(PC) Camposeco v. Stamper

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 SAMUEL CAMPOSECO, Case No. 1:19-cv-01330-AWI-BAM (PC)

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

13 v. DISMISS

14 BOUDREAUX, et al., (ECF No. 31)

15 Defendants.

FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

16

17 I. Introduction

18 Plaintiff Samuel Camposeco (“Plaintiff”) is a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in

19 forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on

20 Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendants Stamper and Jones for violation of the First and Sixth

21 Amendments for reading Plaintiff’s legal mail outside of Plaintiff’s presence and confiscating the

22 legal mail.

23 On April 27, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that this lawsuit is

24 barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his

25 administrative remedies before filing suit and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

26 granted. (ECF No. 31.) Plaintiff filed his opposition on June 4, 2021.1 (ECF No. 34.)

27

1 Plaintiff’s opposition refers to Sheriff Michael Boudreaux as “defendant.” Per the Court’s

28 screening order, Sheriff Michael Boudreaux has been dismissed from the case. Defendants

1 Defendants filed a reply on June 10, 2021, and Plaintiff filed a sur-reply on July 2, 2021. (ECF

2 Nos. 36, 38.) The motion is deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l).

3 II. Legal Standards

4 A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

5 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides for motions to dismiss for

6 “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In

7 considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court

8 must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89

9 (2007), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v.

10 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Meek v. Cty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir.

11 1999). In ruling on the motion, the court “may generally consider only allegations contained in

12 the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice.”

13 Outdoor Media Grp., Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and

14 quotation marks omitted). The court may also consider documents incorporated by reference into

15 the complaint. Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002).

16 In general, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by

17 lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court has an obligation to construe

18 such pleadings liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

19 However, a court’s liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements

20 of the claim that were not pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

21 Cir. 1982). Also, the Court need not credit “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a

22 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

23 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007).

24 B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Standard

25 Pursuant to the PLRA,“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

26 under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or

27

28 Stamper and Jones are the only remaining defendants in this case.

1 other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42

2 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007); McKinney v. Carey, 311

3 F.3d 1198, 1199–1201 (9th Cir. 2002). “The PLRA attempts to eliminate unwarranted federal-

4 court interference with the administration of prisons, and thus seeks to afford corrections officials

5 time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal

6 case.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) (alterations, footnote, and quotation marks

7 omitted). Requiring exhaustion provides prison officials a “fair opportunity to correct their own

8 errors” and creates an administrative record for grievances that eventually become the subject of

9 federal court complaints. Id. at 94, 126; see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002).

10 Exhaustion is required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief

11 offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and the exhaustion

12 requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. Porter, 534 U.S. at 532. Prisoners

13 must adhere to the deadlines and other “critical procedural rules” of the prison’s grievance

14 process, Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90; Jones, 549 U.S. at 218, such that an untimely or otherwise

15 procedurally defective grievance is insufficient. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 83–84.

16 Failure to exhaust may be excused where the administrative remedies have been rendered

17 “unavailable,” and in such a case, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the

18 grievance process was unavailable to him through no fault of his own. Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623

19 F.3d 813, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2010). See also Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1044–45 (9th Cir.

20 2012) (exhaustion excused where futile); Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010)

21 (warden’s mistake rendered prisoner’s administrative remedies “effectively unavailable”); Brown,

22 422 F.3d at 939-40 (plaintiff not required to proceed to third level where appeal granted at second

23 level and no further relief was available). Aside from this single exception, “the PLRA’s text

24 suggests no limits on an inmate’s obligation to exhaust––irrespective of any ‘special

25 circumstances.’ . . . [a]nd that mandatory language means a court may not excuse a failure to

26 exhaust, even to take such circumstances into account.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856

27 (2016).

