referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
How later courts described this case
- referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
- holding that there is no 24 respondeat superior liability under § 1983
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 DOMINIQUE MERRIMAN, No. 2:19-CV-2486-DMC-P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 L. ELDRIDGE, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s first second complaint, ECF No. 12.
19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,
24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain
25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This
26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the
28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it
1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege
2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the
3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is
4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague
5 and conclusory.
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7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
8 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) L. Eldridge, the Acting Warden of
9 the California Health Care Facility (CHCF); and (2) P.T. Martin, a psychiatric technician at
10 CHCF.1 Plaintiff’s claims are summarized below.
11 Martin -- Plaintiff states that, while under suicide watch at CHCF, he was sexually
12 assaulted by Defendant Martin on May 9, 2019.
13 Eldridge – Plaintiff claims Defendant Eldridge is liable for failing to adequately
14 train and supervise defendant Martin. He also claims Eldridge is liable for failing to provide
15 adequate security and safety measures, including video monitoring and emergency alert systems.
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17 II. DISCUSSION
18 As with the first amended complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated
19 sufficient facts for this case to proceed against Defendant Martin on an Eighth Amendment claim
20 arising from the alleged sexual assault on May 9, 2019. The Court, however, finds that the
21 second amended complaint remains insufficient as to Defendant Eldridge.
22 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their
23 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no
24 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional
25 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The
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27 1 San Joaquin County, which was named in Plaintiff’s original and first amended
complaint, is not named in the operative second amended complaint. The Clerk of the Court will
28 be directed to update the docket accordingly.
1 Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on
2 knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government
3 officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct
4 and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory
5 personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of
6 constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be
7 liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v.
8 Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
9 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such
10 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.
11 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.
12 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in
13 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th
14 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
15 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676.
16 In this case, plaintiff sues Eldridge, who holds a supervisory position as Acting
17 Warden of CHCF. Plaintiff has not, however, alleged how this defendant’s personal conduct
18 caused the claimed constitutional violation. Nor has Plaintiff alleged implementation of any
19 policy which itself is so deficient as itself constitute a repudiation of Plaintiff’s rights. Rather, it
20 appears plaintiff assigns liability under a respondeat superior theory, which is not cognizable
21 under § 1983. Plaintiff will be provided one additional opportunity to amend before the Court
22 recommends dismissal of Defendant Eldridge.
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24 III. CONCLUSION
25 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
26 amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
27 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an
28 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,
1 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the
2 | prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An
3 || amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
4 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the
5 || conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See
6 | Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
7 || each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
8 || between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
9 | 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
10 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no third
11 amended complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and
12 || recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such
13 | further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.
14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
15 1. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate San Juaquin County as a
16 || defendant to this action; and
17 2. Plaintiff may file a third amended complaint within 30 days of the date of
18 || service of this order.
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21 | Dated: October 30, 2020 Sx<o_-
22 DENNIS M. COTA
23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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