The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 CLAYTON GUNN, JR., No. 2:19-CV-1729-KJM-DMC
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14 COUNTY OF BUTTE, et al.,
15 Defendants.
16
17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the
18 Court is the motion to dismiss, ECF No. 30, filed by Defendants County of Butte, Butte County
19 Sheriff’s Department, Butte County District Attorney’s Office, Kory Honea, Vaj Thao, Michael
20 Ramsey, and Michael F. Tufaro (County Defendants).1 The parties appeared before the
21 undersigned for a hearing on June 16, 2021, in Redding, California. Plaintiff appeared pro se.
22 Matthew Gross, Esq., appeared for the County Defendants.
23 / / /
24 / / /
25 / / /
26 / / /
27 / / /
28 1 Defendant Butte County Superior Court has not been served.
1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2 Plaintiff initiated this action with a complaint filed on September 3, 2019. See
3 ECF No. 1. On January 31, 2020, the Court approved the parties’ stipulation to allow the filing of
4 a first amended complaint. See ECF No. 14. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint was thereafter
5 filed on March 13, 2020. See ECF No. 16. On April 7, 2020, the County Defendants moved to
6 dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. See ECF No. 20. On February 26, 2021, the Court
7 issued findings and recommendations that the first amended complaint be dismissed with leave to
8 amend. See ECF No. 27.
9 In adopting the findings and recommendations in substantial part on March 31,
10 2021, the District Judge made the following orders:
11 1. Defendant Butte County Superior Court is immune from suit under
the Eleventh Amendment and all claims against Defendant Butte
12 County Superior Court are dismissed without leave to amend. See ECF
No. 28, pg. 2.
13
2. The first amended complaint may be plausibly construed as asserting
14 some claims to which the remaining defendants would not be immune
under the Eleventh Amendment or the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial
15 immunity. See id.
16 3. Defendants Ramsey, Tufaro, Honea, and Thao are entitled to qualified
immunity as to the federal claims alleged in the first amended complaint
17 because those claims do not establish a violation of any constitutional
right. See id.
18
4. Plaintiff’s first claim, for malicious prosecution in violation of 42 U.S.C.
19 § 1983, is dismissed with leave to amend because the first amended
complaint does not include factual allegations to allow the Court to
20 infer that Plaintiff was prosecuted without probable cause and that
all relevant prior proceedings terminated in a manner to indicate
21 Plaintiff’s innocence. See id.
22 5. Plaintiff’s second claim is dismissed without leave to amend as
duplicative of the first claim. See id. at 3.
23
6. Plaintiff’s third and fourth claims, for false arrest and false detention
24 in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are dismissed with leave to amend
because the First amended complaint does not include factual allegations
25 that allow the Court to infer Plaintiff was detained without probable
cause. See id.
26
7. Plaintiff’s fifth and sixth claims, for cruel and unusual punishment in
27 violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are dismissed with leave to amend
because the first amended complaint does not contain factual allegations
28 that allow the Court to infer deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious
1 medical needs and Plaintiff does not allege that he had been convicted
at the time of the allegedly unconstitutional medical treatment. See id.
2
8. Plaintiff’s sixth and eighth claims, for intentional infliction of emotional
3 distress, defamation, and false light, are dismissed with leave to amend
as they are derivative of Plaintiff’s federal claims. See id.
4
9. Plaintiff’s seventh and ninth claims, for deprivation of due process rights
5 and “campaign of harassment for violation of civil rights,” both
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are dismissed with leave to amend
6 because the first amended complaint does not contain a short and
plain statement of the basis for liability, as required by Federal Rule
7 of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). See id.
8 Plaintiff was directed to file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date of the
9 District Judge’s order. See id.
10
11 II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
12 This action now proceeds on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, see ECF No.
13 29, timely filed pursuant to the District Judge’s March 31, 2021, order. As with the first amended
14 complaint, Plaintiff outlines various “background/history” facts. See id. at 13-18. These facts are
15 largely the same as those alleged in the first amended complaint.
16 According to Plaintiff, since the mid-1980s, Defendant Ramsey’s father, Chet
17 Ramsey, became close friends with Leah Martin Gunn, who was Plaintiff’s grandmother. See id.
18 at 13. Plaintiff states that Chet would often bring Leah large bottles of alcohol. See id. Plaintiff
19 contends that, “at some point,” he and his father, Clayton Gunn, Sr., learned that Chet was
20 bringing Leah large bottles of hard alcohol and getting her intoxicated. See id. Plaintiff states
21 that, as a result, “several companies have various ground leased [sic] to harvest the aggregates.”