28 ///

1 The failure to exhaust in compliance with section 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense under

2 which Defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones, 549

3 U.S. at 216; Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendants may raise

4 exhaustion deficiencies as an affirmative defense under § 1997e(a) in either (1) a motion to

5 dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or (2) a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Albino

6 v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“Albino II”). If the Court concludes

7 that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice of the

8 portions of the complaint barred by § 1997e(e). Jones, 549 U.S. at 223–24; Lira v. Herrera, 427

9 F.3d 1164, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2005).

10 III. Brief Overview of the Case

11 Briefly summarized, this action proceeds on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed

12 July 20, 2020, against Defendants Stamper and Jones for violation of the First and Sixth

13 Amendments for reading Plaintiff’s legal mail outside of Plaintiff’s presence and confiscating the

14 legal mail. (ECF No. 21.)

15 In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on August 19, 2019 and October 3,

16 2019, Defendants Stamper and Jones viewed the contents of Plaintiff 128GB flash drive that

17 contained privileged and confidential materials, which was legal mail. Plaintiff alleges that the

18 documents on the flash/jump drive included confidential communications from his appointed

19 advisory counsel as well as investigations. He alleges the flash/jump drive was thoroughly read

20 by Defendants Stamper and Jones outside of Plaintiff’s presence and the flash/jump was

21 confiscated. It contained information he had disclosed to his attorney, such as alibi witnesses,

22 information, and work product, including interviews of alibi witnesses. Plaintiff contends that

23 there were all kinds of confidential information on the flash drive, such as names and addresses,

24 reports of interviews, medical information. Both Defendants Stamper and Jones viewed several

25 folders, files, videos, and other content without Plaintiff’s authorization and consent and without

26 Plaintiff being present. They determined that the flash drive contained contraband and rejected

27 the jump/flash drive. Plaintiff does not specifically allege that the flash/jump drive was labeled

28 legal mail, but liberally construing the allegations, the Court found that Plaintiff alleges a

1 violation of his Sixth Amendment and First Amendment rights when Defendants Stamper and

2 Jones read the entirety of flash/jump drive outside Plaintiff’s presence and confiscated it.

3 IV. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

4 A. Defendants’ Arguments

5 1. Defendants’ Argument Regarding Failure to Exhaust

6 Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies.

7 Plaintiff did not give fair notice in the grievance of all issues in this case. Plaintiff did not allege

8 in either the second amended complaint, or in his grievance, that defendants confiscated or read

9 his legal mail. The “confiscation” claim should be dismissed.

10 Plaintiff’s grievance did not alert staff that he claimed staff improperly read his legal mail.

11 (ECF No. 31-1, p. 5.) A claim that the Defendants “viewed” the contents of the flash drive and

12 then rejected it does not suffice to alert the jail of the new allegations in the SAC that (1) the jump

13 drive contained confidential legal correspondence with his attorney, and that (2) Defendants

14 specifically read such protected legal correspondence in violation of his First and Sixth

15 Amendment rights. His grievance complained of an incident on August 19, 2019, of staff

16 rejecting the jump drive from being dropped off by the legal runner and “intentionally deprived

17 him” of the jump drive on August 19, 2019, provided by his counsel. Defendants assert this is

18 untrue because the criminal court had vacated his appointment of counsel two months prior.

19 Also, Plaintiff did not grieve any later incident on October 3, 2019.

20 2. Defendants’ Arguments Regarding Failure to State a Claim

21 The jump drive is not “legal mail,” because it was not from an attorney and consisted of

22 discovery provided from a prosecutor. “Legal mail” under the First Amendment is narrowly

23 defined. Plaintiff’s jump drive was not marked as legal mail and was an isolated instance not

24 rising to constitutional level. Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1989). The

25 Sixth Amendment protects legal mail. Plaintiff has not alleged the correspondence was properly

26 marked as legal mail and alleges it was not so marked. Plaintiff was pro se at the time and did

27 not have an attorney. Further, the jail has a substantial penological interest in scanning mail. Jail

28 Pro-Per Policy 605 defines handling legal materials and correspondence. Materials entering or

1 leaving the jail are subject to inspection. Only properly marked confidential correspondence

2 between a prisoner and his attorney is afforded the protections of the First and Sixth

3 Amendments. The Defendants viewed the contents of the flash drive in the presence of Plaintiff’s

4 legal runner, located contraband, and rejected the flash drive as a result. The flash drive was

5 returned to Plaintiff’s legal runner. The conduct alleged by Plaintiff is in accord with Policy 605

6 which is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.

