A guilty plea is not compelled “whenever motivated by the 7 defendant’s desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider 8 range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by 9 law for the crime charged.”
How later courts described this case
- A guilty plea is not compelled “whenever motivated by the 7 defendant’s desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider 8 range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by 9 law for the crime charged.”
- vacated and 7 remanded on other grounds in Mayle v. Brown, 538 U.S. 901 (2003)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 CARLTON DWAYNE FIELDS, Case No. 1:18-cv-01545-DAD-JDP
12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
13 v. CORPUS, DECLINE TO GRANT A
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND
14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF DENY MOTION TO REDUCE
CORRECTIONS AND RESTITUTION
15 REHABILITATION,
ECF No. 1
16 Respondent.
17
18 Petitioner Carlton Dwayne Fields, a state prisoner without counsel, seeks a writ of habeas
19 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. Petitioner claims that: (1) his trial counsel was
20 ineffective when he failed to develop and present a drug-induced psychosis theory;1 (2) his trial
21 counsel coerced him into pleading no contest; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in
22 sentencing. See id. Petitioner also seeks a reduction in his court-ordered restitution. See id. The
23 respondent argues that the Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of
24 counsel claims was reasonable, and that petitioner’s claim of state-law error does not entitle him
25 to relief. See ECF No. 29. For the reasons stated below, we recommend that the court deny the
26 petition.
27
1 Although petitioner also claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective, he has identified no
28 factual support for this contention. ECF No. 1. Therefore, we cannot analyze this claim.
1 I. Background
2 In 2013, petitioner pleaded no contest to various criminal charges, including mayhem,
3 battery, assault with a deadly weapon, and criminal threats. ECF No. 1 at 1. He was sentenced to
4 21 years in prison. Id. We set forth below the facts of the underlying offenses, as stated by the
5 California Court of Appeal. A presumption of correctness applies to these facts. See 28 U.S.C.
6 § 2254(e)(1); Crittenden v. Chappell, 804 F.3d 998, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2015).
7
Case No. F11903982
8
In May through July 2011, Jane Doe lived on and off with Fields in
9 an apartment in Fresno. On the evening of July 2, 2012, she and
Fields argued because Fields believed she had been unfaithful to
10 him. During the argument, Fields repeatedly threatened to kill her
as he paced back and forth from the living room to the kitchen
11 holding a cake knife. At one point, Fields touched Doe on the
stomach with the knife. Eventually, Doe left the apartment and
12 Fields followed her outside where they continued arguing. Fields
then lifted Doe off the ground and slammed her on the ground.
13 Afterwards, Doe walked back to the apartment to get her
belongings to leave but wound up staying there. The following
14 morning Fields and Doe continued arguing and Fields punched Doe
in her right eye, which caused her eye to go blind. Fields also
15 grabbed Doe by the neck and slapped her on the face. Prior to these
incidents, Fields had assaulted Doe on four or five other separate
16 occasions.
17 On July 3, 2011, Fresno Police Officer Leonard Turk arrested
Fields and transported him to the Fresno County Jail. While Turk
18 used a computer in the patrol car to type out an arrest report, Fields
kept asking for water. Turk told Fields to calm down and he would
19 get Fields some water as soon as they entered the jail. Fields told
the officer that if he did not get him some water, he was going to
20 kick the patrol car’s window out. He then began kicking a rear
window on the patrol car, damaging it.
21
The Psychological Evaluations
22
23 On August 17, 2011, after an issue arose regarding Fields’s mental
competence, the court suspended criminal proceedings and
24 appointed Drs. Howard Terrell and Paula Willis to evaluate Fields.
Dr. Terrell examined Fields on August 22, 2011. In his written
25 evaluation, Dr. Terrell described Fields as appearing to be “floridly
psychotic.” Dr. Terrell diagnosed Fields with nonspecific
26
psychosis and cocaine abuse that was in institutional remission. He
27 recommended the court find Fields mentally incompetent.
On August 25, 2011, Dr. Paula Willis evaluated Fields. Fields did
28 not indicate to Dr. Willis that he had a history of mental disorders.
