concluding that Nevada 1 Department of Prisons was a state agency entitled to Eleventh 2 Amendment immunity
How later courts described this case
- concluding that Nevada 1 Department of Prisons was a state agency entitled to Eleventh 2 Amendment immunity
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 ESTATE OF MICHAEL LEE, et No. 2:20-cv-01161-JAM-CDK
al.,
12
Plaintiffs,
13 ORDER GRANTING CDCR’S MOTION TO
v. DISMISS
14
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
15 CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION, et al.,
16
Defendants.
17
18 This matter is before the Court on California Department of
19 Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) Motion to Dismiss.
20 CDCR’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 28. Plaintiffs opposed
21 this motion, Opp’n, ECF No. 40, to which CDCR responded, Reply,
22 ECF No. 41. After consideration of the parties’ written
23 arguments on the motion and relevant legal authority, the Court
24 GRANTS CDCR’s Motion to Dismiss.1
25 ///
26
27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
28 scheduled for October 27, 2020.
1 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
2 This case arises from the suicide of inmate Michael Lee.
3 Michael had a history of mental health issues, including suicide
4 attempts, due to a traumatic brain injury he suffered from a car
5 accident in 2004. Compl. ¶¶ 71-77, ECF No. 1. On June 30, 2017,
6 Michael turned himself in for his role in a fight that had
7 occurred several weeks prior. Compl. ¶ 78. Michael pled guilty
8 and was incarcerated in El Dorado County Jail. Id. Concerned
9 about her son, Michael’s mother, Mary Pamela Sandy, brought his
10 medical records to the jail and spoke with the warden, a doctor,
11 and a nurse about Michael’s injury, resulting mental health
12 condition and prior suicide attempts. Compl. ¶ 79. Plaintiffs
13 allege this information was provided to CDCR upon his transfer to
14 their custody on August 30, 2017. Compl. ¶¶ 79-81. While in
15 CDCR custody, Michael’s mental health deteriorated, Compl. ¶¶ 94-
16 146, and on January 8, 2019 he committed suicide. Compl. ¶¶ 147.
17 The Estate of Michael Lee and Michael’s mother, Mary Pamela
18 Sandy, (collectively “Plaintiffs”), brought this action against
19 CDCR and 25 individual defendants, based on alleged deficiencies
20 in Michael’s care while in CDCR custody. See generally Compl.
21 Relevant to this motion, Plaintiffs brought two claims against
22 CDCR: the first, for violation of Title II of the Americans with
23 Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and as a result violation of
24 California’s Unruh Act and the second, for violation of the
25 Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). Compl. at 49-51. CDCR now moves to
26 dismiss both causes of action for failure to state a claim. See
27 generally Mot. Additionally, CDCR seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’
28 claims for injunctive relief because they are moot. Mot. at 12.
1 II. OPINION
2 A. Legal Standard
3 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the complaint as not
4 alleging sufficient facts to state a claim for relief. Fed. R.
5 Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under
6 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
7 accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible
8 on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)
9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While
10 “detailed factual allegations” are unnecessary, the complaint
11 must allege more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
12 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”
13 Id. at 678. “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to
14 dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable
15 inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a
16 claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret
17 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
18 B. Analysis
19 1. Unruh Act
20 Sovereign immunity bars federal suits against a state or
21 one of its agencies or departments. Pennhurst State Sch. &
22 Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). This immunity
23 applies to claims brought under California’s Unruh Act. See
24 Stanley v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1134
25 (9th Cir. 2006).
26 CDCR is a state agency and therefore immune from suit under
27 the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. See Taylor v. List,
28 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that Nevada
1 Department of Prisons was a state agency entitled to Eleventh
2 Amendment immunity). Plaintiffs do not dispute this. See Pls.’
3 Opp’n. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Unruh Claim is DISMISSED with
4 prejudice.
5 2. ADA and RA
6 Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public
7 entities on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o
8 qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
9 disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
10 benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
11 entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”)
12 To state a Title II ADA claim, a plaintiff must allege facts
13 showing that they: (1) are a qualified individual with a
14 disability; (2) were discriminated against or excluded from
15 participation in a public entity’s services, programs, or
16 activities; and (3) that the discrimination was by reason of
17 their disability. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th
18 Cir. 2002).
19 Similarly, to establish a violation of § 504 of the RA, a
20 plaintiff must allege that they: (1) are an individual with a
21 disability; (2) are otherwise qualified to receive a benefit;
22 (3) were denied the benefits of a program solely by reason of
23 their disability; and (4) the program receives federal financial
24 assistance. Id. Both the ADA and RA apply in the state prison
25 context, Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1022-23 (9th Cir.
26 1997), and there is no significant difference in the analysis of
27 the two. Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045
28 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999).
1 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ ADA and RA claims are
2 actually claims for inadequate mental-health treatment, which is
3 not actionable under either statute. Mot. at 10-11; Simmons v.
4 Navajo Cty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) overruled on
5 other grounds by Castro v. Cty. Of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060
6 (9th Cir. 2016). The Court agrees.
