discussing “under color of state 24 law”
How later courts described this case
- discussing “under color of state 24 law”
- “State officers in their official capacities, like States themselves, are not amenable to 28 1 suit for damages under § 1983.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, Case No. 1:21-cv-00572-NONE-EPG
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANTS’
14 CHRISTIAN PFEIFFER, et al., MOTION TO DISMISS BE GRANTED AND
THAT PLAINTIFF BE GRANTED LEAVE
15 Defendants. TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT
16 (ECF No. 9)
17 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN
FOURTEEN DAYS
18
19 I. BACKGROUND
20 Plaintiff Manuel Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”), proceeding through counsel, filed this action
21 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 5, 2021, alleging claims against Defendants Christian
Pfeiffer, Michael Felder, Harpreet Singh R.N., E. Vito, L.V.N., Lawrence Aflague R.N.R., and
22
Does 1 through 10 for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation of
23
the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 1.)
24
On June 14, 2021, Defendants Pfeiffer, Felder, and Vitto1 filed a motion to dismiss the
25
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff filed an
26
opposition on June 30, 2021. (ECF No. 15.) Defendants Pfeiffer, Felder, and Vitto filed a reply on
27
28 1 Defendants Singh and Alague did not join in the motion.
1 July 9, 2021. (ECF No. 16.)
2 For the following reasons, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be
3 granted and that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend the complaint.
4 II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
The complaint’s relevant factual allegations, which are accepted as true for the purposes
5
of this motion, are as follows:
6
Plaintiff is an incarcerated and convicted prisoner in the custody of the California
7
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff is currently
8
incarcerated at the California Health Care Facility in Stockton, California. (Id.)
9
Defendant Pfeiffer is the Acting Warden at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”). (ECF No.
10
1 at 2.) Defendant Felder is the CEO of KVSP and “in that position had overall charge with the
11
provision of medical care at KVSP.” (Id.) Defendants Singh, Vito, and Aflague are healthcare
12
workers licensed in California to practice nursing or other ancillary healthcare. (Id.)2
13
Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder oversee the provision of healthcare at KVSP and ensure
14
that it provides adequate healthcare to those inmates with serious medical needs. (ECF No. 1 at
15
3.) Defendants are responsible for providing adequate medical care for the inmates at KVSP
16 under State, Federal, and constitutional law. (Id.) Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder knew that
17 incarcerated prisoners were totally dependent on Defendants for medical care and, if Defendants
18 did not act according to law, inmates such as Plaintiff would be unable to receive prompt and
19 appropriate medical care. (Id.) Defendants were also responsible for providing security and
20 custodial supervision to inmates. (Id.) They were responsible for monitoring sick or ill inmates to
21 determine which had serious medical needs requiring response. (Id.)
22 In May of 2019, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at KVSP, Plaintiff suffered a neck injury.
23 (ECF No. 1 at 3.) In June and July of 2019, he complained of neck pain and suffered progressive
pain and disability. (Id.) When Plaintiff requested to be seen by medical staff, he was seen by
24
nursing staff who did not have the training, experience, or knowledge to make a diagnosis,
25
properly evaluate the injury, or recommend diagnostic tests, and they did not make a referral to a
26
medical doctor. (Id.) From the date of his injury to July 9, 2019, Plaintiff was not seen by a
27
28 2 Plaintiff also alleges Does 1 through 10 were employed at KVSP in various positions. (ECF No. 1 at 2.)
1 medical doctor. (Id.) Plaintiff was seen on July 9, 2019 because he had collapsed, was not able to
2 ambulate, and suffered sensory changes. (Id. at 3-4.) Because of Defendants’ delay, Plaintiff
3 “suffered catastrophic consequences of the injury which he had sustained in May, 2019.” (Id. at
4 4.)
On June 6, 2019, Plaintiff requested to see Health Care Medical because his shoulder and
5
neck were injured. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff was not allowed to be seen by a doctor at that time.
6
(Id.) Defendant Doe 1, a nurse, told Plaintiff that there was nothing that could be done because it
7
was a pinched nerve and the only way that Plaintiff would be seen by a doctor was if his pain was
8
getting worse. (Id.) The only care that was provided to Plaintiff consisted of Ibuprofen and a
9
worksheet with exercises for his shoulder. (Id.) This opinion was seconded by David Rohrdanz
10
M.D., who was consulted with by nursing staff from KVSP but did not see or evaluate Plaintiff.
