Opinion

(PC) Gaines v. Brown

Court
District Court, E.D. California
Filed
Jun 8, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.6%

dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring 11 amendment of complaint

How later courts described this case

  • dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring 11 amendment of complaint

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 MARY LEE GAINES, Case No. 1:16-cv-01666-NONE-BAM (PC)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR FOURTH EXTENSION OF TIME TO

13 v.

FILE OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR

14 BROWN, et al., SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(ECF No. 100)

15 Defendants.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

16 RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF

ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE

17

TO PROSECUTE AND FAILURE TO OBEY

18 COURT ORDER

(ECF No. 99)

19

FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

20

21 Plaintiff Mary Lee Gaines (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

22 pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on

23 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint against Defendants Mirelez and Hoehing for deliberate

24 indifference to medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. For the reasons that follow,

25 the Court recommends that this action be dismissed, with prejudice.

26 I. Background

27 On December 16, 2020, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ.

28 P. 56. (ECF No. 92.) Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing a

1 motion for summary judgment. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012); Rand v. Rowland,

2 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1988); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411–12 (9th Cir. 1988).

3 (ECF No. 92-1.) Following three extensions of time, Plaintiff’s opposition was due on or before

4 April 25, 2021. (ECF No. 99.)

5 II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Fourth Extension of Time to File Opposition

6 In the order granting Plaintiff’s third extension of time, the Court noted that the original

7 deadline for Plaintiff to file her opposition was nearly three months prior, Plaintiff’s motions for

8 extension of time had been cursory and brief, and in light of Plaintiff’s history of repeatedly

9 requesting extensions of time, were no longer sufficient to present good cause for further

10 extensions. Accordingly, the Court warned Plaintiff that any future requests for extension of this

11 deadline would be subject to a narrow interpretation of what constitutes good cause. Plaintiff was

12 advised that in any future such request, she must describe what attempts she has made to access

13 the law library at her institution, the results of those attempts, how many times she has

14 successfully accessed the law library, and what specific further research or other acts must be

15 accomplished using law library services before her opposition could be completed and submitted

16 to the Court. Further, Defendants would be given an opportunity to oppose any further requests

17 for extension of time. (Id.)

18 On April 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion for a fourth extension of time to file her

19 opposition. (ECF No. 100.) Despite the Court’s warning, Plaintiff’s motion is nearly identical to,

20 and just as cursory as, her previous motions for extension of time. (See ECF Nos. 94, 96, 98.)

21 Plaintiff again alleges that she continues to experience limited and no access to the prison law

22 library due to the COVID-19 pandemic, where the prison is constantly on lockdown since

23 February 20191 with the continued prison law library closure, and illness of COPD complications

24 that delay Plaintiff in her legal research. (ECF No. 100.) Plaintiff requests another thirty-day

25 extension of time. (Id.)

26

27 1 As the Court has previously noted, and despite what Plaintiff has repeatedly argued in her

motions, the COVID-19 pandemic did not begin affecting prison programming until

28 approximately February 2020. (See ECF No. 99 at 2.)

1 Defendants filed an opposition on May 12, 2021. (ECF No. 101.) Defendants argue that

2 the law library at the Central California Women’s Facility (“CCWF”), where Plaintiff has been

3 incarcerated throughout this action, is available to Plaintiff and she has simply failed to use it.

4 Defendants submit a declaration in support from the Senior Legal Law Librarian at CCWF, R.

5 Oldfield, who asserts that during the ongoing pandemic, the CCWF law library has been open by

6 appointment and operating under a modified program for more than six months. (ECF No. 101-

7 1.) Under the modified program, only inmates with pending deadlines and PLU status may

8 access the law library. According to the library’s PLU log and the Library Ducat List, Plaintiff

9 did not apply for PLU status or request law library time within the last sixty days at CCWF. (Id.)

10 The deadline for Plaintiff to file a reply to Defendants’ opposition was May 24, 2021.

11 The Court has not received any communication from Plaintiff. The motion is therefore deemed

12 submitted. Local Rule 230(l).

