(PC) Davis v. Jones

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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 MICHAEL SCOTT DAVIS, No. 2:19-CV-2072-TLN-DMC

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

14 SCOTT JONES, et al.,

15 Defendants.

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17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

18 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s second amended complaint (ECF No. 8).

19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

21 § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This

26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d

27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it

1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege

2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the

3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

4 impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

5 and conclusory.

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7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

8 In its June 25, 2020, screening order, the Court summarized plaintiff’s factual

9 allegations as follows:

10 Plaintiff, Michael Scott Davis, is an inmate at Sacramento

County Main Jail. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Scott

11 Jones, Sheriff, (2) Doctor Robert Padilla, (3) J. Holt, Nurse Practitioner,

and (4) Sacramento County Main Jail’s Chief Medical Officer.1

12 Plaintiff claims that defendants violated his Eighth

Amendment rights by denying him medical treatment after he was

13 arrested. Plaintiff has a spinal cord disorder and suffers from severe

chronic pain in his lower back and hips. Plaintiff also suffers from a

14 chronic shoulder condition. Plaintiff claims that two men assaulted him on

September 3, 2019 and exacerbated his injuries in his lower back and

15 shoulder. Plaintiff sought treatment in an emergency room on September

4, 2019. Plaintiff alleges that the emergency room report stated that

16 plaintiff should see his surgeon within three days and prescribed plaintiff a

seven-day supply of Norco, a narcotic, for severe acute and chronic pain.

17 Plaintiff was arrested and booked into Sacramento County Main Jail on

September 5, 2019. Plaintiff claims he told an intake nurse about his

18 medical conditions, and she told him he would be placed on the doctor’s

call list. Plaintiff alleges that his doctor’s appointments on September

19 10th, 17th, and 24th of 2019 were cancelled without explanation. Plaintiff

also claims that on September 30, 2019, a judge ordered that plaintiff see a

20 doctor because plaintiff had not yet been to a surgeon per emergency room

orders or received treatment for his pain condition.

21 Plaintiff alleges that he saw defendant Holt, a nurse

practitioner, on October 1, 2019. Plaintiff claims defendant Holt also

22 violated his Eighth Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent to

plaintiff’s medical needs and exacerbating plaintiff’s existing medical

23 injury. Plaintiff requested Norco from defendant Holt, who allegedly

responded by explaining to plaintiff that Sacramento County Main Jail had

24 a policy that prevented medical professionals from prescribing narcotic

pain medication unless a patient is dying of cancer. Plaintiff also alleges

25 that despite having knowledge of plaintiff’s shoulder condition, defendant

Holt forcibly pulled plaintiff’s right arm forward until it was at a ninety-

26 degree angle to plaintiff’s torso. Plaintiff claims he started screaming for

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1 Plaintiff also makes various allegations against Sacramento County Main Jail,

28 however, plaintiff does not name Sacramento County Main Jail as a defendant in his complaint.

1 Holt to stop, but Holt nevertheless forcibly pushed plaintiff’s arm

backward behind his torso. Plaintiff alleges that he continued to scream

2 while defendant Holt lifted plaintiff’s arm high above his shoulder’s range

of motion and rotated it twice. Plaintiff claims he is in worse pain than

3 ever before due to defendant Holt’s actions. Plaintiff also alleges that his

shoulder now clicks, pops, and glides whenever he tries to move it.

4 Plaintiff claims he saw Sacramento County Main Jail’s

orthopedic surgeon on or around October 26, 2019, who told plaintiff that

5 he needed surgery. Plaintiff alleges that he did not see defendant Doctor

Robert Padilla until November 6, 2019, which was 33 days after a superior

6 court judge ordered that plaintiff immediately be seen by a doctor.

Plaintiff claims Padilla told him that the Sacramento County Jail’s Chief

7 Medical Officer denied the surgeons’ order for plaintiff to get an MRI.

Plaintiff requested Norco from defendant Padilla, who reiterated the jail’s

8 policy that prevented prescribing narcotics unless the patient was dying

from cancer. Plaintiff alleges that the policy violates his Fourteenth

9 Amendment rights to equal protection because it goes against the

provisions set out in the Pain Patient’s Bill of Rights. Plaintiff also claims

10 that the delay in seeing Doctor Padilla caused him to suffer unnecessary

severe pain in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel

11 and unusual punishment.

