives can protect an

animal from the parasite, but if given after the animal is infected, the

medication can itself result in impairment and death. So it’s important

to determine whether a dog has heartworm disease before giving the dog

a preventive, like a heartworm pill. The parasite’s presence can be

detected with a blood test.

IDEXX Laboratories, Inc. (“Labs”) has long been involved in

developing, manufacturing, and selling veterinary diagnostic tests,

products, and services. Labs invented heartworm tests in the 1980s and

in 1992 offered its first “SNAP” product, a single-use device to test a

dog’s blood quickly and easily for heartworm without laboratory

processing. A small sample of blood is placed in one part of the device

and a chemical solution in another. Then at the press of a button, the

device snaps them together (hence the name). Within eight minutes, the

result shows whether the dog has the antigen for heartworm.

The SNAP product was a success and quickly made Labs an

industry leader in the market for heartworm tests. But its success and

the seriousness of heartworm disease encouraged others to develop

competing tests, prompting Labs to look for ways to distinguish its

SNAP product. At one point, it added a test for a tickborne pathogen, E.

canis, which causes ehrlichiosis, 4 calling the product the SNAP Canine

4 Ehrlichiosis is an infection that affects cells of the immune system in

dogs, cats, and people.

3

Combo. Continuing its diversification efforts, Labs sought to obtain an

exclusive license to use a peptide newly discovered at Tulane University

to test for Lyme disease. In the process, Labs learned that The

University of Texas (“the University”) had applied for a patent on the

same peptide. To assure its exclusive use, Labs also obtained an

exclusive license of the University’s patent.

In determining the royalties it would pay, Labs discussed with

the University the sorts of products it might develop by combining the

Lyme disease test with tests for other tickborne diseases and Labs’

flagship heartworm test. The parties attempted to assess what test

combinations could be most profitably and successfully marketed. After

much discussion and many proposals back and forth, the parties signed

a lengthy patent license agreement in 2000 calling for royalties on three

types of products depending on what tests were included. Boiled down

to its essentials, paragraph 5.1(b) obligated Labs to pay quarterly, on

net sales for products sold

(i) “to detect Lyme disease alone” — 4%;

(ii) “to detect Lyme disease in combination with one other

veterinary diagnostic test . . . (for example, but not limited to, a

canine heartworm diagnostic test . . .)” — 1%; and

(iii) “to detect Lyme disease in combination with one or more

veterinary diagnostic products . . . to detect tick-borne disease(s)”

— 2.5%. 5

5 Paragraph 5.1(b) stated:

In consideration of rights granted by Board [of Regents of The

University of Texas System] to IDEXX under this Agreement,

IDEXX agrees to pay . . . a running royalty as follows:

4

The 1% royalty under (b)(ii) was to be shared equally with Tulane. The

2.5% royalty under (b)(iii) was not. The University’s patent was to expire

in 2017.

Shortly after executing the agreement, Labs introduced its first

SNAP product testing for Lyme disease, adding that test to its SNAP

Canine Combo. SNAP3Dx tested for Lyme disease and E. canis, two

tickborne diseases, as well as mosquito-borne heartworm. Over the

years, Labs marketed two other SNAP products. The first added a test

for another tickborne disease and the second added tests for two more. 6

Thus, these three SNAP products test for Lyme disease with one, two,

or four other tickborne diseases, and all test for mosquito-borne

heartworm. None of the products test for a non-tickborne disease other

i. Four percent (4.0%) of Net Sales for all Licensed Products Sold

to detect Lyme disease alone.

ii. One percent (1.0%) of Net Sales for all Licensed Products Sold

to detect Lyme disease in combination with one other veterinary

diagnostic test or service (for example, but not limited to, a

canine heartworm diagnostic test or service). Such royalty rate

shall be reduced by a percentage rate equal to the percentage

rate paid to a third party, other than sublicensees and Affiliates,

for products or components used by IDEXX exclusively in the

production or Sale of the Licensed Product, However, the total

reduction of the royalty rate shall not exceed one-half percent

(0.5%).

iii. Two and one-half percent (2.5%) of Net Sales for all Licensed

Products Sold as a product or service to detect Lyme disease in

combination with one or more veterinary diagnostic products or

services to detect tick-borne disease(s).