13 Plaintiff was warned that any future requests for extension of the deadline to file her

14 opposition would be subject to a narrow interpretation of what constitutes good cause, and

15 specifically instructed as to the information she would need to provide to meet that standard.

16 Nevertheless, Plaintiff presented the same conclusory allegations that she was experiencing

17 limited to no access to the law library at her institution, with no further explanation. In addition,

18 Defendants’ unrebutted opposition demonstrates that Plaintiff has failed to even request law

19 library access or PLU status for at least the last sixty days.

20 It is now nearly five months from the original deadline for Plaintiff to file her opposition.

21 Furthermore, it is also two weeks past the extended deadline proposed in Plaintiff’s motion for

22 fourth extension of time, and Plaintiff has not submitted her opposition or a further request for an

23 extension of the deadline. Plaintiff was provided multiple opportunities to oppose Defendants’

24 motion for summary judgment, and was warned that if she failed to file an opposition or a motion

25 for extension of time that met the required good cause standard, this case would be subject to

26 dismissal. Plaintiff has failed to submit any response to Defendants’ motion for summary

27 judgment and has not otherwise presented good cause for further extending the deadline for her

28 response.

1 III. Discussion

2 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with

3 any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . .

4 within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their

5 dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where

6 appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A

7 court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action,

8 failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46

9 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

10 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring

11 amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987)

12 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order).

13 In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors:

14 (1) the public’s interest in expeditions resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its

15 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of

16 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779

17 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1988).

18 Here, the action has been pending for more than four years, and Plaintiff’s response or

19 opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is overdue. Plaintiff is obligated to

20 comply with the Local Rules and was informed by Defendants of the need to oppose a motion for

21 summary judgment. Despite Plaintiff’s duty to comply with all applicable rules and Defendants’

22 notice, Plaintiff did not file a proper opposition. Plaintiff instead requested numerous cursory

23 extensions of time and was warned by the Court that failure to present good cause for any further

24 requests would result in dismissal of this action. Plaintiff has filed yet another cursory request,

25 and has failed to address Defendants’ contention that she has not requested access to the law

26 library in the past sixty days. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket if a party ceases

27 litigating the case. Thus, both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal of this

28 action.

1 The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, because

2 a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an

3 action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). Because public policy favors

4 disposition on the merits, the fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal. Pagtalunan v.

5 Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party

6 whose responsibility is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct

7 impedes progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA)

8 Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006).

9 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the Court’s order will result in

10 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives requirement.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262;

11 Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s March 29, 2021 order

12 granting Plaintiff’s motion for third extension of time to file her opposition expressly warned

13 Plaintiff that if she failed to file an opposition or a motion for extension of time that meets the

14 good cause standard provided, her case would be subject to dismissal due to Plaintiff’s failure to

15 oppose the motion for summary judgment and failure to prosecute. (ECF No. 99, p. 3.) Thus,

16 Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal of this action could result from her noncompliance.

17 At this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court which would constitute a

18 satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further unnecessary expenditure of its

19 scarce resources. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this action, making monetary

20 sanctions of little use, and the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is likely to have no effect given

21 that Plaintiff has ceased litigating this case.

22 In summary, Plaintiff is no longer prosecuting this action, and the Court cannot afford to

23 expend resources resolving unopposed dispositive motions in a case which Plaintiff is no longer

24 prosecuting.

25 IV. Order and Recommendation

26 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for a fourth extension of

27 time to file an opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (ECF No. 100), is

28 DENIED.

1 Furthermore, the Court finds that dismissal is the appropriate sanction and HEREBY

2 RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to prosecute and for

3 failure to obey a court order.

4 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

5 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within

6 fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may

7 file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to

8 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file

9 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the

10 magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014)

11 (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

12

IT IS SO ORDERED.

13

14 Dated: June 7, 2021 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.