7 Defendants also argue they are entitled to qualified immunity.

8 B. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition

9 1. Plaintiff’s Argument Regarding Failure to Exhaust

10 Plaintiff states that although he no longer had his appointed attorney, his former attorney,

11 Erin Brooks of the Public Defender’s Office, still provided him with the legal documentation and

12 the flash drive on August 19, 2019. As to his grievance, Plaintiff notes that the grievance was

13 submitted on 8/21/19, and says that he had not gotten a response by 9/29/19. Plaintiff alerted

14 prison officials that he had previously filed a grievance which was never answered or returned to

15 Plaintiff. Administrative remedies were not available to Plaintiff because he had to inquire about

16 his jump drive and had been repeatedly told that “pro per” issues were not grieveable issues. The

17 person who reviews grievances is the person involved in the underlying wrong. While it is

18 uncertain what Plaintiff is arguing, Plaintiff seems to take issue that his signature is not on

19 “Exhibit B” in the facility commander’s step “C” response. (ECF No. 34, p. 5.)

20 2. Plaintiff’s Argument Regarding Failure to State a Claim

21 Plaintiff had confidential communications on the jump drive, which had been provided to

22 him by his counsel who had been representing him. Plaintiff clarified in the second amended

23 complaint what was contained on the jump drive. At no point did Defendants offer or discuss

24 with Plaintiff, what if any accommodations or assistance they may offer to allow Plaintiff to

25 exercise his self-representation.

26 As to the Pro-Per Policy, Plaintiff was not given such a policy. He was provided a

27 memorandum (attached as Exhibit D to the opposition). The memorandum states that legal

28 material may be searched only in the presence of the inmate. Attorney Erin Brooks provided the

1 jump drive to Plaintiff and labeled it “Samuel Camposeco VCF34799A.” The memorandum

2 states that Plaintiff may have a legal runner/assistant and items being brought to the jail can be

3 inspected. Defendants had knowledge, through their own policies, of constitutional violations.

4 The jump drive was placed in a sealed manila envelope with legal mail written on the surface

5 when the defendants opened and received the envelope. (ECF No. 34, p. 8.)

6 Plaintiff has a constitutional right to access to the courts under the First Amendment.

7 (ECF No. 34, p. 9.) Plaintiff had a trial date in his criminal case and the rejection and deprivation

8 of the jump drive caused him to surrender his speedy trial rights. Plaintiff has the right to self-

9 representation under the Sixth Amendment and the right to prepare a defense. Defendants’

10 actions deprived him of documentation which he needed to build a defense. And Defendants read

11 his legal mail. Even a single instance is a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Nordstrom v. Ryan,

12 762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014). The Sixth Amendment gives prisoners the right to be present when

13 their legal mail is opened. While Plaintiff agrees Defendants had the right to screen the mail, they

14 failed to give notice to Plaintiff and failed to allow him to be present while they screened the

15 jump drive. Plaintiff argues “the legal runner followed all procedures by placing the jump drive

16 in an envelope labeled legal mail, in addition to the printed label on the jump drive itself, which

17 was specifically labelled ‘SAMUAL COMPOSECO VFC 347299A’” (ECF No. 34, p. 12.)

18 Plaintiff argues the jump drive was properly marked because it was accepted then rejected months

19 later. Plaintiff argues that he, his advisory attorney, and investigator have a right of

20 confidentiality.

21 3. Qualified immunity

22 Plaintiff argues that Defendant Stamper is not an “ordinary” officer. She is the sergeant

23 assigned as the pro per liaison. She is experienced in pro per matters. There is a question of fact

24 whether Defendants Stamper and Jones violated Plaintiff’s First and Sixth Amendment rights. It

25 was clearly established that an inmate has the right to be present when his legal mail is screened.