11
(Id.) Even though Dr. Rohrdanz did not see, speak to, or examine Plaintiff, he seconded the
12
opinion of nursing and indicated that the health care staff at KVSP was encouraged to ignore or
13
delay necessary medical diagnosis and treatment. (Id.)
14
By July 1, 2019, Plaintiff’s pain was getting substantially worse but neither nursing,
15
medical, or any other type of health care would provide care and treatment. (ECF No. 1 at 4.)
16 Plaintiff walked in to the Health Care Office but the office would only provide a Health Care
17 Request Form to refill his Ibuprofen. (Id.)
18 On or about July 4, 2019, Plaintiff experienced pain that affected his ability to move and
19 sleep. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff was in so much pain and discomfort that he went “mandown”
20 and custodial staff contacted the Health Care Office at KVSP. (Id.) Plaintiff was seen by
21 Defendant Singh, a nurse. (Id.) Plaintiff advised Defendant Singh of the incident, the progression
22 of pain thereafter, that his pain was a “10/10,” and that the pain had progressed so that Plaintiff’s
23 chest hurt. (Id. at 4-5.) Defendant Singh documented Plaintiff’s complaints and discounted them
because he had a subjective animosity towards Plaintiff and a preconceived opinion that all
24
inmates including Plaintiff were not providing true and accurate accounts of pain and their
25
present physical condition. (Id. at 5.) Defendant Singh’s examination of Plaintiff was cursory and
26
performed with the predetermined opinion that all inmates including Plaintiff were falsifying their
27
complaints to seek pain medication and were “drug seeking.” (Id.) Defendant Singh refused to
28
1 allow Plaintiff to see a doctor and gave him Ibuprofen. (Id.)
2 On July 8, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Aflague. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff
3 advised Defendant Aflague of his history and that he had progressively worsening neck pain,
4 numbness, tingling, and weakness down his right hand and arm. (Id.) Once again, Defendant
Aflague failed to perform an examination or summon a doctor even though Defendant Aflague
5
did not have the knowledge, training, education, or experience to competently evaluate those
6
signs and symptoms. (Id.) Defendant Aflague instead told Plaintiff that he would be seen by a
7
doctor in two or three weeks. (Id.) Even though Plaintiff told Defendant Aflague that the pain was
8
unbearable, Defendant Aflague ignored his symptoms and Plaintiff was sent back to his cell. (Id.)
9
On July 9, 2019, Plaintiff attempted to ambulate to his education classes. (ECF No. 1 at
10
5.) Because he was in severe pain, Plaintiff was sent back to his cell. (Id.) As Plaintiff was
11
walking back to his cell, his legs collapsed. (Id.) Custodial officers who observed Plaintiff
12
summoned medical personnel by alarm and Plaintiff was taken to medical. (Id.) At medical, Does
13
1-3 once again stated that Plaintiff was falsifying his symptoms and attempted to send him back
14
to his cell. (Id.) At this time, Plaintiff had a sensory deficit below his chest at the thoracic T8/9
15
level. (Id. at 5-6.)
16 Plaintiff was finally seen by a doctor on July 9, 2019, over two hours after custodial
17 officers sounded the alarm. (Id. at 6.) This was the first time that Plaintiff was seen by a medical
18 doctor for his injury. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) At that examination, which was performed at
19 approximately 1940 hours, it was determined that Plaintiff had a sensory deficit below T8/9
20 where he could not feel anything, even strong pinches. (Id.) It was also determined at that time
21 that Plaintiff’s reflexes in his lower legs were abnormal and that his toes were in an equinus
22 position. (Id.) The medical doctor made orders to transfer Plaintiff to an outside health care
23 facility to rule out an epidural abscess and for examination, diagnosis, and definitive care. (Id.)
Plaintiff was subsequently diagnosed with an epidural abscess. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) An
24
epidural abscess is an infection that forms in the central nervous system. (Id.) Abscesses that are
25
enclosed in the bony confines of the spinal column can expand to compress the spinal cord and
26
cause severe symptoms, including paralysis or death. (Id.) Prompt diagnoses and treatment of the
27
condition are imperative to avert complications. (Id.) If there is prompt diagnoses and treatment
28
1 by aspiration or drainage of the abscess, a cure can be achieved. (Id.) Time is of the essence and
2 prompt examination by a qualified healthcare provider followed by prompt diagnosis and
3 treatment is required to avert disastrous consequences. (Id.) In Plaintiff’s case, the epidural
4 abscess was a result of Plaintiff’s neck injury in May of 2019. (Id.)