22 Id. Plaintiff characterizes these allegedly fraudulent documents as “double leases” on gravel
23 areas of the family ranch, known as the “Lucky 7 Ranch.” Id. Plaintiff states: “Ultimately the
24 Gunn family found themselves in a situation where they would be forced to settle the double
25 leases resulting in sever [sic] losses over gravel royalties owed to the Lucky 7 Ranch.” Id.
26 / / /
27 / / /
28 / / /
1 Plaintiff adds:
2 Upon learning of Chet Ramsey’s activities, he was ‘kicked off’ the ranch
by Clayton Gunn Sr. and Plaintiff. This resulted in Chet Ramsey being
3 disgruntled to the point of resentment and retribution primarily towards
Plaintiff Clayton Gunn Jr. Part of this retribution was to notify his son
4 Defendant Michal Ramsey of what had occurred. Consequently,
Defendant Michal Ramsey has taken measures described herein as part of
5 his father’s retribution campaign.
6 Id. at 13-14.
7 Plaintiff states that a criminal complaint was filed against him on August 27, 1996,
8 by the Butte County District Attorney, Defendant Michal Ramsey, for theft by false pretenses. Id.
9 at 14. In support of this allegation, Plaintiff cites Exhibit E to the second amended complaint.
10 See id. According to Plaintiff, he pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and agreed to pay $3,600 in
11 restitution within 120 days with the understanding that, if he failed to do so, the matter would be
12 re-charged as a felony. See id. Plaintiff states that he was unable to pay the full restitution
13 amount within the 120-day period and, as a result, he was charged with and later convicted of a
14 felony violation. See id. Plaintiff contends that he did not commit the alleged crime and that the
15 charges were unfounded and should not have been brought. See id. at 6. Plaintiff then outlines a
16 number of alleged facts he asserts show his innocence. See id. 14-15.
17 Next, Plaintiff claims:
18 Clayton Gunn Jr. can also show that he stupidly/ignorantly hired one of
the worst attorneys in Butte County’s history to represent him. Grady
19 Davis otherwise commonly referred to as “Shady Grady,” or the “Butte
Count Sell Out King,” dragged Clayton Gunn Jr. to over an approximate
20 30-month period with approximately 30 plus court appearances.
EXHIBIT D
21
In the end, when the Judge was completely frustrated over having so many
22 court appearances was “not in the mood’ for yet another delay by Mr.
Davis, Mr. Davis pleaded with Clayton Gunn Jr. to take the plea deal
23 “wobbler” as explained above because Mr. Davis in his own words
24 ‘Had not prepared for trial.’
25 Yet all Mr. Davis had to do was file a motion to dismiss due to lack of
evidence by showing the Court that Clayton Gunn Jr. simply made a
26 mistake and corrected it, illustrated by the actual document that Clayton
Gunn Jr. delivered to the alleged victim Robyn Hoffman to show there
27 was absolutely no intent to commit fraud through false pretenses. But Mr.
Grady is infamous for selling out his clients by his intentional incompetent
28 and intentional neglectful acts in an ongoing effort to demonstrate his
1 ineffective counsel – in order to serve Defendant, Butte County District
Attorney Michael Ramsey.
2
Id. at 15.
3
4 Plaintiff states that, ultimately, the felony charge was reduced to a misdemeanor. See id. at 16.
5 In support of this contention, Plaintiff cites Exhibit B. See id. Plaintiff adds:
6 It is important to note to the Court that the Butte County Sheriff’s
Department issued “Officer’s Bulletin” upon Plaintiff which was essentially
7 a “Death Warrant,” while Plaintiff was serving time. (EXHIBIT E)
8 Id.
9 According to Plaintiff, in 1997 Defendant Ramsey “continued his campaign of
10 harassment” by directing Code Enforcement Officers to make unannounced visits to Plaintiff’s
11 residence over a two-year period. Id. Plaintiff states that this occurred “[w]hile the Butte County
12 Planning Commission and the Butte County Board of Supervisors wrongfully delayed Plaintiff
13 use permit for a wedding facility use along with a concert venue.” Id. Plaintiff claims:
14 Finally, Plaintiff was so exhausted and distraught over the harassment
along with the Board of Supervisor’s ridiculous 38 conditions of operation
15 he sued the County for continued harassment. Listing the Code
Enforcement Officers, along with Defendant Michael Ramsey out of the 8
16 Defendants. (EXHIBIT K). Attorneys for Plaintiff Clayton Gunn Jr.
were Robert Noel and Marjorie Knowler from San Francisco. The case
17 was dropped due to the fact Plaintiff attorneys were in jail because of the
dog mauling that occurred at their residence.