26 Whether the envelope was properly labeled is a question of credibility.

27 ///

28 ///

1 C. Defendants’ Reply Brief

2 Defendants point out that Plaintiff submitted a 55-page opposition. The Court may not

3 look beyond the allegations in the second amended complaint in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6)

4 motion. Any new allegations should not be considered. Plaintiff has been given several

5 opportunities to amend his complaints and perfect his claims, and further leave to amend is not

6 warranted.

7 D. Plaintiff’s Sur-reply

8 1. No Right to File Sur-reply

9 Generally, parties do not have the right to file sur-replies, and motions are deemed

10 submitted when the time to reply has expired. Local Rule 230(l). The Court generally views

11 motions for leave to file sur-replies with disfavor. Hill v. England, No. CVF05869 REC TAG,

12 2005 WL 3031136, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Fedrick v. Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC, 366 F.

13 Supp. 2d 1190, 1197 (N.D. Ga. 2005)). However, district courts have the discretion to either

14 permit or preclude a sur-reply. See U.S. ex rel. Meyer v. Horizon Health Corp., 565 F.3d 1195,

15 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (district court did not abuse discretion in refusing to permit “inequitable

16 surreply”); JG v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 552 F.3d 786, 803 n.14 (9th Cir. 2008) (district court

17 did not abuse discretion in denying leave to file sur-reply where it did not consider new evidence

18 in reply); Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996) (new evidence in reply may not

19 be considered without giving the non-movant an opportunity to respond). In this Circuit, courts

20 are required to afford pro se litigants additional leniency. E.g., Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d

21 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva v. Di

22 Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir.

23 2010).

24 Here, Plaintiff did not seek leave of Court before filing his sur-reply. However, in light of

25 Defendants’ apparent non-opposition and Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court will exercise its

26 discretion to not strike the evidence. The Court will consider proper evidence presented.

27 ///

28 ///

1 2. Plaintiff’s Sur-reply Arguments

2 Plaintiff argues that he is not raising new claims. He is showing the conditions the

3 Plaintiff must live under at the detention facility. Plaintiff argues that he never signed the step C

4 grievance form when Defendants answered the grievance, which means that they withheld his

5 grievance. (ECF No. 38, p. 5.) He had to file a second grievance in 5 days. Plaintiff repeats that

6 Defendants did not attempt to confer with Plaintiff to resolve the jump drive issue.

7 Plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice of his habeas corpus petition filed in

8 February 2021, Case VHC 4049287 which is “intertwined with this instant case.” (ECF No. 38,

9 p. 7, citing to attached Exh. 1.)2 The remainder of the sur-reply involves citations to various legal

10 authorities pertaining to motions to dismiss.

11 V. Discussion

12 A. Request for Judicial Notice

13 Both Plaintiff and Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of various

14 documents. Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of: (1) Plaintiff’s Inmate Grievance

15 form; (2) Tulare County Superior Court Case Number VCF347299 minute order of June 3, 2019

16 denying Plaintiff appointment of advisory counsel; and (3) Tulare County Sheriff’s Pro-Per

17 Inmate Policy 605. (ECF No. 31-2.) As mentioned above, Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of a

18 document from Plaintiff’s habeas corpus petition: Defendants’ informal response to Plaintiff’s

19 petition for habeas corpus. (ECF No. 38. p. 11.)

20 Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs judicial notice. The content of

21 records and reports of administrative bodies are proper subjects for judicial notice under Rule

22 201(d). Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1953). A

23 court may also take judicial notice of the contents of public records. Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

24 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However, “[c]ourts may only take judicial notice of

25 adjudicative facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d

26

2 The Exhibit is the County of Tulare’s “Informal response” to the petition for habeas corpus,

27 pending in the Tulare County Superior Court. As relevant to the instant case, the County argued

that Plaintiff failed to comply with applicable habeas corpus petition requirements; and he failed

28 to exhaust his administrative remedies.

1 903, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). “Facts are indisputable, and thus

2 subject to judicial notice, only if they either ‘generally known’ . . . or capable of accurate and

3 ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned[.]” Id. at 909.