6 SNAP4Dx added a test for tickborne E. equi, which also causes

ehrlichiosis. SNAP4Dx Plus added tests for tickborne E. ewingii, another cause

of ehrlichiosis, and A. platys, which causes anaplasmosis, a disease in the

ehrlichiosis family.

5

than heartworm.

From the beginning, Labs paid, and the University accepted, a

0.5% royalty under (b)(ii) on sales of all three SNAP products. 7

Accompanying each quarterly payment was a report detailing the name

of the product, the included tests, the number of sales, the royalty rate,

and the royalty amount. In 2010, several years into the arrangement,

Labs recognized that (b)(iii) could be read to apply to the SNAP products

and require a much higher royalty because they all contained tests for

Lyme disease and one or more other tickborne diseases. But (b)(iii)

doesn’t mention heartworm—(b)(ii) does—and (b)(ii)’s limitation to

“Lyme disease in combination with one other . . . test” could be read to

mean one or more. Labs never raised the issue with the University.

As the University’s patent was expiring, it commissioned an audit

of Labs’ thirteen years of royalty payments. The audit found that net

sales of SNAP products totaled more than $912 million and that Labs

had paid 0.5% in royalties, some $4.5 million. The audit concluded that

the royalty rate should have been 2.5% under (b)(iii) and that Labs owed

over $18 million. In early 2018, the University sued Labs for unpaid

royalties plus interest.

The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on

the applicable royalty rate, each maintaining that the licensing

agreement was clear and unambiguous. The trial court granted the

University’s motion and denied Labs’. In a series of summary-judgment

7 Labs also sold a product, Lyme Quant C6 to test for Lyme disease

alone and paid the 4% royalty under (b)(i). That product isn’t at issue in this

case.

6

rulings, the trial court rejected Labs’ affirmative defenses 8 and

concluded that the University was entitled to recover the unpaid

royalties claimed plus $27 million in accrued interest at 18%, with

interest continuing to accrue at $9,002 per day.

On appeal, Labs shifted its position on the royalty rate, arguing

for the first time that the licensing agreement is ambiguous. In a brief

opinion, the court of appeals agreed, reasoning as follows. All three

SNAP products tested for heartworm, Lyme disease, and one or more

other tickborne diseases. Thus, neither (b)(ii) nor (b)(iii) fit the SNAP

products perfectly.

Subparagraph (b)(ii) would apply to all three if “Lyme in

combination with one other test” means at least one or one or more, but

not if the phrase means one and only one. Meanwhile, (b)(iii) would

apply if “Lyme in combination with one or more tick-borne disease tests”

doesn’t exclude a heartworm test by not mentioning it—but would not

apply if the phrase means tickborne tests and nothing else (i.e., no

heartworm test). The court of appeals concluded that both

interpretations are reasonable and conflicting, and therefore the royalty

provisions are ambiguous. It reversed and remanded without reaching

Labs’ arguments that the licensing agreement didn’t call for 18%

interest on unpaid royalties and that its affirmative defenses shouldn’t

have been rejected as a matter of law. 9

We granted the University’s petition for review.

8 Labs asserted several defenses, including limitations, estoppel, laches,

waiver, and ratification.

9 683 S.W.3d at 111.

7

II

“When a contract’s meaning is disputed, our primary objective is

to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent as expressed in the

instrument.” 10 This venerable rule has long been part of the law’s

Decalogue. But achieving the objective can seem difficult. “Since the

Tower of Babel, expression is inexact.” 11 After all, “words are simply

implements of communication, and imperfect ones at that. Oftentimes

they cannot be assigned a rigid meaning, inherent in themselves.