12 ECF No. 13, pg. 4.

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14 II. DISCUSSION

15 In its June 25, 2020, screening order, the Court found that plaintiff stated a

16 cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Holt. However, the Court also found that

17 plaintiff’s complaint failed in all other respects. Specifically, the Court stated that:

18 . . . First, plaintiff has failed to establish a cognizable claim

against defendant Sheriff Jones because plaintiff has not alleged any

19 specific causal connection between Sheriff Jones and the alleged

constitutional violations. Second, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable

20 claim against defendant Padilla because plaintiff fails to allege that

Padilla’s behavior amounted to the deliberate indifference required to

21 successfully establish a cognizable Eighth Amendment medical treatment

claim. Third, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against

22 defendant Sacramento County Main Jail Chief Medical Officer because

plaintiff did not establish a sufficient causal link between the CMO and

23 any of the alleged constitutional violations. Fourth, plaintiff cannot allege

a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim regarding the

24 prison’s anti-narcotics policy because the policy has a legitimate

penological purpose. . . .

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ECF No. 13, pg. 4.

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1 As to defendant Jones, the Court stated:

2 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983

for the actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

3 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under

§ 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of

4 subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See

id. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant

5 can be liable based on knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s

unconstitutional conduct because government officials, regardless of their

6 title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct and

not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).

7 Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy

itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and the moving force behind

8 a constitutional violation may, however, be liable even where such

personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v.

9 Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).

When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal

10 link between such defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir.

11 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and

conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory

12 personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of

Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that

13 each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676.

14 Here, plaintiff has failed to allege any specific causal link

between Sheriff Jones and the alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiff

15 does not explain or even mention Sheriff Jones’s role in the alleged

events. As a result, plaintiff has failed to establish that Sheriff Jones

16 condoned or directly participated in the alleged constitutional violations.

Plaintiff has also failed to establish that Sheriff Jones implemented a

17 policy that caused the alleged constitutional violations to occur. Plaintiff’s

claims against Sheriff Jones’s subordinates are not sufficient to establish a

18 cognizable § 1983 against Sheriff Jones because supervisory personnel are

only responsible for their own actions under § 1983. Therefore, plaintiff

19 has failed to allege a cognizable claim against Sheriff Jones.

20 ECF No. 13, pgs. 5-6.

21 As to defendant Padilla, the Court stated:

22 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the

conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny

23 under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual

punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v.

24 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . .

embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,

25 humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).

Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See

26 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison

officials must provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation,

27 medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d

1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth

28 Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the

1 official’s act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the

denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

2 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and

wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

3 Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a

“sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

4 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or

injury, or risks of serious injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the

5 Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; see also Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health

6 needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An

injury or illness is sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s

7 condition could result in further significant injury or the “. . . unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059

8 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th

Cir. 1994). Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable

9 doctor would think that the condition is worthy of comment; (2) whether

the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily activities; and (3)

10 whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain.

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

11 The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent

in medical needs cases than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because

12 the responsibility to provide inmates with medical care does not generally

conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d

13 at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison

officials as to decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental

14 Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989). The complete denial of medical

attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See Toussaint v.

15 McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing

medical treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also

16 constitute deliberate indifference. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where

delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate that the

17 delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

Here, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable Eighth

18 Amendment claim against Doctor Padilla because it is not clear from

plaintiff’s allegations that Doctor Padilla’s behavior amounted to

19 deliberate indifference. Plaintiff claims he did not see Doctor Padilla until

33 days after a judge ordered plaintiff be seen by a doctor. See ECF No. 1,

20 p. 4. However, plaintiff does not allege that Doctor Padilla was

responsible for that delay or knew that plaintiff had been waiting for 33

21 days. Doctor Padilla could not have shown deliberate indifference to

plaintiff’s needs if he was not responsible for the delay in seeing plaintiff

22 or if he did not previously know of plaintiff’s need for medical treatment.

