explaining constitutional standards for evaluating 27 claims based upon removal of children
How later courts described this case
- explaining constitutional standards for evaluating 27 claims based upon removal of children
- holding that the domestic relations exception to federal subject matter 23 jurisdiction “divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody 24 decrees.”
- a state agency may remove children from their parents’ custody in 1 an emergency situation if the children are subject to immediate or apparent danger or harm.
- “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment[] guarantee[s] ‘that parents and children will not 5 be separated by the state without due process of law except in an emergency.’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7
JOSE RAYMUNDO LEAL, Case No. 1:19-cv-01223-DAD-BAM
8
Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER GRANTING
9 PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AN
v. AMENDED COMPLAINT
10
P.O. MUZUKA, et al., (Doc. No. 1)
11
Defendants. THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE
12
13
Plaintiff Jose Raymundo Leal (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed
14
this civil rights action on September 5, 2019. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff’s complaint is currently
15
before the Court for screening.
16
II. Screening Requirement and Standard
17
The Court screens complaints brought by persons proceeding in pro se and in forma
18
pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to
19
dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
20
granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
21
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
22
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
23
pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
24
required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
25
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
26
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as
27
true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
28
1 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
2 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires
3 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable
4 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret
5 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully
6 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility
7 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
8 III. Plaintiff’s Allegations
9 Plaintiff names P.O. Mazuka, a Probation Officer with the Kings County Probation
10 Department, and Child Protective Services (“CPS”) as defendants. In his form complaint,
11 Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fifth Amendment rights as
12 well as claims for “false information, slander, [and] defamation of character.” (Doc. No. 1 at 3.)
13 Plaintiff alleges that he was released from Wasco State Prison and was in the process of
14 family reunification services. CPS was determined to have his newborn and two-year-old
15 daughters adopted and asked Plaintiff’s probation officer about his special conditions of
16 probation. Plaintiff contends that he had none upon release but, after CPS talked to Plaintiff’s
17 probation officer, the probation officer called Plaintiff and stated he had special conditions to
18 sign. Plaintiff’s probation officer made Plaintiff sign conditions that he would not be allowed
19 around minors under eighteen years of age. CPS then denied Plaintiff’s reunification and took his
20 parental rights.
21 Plaintiff further alleges that he appeared in front of a judge for violation of his probation
22 and asked why he had special conditions. The judge stated that there were no special conditions
23 on record and only a judge had authority to make those conditions. Plaintiff was found to be not
24 in violation of his probation. Another probation officer tried to help Plaintiff get visits started, but
25 by that time Plaintiff’s daughters had been adopted by another family. Plaintiff has filed an appeal
26 but has not received any response.
27 In his request for relief, Plaintiff requests that his children be returned to him, counseling
28 for him and his children, an apology, and for defendants to be accountable for lies they told.
1 Plaintiff states that if a jury decides to grant him and his family funding for the pain this situation
2 has caused then so be it, but that is not what Plaintiff is looking for.
3 IV. Discussion
4 Plaintiff’s complaint does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to
5 state a cognizable claim for relief. As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he will be granted leave to
6 amend his complaint to cure the identified deficiencies to the extent he can do so in good faith.
7 To assist Plaintiff, the Court provides the pleading and legal standards that appear relevant to his
8 allegations.
9 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
10 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain
11 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed
12 factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
13 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation
14 omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
15 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
16 While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly,
17 550 U.S. at 556–557.
18 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges various claims but does not state which facts relate to which
19 claim or how the facts relate to the legal claims raised. Although Plaintiff names P.O. Mazuka as
20 a defendant, he is not identified anywhere in the factual allegations. It is unclear which claims
21 Plaintiff asserts against P.O. Mazuka and what the factual basis for those claims may be. Plaintiff
22 fails to adequately describe specific actions taken by each of the defendants named in the
23 complaint that violated his constitutional rights. Instead, the complaint is filled with opaque,
24 scattershot factual allegations and generalized statements. This is not permissible because it does
25 not give the defendants “fair notice” of the claims against which they must defend and the facts
26 and legal theories that give rise to the claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
27 Plaintiff must set forth factual allegations against each named defendant sufficient to state
28 a claim. If Plaintiff elects to amend his complaint, he must separate each claim, state the legal
1 basis for the claim, and identify how the facts alleged support and show that the particular
2 defendant committed the violation asserted as the legal basis for the claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
3 8(a). The failure to do so may result in dismissal of this action.
4 B. Linkage Requirement
5 The Civil Rights Act, under which certain claims proceed, provides:
6 Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the
7 deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
8 law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
9 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between
10 the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff.