Rather, their meaning turns upon use, adaptation, and context as they

are employed to fit various and varying situations.” 12 In recognition of

these truths,

we have long allowed that words must be construed in the

context in which they are used. Context is not, however,

confined to the two-dimensional contractual environs in

which the words exist but may also encompass the

circumstances present when the contract was entered. This

is so because words are the skin of a living thought, and

our quest is to determine, objectively, what an ordinary

person using those words under the circumstances in

which they are used would understand them to mean. 13

Contractual text is not ambiguous in a legal sense merely because

10 URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 543 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. 2018).

11Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 582 (Tex. 2014)

(Hecht, C.J., dissenting); see also Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282

S.W.3d 433, 445-446 (Tex. 2009) (Hecht, J., concurring); cf. GENESIS 11:1-9.

12 URI, 543 S.W.3d at 764 (quoting Cal. Dep’t of Mental Hygiene v. Bank

of Sw. Nat’l Ass’n, 354 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. 1962)).

13 Id. (quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Columbia

Gas Transmission Corp., 940 S.W.2d at 589; Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,

425 (1918)).

8

it is unclear 14 and certainly not because the parties disagree about how

to interpret it. The latter is irrelevant; 15 after all, issues of intent and

proper interpretation arise only when there is disagreement.

Disagreement over the meaning of a contract does not mean that it is

ambiguous, legally. Lack of clarity is commonplace. Not every unclear

text is legally ambiguous. Despite the deficits inherent in the use of

language, “[w]henever possible, courts must assess adverse arguments

and resolve a text’s meaning as a matter of law.” 16

We have often stated that if contractual text “is subject to two or

more reasonable interpretations, it is ambiguous.” 17 That statement

should not suggest that the dichotomy between reasonable and

unreasonable is merely semantic. Chief Justice Calvert first announced

the rule for the Court in 1951:

a contract is ambiguous only when the application of

pertinent rules of interpretation to the face of the

instrument leaves it genuinely uncertain which one of two

or more meanings is the proper meaning. . . . In other

words, if after applying established rules of interpretation

to the contract it remains reasonably susceptible to more

14 Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 243 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.

1951) (stating that “‘ambiguous’ and ‘ambiguity’ . . . are often used to denote a

simple lack of clarity in language but that is not the sense in which we use

them [for determining whether instruments are ambiguous]”).

15 See, e.g., U.S. Polyco, 681 S.W.3d at 385 (stating that “parties’

‘disagreement’ about [contract words’] intent is irrelevant to whether that text

is ambiguous”); URI, 543 S.W.3d at 763 (“A contract is not ambiguous merely

because the parties disagree about its meaning . . . .”).

16 U.S. Polyco, 681 S.W.3d at 389.

17 See, e.g., Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Simien, 674 S.W.3d 234, 257

(Tex. 2023) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. CBI Indus.,

Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995)).

9

than one meaning it is ambiguous, but if only one

reasonable meaning clearly emerges it is not ambiguous. 18

The interpreting court must decide whether the meaning of the text read

in context is genuinely uncertain or whether one reasonable meaning

clearly emerges.

A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Pulsifer v.

United States, 19 illustrates the point well.

The “safety valve” provision of federal sentencing law

exempts certain defendants from mandatory minimum

penalties, thus enabling courts to give them lighter prison

terms. To qualify for safety-valve relief, a defendant must

meet various criteria, one of which addresses his criminal

history. That criterion, in stylized form, requires that a

defendant “does not have A, B, and C”—where A, B, and C

refer to three ways in which past criminality may suggest

future dangerousness and therefore warrant a more severe

sentence. 20

In the abstract, the phrase “does not have A, B, and C” can have virtually

opposite meanings. It could mean that a qualifying defendant doesn’t

have A, doesn’t have B, and doesn’t have C—a checklist. A defendant

with any one of the three doesn’t qualify, making the qualifying criteria

for the safety valve very stringent.

But the phrase could also mean that a defendant qualifies as long

as he doesn’t have the combination of A, B, and C—all three—making

the safety valve more easily available. Both readings are grammatically

correct, and each would readily be understood to be the intended

18 Universal C. I. T., 243 S.W.2d at 157 (emphases added).

19 144 S. Ct. 718 (2024).

