“It is well established that the privilege to 24 represent oneself pro se . . . is personal to the litigant and does not extend to other parties or 25 entities.”
How later courts described this case
- “It is well established that the privilege to 24 represent oneself pro se . . . is personal to the litigant and does not extend to other parties or 25 entities.”
- affirming the decision of a 26 district court that a pro se prisoner “could not prosecute the instant action as a class action”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 KEITH A. BROWN, Case No. 1:18-cv-00470-AWI-JDP
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND MOTION
13 v. TO APPOINT COUNSEL
14 JENNIFER SHAFFER, et al., ECF No. 15
15 Defendants. ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF NOTIFY THE
COURT WHETHER HE INTENDS TO FILE A
16 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS OF THIS ORDER
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18 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this civil rights action brought
19 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 21, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion for class certification and for
20 appointed counsel. ECF No. 15. Plaintiff submits that his complaint raises issues common to a
21 class, and that the issues are of sufficient complexity to warrant counsel. Id.
22 Because he is proceeding pro se, plaintiff is not entitled to represent a class. See Simon v.
23 Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is well established that the privilege to
24 represent oneself pro se . . . is personal to the litigant and does not extend to other parties or
25 entities.”); Welch v. Terhune, 11 F. App’x 747, 747 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming the decision of a
26 district court that a pro se prisoner “could not prosecute the instant action as a class action”).
27 Plaintiff’s motion for class certification is therefore denied.
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1 Moreover, plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action,
2 see Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn in part on other grounds
3 on reh’g en banc, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), and the court lacks the authority to require an
4 attorney to represent plaintiff, see Mallard v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
5 Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). This court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel. See
6 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. However, without a means to compensate
7 counsel, the court will seek volunteer counsel only in exceptional circumstances. In determining
8 whether such circumstances exist, “the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success
9 on the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the
10 complexity of the legal issues involved.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (internal quotation marks and
11 citations omitted).
12 The court cannot conclude that exceptional circumstances requiring the appointment of
13 counsel are present here. At this stage in the proceedings, plaintiff has not demonstrated a
14 likelihood of success on the merits, and the issues covered in his complaint do not appear
15 unusually complex. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel, ECF No. 26,
16 is denied without prejudice. The court may revisit this issue at a later stage of the proceedings if
17 the interests of justice so require.
18 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
19 On May 13, 2019, the court screened plaintiff’s first amended complaint and
20 recommended the dismissal of certain claims and defendants. ECF No. 13. On May 13, plaintiff
21 filed objections, focusing in particular on his claims against defendant Brynulfsen. ECF No. 14.
22 While the May 13 recommendation has not been formally adopted by the court, we note
23 that adoption would not prevent plaintiff from filing a second amended complaint. Thus, should
24 plaintiff wish to make out his allegations against defendant Brynulfsen in more detail, he may
25 wish to consider filing a second amended complaint that does so. Filing a second amended
26 complaint would allow plaintiff’s case to continue without further delay.
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wOAoOe 4.4000 VOUT ENN RA MMU tC ee Oy VV
1 Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff is ordered to notify the court
2 | whether he intends to file a second amended complaint.
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4 IT IS SO ORDERED.
° y 2, —N prssann —
Dated: _ July 2, 2020
6 UNI STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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