Opinion

(PC) Bowell v. California Department of Corrections

Court
District Court, E.D. California
Filed
Jul 30, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.5%

“Once the defense of qualified 4 immunity is raised by the defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the rights 5 allegedly violated were ‘clearly established.’” (citation omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • “Once the defense of qualified 4 immunity is raised by the defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the rights 5 allegedly violated were ‘clearly established.’” (citation omitted)
  • noting that Ninth Circuit precedent is sufficient to meet the “clearly established” 17 prong of qualified immunity
  • taking judicial notice of the legislative history of California Penal Code 2 § 148.6
  • mandatory TB testing 8 accomplished legitimate penological interest of protecting other inmates and staff from infectious 9 diseases

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 JAMES BOWELL, No. 2:17-cv-0981 KJM KJN P

12 Plaintiff,

13 v.

14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

CORRECTIONS, et al., RECOMMENDATIONS

15

Defendants.

16

17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner, who proceeds without counsel and in forma pauperis, in this

18 civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case proceeds on the first amended

19 complaint, against defendants K. Allison and J. Lewis.1 Presently pending are defendants’

20 motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and motion to strike plaintiff’s

21 unauthorized filings, and request for judicial notice. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned

22 grants the motion to strike and the request for judicial notice, and recommends that defendants be

23 granted qualified immunity.

24 I. The First Amended Complaint

25 Plaintiff alleges violations of his Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based

26 on forced tuberculosis (“TB”) skin tests, citing Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), and Rogers

27

1 Defendants Fitter and Ha and plaintiff’s putative state law claims were dismissed based on

28 plaintiff’s voluntary requests. (ECF Nos. 52, 55, 62.)

1 v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (1979). Plaintiff alleges that on an unidentified date he was forced to

2 have a TB skin test, which he claims caused a “resurgence” of his skin cancer on May 3, 2016.

3 (ECF No. 16 at 3.) He cites California Code of Regulations, Title 15 § 3351(e). (ECF No. 16 at

4 4.) Plaintiff also claims that defendants deprived plaintiff of his right to refuse TB test injections

5 which should not be administered to persons who previously experienced a severe reaction. (ECF

6 No. 16 at 7, citing pgs. 16, 27, 31, & 57-59.)

7 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Allison, the Director of the Division of Adult Institutions,

8 Sacramento, California, is directly responsible for enforcing the annual tuberculosis skin test, and

9 requiring that inmates who refuse the test will receive a CDCR-115 rule violation. Plaintiff refers

10 to and provides the 2015 notice requiring annual inmate TB testing, which states that California

11 State Law requires that every inmate be tested yearly for TB. (ECF No. 16 at 4, 14.) The notice

12 states that inmates who refuse the test “will be evaluated for forced testing, which could result in

13 disciplinary action.” (ECF No. 16 at 14.)

14 Further, plaintiff alleges that J. Lewis, Deputy Director, is in charge of Policy & Risk

15 Management Services for the California Correctional Health Care Services, and personally

16 participates in forcing prisoners to receive injections of Aplisol and Tubersol chemicals. (ECF

17 No. 16 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges such chemicals are described as carcinogens, and accompanied by

18 certain high risk warnings. (ECF No. 16 at 3, 25-34.)

19 Plaintiff seeks money damages.2 (ECF No. 16 at 12.)

20 II. Defendants’ Motion to Strike

21 Plaintiff filed multiple documents in response to defendants’ motion to dismiss and reply.

22 On October 30, 2019, plaintiff was granted an extension of time to file one opposition to the

23 motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 61.) On November 12, 2019, plaintiff filed his opposition.3 (ECF

24 No. 64.) On November 20, 2019, defendants filed a motion to strike plaintiff’s subsequently-filed

25

2 Plaintiff also sought appointment of counsel, which was denied on March 6, 2020. (ECF No.

26

72.)

27

3 Plaintiff’s opposition was signed November 5, 2019, and specifically references the court’s

28 order (ECF No. 61) in the title of his opposition. (ECF No. 64.)

1 addendum and supporting authority. (ECF Nos. 65 & 66.) Plaintiff filed objections to the motion

2 to strike based on his status as a prisoner, but then further argued the merits of his opposition to

3 the motion, and included facts and exhibits concerning medical treatment at R.J. Donovan for an

4 unrelated medical condition concerning his eye. (ECF No. 68.)