20 Id. at 723.

10

meaning in various contexts. The Court gives this example: don’t

(A) drink and (B) drive means don’t do them both together; don’t

(A) eat and (B) drink before surgery means don’t do either one at all. 21

It gives many more.

Words aren’t ambiguous merely because they can be read

differently in the abstract. They must be read in context, another

fundamental rule. As the Court states, the choice between the two

possible meanings “can sensibly be made only . . . by reviewing text in

context.” 22 Analyzing the federal sentencing guidelines, 23 the Court

reasoned that requiring A, B, and C, each, provides a safety valve for

otherwise stricter sentences, while requiring only one or two of the three

would allow more violent criminals to be released sooner and seriously

rupture the sentencing system. Thus, the Court held that the safety

valve was available only for a defendant meeting each of the three

requirements.

Another rule is that words be read together so that none is

rendered meaningless. Our decision in Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v.

21 Id. at 727-728.

22 Id. at 726.

23 As the Court explained, “[i]n general, the severity of Guidelines

sentencing recommendations increases with the number of criminal-history

points the defendant has (often called his criminal-history score). And the

Guidelines assign more points to more serious prior offenses.” Id. at 724. One

qualification for the safety valve is that a defendant not have (A) more than 4

criminal history points, (B) a prior 3-point offense, and (C) a prior 2-point

violent offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1). Pulsifer had been convicted of two 3-

point offenses, so he failed to satisfy (A) and (B). Pulsifer, 144 S. Ct. at 724-

725. But because he hadn’t been convicted of a 2-point offense, he argued that

he qualified for the safety valve since he hadn’t failed to meet (A), (B), and (C),

together. Id.

11

Daniel provides the classic example. 24 A car dealer sold its buyers’ notes

to a credit company. The dealer agreed, however, that it would

repurchase certain vehicles repossessed by the credit company. The

contract provided that the dealer would endorse the notes to be with

recourse on certain types of vehicles but without recourse on others. It

further stated that “in such cases”, the credit company would “make any

necessary correction in [the] endorsement and [the dealer’s repurchase

obligation] shall not apply.” 25 The contract left unclear whether “such

cases” were endorsements with recourse or those without. 26

Read grammatically and standing alone, the phrase could apply

to both types of endorsements. But if so, the dealer’s repurchase

obligation would never apply because all the endorsements were either

with or without recourse. We rejected that interpretation because it

would “render [the repurchase obligation] meaningless and . . . read [it]

out of the contract entirely.” 27

To construe the phrase, we instead examined the parties’ contract

in their business context. The contract could be read to authorize the

credit company to “correct” the dealer’s non-recourse endorsement on a

note to make it with full recourse, thereby unilaterally changing the

dealer’s liability. “Surely the parties had no such intent”, we said,

reflecting our conclusion that in the circumstances, the interpretation

24 243 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1951).

25 Id. at 156.

26 Id. at 158.

27 Id.

12

was unreasonable. 28

And if an endorsement could be changed from non-recourse to

recourse, giving the credit company the right to sue the dealer directly,

the repurchase obligation would provide nothing. There would be no

reason to excuse it. In our view, such an “interpretation [could] hardly

be said to be reasonable.” 29

The only reasonable interpretation of the contract, we concluded,

was that the credit company was authorized to correct an endorsement

intended to be with recourse to show that it actually was with recourse,

thereby assuring a direct remedy against the dealer and excusing the

then-unnecessary repurchase obligation. That left the repurchase

obligation as the credit company’s remedy when an endorsement was

without recourse and excused it when the credit company already had a

direct remedy against the dealer. 30

The teaching of these authorities is that in interpreting a

contract, we ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent expressed in

the text, read without rendering any portion meaningless, and not in the

abstract but in the context in which the words appear and were

written—the realities they were meant to address. A limited

examination may yield reasonable, conflicting interpretations, but only

when one interpretation does not clearly emerge as correct after a full

examination is a contract ambiguous and the determination of its

meaning left to a jury.