18
Id. at 17.
19
20 Plaintiff states that, he “ultimately accomplished a County wide initiative to eliminate the over
21 burdensome and restrictive use permit.” Id. In support of this contention, Plaintiff cites Exhibits
22 L and Z. See id.
23 Next, Plaintiff claims that he was “falsely and maliciously” arrested in 2006 on
24 four felony counts of child endangerment, cultivation of marijuana, marijuana for sale, and felon
25 in possession of ammunition. See id. According to Plaintiff:
26 Plaintiff lived at a separate residence on ranch property and was
confronted with over 20 laser dots on his chest from the Butte County
27 Interagency Task Force. Plaintiff did not resist or he would have been
shot. Plaintiff was arrested and charged even though he had nothing to
28 due [sic] with children, marijuana, or being a Felon in possession of a
1 firearm. Defendant Michael Ramsey proved he had personal knowledge
of the false charges specifically to ammunition charges shown by his
2 personal statements to the press regarding Plaintiff in referring to the
specific charges and why he dismissed them. (EXHIBIT J)
3
Id.
4
5 Plaintiff alleges that, in 2016 and 2017, the Butte County Sheriff’s Department
6 kept harassing him by making unannounced visits to his residence in a “bogus” investigation over
7 adult abuse concerning his mother, Marilyn Gunn. See id. Plaintiff contends that deputies
8 arrived several times to “falsely charge” him but never arrested him because his mother was in
9 the hospital. See id. at 17-18. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that, in 2019, he was wrongfully arrested
10 and charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. See id. at 18. In
11 support of this last allegation, Plaintiff cites Exhibit I, which was not attached to the first
12 amended complaint and is not attached to the second amended complaint. See id.
13 In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff outlines the following eight legal
14 theories:
15 First Claim Administrative Malicious Prosecution and
Judicial Malicious Prosecution2
16
Second Claim False Arrest3
17
Third Claim False Imprisonment4
18
Fourth Claim Cruel and Unusual Punishment5
19
Fifth Claim Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress6
20
Sixth Claim Violation of Due Process7
21
2 Plaintiff’s current first claim for Judicial Malicious Prosecution was styled in the
22 first amended complaint as Plaintiff’s separate second claim for relief, which the District Judge
dismissed with prejudice as duplicative of Plaintiff’s claim of administrative malicious
23 prosecution.
3 This claim was styled as Plaintiff’s third claim for relief in the first amended
24 complaint.
4 This claim was styled as Plaintiff’s fourth claim for relief in the first amended
25 complaint.
5 This claim was styled as Plaintiff’s fifth claim for relief in the first amended
26 complaint.
6 This claim was styled as Plaintiff’s sixth claim for relief in the first amended
27 complaint.
7 This claim was styled as Plaintiff’s seventh claim for relief in the first amended
28 complaint.
1 Seventh Claim Defamation and False Light8
2 Eighth Claim Campaign of Harassment of Violation of Civil
Rights9
3
See id. at 18-43.
4
5 Attached to the second amended complaint and referenced throughout are the
6 following exhibits, almost all of which were also attached to and referenced in the first amended
7 complaint:10
8 Exhibit A A felony criminal complaint filed in the Butte County Superior
Court on February 22, 2019, in case no. 19CE01039.
9
Exhibit B Court minutes for an October 10, 2000, proceeding in case no.
10 SCM008054.
11 Exhibit C A January 21, 1998, “Plea of Guilty/No Contest – Felony”
form in case no. CM8054.
12
Exhibit D A “Criminal Case Summary” for case no. SCM008054.