4 The Court will take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s grievance because both parties have

5 submitted the same document for the Court to consider. (See ECF No. 31-3 (Defendants) and

6 ECF No. 34, p. 20 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit B).)3

7 The Court declines to take judicial notice of the Tulare County Superior Court Case

8 Number VCF347299 minute order of June 3, 2019 denying Plaintiff appointment of advisory

9 counsel. The document has not been properly authenticated. Fed. R. Evid. 901, 902. The

10 document is mostly handwritten on a preprinted form, and the Court cannot discern who wrote on

11 the document. The document is not certified as a court document. A court may refuse to take

12 judicial notice of documents if the requesting party has failed to authenticate them. Madeja v.

13 Olympic Packers, LLC, 310 F.3d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 2002).

14 The Court also declines to take judicial notice of Tulare County Sheriff’s Pro-Per Inmate

15 Policy 605. Judicial notice should be reserved for those matters that are virtually indisputable.

16 Plaintiff argues in his opposition that this policy is not the operable policy and attaches a different

17 memorandum which applies to pro per inmates.

18 Turning to Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice, the Court declines to take judicial notice

19 of Defendants’ informal response to Plaintiff’s petition for habeas corpus. The matter to be

20 judicially noticed must be relevant to the issues in the case. Fed. R. Evid. 402. The Court does

21 not find the document relevant to the resolution of the motion to dismiss.

22 To the extent Plaintiff’s request is also for judicial notice of court orders and filings placed

23 on the court’s docket in this case, it is unnecessary and shall be denied.

24 ///

25 ///

26 ///

27

3 Plaintiff also submits an “Exhibit C” which is purportedly a letter Plaintiff wrote to Sheriff

28 Boudreaux. (ECF No. 24, p. 3, and Exhibit C.) However, this document is illegible.

1 B. Plaintiff’s Grievance and the Exhaustion Requirement

2 1. Scope of Plaintiff’s Grievance

3 Defendants do not provide a summary of the County of Tulare’s administrative

4 procedures. However, the parties seem to be in agreement that a procedure for exhaustion exists

5 at the jail and that Plaintiff exhausted through all levels. Indeed, Defendants do not argue that

6 Plaintiff failed to exhaust to the highest administrative level. Rather, Defendants argue that the

7 scope of the grievance was not sufficient to alert jail officials that Plaintiff: (1) had a

8 “confiscation claim,” (2) was challenging “reading” legal mail, or (3) was challenging any

9 incident occurring on October 3, 2019.

10 a. Confiscation claim

11 In rereading Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that the jump

12 drive was “confiscated,” or state any words to that effect. Rather, he alleges “they rejected the

13 jump drive.” (ECF No. 18, p. 5 (“they rejected the jump drive,” “ jump drive was not seized,” the

14 “officers deprived the plaintiff of his flash drive” “the Lexar flash drive was rejected.”).) Thus, as

15 Plaintiff is not making a claim that his property was confiscated, any such claim found by the

16 Court to be cognizable should be dismissed.

17 b. Reading Plaintiff’s Legal Mail

18 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s grievance did not alert the jail of the claims made in his

19 second amended complaint that Defendants read his legal mail in violation of his First and Sixth

20 Amendment rights, because Plaintiff complained only about the authority to “view” the contents

21 of the jump drive.

22 The sole grievance provided by both parties is the grievance dated 8/29/19 with the

23 lieutenant signing off on 9/9/19. Plaintiff’s grievance states:

24

On 8-19-19 Sgt Stamper rejected a jump drive from being dropped off by my

25 legal runner. I am entitled to this as a matter of law and court order. The contents

were of my full discovery DA Ricky Tripp provided to my PD Erin Brooks who

26 provided me with such. I grievanced this on 8-21-19 but have received no

response. Sgt. Stamper had no authority to view the contents of the jump drive

27 without my permission or presence. This is a single complaint regarding the

rejection of the jump drive which I already grieved but got no response. Todays

28

1 date is 8/29/19. Deputy J. Yahnian was given said grievance on 8/21/19. Signed

on 8-20-19.