Therefore, plaintiff’s allegation that he did not see Doctor Padilla until 33

23 days after a judge ordered plaintiff be seen by a doctor is not, in and of

itself, sufficient to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against

24 Doctor Padilla.

25 ECF No. 13, pgs. 6-7.

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1 As to defendant Sacramento County Main Jail’s CMO, the Court stated:

2 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must

allege an actual connection or link between the actions of the named

3 defendants and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social

Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A

4 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,

within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in

5 another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally

required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”

6 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and

conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in

7 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth specific

8 facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged

constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th

9 Cir. 1988).

Here, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against

10 Sacramento County Main Jail’s CMO because plaintiff’s allegations do

not clearly explain the CMO’s link to the causal events. Plaintiff’s only

11 reference to the CMO is that defendant Padilla told plaintiff that the CMO

denied the orthopedic surgeon’s MRI order for plaintiff. See ECF No. 1, p.

12 4. However, plaintiff does not explain if or why he believes this action

amounted to a constitutional violation. Based on plaintiff’s complaint, it is

13 unclear whether plaintiff is attempting to sue the CMO for an Eighth

Amendment medical care claim, a Fourteenth Amendment equal

14 protection claim based on the drug policy in Sacramento County Main

Jail, or for other constitutional violations under a theory of respondeat

15 superior similar to plaintiff’s allegations against Sheriff Jones. Because

plaintiff has not established a sufficient causal connection between the

16 CMO and any constitutional violation, he has failed to allege a cognizable

§ 1983 complaint against the Sacramento County Main Jail CMO.

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ECF No. 13, pg. 8.

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19 Finally, the Court determined that plaintiff failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment

20 Equal Protection claim based on the denial of narcotic medication. The Court stated:

21 Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that

similarly situated individuals are treated differently without a rational

22 relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio School District

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Equal protection claims are not

23 necessarily limited to racial and religious discrimination. See Lee v. City

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying minimal

24 scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the

disabled do not constitute a suspect class); see also Tatum v. Pliler, 2007

25 WL 1720165 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal

protection claim based on denial of in-cell meals where no allegation of

26 race-based discrimination was made); Hightower v. Schwarzenegger,

2007 WL 732555 (E.D. Cal. March 19, 2008). (footnote omitted).

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1 In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must

2 allege that defendants acted with intentional discrimination against

plaintiff, or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff, and that

3 such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. See

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that

4 equal protection claims may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v.

Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v.

5 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins.

Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of

6 Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985).

Here, plaintiff cannot establish a cognizable Fourteenth

7 Amendment claim because the prison’s ban on narcotics prescriptions

serves a legitimate penological purpose. The state has a legitimate interest

8 in deterring substance abuse within the prison system. See Overton v.

Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 134 (2003). Narcotics are among the most

9 frequently abused substances. Therefore, a policy that strictly regulates the

distribution of narcotics within the prison system has a legitimate

10 penological interest. Plaintiff does not allege that Doctor Padilla refused to

treat his pain condition. Rather, plaintiff alleges that defendants refused to

11 provide him with his preferred treatment. See ECF No. 8, p. 4. Differences

in medical opinion do not amount to constitutional violations. See Toguchi

12 v. Young, 391 F.3d 1051, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff cannot

establish a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim because the

13 regulation in question serves a legitimate penological purpose.

14 ECF No. 13, pgs. 9-10.

15 In the screening order, plaintiff was granted leave to file a third amended

16 complaint. Plaintiff was also warned that failure to amend would result in the Court issuing

17 “findings and recommendations that the claims identified [therein] as defective be dismissed, as

18 well as such further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.” Id.

19 at 11. To date, plaintiff has not filed a third amended complaint. Therefore, the Court now issues

20 these findings and recommendations consistent with the Court’s prior screening order.

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wMOASe 2 LDU VEV EO PRIN MINING VEU PI OPEN EN TP Yt OMT O

1 I. CONCLUSION

2 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

3 1. Plaintiff's action proceed on the second amended complaint solely on his

4 | Eight Amendment claim against defendant J. Holt; and

5 2. All other claims and defendants be dismissed from this action.

6 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

7 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within 14 days

8 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

9 | objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

10 | objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See

11 | Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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13 | Dated: August 19, 2020 Ssvcqo_

DENNIS M. COTA

15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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