referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
How later courts described this case
- referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 MARTIN LEE FOSTER, No. 2:21-CV-0316-TLN-DMC-P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 GAVIN NEWSOM,
15 Defendant.
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17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action under 42
18 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 3.
19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,
24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain
25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This
26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the
28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it
1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege
2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the
3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is
4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague
5 and conclusory.
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7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
8 As the only defendant, Plaintiff names Gavin Newsom, the Governor of the State
9 of California. See ECF No. 3, pg. 1. Plaintiff states that his complaint gives rise to “two (2)
10 serious claims.” Id. First, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Newsom operates an establishment in
11 downtown Sacramento, California, involved in child sexual misconduct akin to the “Bunny
12 Ranch” in the State of Nevada. See id. Second, Plaintiff claims that the “motive for said
13 allegations” is to help Anne Marie Schubert, an attorney with the California Department of
14 Justice, “aid and abed [sic]” misconduct by a Sacramento police officer. Id. Finally, Plaintiff
15 states that he is being held illegally in the Sacramento County Main Jail, though it is unclear how
16 this contention is related to Plaintiff’s other allegations. See id. at 1-2.
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18 II. DISCUSSION
19 Plaintiff’s complaint is defective for several reasons. First, Defendant Newsom is
20 immune from suit to the extent he is sued in his official capacity. Second, Plaintiff has not
21 established a causal connection between conduct by Defendant Newsom and a violation of rights
22 guaranteed to Plaintiff. Third, to the extent success on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims implies the
23 invalidity of Plaintiff’s incarceration in the Sacramento County Main Jail, his claims are not
24 cognizable under § 1983. Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend. In doing so, Plaintiff should
25 keep the following legal principles in mind.
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1 A. Immunity
2 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought
3 against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v.
4 Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition
5 extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t
6 of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th
7 Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state
8 agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782
9 (1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
10 The Eleventh Amendment also bars actions seeking damages from state officials
11 acting in their official capacities. See Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1995); Pena
12 v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The Eleventh Amendment does not,
13 however, bar suits against state officials acting in their personal capacities. See id. Under the
14 doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for
15 prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities. See
16 Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997). The Eleventh Amendment also does
17 not bar suits against cities and counties. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690
18 n.54 (1978).
19 B. Causal Link
20 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual
21 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See
22 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A
23 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of
24 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform
25 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
26 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
27 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See
28 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth
1 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional
2 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
3 C. Relation to Habeas Corpus
4 When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks
5 is a determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not
6 cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ
7 of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda,
8 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir.
9 1995) (per curiam). Thus, where a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory relief
10 alleges constitutional violations which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s
11 underlying conviction or sentence, or the result of a prison disciplinary hearing resulting in
12 imposition of a sanction affecting the overall length of confinement, such a claim is not
13 cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated on appeal, by
14 habeas petition, or through some similar proceeding. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-
15 84 (1994) (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations were akin to
16 malicious prosecution action which includes as an element a finding that the criminal proceeding
17 was concluded in plaintiff’s favor); Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1997)
18 (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural defects were an
19 attempt to challenge substantive result in parole hearing); cf. Neal, 131 F.3d at 824 (concluding
20 that § 1983 claim was cognizable because challenge was to conditions for parole eligibility and
21 not to any particular parole determination); cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005)
22 (concluding that § 1983 action seeking changes in procedures for determining when an inmate is
23 eligible for parole consideration not barred because changed procedures would hasten future
24 parole consideration and not affect any earlier parole determination under the prior procedures).
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1 III. CONCLUSION
2 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
3 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire
4 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is
5 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See
6 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to
7 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended
8 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if
9 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make
10 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be
11 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
12 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the
13 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See
14 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
15 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
16 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
17 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
18 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the
19 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at
20 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply
21 with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).
22 See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
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1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
2 1. Plaintiff's first amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and
3 2. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date
4 | of service of this order.
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6 || Dated: August 4, 2021 Ssvcqo_
7 DENNIS M. COTA
8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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