13
Exhibit E An April 8, 1999, Butte County Sheriff’s Office “Briefing
14 Bulletin” issued for Clayton E. Gunn, Jr.
15 A felony criminal complaint filed in the Butte County
Municipal Court on August 27, 1996, against Clay Edward
16 Gunn, Jr., in case no. CM008054.
17 Exhibit F A copy of the text of California Penal Code § 13125.
18 Exhibit G A copy of the text of California Penal Code §§ 11115-11117.
19 Exhibit H A copy of the text of California Penal Code § 13151.
20 A felony criminal complaint filed in the Butte County Superior
Court on October 20, 2006, against Cathy Dawn Garcia, Clay
21 Edward Gunn, Marilyn Lila Gunn, and William Richard Tovar,
in case no. CM025884.
22
Exhibit J A newspaper article entitled “Gunn cleared on marijuana
23 charges.”
24 Exhibit K A newspaper article entitled “Local promoter files suit against
county.”
25
8 This claim was styled as Plaintiff’s eighth claim for relief in the first amended
26 complaint.
9 This claim was styled as Plaintiff’s ninth claim for relief in the first amended
27 complaint.
10 No exhibits are denoted as “Exhibit I,” “Exhibit O,” “Exhibit P,” “Exhibit Q,”
28 “Exhibit R,” “Exhibit S,” “Exhibit T,” “Exhibit U,” “Exhibit V,” “Exhibit W,” or “Exhibit X.”
1 Exhibit L A newspaper article regarding the “Field of Dreams” initiative.
2 Exhibit M A September 18, 2019, letter from the Law Enforcement Unit
of the California Bureau of Firearms.
3
Exhibit N A December 19, 2019, receipt from Madison Home Pharmacy.
4
Exhibit Y A Butte County Sheriff’s Office felony report dated February 19,
5 2019, related to “Case 19-01253.”.
6 Exhibit Z A list of concert venues.
7 See id. at 46-90.
8
9 III. STANDARDS FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
10 In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of
11 material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The
12 Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer
13 v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S.
14 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All
15 ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen,
16 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual
17 factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).
18 In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers.
19 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement
21 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair
22 notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly,
23 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order
24 to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
25 more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual
26 allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56. The
27 complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at
28 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
1 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
2 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but
3 it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting
4 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
5 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement
6 to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
7 In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court generally may not consider materials
8 outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998);
9 Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court may, however, consider: (1)
10 documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no
11 party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question,
12 and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see
13 Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials
14 of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir.
15 1994).
16 Finally, leave to amend must be granted “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no
17 amendment can cure the defects.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per
18 curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
19
20 IV. DISCUSSION
21 In their motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, Defendants argue
22 each of the eight claims raised fail.
23 A. First Claim – Malicious Prosecution
24 In his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ramsey was the Butte County
25 District Attorney at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest on February 19, 2019. See ECF No. 29, pg. 19.
26 According to Plaintiff, Defendant Ramsey’s failure to “exercise proper training and discipline
27 under his administrative duty” allowed Defendant Tufaro, a Deputy District Attorney at the time,
28 to act outside the scope of his duty and initiate Plaintiff’s prosecution. Id. Plaintiff claims
1 Defendant Tufaro intentionally suppressed exculpatory evidence. See id. More specifically,
2 Plaintiff alleges that it was a matter of public record at the time that Plaintiff was not a convicted
3 felon. See id. Plaintiff cites Exhibits F, G, and H in support of these allegations. See id.
4 Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Butte County Superior Court – which has
5 been dismissed with prejudice as immune – is “responsible and should be held accountable for
6 administrative failure to follow the law. . . .” Id. at 20. Plaintiff cites Exhibit M in support of this
7 allegation.
8 Next, Plaintiff claims Defendant Butte County is liable for failing to train,
9 supervise, and discipline the Butte County Superior Court. See id.
10 Plaintiff also contends in his first claim that Defendant Butte County Sheriff’s
11 Department and Defendant Honea, who was the Butte County Sheriff at the time, are “culpable as
12 administrators to allow such appalling conduct by Deputy Thao,” who prepared the police report
13 relating to Plaintiff’s arrest in February 2019. Id. at 20-21.
14 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Thao and Tufaro are liable as co-
15 conspirators in bringing wrongful charges. See id. at 21-22.
16 In addressing this claim in the context of Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first
17 amended complaint, the Court stated:
18 A claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires the
plaintiff to allege: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal prosecution of the
19 plaintiff with a malicious motivation to deny the plaintiff of equal protection
or another constitutional right; (2) the prosecution lacked probable cause; and
20 (3) the prosecution was terminated in such a manner as to indicate the
plaintiff’s innocence. See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066
21 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189
(9th Cir. 1995). The presence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a
22 claim of malicious prosecution. See Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285 (9th Cir.