Plaintiff was taken to a healthcare facility outside KVSP where he was admitted,
5
diagnosed with an epidural abscess, and operated upon. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) However, because of
6
Defendants’ delay in diagnosis and treatment, which was avoidable, the epidural abscess caused
7
severe, catastrophic, and disabling damage to Plaintiff’s spine, rendering him quadriplegic and
8
dependent on others for all of his activities of daily living. (Id. at 6-7.)
9
Defendants each acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical condition. (ECF
10
No. 1 at 7.) There was a culture at KVSP, tolerated and ratified by Defendants Pfeiffer and
11
Felder, that all prisoners would be viewed as persons who were seeking pain medications not for
12
therapeutic purposes but for illicit and/or recreational purposes. (Id.) That culture resulted in all
13
prisoners being viewed as liars when complaining of pain. (Id.) If pain medication was dispensed,
14
it was essentially over the counter pain medication, no matter the inmate’s presentation. (Id.) This
15
custom and practice had the net effect of denying medical care to persons with serious medical
16 needs. (Id.)
17 Defendants were each aware that the KVSP medical staff was primarily made up of
18 nursing staff who act as the gatekeepers for inmates to be seen my medical doctors. (ECF No. 1 at
19 7.) The KVSP nursing staff was not qualified by education, training, or state licensing to act in
20 this position. (Id.) This was a deliberate policy to minimize the participation of medical doctors in
21 the care and treatment of inmates to minimize the cost of medical care. (Id.)
22 Plaintiff was not seen by a medical doctor for more than one month after he first sought
23 examination and treatment for his neck injury, and that only occurred on July 9, 2019, because of
his collapse. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) The delay was caused by Defendants’ deliberate indifference to a
24
serious medical need. (Id.) Defendants each had reason to know that Plaintiff had a serious
25
medical need because, as time progressed, his symptoms were getting worse and gave all
26
indication of having nervous system involvement. (Id. at 7-8.) Defendants’ practice was to
27
minimize symptoms and complaints and to provide over the counter medication as a panacea for
28
1 most, if not all, physical complaints. (Id. at 8.) Had Plaintiff been sent immediately for definitive
2 diagnosis when he originally voiced physical complaints and sought treatment, Plaintiff would
3 have more probably than not had a definitive treatment and cure of the epidural abscess. (Id.)
4 However, Defendants’ delay caused by their deliberate indifference and conscious disregard was
a substantial factor in the severity of Plaintiff’s now permanent condition of quadriplegia. (Id.)
5
The deliberate indifference was the result of Defendants’ subjective belief that all inmates,
6
including Plaintiff, were “drug seeking” and falsifying their symptoms, as well as the custom and
7
practice to minimize the costs of inmate medical care. (Id.)
8
Plaintiff brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Eighth Amendment
9
rights. (ECF No. 1 at 8-11.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder created,
10
maintained, and promoted a system of rendition of medical care where the primary healthcare
11
providers would be nursing and other ancillary healthcare staff who did not have the expertise or
12
knowledge to diagnose and treat patients. (Id. at 10.) “There was an administrative mandate set
13
forth by custom and practice” that the KVSP nursing and ancillary staff would be primary
14
healthcare providers and that inmates would be actively prevented from being treated by medical
15
doctors. (Id.) There was also a mindset, which Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder encouraged and
16 tolerated, that these “primary healthcare providers” would deny treatment and care and
17 examination by medical doctors and would consider any inmate requesting treatment for pain or
18 pain medication as being “drug seeking” and providing only over the counter pain medication, no
19 matter the inmate’s presentation. (Id.)
20 Additionally, each of the Defendant health care providers knew that Plaintiff had
21 sustained a neck injury and knew that over the period of time his symptoms were getting worse.
22 (ECF No. 1 at 10.) These defendants knew that Plaintiff’s symptoms were neurologically related
23 and Plaintiff had a serious medical need. (Id.) Regardless, they failed and refused to refer Plaintiff
to a medical doctor for examination, diagnosis, and treatment. (Id.)
24
III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
25
a. Defendants’ Position
26
The motion argues that Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder are immune from suit under the
27
Eleventh Amendment because they are being sued solely in their official capacities. (ECF No. 9-1
28
1 at 4-5.) Additionally, the factual allegations are insufficient to state a claim against them for
2 deliberate indifference. (Id. at 7-8.) Further, other than alleging Defendant Vitto’s occupation, the
3 complaint does not contain any factual allegations against Defendant Vitto. (Id. at 8-9.)