2

3 (See ECF No. 31-3, Defendants’ “Exhibit Grievance” and ECF No. 35, Plaintiff’s Exhibit B

4 (unedited text).) Again, from what the parties argue, and from what has been submitted to the

5 Court, it appears that there is a grievance process at the jail which consists of steps A, B, and C.

6 Thus, the jail had a grievance process at the time of the events, and Plaintiff knew how to use the

7 grievance process.

8 A prisoner’s grievance must be “sufficient under the circumstances to put the prison on

9 notice of the potential claims and to fulfill the basic purposes of the exhaustion requirement.”

10 Irvin v. Zamora, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1135 (S.D. Cal. 2001) . “[W]hen a prison’s grievance

11 procedures are silent or incomplete as to factual specificity, ‘a grievance suffices if it alerts the

12 prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.’” Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117,

13 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002). This standard

14 “advances the primary purpose of a grievance: to notify the prison of a problem.” Id. (citing

15 Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir 2004). The Griffin standard for exhaustion

16 establishes a “low floor” for specificity. Id. It is enough that the inmate alerts prison officials to

17 the specific nature of his problem and what remedy he seeks.

18 Plaintiff adequately put Defendants on notice of the problem for which he seeks redress.

19 See Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120. Broadly construed, Plaintiff's grievance concerned Sgt. Stamper’s

20 access to and “view” of the contents of the jump drive and that it was done without Plaintiff’s

21 presence or his consent. This allegation is the sum and substance of the allegations in the second

22 amended complaint. While Plaintiff’s grievance did not use the word “read” the contents, and

23 instead used the word “view,” this word choice does not defeat exhaustion. The information in

24 the grievance was sufficient to put the jail on notice of the complaint he had regarding his jump

25 drive. Plaintiff’s grievance was sufficient under the circumstances to put the prison on notice of

26 the potential claims and to fulfill the basic purposes of the exhaustion requirement. As long as

27 the basic purposes of exhaustion are fulfilled, there does not appear to be any reason to require a

28 prisoner plaintiff to present fully developed legal and factual claims at the administrative level.

1 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has under other, but somewhat analogous circumstances, required

2 liberal construction of claims submitted by pro se prisoners and instructed that pro se prisoner

3 plaintiffs should be given any benefit of the doubt. See, e.g., Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d

4 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1988).

5 c. Incident on October 3, 2019

6 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of the

7 jump/flash drive on October 3, 2019 which contained confidential correspondence and documents

8 between his counsel, advisory counsel and private investigators. (ECF No. 18, p. 8.) While the

9 allegations are unclear, Plaintiff appears to be alleging a second rejection of a jump drive on

10 October 3, 2019, separate from the rejected jump drive alleged to have occurred on August 19,

11 2019.

12 Plaintiff has not attached or argued that he submitted a grievance for any incident on

13 October 3, 2019 involving Defendants reading a jump drive. The sole exhausted grievance is

14 dated August 29, 2019 by Plaintiff which was exhausted through Step C.4 (Grievance, ECF No.

15 31-1, p. 1; accord Plaintiff’s Exh. B, ECF No. 34, p. 20.) The earlier submitted grievance on

16 August 29, 2019 does not exhaust a later-occurring incident on October 3, 2019. Since Plaintiff

17 failed to exhaust his administrative remedies through all steps for an incident on October 3, 2019,

18 any First or Sixth Amendment claims based on events occurring on October 3, 2019 should be

19 dismissed.

20 C. Failure to State a Claim

21 In screening the complaint, the Court found a cognizable claim against Defendants under

22 the First and Sixth Amendments for reading Plaintiff’s legal mail outside of Plaintiff’s presence.

23 Prisoners have a Sixth Amendment right to confer privately with counsel and the practice

24 of opening legal mail in the prisoner’s presence is specifically designed to protect that right.

25 Mangiaracina v. Penzone, 849 F.3d 1191, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 2017) (Sixth Amendment requires a

26

27 4 Plaintiff refers to an earlier submitted grievance, on 8/21/19, which was not answered. For

purpose of Defendants’ argument, the earlier submitted grievance on 8/21/19 does not exhaust the

28 later occurring incident on October 3, 2019.