1994). As the Supreme Court noted in Heck v. Humphrey, the lack of
23 probable cause is an essential element of a malicious prosecution claims.
See 512 U.S. 477, 484 n.4.
24 Any liability for malicious prosecution necessarily relies on
the conduct of the individual defendants – the Butte County Sheriff
25 (Defendant Honea), the arresting Deputy Sheriff (Defendant Thao), the Butte
County District Attorney (Defendant Ramsey), and the Deputy District
26 Attorney (Defendant Tufaro) – who are alleged to have been responsible for
Plaintiff’s prosecution. . . .
27
* * *
28
1 The gravamen of Plaintiff’s claim is that his arrest was based
on information that was untrue. Inferring from this that any arrest warrant
2 was issued without probable cause, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show
that any of the individual defendants did so with the intent to deprive
3 Plaintiff of equal protection or any other constitutional right, an essential
element of a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983. Rather, Plaintiff
4 very specifically alleges the individual defendants acted in order to please
Defendant Ramsey. Plaintiff has not explained how pleasing Defendant
5 Ramsey amounts to an abrogation of rights guaranteed under the
Constitution. Moreover, while Plaintiff alleges that he had been cleared on
6 the charges that led to the malicious prosecution arising from the February
2019 arrest, Plaintiff has not alleged that such prosecution concluded in a
7 way to indicate Plaintiff’s innocence, also an essential element.
8 ECF No. 27, pgs. 9-11.
9 The District Judge dismissed Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim with leave to amend for the
10 reasons outlined above. See ECF No. 28, pg. 2.
11 In the instant motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, Defendants
12 note that Plaintiff’s current allegations are the same as those set forth in the first amended
13 complaint, which the Court dismissed with leave to amend on the possibility Plaintiff could plead
14 additional facts to state a claim. See ECF No. 30-1, pg. 13. Plaintiff has failed to do so in his
15 second amended complaint. In particular, Plaintiff continues to fail to plead any facts showing
16 that the February 19, 2019, arrest was accomplished in the absence of probable cause or that the
17 resulting criminal proceeding concluded in such a way as to show Plaintiff’s innocence. These
18 defects are fatal to Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim as against all defendants.
19 Because Plaintiff was provided an opportunity to amend to plead additional facts
20 to state a claim for malicious prosecution, and because Plaintiff has failed to do so in the second
21 amended complaint, it does not appear that Plaintiff can plead sufficient facts. Plaintiff’s
22 malicious prosecution claim should be dismissed in its entirety without further leave to amend.
23 B. Second and Claim – False Arrest
24 In his second claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Thao is liable for false arrest
25 because he “did not have an ‘honest and reasonable belief in the charges’” leading to the February
26 19, 2019, arrest. ECF No. 29, pgs. 24-25. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Thao failed to make
27 a reasonable inquiry and wrongfully arrested Plaintiff. See id. at 25. Specifically, Plaintiff again
28 states that at the time of his February 2019 arrest, he was not a convicted felon, a fact which
1 Defendant Thao knew. See id.
2 In addressing this claim in the context of Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first
3 amended complaint, the Court dismissed the claim because it relied on allegations made in
4 Plaintiff’s original complaint which had been superseded by amendment. See ECF No. 27, pgs.
5 14-15. The District Judge agreed that reference to a superseded pleading was improper. See ECF
6 No. 28, pgs. 1-2. The District Judge dismissed Plaintiff’s false arrest claim with leave to amend
7 to allege facts that allow the Court to infer that Plaintiff was detained without probable cause.
8 See id. at 3 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 433 U.S. 137, 143 (1979)).
9 In the current motion to dismiss, Defendants argue the second amended complaint
10 fails to state a claim for false arrest because Plaintiff has not pleaded the lack of probable cause,
11 which is a necessary element. See ECF No. 30-1, pgs. 16-17. According to Defendants, Deputy
12 Thao’s police report of the February 19, 2019, arrest, which Plaintiff references in support of this
13 claim and attaches to the second amended complaint as Exhibit Y, establishes the presence of
14 probable cause, thereby defeating Plaintiff’s false arrest claim as a matter of law. See id.