4 b. Plaintiff’s Position
In his opposition, Plaintiff concedes that the complaint names Defendant Pfeiffer and
5
Felder in their official capacities as Acting Warden and CEO of KVSP. (ECF No. 15 at 2.)
6
However, Plaintiff argues that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply because Plaintiff is
7
not only seeking to sue the state based on a state policy. (Id. at 3-6.) Additionally, while there are
8
no specific allegations against Defendant Vitto, the allegations are sufficient to state a claim
9
against him. (Id. at 7.) If the motion to dismiss is granted, Plaintiff requests leave to amend. (Id. at
10
7-8.)
11
IV. GENERAL LEGAL STANDARDS
12
a. Motions to Dismiss
13
In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of material fact in
14
the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex
15
Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). The Court must also construe the alleged facts in the
16 light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on
17 other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813,
18 816 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff’s
19 favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). “While the Court cannot accept
20 new facts alleged in opposition papers, a plaintiff’s briefing may always be used to clarify
21 allegations in a complaint.” Yordy v. Astrue, 2010 WL 653099, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2010)
22 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 230 (2000)).
23 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the
complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The first step in testing the sufficiency of the complaint is
24
to identify any conclusory allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “Threadbare recitals of the
25
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at
26
678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
27
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
28
1 elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and quotation
2 marks omitted).
3 After assuming the veracity of all well-pleaded factual allegations, the second step is for
4 the court to determine whether the complaint pleads “a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A claim is facially plausible
5
when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
6
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
7
556). The standard for plausibility is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it requires “more
8
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
9
b. Section 1983
10
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
11
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
12 custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
13 United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
14 Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
15 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely
16 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490
17 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also
18 Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles,
19 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012);
20 Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
21 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under
22 color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or
federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh
23
v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of state
24
law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he
25
does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which
26
he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Preschooler
27
II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy,
28
1 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an
2 official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should
3 know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183
4 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation “closely resembles the standard
‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d
5
1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir.
6
2008).
7
Additionally, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally
8
participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must
9
be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged
10
to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,
11
691, 695 (1978).
12
c. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
13
“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate
14
must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091,
15
1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires Plaintiff
16 to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition
17 could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and
18 (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (quoting
19 McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992)) (citation and internal quotations
20 marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th
21 Cir. 1997) (en banc).
22 Deliberate indifference is established only where the defendant subjectively “knows of and
23 disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057
(9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate
24
indifference can be established “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a
25
prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d
26
at 1096 (citation omitted). Civil recklessness (failure “to act in the face of an unjustifiably high
27
risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known”) is insufficient to
28
1 establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 & n.5
2 (1994) (citations omitted).
3 A difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical personnel—or between
4 medical professionals—regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment is not enough to
establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989);
5
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, “a complaint that a
6
physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid
7
claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not
8
become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at
9
106. To establish a difference of opinion rising to the level of deliberate indifference, a “plaintiff
10
must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the
11
circumstances.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).
12
V. DISCUSSION
13
a. Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder
14
i. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
15
Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder first argue that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment
16 immunity because they are sued in their official capacities. (ECF Nos. 9-1 at 4-5, 16 at 1-2.)
17 Plaintiff concedes that these defendants are named in their official capacities, but argues that
18 Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply because this case concerns the rendition of
19 medical care at KVSP, and not CDCR’s policies and procedures. (ECF No. 16 at 2-7.)
20 The Eleventh Amendment bars a plaintiff's claims for damages against the state, its
21 agencies or its officials in their official capacities, unless the state waives its immunity. Kentucky
22 v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); see also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S.
23 58, 71 (1989). Section 1983 does not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 344–45 (1979).
24
When state officials are sued in their official-capacities, the suit is treated as against the
25
state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., 131
26
F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir.1997); see also Arizonas for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 n.
27
24 (1997) (“State officers in their official capacities, like States themselves, are not amenable to
28
1 suit for damages under § 1983.”). “1983 claims against government officials in their official
2 capacities are really suits against the governmental employer because the employer must pay any
3 damages awarded.” Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 fn. 8 (9th Cir.2002). In such suits, the real
4 party in interest is the entity for which the official works. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
By contrast, “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government
5
official for actions [taken] under color of state law.” Id. at 165. “[T]he distinction between official
6
capacity suits and personal-capacity suits is more than ‘a mere pleading device.’” Hafer, 502 U.S.