1 pretrial detainee be present when legal mail related to a criminal matter is inspected; even a single

2 incident of improper reading of a pretrial detainee’s mail may give rise to a constitutional

3 violation). Even a single instance of an employee reading a prisoner’s criminal legal mail is

4 sufficient to establish a Sixth Amendment violation. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.

5 2014) (a prison guard actually read the letter, instead of merely scanning and inspecting the letter

6 for contraband.) Prison officials may open and inspect, but not read, a prisoner’s legal mail. Id. at

7 910. In addition to prohibiting prison employees from actually reading prisoner legal mail, the

8 Sixth Amendment gives prisoners “the right to be present when legal mail related to a criminal

9 matter is inspected” to avoid the “chilling” of a prisoner’s protected communications.

10 Mangiaracina v. Penzone, 849 F.3d at 1196. To maintain a Sixth Amendment claim, a prisoner

11 must allege that the mail was marked as “legal mail.” Id. (the district court correctly determined

12 that Mangiaracina failed to allege that the mail was properly marked as legal mail, so these counts

13 were properly dismissed.) Nonetheless, correctional institutions and jails have a legitimate

14 governmental interest in imposing certain restraints on inmate or detainee correspondence to

15 maintain order and security. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overturned on

16 other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989). For example, inmates and

17 detainees may have their mail screened to ensure that there is no contraband inside.

18 Mangiaracina v. Penzone, 849 F.3d at 1195.

19 The Ninth Circuit “recognize[s] that prisoners have a protected First Amendment interest

20 in having properly marked legal mail [including civil mail] opened only in their presence.”

21 Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Nordstrom, 762 F.3d at

22 903). In Hayes v. Idaho Correctional Center, the Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment

23 protects prisoners’ right to have legal mail opened in their presence. But see Stevenson v. Koskey,

24 877 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1989) (an isolated instance or occasional opening of legal mail

25 outside the inmate’s presence does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.)

26 “Mail from the courts, as contrasted to mail from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not legal mail.”

27 Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996). “All correspondence from a court to a

28 litigant is a public document, which prison personnel could if they want inspect in the court’s

1 files.” Id. at 1094 (citing to Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1987)). Mail from a

2 “sheriff’s” department which is a county agency and such mail also does not constitute legal mail.

3 O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 1996) (a prison need not treat all mail sent

4 to/from government agencies and officials as legal mail); see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d at

5 1094 (concluding that mail from the courts, as contrasted to mail from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not

6 legal mail), amended on denial of rehr’g, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).

7 Defendants argue that the envelope was not clearly marked as legal mail and did not

8 contain legal mail. On a motion to dismiss, the Court construes all facts in the light most

9 favorable to the plaintiff, and construes a pro se complaint liberally. Mangiaracina, 849 F.3d at

10 1195. Plaintiff alleges that his former counsel, who was appointed as advisory counsel,

11 “personally delivered this device to Plaintiff in April of 2019.” (ECF No. 18, p. 5.) The Court

12 has already liberally construed the allegations in this regard in screening the complaint.

13 Defendants argue that they viewed the contents of the flash drive in the presence of

14 Plaintiff’s legal runner, located contraband, and rejected the flash drive as a result. The flash

15 drive was returned to Plaintiff’s legal runner. But these facts are not alleged in the second

16 amended complaint. The Court does not consider extraneous facts outside of the applicable

17 amended complaint.

18 Here, Plaintiff alleges that “both Julie Stamper and Cory Jones viewed the contents of” the

19 flash drive which “contained privileged and confidential materials.” The documents on the

20 flash/jump drive included confidential communications from his appointed advisory counsel as

21 well as investigations. “Both Julie Stamper and Cory Jones viewed several folders, files, videos,

22 and other content without my authorization, consent, and without me being present.” (ECF No.