5 The Local Rules do not authorize the routine filing of a sur-reply. Nevertheless, a district

6 court may allow a sur-reply “where a valid reason for such additional briefing exists, such as

7 where the movant raises new arguments in its reply brief.” Hill v. England, 2005 WL 3031136, at

8 *1 (E.D. Cal. 2005); accord Norwood v. Byers, 2013 WL 3330643, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2013)

9 (granting the motion to strike the sur-reply because “defendants did not raise new arguments in

10 their reply that necessitated additional argument from plaintiff, plaintiff did not seek leave to file

11 a sur-reply before actually filing it, and the arguments in the sur-reply do not alter the analysis

12 below”), adopted, 2013 WL 5156572 (E.D. Cal. 2013). In the present case, defendants opted not

13 to file a reply. Plaintiff did not seek leave to file a sur-reply, and his reiterated arguments and

14 supplemental authorities do not alter the court’s analysis. For these reasons, defendants’ motion

15 to strike is granted, and the court strikes plaintiff’s filings (ECF Nos. 65 and 66).

16 III. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

17 Defendants request the court take judicial notice of California Penal Code §§ 7570, 7572,

18 7573, and 7574, and California Code of Regulations, Title 15 § 3351, all governing mandatory

19 TB testing. (ECF No. 56-2.) Plaintiff did not address defendants’ request.

20 The court may judicially notice a fact not subject to reasonable dispute because it “(1) is

21 generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and

22 readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R.

23 Evid. 201(b). Judicial notice is proper for public records whose accuracy is not in dispute. See

24 Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1094 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A court] may take judicial notice

25 of records and reports of administrative bodies.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United

26 States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003) (same). In addition, courts may take judicial

27 notice of state statutes and their legislative history. See Anderson, 673 F.3d at 1094 n.1

28 (“Legislative history is properly a subject of judicial notice.”); Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215,

1 1223 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) (taking judicial notice of the legislative history of California Penal Code

2 § 148.6).

3 The Court finds the requested judicial notice is appropriate. The state statutes and

4 regulation provided by defendants contain facts that can be readily determined from accurate

5 sources. Moreover, in his operative pleading, plaintiff referred to and provided the notice that

6 California state law requires the administration of TB tests, and that forced testing may be

7 imposed. (ECF No. 16 at 14.) Plaintiff also cites to California Code of Regulations, Title 15

8 § 3351. (ECF No. 16 at 4.)

9 Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of such documents, “without converting the

10 motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908 (citations

11 omitted).

12 IV. Motion to Dismiss

13 In screening plaintiff’s pleading, the undersigned found that plaintiff stated potentially

14 cognizable Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims based on his allegations that he was

15 involuntarily forced to submit to a TB skin test. (ECF No. 16 at 3.)

16 A. Legal Standards Governing Motion to Dismiss

17 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides for motions to dismiss for

18 “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In

19 considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court

20 must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89

21 (2007), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v.

22 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir.

23 1999). Still, to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must contain more

24 than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

25 cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In other words,

26 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

27 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim

28 upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

1 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

2 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556

3 U.S. at 678.

4 “As a general rule, ‘a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in

5 ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir.

6 2001) (quoting Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994)). Otherwise, the motion is

7 treated as one for summary judgment. Id. There are exceptions for material which is properly

8 submitted as part of the complaint and “matters of public record” which may be judicially

9 noticed. Id. at 688-89. “If the documents are not physically attached to the complaint, they may

10 be considered if the documents’ ‘authenticity . . . is not contested’ and ‘the plaintiff’s complaint

11 necessarily relies’ on them.” Id. at 688(quoting Parrino v. FHD, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-06 (9th

12 Cir. 1998).

13 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears

14 beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would

15 entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In general, pro se

16 pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner,

17 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court has an obligation to construe such pleadings liberally. Bretz

18 v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the court’s liberal

19 interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

20 pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

21 B. The Parties’ Positions

22 1. Defendants’ Motion

23 Defendants contend that plaintiff fails to state a claim for administration of a TB skin test.

24 First, plaintiff fails to identify the particular administration of the TB test he challenges. He does

25 not allege any facts regarding when or how he was forcibly subjected to a test he allegedly

26 refused, or how the defendants participated in the administration of such test, including the April

27 29, 2016 test mentioned in the appended exhibits. Plaintiff does not allege how any testing

28 mentioned in his pleading or its attachments was “unreasonable or inconsistent with the

1 penological goal of protecting the health and safety of inmates and staff.” (ECF No. 56-1 at 3,

2 citing Washington v. Cambra, No. C 95-3216 TEH, 1996 WL 507313, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27,

3 1996.)