7
at 27 (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 71).
8
Here, as Plaintiff concedes, the complaint names Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder in their
9
official capacities and only seeks monetary relief.3 (ECF No. 1 at 1, 12-13.) The real party in
10
interest is therefore these defendants’ employer, CDCR. Although Plaintiff argues that he is not
11
seeking to sue the state based on state policy, because the compliant names Defendants Pfeiffer
12
and Felder in their official capacities Plaintiff’s claims must be treated as being brought against
13
the state. State officers sued in their official capacities receive the same immunity as the
14
government agency that employs them. Thus, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claims
15
against Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder be dismissed.
16 ii. Supervisory Liability
17 Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder also argue that the factual allegations against them are
18 insufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference. (ECF No. 9-1 at 7-8.) As discussed above,
19 the Court has found that these defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
20 However, because the Court also recommends granting leave to amend as discussed below, it will
21 also address Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder’s argument that the factual allegations fail to
22 establish supervisory liability against them.
23 A plaintiff proceeding under § 1983 must demonstrate that each named defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words,
24
25
3 The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a declaratory or injunctive relief § 1983 claim against an official-
26 capacity state officer for violations of a plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents
of Nev., 616 F.3d 963, 967–68 (9th Cir.2010) (“A narrow exception [to the Eleventh Amendment bar] exists where
27 the relief sought is prospective in nature and is based on an ongoing violation of the plaintiff's federal constitutional
or statutory rights.” (internal quotations omitted)). However, the complaint does not seek declaratory or injunctive
28 relief against Defendants Pfeiffer or Felder.
1 there must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the
2 deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of
3 N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 695 (1978). Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983
4 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a
named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed
5
constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Fayle v. Stapley,
6
607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978).
7
To state a claim for relief under § 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, a
8
plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that the supervisory defendants either
9
personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations
10
and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the
11
policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional
12
violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations and internal quotation
13
marks omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). For instance, a supervisor
14
may be liable for his “own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of
15
his subordinates,” “his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is
16 made,” or “conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Larez v.
17 City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations, quotation marks, and
18 alterations omitted).
19 Plaintiff does not allege that these defendants were personally involved in the alleged
20 deliberate indifference. Therefore, he must allege either that these Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder
21 knew of the constitutional violations and failed to act to prevent them, or that they promulgated or
22 implemented a constitutionally deficient policy. Plaintiff contends that the complaint adequately
23 alleges that Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder were aware of and participated in 1) a culture of
denying inmates care by considering pain complaints to be a sham and only for the purpose of
24
obtaining medications for illicit or recreational purposes; and 2) a medical structure where nurses
25
acted as gatekeepers for inmates to be seen by medical doctors in order to reduce costs. (ECF No.
26
15 at 6.)
27
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1 Again, Plaintiff alleges that “There was an administrative mandate set forth by custom and
2 practice” that the KVSP nursing and ancillary staff would be primary healthcare providers and
3 that inmates would be actively prevented from being treated by medical doctors. (Id.) There was
4 also a mindset, which Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder encouraged and tolerated, that these
“primary healthcare providers” would deny treatment and care and examination by medical
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doctors and would consider any inmate requesting treatment for pain or pain medication as being
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“drug seeking” and providing only over the counter pain medication, no matter the inmate’s
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presentation. (Id.)
8
The complaint’s allegations regarding Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder’s involvement in the
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alleged constitutional violations are conclusory and are not supported by sufficient factual detail.
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Plaintiff does not allege any facts supporting that there is such a policy, such as a document
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stating a policy or a statement by a medical professional referring to such a policy, informal or
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otherwise. Plaintiff does not allege anything Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder did or said that leads
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to this conclusion. Plaintiff does not allege how Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder were responsible
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for or otherwise involved in the policies or practices at issue. Plaintiff also does not allege that
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any of the other defendants chose not to provide treatment due to these policies or practices.
16 Without such facts, alleging that there was a general “mindset” that was “tolerated” is not
17 sufficient to state a constitutional claim against these defendants. To state a claim, a complaint
18 must contain sufficient factual detail for the Court to draw the reasonable conclusion that the
19 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; See also Krainskin v. Nev.