11 See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
12 The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional
13 right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's
14 affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the
15 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
16 Plaintiff alleges a chronology of events and circumstances following his release from
17 Wasco State Prison. However, Plaintiff fails to link each defendant to his claims. Additionally, as
18 mentioned above, Plaintiff refers generally to at least two different “PO[s]” but does not identify
19 P.O. Mazuka or describe his involvement. If Plaintiff elects to amend his complaint, he must
20 allege what each individual defendant did or did not do that resulted in a violation of his
21 constitutional rights. Plaintiff must clearly identify which defendant(s) he believes are responsible
22 for each violation of his constitutional rights and set forth the supporting factual basis so that the
23 complaint places each defendant on notice of Plaintiff’s claims against him or her. See Austin v.
24 Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). A chronological listing is insufficient, and Plaintiff
25 must instead link each defendant to specific constitutional claims.
26 B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
27 Plaintiff may not pursue a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against CPS.
28 CPS is not a proper defendant because it is a state entity immune from suit under the Eleventh
1 Amendment. See Gomez v. Fresno Police Dep't, 2016 WL 2939416, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 20,
2 2016) (finding Child Protective Services not a proper defendant in section 1983 action because it
3 is a state entity immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment).1
4 A claim for civil rights violations pursuant to section 1983 requires a “person” acting
5 under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Local governmental units, such as counties or
6 municipalities, are considered “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of
7 State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70, (1989). However, municipal departments and sub-units are
8 generally not considered “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983. United States v. Kama,
9 394 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2005) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (municipal police departments and
10 bureaus are generally not considered “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see
11 also Hopton v. Fresno Cty. Human Health Sys., 2020 WL 3035157, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 5,
12 2020) (“[N]aming a municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading
13 a [Section] 1983 action against a municipality.”) (citation omitted); Sanders v. Aranas, 2008 WL
14 268972, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2008) (Fresno Police Department not a proper defendant
15 because it is a sub-department of the City of Fresno and is not a person within the meaning of §
16 1983).
17 Additionally, a public entity cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of its
18 employees in violation of section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. See Monell v. Dep’t of
19 Soc. Servs., , 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Rather, a municipality can only be held liable for injuries
20 caused by the execution of its policy or custom or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said
21 to represent official policy. Id. at 694. To impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation
22 1 Although Plaintiff has not named any individual CPS employees as defendants, to assist Plaintiff the Court notes
that social workers are also absolutely immune from civil liability for claims concerning their “discretionary, quasi-
23 prosecutorial decisions to institute court dependency proceedings to take custody away from parents.” Beltran v.
Santa Clara Cty., 514 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898 (9th Cir.
24 2003)); see also Meyers v. Contra Costa Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987). The immunity
“covers the official activities of social workers only when they perform quasi-prosecutorial or quasi-judicial
25 functions in juvenile dependency court.” Hardwick v. Cty. of Orange, 844 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017). Social
workers may have absolute immunity when discharging functions that are “critical to the judicial process
26 itself.” Beltran, 514 F.3d at 908. “[S]ocial workers are not afforded absolute immunity for their investigatory
conduct, discretionary decisions or recommendations.” Tamas v. Dep't of Social & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 842
27 (9th Cir. 2010). In those instances, only qualified, not absolute, immunity is available. Miller, 335 F.3d at 898.
Examples of such discretionary decisions include “decisions and recommendations as to the particular home where
28 a child is to go or as to the particular foster parents who are to provide care.” Id.
1 of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional
2 right of which [he] was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy
3 amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is
4 the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” See Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 Cty. of
5 Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). For
6 municipal liability, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts regarding the specific nature of the
7 alleged policy, custom or practice to allow the defendant to effectively defend itself, and these
8 facts must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See AE v. Cty. of Tulare, 666
9 F.3d 631, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2012). It is not sufficient to merely allege that a policy, custom or
10 practice existed or that individual officers’ wrongdoing conformed to a policy, custom or
11 practice. See id. at 636–68. Thus, even if Plaintiff properly named a local government unit
12 subject to suit under section 1983, the complaint fails to state a claim against it because there
13 is no allegation that any action inflicting injury flowed from either an explicitly adopted or a
14 tacitly authorized governmental policy.
15 C. Child Custody Claims
16 The crux of Plaintiff’s complaint appears to involve child custody and visitation issues.
17 Notably, Plaintiff’s allegations seem to indicate that he has appealed the state court decision
18 regarding custody of his children. Further, Plaintiff requests that the Court return his children to
19 him.
