referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
How later courts described this case
- referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
- holding that there is no 17 respondeat superior liability under § 1983
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 WILLIAM ERIK MONROE, No. 2:19-CV-2218-DMC-P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 G. MORTELL, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1).
19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,
24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain
25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This
26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the
28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it
1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege
2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the
3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is
4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague
5 and conclusory.
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7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
8 Plaintiff names six defendants: (1) G. Mortell, (2) N. Dordon, (3) C. Cervantes, (4)
9 M. Knedler, (5) Marion E. Spearman, and (6) T. Thompson. Plaintiff claims defendants violated
10 his First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by their actions, or
11 lack thereof, relating to defendant Mortell repeatedly harassing plaintiff.
12 Defendant Mortell is alleged to have repeatedly used derogatory, discriminatory,
13 and racist language towards plaintiff intending to threaten, provoke, and humiliate him.
14 Defendant Mortell also allegedly retaliated against plaintiff for a grievance he filed against
15 Mortell and for plaintiff seeking mental health treatment. Defendant Mortell told his colleagues
16 that he intended to harass plaintiff until he “got the response he desired.” ECF 1 at 6. On May
17 13, 2019, defendant Mortell verbally sexually harassed plaintiff with the intention of humiliating
18 and threatening plaintiff. On May 24, 2019, defendant Mortell ordered another unidentified
19 correctional officer to destroy plaintiff’s new mattress without justification or cause. On August
20 27, 2019, defendant Mortell removed plaintiff’s T.V. antenna without justification or cause.
21 Plaintiff alleges he received multiple 115 rule violations by defendant Mortell in retaliation for
22 filing grievances against defendant Mortell. As punishment for the retaliatory 115 rule violations,
23 plaintiff alleges defendant Dordon authorized defendant Mortell’s request to have plaintiff move
24 housing units on multiple occasions to be under defendant Mortell’s supervision and continued
25 harassment. Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendant Mortell ordered plaintiff’s status to change
26 for 60 days, prohibiting him from working his job assignment and thereby losing his employment.
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1 On May 13, 2019, plaintiff informed defendant Dordon he was sexually harassed
2 by defendant Mortell. As supervisor, defendant Dordon allowed defendant Mortell to continue
3 harassing plaintiff, and authorized housing changes at defendant Mortell’s request. Similarly,
4 plaintiff alleges defendants Cervantes, Knedler, and Spearman are liable insofar as a general
5 failure to act in their roles as supervisors. However, only defendant Spearman officially
6 acknowledged defendant Mortell harassing plaintiff by correspondence dated July 24, 2019.
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8 II. DISCUSSION
9 Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to state cognizable claims of verbal harassment,
10 discrimination, and retaliation against defendant Mortell, violating plaintiff’s Eighth, Fourteenth,
11 and First Amendment rights respectively. Plaintiff also states a cognizable Eighth Amendment
12 claim against defendant Dordon, Mortell’s supervisor. The Court, however, does not find that
13 plaintiff has alleged sufficient factual allegations to state cognizable claims against defendants
14 Cervantes, Knedler, Thompson, or Spearman.
15 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their
16 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no
17 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional
18 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The
19 Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on
20 knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government
21 officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct
22 and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory
23 personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of
24 constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be
25 liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v.
26 Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
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1 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such
2 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.
3 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.
4 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in
5 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th
6 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
7 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676.
8 Plaintiff merely alleges defendants Cervantes, Knedler, Thompson, and Spearman
9 could have prevented defendant Mortell’s harassing behavior, which is insufficient. Plaintiff
10 states that only defendant Spearman actually had knowledge of defendant Mortell’s treatment of
11 plaintiff, but acquiescence on his part is still insufficient. Id. Plaintiff never provides factual
12 allegations claiming defendants Cervantes, Knedler, Thompson, and Spearman implemented any
13 policy encouraging or condoning defendant Mortell’s unconstitutional treatment of plaintiff.
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15 III. CONCLUSION
16 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
17 amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
18 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an
19 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,
20 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the
21 prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An
22 amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
23 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the
24 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See
25 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
26 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
27 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
28 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
WOU 2 LUV LOOMIS MUU OPI ee AY VI
1 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended
2 | complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and
3 || recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such
4 | further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.
5 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff may file a first amended
6 | complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.
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9 | Dated: June 12, 2020 Ssvcqo_
10 DENNIS M. COTA
11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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