20 Ex rel. Bd. Of Regents of Nev. Sys. Of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 2010)
21 (dismissing complaint because plaintiff “merely alleged in a conclusory fashion that the officers
22 ‘knew or should have known’” of the violation); Sullivan v. Biter, 2017 WL 1540256, at *1 (E.D.
23 Cal. Apr. 28, 2017) (“Conclusory allegations that various prison officials knew or should have
known about constitutional violations occurring against plaintiff simply because of their general
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supervisory role are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
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Thus, the Court finds that the complaint fails to state a claim against Defendants Pfeiffer
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and Felder for deliberate indifference on the basis of supervisory liability.
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///
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1 iii. Leave to Amend
2 Plaintiff requests leave to amend the complaint. (ECF No. 15 at 8.) Defendants’ briefing
3 does not address whether leave to amend should be granted. (See ECF Nos. 9, 16.)
4 Under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “the court should freely give leave
[to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). As discussed above, the Court
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finds that Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
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Plaintiff’s opposition indicates that Plaintiff intends to impose liability against Defendants
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Pfeiffer and Felder in their personal capacity. (ECF No. 15 at 4.)The Court will recommend that
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Plaintiff be granted leave to amend the complaint to allege that the claims against Defendants
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Pfeiffer and Felder seek to impose personal liability for actions taken under color of state law.
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Additionally, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend to the
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extent he can allege additional facts showing a causal link between Defendants Pfeiffer and
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Felder and the alleged deliberate indifference. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he
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should describe what each defendant did that violated his constitutional rights. If liability as to
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Defendants Pfeiffer and Felder is based on the implementation of a policy, Plaintiff should
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describe what these defendants did to promulgate or implement the policy and should identify
16 facts that lead Plaintiff to believe there is a policy that caused the constitutional violation.
17 b. Defendant Vitto
18 Defendant Vitto argues that the claim against him should be dismissed because Plaintiff
19 does not allege what, if anything, he did or did not do to cause him harm. (ECF No. 9-1 at 8.)
20 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Vitto is a Licensed Vocational Nurse and is a healthcare worker
21 duly licensed in the state of California to practice nursing or other ancillary healthcare but
22 Defendant Vitto otherwise is not mentioned in the complaint. (Id.) Plaintiff, in turn, argues that
23 the allegations against Defendant Vitto because Defendants Singh and Aflague have filed an
answer admitting that Plaintiff was seen by nursing staff, which would include Defendant Vitto.
24
(ECF No. 15 at 7.)
25
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain “a short
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and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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8(a)(2). Although a complaint is not required to include detailed factual allegations, it must set
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1 forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
2 face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). It must also contain “sufficient
3 allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
4 effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Moreover, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his
5
rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77.
6
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to connect Plaintiff’s factual allegations to the claim he is
7
attempting to bring against Defendant Vitto. Other than alleging Defendant Vitto’s occupation,
8
the complaint does not mention this defendant. Plaintiff does not allege how Defendant Vitto
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violated his constitutional rights. General references to “Defendants” or “nursing staff” do not
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give fair notice to Defendant Vitto to enable him to defend himself effectively. Therefore, the
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complaint violates Rule 8 and the Court recommends that the claim against Defendant Vitto be
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dismissed.
13
Plaintiff requests leave to amend. (ECF No. 15 at 7.) His opposition describes two
14
occasions when Defendant Vitto saw Plaintiff but did not refer him to a doctor and only refilled
15
his Ibuprofen. (Id.) Defendants again do not address Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend. (See
16 ECF Nos. 9, 16.) As discussed above, leave to amend should be freely granted. Thus, the Court
17 will recommend that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his claim against Defendant Vitto. As
18 mentioned above, if Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he should allege what each
19 defendant did to violate his constitutional rights.
20 VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
21 Accordingly, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
22 1. Defendants Pfeiffer, Felder, and Vitto’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 9) be granted;
23 2. Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his claims against Defendants Pfeiffer, Felder, and
Vitto;
24
3. Plaintiff be directed to file his First Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of
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service of an order adopting these findings and recommendations; and
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4. Defendant be directed to respond to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint within
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fourteen (14) days of service.
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1 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States district judge
2 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen
3 | (4) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
4 | objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's
5 | Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within
6 fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file
7 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v.
8 Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394
9 (9th Cir. 1991)).
10 | Tr IS SO ORDERED.
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15 | Dated: _August 31, 2021 [sf ey —
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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