28 Id.

29 Id.

30 Id. at 159.

13

III

Applying these principles to this case, we begin where the court

of appeals left off. Royalty provisions (b)(ii) and (b)(iii) of the parties’

licensing agreement can both reasonably be read, separately and in the

abstract, to apply to all three SNAP products. Subparagraph (b)(ii)

applies to a product “to detect Lyme disease in combination with one

other veterinary diagnostic test . . . (for example, but not limited to, a

canine heartworm diagnostic test . . . )”. All three SNAP products test

for Lyme disease and heartworm. Subparagraph (b)(iii) applies to a

product “to detect Lyme disease in combination with one or more

veterinary diagnostic products . . . to detect tick-borne disease(s).” All

three SNAP products test for Lyme disease and one or more other

tickborne diseases.

But the analysis cannot end there. If (b)(ii) and (b)(iii) can both

apply to all three SNAP products, then one or the other is meaningless

surplusage and needn’t have been included in the agreement. That

interpretation is unreasonable because the two provisions call for very

different royalty amounts: 1% (reduced to 0.5% when Tulane is also

entitled to a royalty) and 2.5% (not reduced for Tulane’s royalty). The

parties couldn’t have intended different royalty rates on the same

product sales. So, we must examine the provisions more closely.

Subparagraph (b)(ii) renders (b)(iii) meaningless only if “one”

means one or more or at least one. If “one” means only one, then (b)(ii)

applies only to a product with two tests—for Lyme disease and one

other. The three SNAP products all include more than two tests.

Subparagraph (b)(iii) applies to products with more than two tests.

14

Reading “one” restrictively keeps (b)(ii) from making (b)(iii) surplusage.

Also, (b)(iii)’s “one or more” and paragraph 2.1’s “at least one” indicate

that when the parties didn’t intend “one” to mean only one, they said so

expressly.

Labs argues that the term “other” in (b)(ii) means

“non-tickborne”. This, Labs continues, suggests that the phrase “not

limited to . . . canine heartworm” means that the “one” other test of

(b)(ii) can be tickborne, since heartworm, the given example, is a

mosquito-borne disease. Were that reading adopted, Labs argues, “one

other” wouldn’t foreclose the inclusion of tickborne tests, and (b)(ii)

wouldn’t be limited to two products.

But that reading again allows (b)(ii) to render (b)(iii) superfluous

and is a self-defeating argument. If “one other” indeed refers to tests

that detect non-tickborne diseases, then that’s another reason (b)(ii)

shouldn’t apply, since each SNAP product detects multiple tickborne

diseases. Labs’ insistence that “other” literally means “non-tickborne”

also results in the nonsensical phrase, “one non-tickborne veterinary

diagnostic test or service”. It’s safe to conclude that the parties didn’t

need to specify that Labs’ veterinary diagnostic tests and services

weren’t being delivered or administered by ticks. Finally, like “one

other”, “one non-tickborne” can be read restrictively, so Labs’ argument

does little to move the ball forward.

However, a broad reading of “one other” in (b)(ii) wouldn’t render

(b)(iii) meaningless if (b)(iii) applies only to products with tests for

tickborne diseases—if it’s what Labs calls a tick panel. All three SNAP

products contain tests for heartworm, so (b)(iii), while not surplusage,

15

wouldn’t apply. And (b)(ii) would apply if “one other” doesn’t limit the

inclusion of tests for tickborne diseases, which all the products have.

But a tick panel was not part of the disease-testing market that

led to the licensing agreement. To the contrary, the market forces

prompting Labs to license the testing process for Lyme disease from the

University and Tulane were pushing Labs to add to its successful SNAP

heartworm test and differentiate it from competing tests, not to

substitute for the heartworm test altogether. 31

On the other side, the University’s reading of (b)(ii)’s “one other”

restrictively to mean only one is in some tension with its non-restrictive

reading of (b)(iii) to include heartworm though not mentioned and not a

tickborne disease. But again, Labs’ market reasons for licensing the

Lyme testing process, as discussed thoroughly with the University, were

to supplement the SNAP heartworm tests, not supplant them.