4 Second, defendants argue that plaintiff’s unexplained reliance on California Code of

5 Regulations (“CCR”) section 3351(e) is unavailing because it expressly exempts TB tests, and

6 California Penal Code section 7574 permits the involuntary testing of an inmate. Id. Also, in

7 Rhinehart, the district court evaluated medical “treatment” under a similar section, CCR section

8 3355, and found that section 3355 did not apply “because the TB test alone was not intended as a

9 treatment or medication, but rather was intended to “prevent the spread of an infectious disease.”

10 Rhinehart v. Gomez, No. 93-cv-3747, 1995 WL 364339, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 1995). Plaintiff

11 fails to show how the administration of the TB test was unreasonable, and defendants contend the

12 mere administration of the test, standing alone, is insufficient to state a claim.

13 Further, defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity because there is no

14 established law finding that the involuntary administration of a TB test violates an individual’s

15 due process rights. Tuberculosis “is a highly contagious disease in prison populations,” and

16 protecting inmates’ health and preventing the spread of disease in prison are legitimate

17 penological goals. Funtanilla v. Campbell, 95 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1996). California Penal Code

18 Section 7574 has provided for mandatory TB testing since at least 2012, and both defendants

19 acted in compliance with § 7574 by mandating annual TB testing, and would not have reasonably

20 believed or understood such conduct to be unlawful. Similarly, defendants are entitled to

21 qualified immunity from plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim because there is no binding case

22 law finding a Fourth Amendment violation for the general administration of a TB skin test.

23 Finally, defendants ask the court to disregard plaintiff’s claims that defendant Lewis failed

24 to provide plaintiff a waiver to comply with a TB test because plaintiff fails to identify the

25 particular TB test at issue, and plaintiff’s exhibits demonstrate he was aware of the change in

26 policy in May 2016 that permits inmates to opt out of TB testing, undercutting any claim by

27 plaintiff that he was forced to submit to a TB test after May of 2016. (ECF No. 56-1 at 7.)

28 ////

1 2. Plaintiff’s Opposition

2 On November 12, 2019, plaintiff filed a four-sentence opposition signed under penalty of

3 perjury. Plaintiff claims that “[t]he California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation is liable for

4 the ‘cancer causation’ created via state personnel and contracted physicians,” and is “fully

5 responsible for monetary damages in civil jury trial.” (ECF No. 64 at 1.) Plaintiff claims this

6 makes “qualified immunity inapplicable issue for” defendants. (Id.)

7 C. State Laws and Regulations Governing TB Testing

8 Tuberculosis testing in California prisons is required under California Penal Code § 7570:

9 [T]he Legislature hereby finds and declares that tuberculosis is a

serious contagious disease. It is vital to the health and safety of

10 inmates, employees, and the public at large, to conduct appropriate

examinations, testing, and treatment in order to control the spread of

11 tuberculosis in California's institutions.

12 Id. (ECF No. 56-2 at 5.) “The chief of medical services, or his or her designee” is tasked with

13 “full powers” to investigate incidents of TB and to “ascertain the source” of such infection. Cal.

14 Penal Code § 7572. (ECF No. 56-2 at 6.) The chief medical officer of a state prison is authorized

15 to administer TB tests “on all inmates” “at least annually.” Cal. Penal Code § 7573(b). (ECF No.

16 56-2 at 7.) Moreover, prison staff may test inmates against their will and may impose

17 disciplinary action against an inmate who refuses to be tested. Cal. Penal Code § 7574. (ECF

18 No. 56-2 at 8.) California Code of Regulations, Title 15 § 3351(e) confirms that involuntary

19 testing for TB is permitted:

20 Health care treatment, including medication, shall not be forced over

the objections of a mentally competent inmate; the guardian of a

21 mentally incompetent inmate; or a responsible relative of a minor

inmate, except in an emergency, or as required to complete the

22 examination or tests for tuberculosis infection, or to implement the

treatment for tuberculosis disease, or unless the provisions of Probate

23 Code Sections 3200 et seq. or the procedures set forth in Penal Code

(PC) Section 2602 are followed.

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25 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3351(e). (ECF No. 56-2 at 11.)

26 ////

27 ////

28 ////

1 V. Qualified Immunity

2 A. Legal Standards

3 Qualified immunity applies when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly established

4 statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. White v.

5 Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017). Officers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983

6 unless (1) the officers violate a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness

7 of their conduct was “clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.

8 577, 589 (2018); White, 137 S. Ct. at 551. “Clearly established” means that the statutory or

9 constitutional question was “beyond debate,” such that every reasonable official would

10 understand that what he is doing is unlawful. See Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589; Vos v. City of

11 Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2018). This is a “demanding standard” that

12 protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Wesby, 138 S.

