referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
How later courts described this case
- referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 CARL FOUST, No. 2:21-CV-0540-DMC-P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 CALIFORNIA MEDICAL FACILITY,
15 Defendant.
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17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 14.
19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,
24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain
25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This
26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the
28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it
1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege
2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the
3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is
4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague
5 and conclusory.
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7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
8 This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. It is not clear who
9 Plaintiff is naming as defendants. Plaintiff alleges that:
10 I am under Armstrong/Clark Remedica Act peri court order I am also
(A.D.A.) and DDP1. Delvelope mentally disability program mobility and
11 C.C.C.m.s./Eop. And high risk medical I have been emotionally disturbed
about what took place to me and that’s whats been keeping me in and out
12 of prison especially ata young age-I have been discriminated on because
of being incarcerated and. I cant get the help that. I have been looking for
13 help I “5” years in the boy scouts in the element school kingaten over “57”
years to me. Dear mr. Falconer, I recived 2 court on 8/15/2021 orders for
14 dead line extensions, I for 30 days, (pc) Foust v. California Medical
Facility. 2:21-cv-0540-DMC-P under the other for 14 days. I am sending
15 you goth copies of what took place yesterday. I received a puloity ducat
yesterday. Sanchez refuse to help me, knowing I am an A.D.A DDP. I am
16 suffering from head trama from two CDCR bus wrecks. Co A. Cribbs tried
to help me Sanchez told CO not to help me and told him. I need ta get
17 some one else to help me mr. Foust, and The Tami Falconer Ombudsman,
Office of the Ombudsman 1515 S Street. Sacramento, CA 95811, T:
18 916.324-5448 to call for me I can help mr. Foust, Carl . . . .
19 ECF No. 14, pg. 1 (errors in original).
20 Plaintiff’s other “claims” are similarly incomprehensible. See id. at 9-11.
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22 II. DISCUSSION
23 Plaintiff’s complaint is defective. Perhaps most notably, Plaintiff has not named
24 any individuals alleged to be responsible for a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory
25 rights. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or
26 link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v.
27 Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person
28 ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he
1 does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which
2 he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v.
3 Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the
4 involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of
5 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to
6 each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Leer v.
7 Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
8 Currently, the only defendant named in this action is the California Medical
9 Facility. See ECF No. 1 (original complaint). The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts
10 from hearing suits brought against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other
11 states. See Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991).
12 This prohibition extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See
13 Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d
14 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of
15 prisoners is a state agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438
16 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (en
17 banc). Here, the only currently named defendant – the California Medical Facility – is immune.
18 Plaintiff will be provided an additional opportunity to file an amended complaint
19 which articulates cognizable constitutional claims against named individuals.
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21 III. CONCLUSION
22 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
23 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire
24 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is
25 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See
26 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to
27 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended
28 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if
1 | Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make
2 | Plaintiffs amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be
3 | complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
4 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the
5 | conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See
6 | Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
7 | each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between
8 || each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167
9 | (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
10 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file a second amended complaint within
11 | the time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d
12 | at 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to
13 | comply with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule
14 | 41(b). See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
15 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
16 1. Plaintiff's first amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and
17 2. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date
18 | of service of this order.
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20 | Dated: November 2, 2021
1 DENNIS M. COTA
7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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