15 Defendants’ argument is persuasive. A false arrest claim cannot stand where there
16 is probable cause for the arrest. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 145; see also Garcia v. County of Merced,
17 632 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2011). In Baker, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a false
18 arrest claim based on mistaken identity. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 145. Here, Defendant Thao’s
19 police report of the February 19, 2019, arrest, attached to the second amended complaint as
20 Exhibit Y, shows: (1) prior to contacting Plaintiff in person in response to Plaintiff’s call for
21 assistance removing Mark Kramer from Plaintiff’s property, Thao asked dispatch to run a records
22 check which revealed Plaintiff had a prior felony conviction; (2) upon arriving at Plaintiff’s
23 residence, Thao noticed a rifle on Plaintiff’s porch; (3) Plaintiff admitted to being in possession of
24 the rifle for several years; and (4) at the time, Plaintiff’s criminal record did not reflect any prior
25 felony conviction having been expunged or reduced to a misdemeanor. See ECF No. 29, pg. 88
26 (Exhibit Y).
27 / / /
28 / / /
1 Accepting as true the allegation that the prior felony conviction had in fact been
2 reduced to a misdemeanor, the facts alleged nonetheless show that, even though based on a
3 mistaken belief, the facts Thao thought were true at the time – that Plaintiff was a convicted felon
4 in current possession of a firearm – clearly establish probable cause supporting Plaintiff’s arrest
5 in February 2019. Similar to Baker, where mistaken identity could not support a false arrest
6 claim otherwise based on probable cause, Thao’s mistaken belief that Plaintiff had in fact been
7 convicted of a felony does not support a false arrest claim. Based on the allegations contained in
8 the second amended complaint, Plaintiff’s arrest in February 2019 for being a felon in possession
9 was based on probably cause supported by facts believed to be true at the time of the arrest.
10 Plaintiff’s false arrest claim should be dismissed as against all defendants with prejudice.
11 C. Third Claim – False Imprisonment
12 In his third claim, Plaintiff contends that the wrongful arrest on February 19, 2019,
13 resulted in a false imprisonment. See ECF No. 29 pgs. 31-32. As with Plaintiff’s false arrest
14 claim, the District Judge dismissed Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim for failure to plead facts
15 to allow the Court to infer that Plaintiff was detained without probable cause. See ECF No. 28,
16 pg. 3. And as with Plaintiff’s second claim, Defendants now contend Plaintiff’s third claim
17 necessarily fails because the facts alleged and, particularly Defendant Thao’s report attached as
18 Exhibit Y, establish Plaintiff’s arrest and detention were based on probable cause. For the
19 reasons discussed above as to the second claim, Defendants’ argument is persuasive. Plaintiff’s
20 third claim should be dismissed as against all defendants with prejudice.
21 D. Fourth Claim – Cruel and Unusual Punishment
22 In his fourth claim, Plaintiff alleges he did not receive “immediate medical care”
23 while confined at the Butte County Jail, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See ECF No. 29,
24 pg. 34. The District Judge dismissed this claim with leave to amend, concluding that Plaintiff had
25 failed to allege facts showing he was being confined in the Butte County Jail pursuant to a
26 conviction. See ECF No. 28, pg. 3 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1979)). In the
27 second amended complaint, Plaintiff clearly alleges that his claim arises under the Eighth
28 Amendment. See e.g. ECF No. 29, pg. 33 (alleging Defendants are liable for “cruel and unusual
1 punishment under the U.S. Constitution under the Eighth Amendment”). Plaintiff does not,
2 however, as with the first amended complaint, allege that he was in custody pursuant to a
3 conviction at the times he states he received inadequate medical care at the Butte County Jail.
4 Because Plaintiff was provided an opportunity to amend to plead additional facts
5 related to his confinement at the Butte County Jail, and because Plaintiff has failed to do so in the
6 second amended complaint, it does not appear that Plaintiff can plead sufficient facts to state a
7 claim under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff’s fourth claim should be dismissed in its entirety
8 without further leave to amend.
9 E. Fifth Claim – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
10 In his fifth claim, Plaintiff alleges the denial of immediate medical care outlined in
11 his fourth claim also constitutes the state law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
12 See ECF No. 29, pgs. 36-38. The District Judge dismissed this claim with leave to amend as
13 derivative of Plaintiff’s federal claims. See ECF No. 30, pg. 3. In the instant motion to dismiss
14 the second amended complaint, Defendants argue: (1) Plaintiff’s state law claim fails because
15 Plaintiff has not affirmatively pleaded compliance with California’s Government Claims Act, Cal.
16 Gov’t Code § 905; and (2) Plaintiff fails to allege facts to show Defendants’ conduct was extreme
17 or outrageous. See ECF No. 30-1, pgs. 20-22.