23 18, p. 5.) Plaintiff alleges the flash/jump drive was read by Defendants Stamper and Jones

24 outside of Plaintiff’s presence and rejected the flash/jump. Plaintiff does not specifically allege

25 that the flash/jump drive was labeled legal mail, but liberally construing the allegations, Plaintiff

26 alleges a violation of his Sixth Amendment and First Amendment right when Defendants Stamper

27 and Jones read the entirety of flash/jump drive outside Plaintiff’s presence.

28 ///

1 The Court agrees that the defendants are permitted to scan the content as a legitimate

2 penological purpose. See United States v. Wilson, 447 F.2d 1, 8 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1971) (“prison

3 officials may examine the communications of a prisoner without infringing upon his rights”);

4 Smith v. Boyd, 945 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir.1991) (upholding inspection of incoming mail). But

5 that is not what Plaintiff alleges occurred. Plaintiff alleges Defendants read folders, files, videos

6 and other content. The Court must construe the allegations liberally. Accordingly, the motion to

7 dismiss for failure to state a claim should be denied.

8 D. Qualified Immunity

9 The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability

10 where “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

11 which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)

12 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity gives

13 government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open

14 legal questions.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). When considering an assertion

15 of qualified immunity, the court makes a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff has

16 alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right and (2) whether such right was clearly

17 established at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (quoting

18 Saucier v. Katz, 535 U.S. 94, 201 (2001)). A district court is “permitted to exercise their sound

19 discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be

20 addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. at 236.

21 “For the second step in the qualified immunity analysis—whether the constitutional right

22 was clearly established at the time of the conduct—the critical question is whether the contours of

23 the right were ‘sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what

24 he is doing violates that right.’” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 442 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting

25 al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741) (some internal marks omitted). “The plaintiff bears the burden to show

26 that the contours of the right were clearly established.” Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632

27 F.3d 1091, 1109 (9th Cir. 2011). “[W]hether the law was clearly established must be undertaken

28 in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Estate of Ford,

1 301 F.3d at 1050 (citation and internal marks omitted). In making this determination, courts

2 consider the state of the law at the time of the alleged violation and the information possessed by

3 the official to determine whether a reasonable official in a particular factual situation should have

4 been on notice that his or her conduct was illegal. Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir.

5 2007); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (the “salient question” to the qualified

6 immunity analysis is whether the state of the law at the time gave “fair warning” to the officials

7 that their conduct was unconstitutional). “[W]here there is no case directly on point, ‘existing

8 precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” C.B. v. City

9 of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1026 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 740). An official’s

10 subjective beliefs are irrelevant. Inouye, 504 F.3d at 712.

11 Although a defendant may raise a qualified immunity defense at early stages in the

12 proceeding, courts have recognized that the defense is generally not amenable to dismissal under

13 Rule 12(b)(6), because facts necessary to establish this affirmative defense generally must be

14 shown by matters outside the complaint. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir.

15 1999). Whether Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated in this matter, and whether a

16 reasonable official would have known their conduct was violating a clearly established right,

17 hinges on further factual development in this action. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962,

18 974–75 (9th Cir. 2009) (where extra-record evidence is proffered or required to determine the

19 facts at hand, qualified immunity must be asserted in a summary judgment motion). Thus, the

20 Court cannot recommend dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity at this stage.

21 VI. Conclusion and Recommendation

22 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties’ requests for Judicial Notice are

23 GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as described, infra, in Section V.A.

24 Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF

25 No. 31), be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

26 1. Plaintiff’s claim for violation of the First and Sixth Amendments for an incident on

27 October 3, 2019 be DISMISSED, without prejudice, on the ground that Plaintiff failed to

28 exhaust his administrative remedies;

1 2. As Plaintiff is not making a claim that his jump drive was “confiscated,” any such claim

2 found by the Court to be cognizable should be DISMISSED; and

3 3. In all other respects, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be DENIED.

4 * * *

5 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

6 Judge assigned to the case, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after being

7 served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written objections with the

8 Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

9 Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

10 time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on

11 appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923

12 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

13

IT IS SO ORDERED.

14

15 Dated: October 7, 2021 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28