20 The Court is without jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims concerning child custody issues
21 because they are exclusively matters of state law. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,
22 702-704 (1992) (holding that the domestic relations exception to federal subject matter
23 jurisdiction “divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody
24 decrees.”); see also Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir.1983) (stating that “federal
25 courts have uniformly held that they should not adjudicate cases involving domestic relations,
26 including ‘the custody of minors and a fortiori, right of visitation.’ For that matter, the whole
27 subject of domestic relations and particularly child custody problems is generally considered a
28 state law matter.”). “Even when a federal question is presented, federal courts decline to hear
1 disputes which would deeply involve them in adjudicating domestic matters.” Thompson v.
2 Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir.1986).
3 Further, to the extent Plaintiff is challenging an order of the state court regarding custody
4 or visitation, he may not do so. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the final
5 determinations of state court dependency proceedings. See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v.
6 McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir.1986) (“The United States District Court ... has no authority
7 to review the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings.”). Under the Rooker-
8 Feldman doctrine, a federal district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear an
9 appeal from the judgment of a state court. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
10 U.S. 280, 283-84 (2005); see also Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
11 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims
12 against CPS or its employees relating to the removal of his daughters from his custody, which
13 presumably arise from state court orders, would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
14 Johnson v. Child Protective Servs., 2017 WL 4387309, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2017) (finding
15 that constitutional claims relating to plaintiffs' children being removed from their custody and
16 placed in foster care, which were the subject of a state court action, barred by the Rooker-
17 Feldman doctrine).
18 D. Fifth Amendment
19 Plaintiff’s complaint claims that his constitutional rights arising under the Fifth
20 Amendment were violated. The Fifth Amendment protects one’s right to be deprived of life,
21 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Fifth Amendment’s
22 due process clause applies only to the federal government.” Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169,
23 1174 (9th Cir.2008). None of the defendants named in the complaint are federal actors. As such,
24 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief for violation of the Fifth Amendment’s due
25 process clause.
26 The Fourteenth Amendment, in turn, prohibits state deprivations without due process.
27 Bingue, 512 F.3d at 1174. However, even construing the complaint liberally, the Court cannot
28 discern from the complaint which, if any, of Plaintiff’s rights arising under the Fourteenth
1 Amendment were violated or what affirmative act or omission each defendant committed to cause
2 such a violation. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he must specify which of his
3 constitutional rights he contends was violated and allege, in specific terms, how each defendant is
4 involved.
5 E. Due Process
6 It appears that Plaintiff may be alleging a denial of familial association. However, the
7 nature of this claim is unclear. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court nevertheless provides
8 Plaintiff with the standard for such a claim.
9 Parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care and custody of their
10 children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). “A parent’s desire for and right to ‘the
11 companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children’ is an important interest that
12 ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. ”
13 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N. C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v.
14 Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)); accord Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 655 (9th
15 Cir. 1985). Further, the Supreme Court held long ago that an unwed father’s interest in having
16 custody of his children is cognizable and substantial. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652.
17 A parent “may state a cause of action under [Section] 1983 when she alleges that the state
18 terminated her parent-child relationship without due process of law.” Smoot v. City of Placentia,
19 950 F. Supp. 282, 283 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The Ninth Circuit has generally characterized the right to
20 familial association as a liberty right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
21 Amendment. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685–86 (9th Cir. 2001); Wallis v. Spencer,
22 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Parents and children have a well-elaborated constitutional
23 right to live together without governmental interference .... That right is an essential liberty
24 interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that parents and children will not be
25 separated by the state without due process of law except in an emergency.”); see also Keates v.
26 Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining constitutional standards for evaluating
27 claims based upon removal of children).
28 The right to familial association has both a procedural and a substantive component.
1 Keates, 883 F.3d at 1236. “While the right is a fundamental liberty interest, officials may interfere
2 with the right if they “provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures[.]” Keates, 883 F.3d
3 at 1236 (internal citations omitted); see also Kirkpatrick v. Cty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 789
4 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment[] guarantee[s] ‘that parents and children will not
5 be separated by the state without due process of law except in an emergency.’”) (quoting Wallis v.
6 Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999)). Substantively, “‘official conduct that ‘shocks the
7 conscience’ in depriving [family members] of [a liberty interest in the companionship and society
8 of a family member] is cognizable as a violation of due process.’” Estate of Osuna v. Cty. of
9 Stanislaus, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1176 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d
10 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010)); Estate of Prasad ex rel. Prasad v. Cty. of Sutter, 958 F. Supp. 2d 1101,
11 1126 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (To violate the substantive due process right to family integrity, a
12 defendant's “alleged conduct must ‘shock[ ] the conscience.’”) (citations omitted); but see Crowe
13 v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 441 n. 23 (9th Cir.2010) (“The standard for deprivation
14 of familial companionship is ‘unwarranted interference,’ not conduct which ‘shocks the
15 conscience.’”) (citations omitted). In determining whether conduct shocks the conscience, the
16 Court must first ask whether the circumstances are such that actual deliberation is practical.
17 Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 554. Where actual deliberation is practical, then “deliberate indifference”
18 may suffice to shock the conscience. Id.