13 Ct. at 589 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). To be “clearly established,” a rule

14 must be dictated by controlling authority or by a robust consensus of cases of persuasive

15 authority. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589; see also Perez v. City of Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 856-57

16 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that Ninth Circuit precedent is sufficient to meet the “clearly established”

17 prong of qualified immunity); Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2016)

18 (“[D]istrict court decisions -- unlike those from the courts of appeals -- do not necessarily settle

19 constitutional standards or prevent repeated claims of qualified immunity.”). In examining

20 whether a rule/right is clearly established, courts are to define the law to a “high degree of

21 specificity,” and not “at a high level of generality.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590; Kisela v. Hughes,

22 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018). The key question is “whether the violative nature of particular

23 conduct is clearly established” in the specific context of the case. Vos, 892 F.3d at 1035 (quoting

24 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)). Although it is not necessary to identify a case that

25 is “directly on point,” generally the plaintiff needs to identify where an officer acting under

26 similar circumstances was held to have violated federal right. Wesby, 138 U.S. at 577; Vos, 892

27 F.3d at 1035; Felarca v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809, 822 (9th Cir. 2018); Shafer v. City of Santa

28 Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017).

1 In a § 1983 action, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing defendants violated their clearly

2 established rights. Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991); see also

3 LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Once the defense of qualified

4 immunity is raised by the defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the rights

5 allegedly violated were ‘clearly established.’” (citation omitted)). “If that burden is satisfied, the

6 defendant must prove that his conduct was ‘reasonable.’” LSO, Ltd., 205 F.3d at 1157.

7 B. Discussion

8 Defendants invoke qualified immunity on both plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth

9 Amendment claims. In opposition, plaintiff cites no authority demonstrating that defendants are

10 not entitled to qualified immunity on either claim. (ECF No. 64.) Plaintiff does not argue that

11 there was no legitimate penological purpose for the TB skin tests he was required to have. Thus,

12 plaintiff fails to bear his burden to show that the rights plaintiff alleges were violated were clearly

13 established.

14 “[T]uberculosis is particularly dangerous in a prison environment, where overcrowding

15 and poor ventilation can hasten the spread of this airborne disease.” See Madrid v. Gomez, 889

16 F. Supp. 1146, 1205 (N.D. Cal. 1995). As early as 1993, the State of California has recognized

17 that tuberculosis is a serious contagious disease, which presents a serious risk to inmates’ health.

18 Cal. Penal Code Section 7570 (effective Oct. 8, 1993). The notice to inmates provided by

19 plaintiff confirms that the TB skin test is required under California state law, and explains the

20 serious nature of TB and why the TB skin test is important. (ECF No. 16 at 14.) Such legislative

21 action demonstrates that the requirement that prison inmates be tested for TB on an annual basis

22 is a legitimate penological goal in order to avoid the spread of a contagious disease and the

23 serious risk to the health of other inmates and prison staff.

24 No party has cited, and the undersigned has not found, a published Ninth Circuit or

25 Supreme Court case addressing the mandatory or forced administration of TB tests on prison

26 inmates. However, in unreported decisions, two California district courts have upheld the

27 punishment of inmates who refused the TB test. Washington v. Cambra, 1996 WL 507313 at 2-4;

28 Rhinehart, 1995 WL 364339 at *4 (Washington v. Harper justifies prison policy of involuntary

1 testing and treatment for TB). Other courts outside the Ninth Circuit have similarly upheld

2 mandatory and forced TB testing of prisoners. See Mack v. Campbell, 1991 WL 243569 (6th Cir.

3 1991) (administrative segregation for refusing TB screening test does not violate due process);

4 Karolis v. New Jersey Dept. of Corr., 935 F. Supp. 523, 527-28 (D. N.J. 1996) (involuntary

5 administration of TB test to prisoner upheld against challenge under Religious Freedom

6 Restoration Act because there is a compelling interest in stopping the spread of TB in a prison);

7 Hasenmeier-McCarthy v. Rose, 986 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 1998) (mandatory TB testing

8 accomplished legitimate penological interest of protecting other inmates and staff from infectious

9 diseases); Dunn v. Zenk, 2007 WL 2904170, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 1, 2007) (“states have a

10 legitimate penological interest in controlling the spread of tuberculosis such that involuntary

11 administration of a test for the disease does not offend the Constitution,” finding the former

12 inmate’s claim that he was forced to take the TB test against his will failed to state a cognizable

13 civil rights claim.).