7 The Court finds O’Guinn v. Nevada Department of Corrections
8 instructive. In that case, the plaintiff argued that because of
9 his uncontrollable behavior, which was a result of his mental
10 health disability, he had been excluded from the Mental Health
11 Unit and denied mental health treatment, programs for which he
12 was otherwise qualified. O’Guinn v. Nevada Dep’t of Corr., No.
13 3:07-CV-00450-LRH-VP, 2010 WL 4395442, at * 4 (D. Nev. Aug. 26,
14 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:07-CV-00450-LRH,
15 2010 WL 4457001 (D. Nev. Oct. 29, 2010), aff’d, 468 F. App’x 651
16 (9th Cir. 2012). The District Court found that although
17 plaintiff’s counsel framed the deprivation of care as
18 discriminatory it was actually a claim for medical negligence.
19 Id. In affirming the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
20 to defendants, the Ninth Circuit noted that key elements of an
21 ADA or RA claim cannot be reconciled with medical treatment
22 decisions for the underlying disability. O’Guinn, 468 F. App’x
23 at 653. The Court pointed out that the plaintiff claimed he was
24 discriminatorily denied mental health treatment because of his
25 disability but he only needed the treatment because he was
26 disabled. Id. Thus, the Court reasoned, he was not otherwise
27 qualified to receive the benefit and his alleged denial of
28 treatment was not discrimination under either the ADA or the RA.
1 Id.
2 Similarly, here Plaintiffs allege that because of Michael’s
3 medication noncompliance, which results from his mental health
4 disability, he was denied inpatient mental health care. Opp’n
5 at 11. But like in O’Guinn, Michael only needed the treatment
6 because he was disabled, making him not “otherwise qualified” to
7 receive the benefit. O’Guinn, 468 F. App’x at 653.
8 The cases upon which Plaintiffs rely, Padilla v. Beard, No.
9 2:14-CV-01118-KJM-CKD, 2014 WL 6059218 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2014)
10 and Biselli v. County of Ventura, No. CV 09-08694 CAS (Ex), 2012
11 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79326 (C.D. June 4. 2012), are distinguishable
12 as both involved administrative discipline, not mental health
13 treatment decisions. Padilla concerned a disciplinary charge
14 resulting from the plaintiff’s behavior during a cell extraction
15 when that behavior allegedly resulted from his mental illness.
16 Padilla, 2014 WL 6059218 at *9. Similarly, in Biselli, the
17 plaintiff was placed in disciplinary segregation based on
18 conduct that stemmed from his mental illness. Biselli, 2012
19 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79326 at *44-45. In both cases the court found
20 that the plaintiff had stated a claim under the ADA because he
21 had been denied some benefit that other non-disabled individuals
22 received, like TV, visits or non-segregated housing, because of
23 conduct related to his disability. Padilla, 2014 WL 6059218 at
24 *9; Biselli, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79326 at *44-45. These
25 benefits had nothing to do with the medical treatment of
26 plaintiffs’ underlying disabilities.
27 In contrast, here, Michael only needed inpatient care
28 because of his mental health. See Compl. ¶ 210. As such, the
1 alleged benefit Michael did not receive is “inextricably linked”
2 to medical decisions for his asserted disability. O’Guinn, 468
3 F. App’x at 653. In sum Plaintiffs challenge “the adequacy of
4 [Michael’s] mental health care, a challenge that cannot be
5 properly brought under the ADA and RA.” Id.; see also Simmons,
6 609 F.3d at 1022. For these reasons Plaintiffs’ ADA and RA
7 claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.2
8 3. Injunctive Relief
9 Lastly, CDCR argues that “Plaintiffs’ claims for
10 unspecified injunctive relief should be dismissed because they
11 are moot.” Mot. at 12. Plaintiffs, again, do not dispute this.
12 See Pls.’ Opp’n. “[A] case is moot when the issues presented
13 are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable
14 interest in the outcome.” Los Angeles Cty. V. Davis, 440 U.S.
15 625, 631 (1979) (internal quotations and citation omitted). A
16 plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show that there is a
17 real or immediate threat they will be wronged again. City of
18 Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).
19 Here, any injunctive relief would obviously be ineffectual
20 as to Michael because he is now deceased. See Estate of Creason
21 v. City of Concord, 203 Fed. Appx. 833, 834 (9th Cir. 2006).
22 His estate and mother also cannot pursue injunctive relief
23 because they cannot show a threat to their interests or that any
24 redress would accompany a favorable judgment. Id.; see also
25 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-03. As such, Plaintiffs’ claims for
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27 2 Because the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim
under the ADA, the Court need not address what, if any, punitive
28 damages are available.
nee enn ene ne nnn nnn nn ne nn on nnn nn nn nO OSE IN SS OO OE
1 injunctive relief are DISMISSED with prejudice.
2
3 Til. ORDER
4 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant
5 | CDCR’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs’ Unruh and injunctive
6 relief claims are dismissed WITH PREJUDICE as the Court finds
7 amendment would be futile. Plaintiffs’ ADA and RA claims are
8 dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If Plaintiffs elect to amend their
9 complaint with respect to these claims, they shall file an
10 | Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days of this Order.
11 Defendant’s responsive pleading is due twenty (20) days
12 thereafter.
13 IT IS SO ORDERED.
14 Dated: January 21, 2021
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