19 “While a constitutional liberty interest in the maintenance of the familial relationship
20 exists, this right is not absolute. The interest of the parents must be balanced against the interests
21 of the state and, when conflicting, against the interests of the children.” Woodrum v. Woodward
22 Cty., Okl., 866 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1989). To state a claim under the Due Process Clause, it
23 is not enough to allege that a state actor interfered with the familial relationship. Id. at 1125.
24 “Officials may not remove children from their parents without a court order unless they have
25 ‘information at the time of the seizure that establishes reasonable cause to believe that the child is
26 in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.’” Keates, 883 F.3d at 1236 (quoting Rogers v.
27 County of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also Caldwell v. LeFaver, 928
28 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1991) (a state agency may remove children from their parents’ custody in
1 an emergency situation if the children are subject to immediate or apparent danger or harm.).
2 Here, it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s children were removed by court order, but it appears
3 such an order may exist in light of Plaintiff’s allegations. Plaintiff cannot state a cognizable claim
4 for denial of familial association in violation of due process where a lawful removal court order
5 has issued. Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate he was not accorded the due
6 process rights of notice and an opportunity to be heard in the proceeding. See Kirk v. I.N.S., 927
7 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Procedural due process requires adequate notice and an
8 opportunity to be heard.”). Nor has Plaintiff pled sufficient factual detail for the Court to
9 determine whether defendants’ actions or policies “shocked the conscience” for purposes of a
10 substantive due process claim.
11 F. State Law Claims
12 1. Claims Presentation Requirement
13 Plaintiff asserts state law claims for false information, slander, and defamation of
14 character. However, Plaintiff fails to show compliance with the claims presentation requirement
15 so as to be allowed to proceed on any such claims in this action.
16 As set forth in California Government Code sections 810 et seq., a plaintiff may not bring
17 a suit for monetary damages against a public employee or entity unless the plaintiff first presented
18 the claim to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (“VCGCB” or
19 “Board”), and the Board acted on the claim, or the time for doing so expired. “The Tort Claims
20 Act requires that any civil complaint for money or damages first be presented to and rejected by
21 the pertinent public entity.” Munoz v. California, 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776 (1995). The
22 purpose of this requirement is “to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to
23 adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation,”
24 City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447, 455 (1974) (citations omitted), and “to confine
25 potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if
26 the various requirements of the Act are satisfied,” Nuveen Mun. High Income Opportunity Fund
27 v. City of Alameda, Cal., 730 F.3d 1111, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013). Compliance with this “claim
28 presentation requirement” constitutes an element of a cause of action for damages against a public
1 entity or official. State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1244 (2004). Thus, in the
2 state courts, “failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim
3 presentation requirement subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer for failure to state
4 a cause of action.” Id. at 1239 (fn. omitted).
5 Federal courts likewise must require compliance with the claims presentation requirement
6 for pendant state law claims that seek damages against state public employees or entities. Willis
7 v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 702, 704 (9th Cir.1969); Mangold v. California Public Utilities Commission,
8 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir.1995). State tort claims included in a federal action, filed pursuant to
9 42 U.S.C. § 1983, may proceed only if the claims were first presented to the state in compliance
10 with the claim presentation requirement. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839
11 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir.1988); Butler v. Los Angeles County, 617 F.Supp.2d 994, 1001 (C.D.
12 Cal.2008).
13 2. Supplemental Jurisdiction
14 Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district
15 court has original jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
16 other claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
17 controversy under Article III,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). The Supreme Court
18 has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be
dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
19
Although the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff must
20
first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In the absence of
21
any cognizable federal claims, the Court declines to individually screen Plaintiff’s purported state
22
law claims.
23
V. Conclusion and Order
24
Plaintiff’s complaint does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to
25
state a cognizable claim for relief. As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will grant Plaintiff
26
an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure the deficiencies to the extent he is able to do so in
27
good faith. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
28
1 Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what
2 each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights or
3 otherwise harmed Plaintiff. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual
4 allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . ..” Twombly,
5 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
6 Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated
7 claims in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no
8 “buckshot” complaints).
9 Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.
10 Lacey, 693 F.3d at 927. Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be “complete in itself
11 without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220.
12 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
13 1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;
14 2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a
15 first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order or file a
16 notice of voluntary dismissal; and
17 3. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order,
18 the Court will recommend dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a
19 court order and for failure to state a claim.
20
IT IS SO ORDERED.
21
22 Dated: July 21, 2020 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
23
24
25
26
27
28