14 In Rhinehart, the plaintiff, a practicing Muslim, argued in his underlying administrative

15 appeal that his religious beliefs prevented him from submitting to mandatory TB testing, but in

16 his moving papers argued that the TB testing violates due process by “unjustified intrusions [sic]

17 on personal security.” Id. at *1. Rhinehart was physically compelled by prison staff to submit to

18 TB testing during a cell extraction. The district court relied on Harper, 494 U.S. at 210, to find

19 that the defendants had a “right to administer involuntary TB tests because the tests can prevent

20 harm both to the prisoner and to others,” and such legitimate interest outweighed Rhinehart’s

21 interests. Rhinehart, 1995 WL 364339 at *3.

22 In Cambra, two inmates refused to submit to TB testing because they had been tested

23 twelve weeks prior. Prison staff forcibly extracted the inmates from their cell using pepper spray

24 so the inmates could be involuntarily tested for TB. The district court stated that, absent a

25 showing that TB testing is reasonably related to a legitimate penological goal, TB testing may

26 violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, but

27 concluded that the practice of testing inmates when they arrived at the prison, and again twelve

28 weeks later to determine whether the inmate had been exposed to TB, was reasonable and

1 constitutional. Cambra, 1996 WL 507313, at *3.

2 Here, plaintiff does not allege that either defendant physically forced plaintiff to take TB

3 tests, or that he was otherwise punished for any alleged refusal to be tested. Rather, plaintiff

4 argues that defendants required or enforced the TB tests, and defendant Lewis refused to exempt

5 plaintiff from the April 29, 2016 TB testing. In determining whether defendants are entitled to

6 qualified immunity, the question is whether it would have been clear to a reasonable Director or

7 Deputy Director knowing what such defendants knew, viewed in the light most favorable to

8 plaintiff, that requiring or enforcing mandatory TB testing as required under California state law

9 posed such a substantial risk of serious harm that it would be constitutionally impermissible.

10 Plaintiff’s amended complaint and its attachments, viewed in the light most favorable to

11 plaintiff, confirms that defendants were acting in compliance with California state statutes.

12 Defendants were obligated to test plaintiff for TB under California law, and had authority to

13 impose TB tests on prisoners involuntarily. Cal. Penal Code Sections 7570, 7574. Such code

14 sections have not been found to be unconstitutional.

15 Moreover, at the time of this incident, it was not clearly established that prison

16 administrators tasked with requiring or enforcing the administration of annual mandatory TB

17 testing would violate an inmate’s constitutional rights by doing so. Plaintiff provides no legal

18 authority demonstrating defendants violated any established constitutional right. Plaintiff cites no

19 legal authority showing that it is beyond debate that enforcing the annual mandatory TB testing

20 for prison inmates, required under state law, is not performed for a legitimate penological goal, or

21 that defendants would not have reasonably believed or understood their conduct in enforcing the

22 requirement would be lawful. Indeed, he provided no legal authority in opposition to defendants’

23 motion.4 The undersigned finds that a reasonable Director or Deputy Director in defendants’

24

4 In his pleading, plaintiff relies on Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), and Rogers v. Okin,

25

478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979). In Mills, the Court addressed the involuntary administration

of antipsychotic medications for involuntarily committed mental health patients, and therefore is

26

distinguishable from the instant case. Id. Rogers, an out-of-circuit district court case, addressed

27 whether a committed, mentally ill patient could, without a judicial proceeding, be forced to take

mind-altering drugs in a non-emergency situation, and thus is distinguishable and also has no

28 persuasive value. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. 1342, aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 634 F.2d

MASE 2b POU YO LING INTTING IN VUUTIOCTIL OU POC VEO e OY AO VE te

1 | positions could have believed that requiring or enforcing a TB test on plaintiff did not offend the

2 | Constitution, under either the Fourth or the Fourteenth Amendments.

3 Therefore, the undersigned recommends that defendants be granted qualified immunity

4 | and this action be dismissed.

5 | VI. Conclusion

6 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

7 1. Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 67) to strike is granted;

8 2. Plaintiffs filings (ECF Nos. 65, 66) are stricken;

9 3. Defendants’ request for judicial notice (ECF No. 56) is granted.

10 Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

11 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 56) be granted in part;

12 2. Defendants be granted qualified immunity; and

13 3. This action be dismissed without prejudice.

14 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

15 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within twenty-one days

16 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner any party may file written

17 | objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

18 | “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

19 | objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The

20 | parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

21 || appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

22 | Dated: July 30, 2020

3 Aectl Aharon

24 KENDALL J. NE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

25 || /vowe0981.mtd.12b6

26

27 | 650 Cist Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982),

certified questions answered sub nom., Rogers v. Commissioner of Mental Health, 390 Mass.

28 | 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983), remanded, Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).

12

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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