18 Defendants’ arguments are persuasive. A review of the second amended
19 complaint reflects Plaintiff alleges no facts related to compliance with California’s Government
20 Claims Act. Moreover, the facts alleged do not suggest outrageous or extreme conduct. Finally,
21 as the District Judge concluded in considering the first amended complaint, Plaintiff’s state law
22 tort claim is derivative of Plaintiff’s federal claim related to medical care which, for the reasons
23 discussed above, is not sufficiently pleaded. Plaintiff’s fifth claim should be dismissed in its
24 entirety without further leave to amend.
25 / / /
26 / / /
27 / / /
28 / / /
1 F. Sixth Claim – Violation of Due Process
2 In his sixth claim, Plaintiff alleges the conduct outlined elsewhere in the second
3 amended complaint amounts to violation of his due process rights. See ECF No. 29, pgs. 38-40.
4 The District Judge dismissed this claim with leave to amend for failure to set forth a short and
5 plain statement of Defendants’ liability pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). See
6 ECF No. 28, pg. 3. The second amended complaint continues to suffer from this defect.
7 Moreover, as Defendants argue, Plaintiff has not pleaded specific facts to show that he was
8 deprived of a life, liberty, or property interest necessary to support a due process claim. See
9 Board of Regent of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
10 Because Plaintiff was provided an opportunity to amend to plead a short and plain
11 statement of his due process claim, and because Plaintiff has failed to do so in the second
12 amended complaint, it does not appear that Plaintiff can plead sufficient facts to state a claim for
13 violation of due process. Plaintiff’s sixth claim should be dismissed in its entirety without further
14 leave to amend.
15 G. Seventh Claim – Defamation and False Light
16 In his seventh claim, Plaintiff alleges state law torts of defamation and false light.
17 See ECF No. 29, pgs. 40-42. According to Plaintiff, Defendants’ conduct resulted in him being
18 falsely portrayed as a convicted felon. See id. at 41. Plaintiff alleges this false portrayal was
19 published in the form of the February 2019 charges. See id. As with Plaintiff’s intentional
20 infliction of emotional distress claim, the District Judge dismissed Plaintiff’s defamation and false
21 light claim with leave to amend as derivative of Plaintiff’s federal claims. See ECF No. 28, pg. 3.
22 In the current motion to dismiss, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s seventh claim fails because an
23 action for damage to reputation can only be sustained under § 1983 when the plaintiff alleges an
24 actual loss of a recognizable property or liberty interest as the result of the claimed damage to
25 reputation. See ECF No. 30-1, pg. 23.
26 / / /
27 / / /
28 / / /
1 Defendants’ argument is persuasive. Here, while Plaintiff vaguely claims
2 | Defendants are liable for defamation and false light in connection with the conduct alleged
3 | elsewhere in the second amended complaint, Plaintiff does not allege any actual injury. See
4 | American Consumer Pub. Ass’n, Inc. v. Margosian, 349 F.3d 1122, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2003).
5 | Moreover, as the District Judge concluded, Plaintiff's seventh claim is derivative of his federal
6 | claims which, as discussed above, are deficient. Plaintiff's seventh claim should be dismissed in
7 | its entirety without further leave to amend.
8 H. Eighth Claim — Campaign of Harassment and Violation of Civil Rights
9 In his eighth claim, Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ conduct resulted in a violation of
10 | his right to equal protection. See ECF No. 29, pgs. 42-43. As with Plaintiffs sixth claim, the
11 | District Judge dismissed this claim with leave to amend for failure to provide a short and plain
12 || statement of Defendants’ liability, as required by Rule 8. See ECF No. 28, pg. 3. The second
13 | amended complaint, which is nearly identical to the first amended complaint, continues to suffer
14 | this defect. Plaintiff's eighth claim should be dismissed in its entirety without further leave to
15 | amend.
16
17 V. CONCLUSION
18 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ motion to
19 | dismiss, ECF No. 30, be granted.
20 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
21 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within 14 days
22 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections
23 | with the Court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of objections.
24 | Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v.
25 | Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
26 | Dated: August 25, 2021 Sx<o_-
27 DENNIS M. COTA
28 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
16