Labs argues that the royalty provisions aren’t comprehensive and

don’t cover products that might have been developed, such as one testing

for Lyme disease, heartworm, and one or more other non-tickborne

diseases. But Labs points to no rule that a contract be comprehensive to

be unambiguous. To the contrary, it would be unreasonable to require

parties, negotiating for particular situations, to provide for others

beyond their scope of interest.

Looking to the industry market for which the SNAP products

were developed, Labs argues that it makes no sense for the University

31 The market forces to which we refer here and below are the

“objectively determinable facts and circumstances that contextualize the

parties’ transaction”, not “extrinsic evidence of [the parties’] subjective intent”.

URI, 543 S.W.3d at 758, 767.

16

to agree to a lower (b)(ii) royalty on a product containing only its Lyme

disease test and Labs’ heartworm test (or potentially a different type of

test) but then insist on a much higher (b)(iii) royalty on a product

containing its Lyme disease test, Labs’ heartworm test, and several

other tests for tickborne diseases. The royalty should be higher, Labs

argues, when the University’s test is just one of two components in a

product rather than when its role is watered down by inclusion among

several others. The University counters that the inclusion of its Lyme

disease test with Labs’ heartworm test differentiated Labs’ SNAP

products from competitors and increased sales but also made possible

further diversification and greater profitability with the inclusion of yet

more tests for tickborne diseases, justifying a higher royalty. Even

though the Lyme test was a smaller component of a product covered by

(b)(iii), the University argues, it was responsible for driving greater

profits.

The context surrounding the parties’ agreement favors the

University’s reading; a restrictive reading of “one other” is closest to the

mark. The most natural reading of “one other” is only one other,

especially when the only alternative, one or more, results in the

problems discussed. As described, the product covered by (b)(ii) has

exactly two components, which test for Lyme disease and heartworm

respectively (although the heartworm component can be swapped out

for a component that tests for a different disease).

And notably, at the time the parties were negotiating, that

product description mirrored the format of an extant Labs product, the

Snap Canine Combo. The Snap Canine Combo tested for a tickborne

17

disease, E. canis, and only one other disease, heartworm. Subparagraph

(b)(ii) would cover a similar product, which tested for Lyme disease and

heartworm (or one other disease), and nothing else. However, it appears

that Labs soon determined that it would be more lucrative to create

products that test for heartworm and multiple tickborne diseases, i.e.,

in a “tick panel format”, as evinced by Labs’ continuing to release

products that tested for an increasing number of tickborne diseases.

Significantly, as Pulsifer reminds us, this reading gives “operative

significance” to all the provisions and ensures that “[e]ach . . . does

independent work”. 32 Subparagraph (b)(i) applies to products that test

for Lyme disease alone; 33 (b)(ii) was intended to apply to a contemplated

product similar to the SNAP Canine Combo, which was ultimately never

produced; and (b)(iii) applies to each of the disputed SNAP products.

Reading the royalty provisions together, not separately, giving

meaning to all, and considering them in the context of the licensing

agreement itself and the objective circumstances in which the license

agreement was produced, we conclude that the provisions are most

reasonably interpreted to require royalties on SNAP products at the

higher (b)(iii) rate.

Labs argues that the University shouldn’t be allowed to accept

royalties at the lower rate for more than 13 years, throughout the life of

the licensing agreement, and then after the agreement ended complain

for the first time that royalties were due at the higher rate. Labs

reported to the University—in detail, every quarter, for each SNAP

32 144 S. Ct. at 731.

33 See supra note 7.

18

product—the sales, royalty rates, and amounts paid. The University

doesn’t claim to have misunderstood or been misled. It claims only that

it was unaware of an issue that Labs purportedly recognized and didn’t

raise. Labs has defenses to the University’s claim that the court of

appeals must address on remand.

* * * * *

Accordingly, the court of appeals’ judgment is reversed, and the

case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.

Nathan L. Hecht

Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 14, 2024

19

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