1 Dr. Willis noted that although Fields claimed he heard voices, he
did not exhibit any outward signs of psychosis, his jail records did
2
not indicate he ever exhibited psychotic symptoms, and Fields’s
thought processes appeared clear, well organized and without
3
delusional content. Dr. Willis administered the Miller Forensic
4 Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST) to Fields, which is used
as a screening tool for malingering symptoms of mental illness. Dr.
5 Willis found that some of the symptoms Fields claimed he was
experiencing indicated he was feigning mental illness and most of
6
his responses were inconsistent with a true clinical disorder. She
7 concluded that Fields was suffering from substance abuse, that if he
suffered any psychotic episodes they may have been induced by
8 illicit drug use, and that there was no evidence that he suffered from
a thought disorder while not under the influence of drugs.
9
On September 21, 2011, the court appointed Dr. Stephen
10
Pointkowski to examine Fields. During his subsequent examination
11 of Fields, Dr. Pointkowski noted that “[j]ail psychiatric records
reflected no credible psychotic symptoms and a pattern of
12 manipulation.” Although Fields initially stated that he continuously
experienced auditory hallucinations, he later described them as
13 intermittent. Additionally, although Fields claimed to have been
experiencing auditory hallucinations throughout the interview, at no
14
time did he appear distracted or to be responding to internal stimuli.
15 In concluding that Fields was probably competent to stand trial, Dr.
Pointkowski wrote, “In all likelihood, Mr. Fields feigned psychotic
16 symptoms and ignorance about legal terminology and processes.”
Dr. Pointkowski also diagnosed Fields with “malingering
17 (provisional).”
18
On October 24, 2011, the court found Fields competent and
reinstated criminal proceedings.
19
20 On February 23, 2012, after an issue regarding Fields’s competency
again arose, the court suspended criminal proceedings and it
21 appointed Drs. Harold Seymour and Robert Taylor to examine
Fields.
22
On March 16, 2012, Dr. Taylor examined Fields. During the
23
interview, Fields appeared to be having an intense interaction with
24 an imaginary woman. However, he appeared surprisingly calm,
unlike a person experiencing a genuine hallucination where the
25 imaginary person was tormenting him.
26
Dr. Taylor administered the M-FAST to Fields and he earned a total
score of 12, which is a level of performance consistent with
27
malingering psychiatric illness. On the Inventory of Legal
28 Knowledge (ILK) test, Fields scored significantly below what is
1 expected by chance and this provided compelling evidence that
Fields was feigning deficits in legal knowledge.
2
In reviewing Fields’s jail psychiatric services (JPS) records, Dr.
3
Taylor noted that Fields had not exhibited psychotic or manic
4 symptoms to JPS staff and his thought processes had been intact
and linear. The JPS records also indicated that Fields had a
5 minimal history of psychiatric treatment that had occurred
exclusively while incarcerated whereas people who genuinely
6
suffer psychotic symptoms typically have a lengthy history of
7 psychiatric treatment and hospitalizations. Dr. Taylor further noted
that Fields claimed he was unable to remember where he was born,
8 his name, his parents’ names or his last employment, that Fields
would have to be suffering from severe dementia in order for these
9 claims to be credible, and that he did not have a history of such a
severe neurological impairment. Dr. Taylor concluded that Fields
10
was malingering psychotic and manic symptoms and recommended
11 the court find him competent to stand trial.
12 Dr. Seymour also evaluated Fields on March 16, 2012. Dr.
Seymour noted that Fields’s thought process was disorganized and
13 that he was experiencing auditory and tactile hallucinations. Dr.
Seymour diagnosed Fields with cocaine dependence, in institutional
14
remission, marijuana abuse, in institutional remission, and
15 psychotic disorder not otherwise specified, and he ruled out
substance induced psychotic disorder. Dr. Seymour noted that
16 tactile hallucinations are commonly associated with cocaine
dependency and he recommended that the court find Fields not
17 competent to stand trial.
18
On March 22, 2012, the court ordered that Fields again be evaluated
19 by Dr. Terrell.
20 On March 24, 2012, Dr. Terrell met with Fields for about eight
minutes at the jail because Fields was extremely uncooperative.
21 Fields fluctuated from laughing and giggling in a hilarious manner
to clenching his fist and making angry hostile statements in a
22
manner suggestive of a psychotic individual who was about to
23 become explosively violent. Based on this short encounter, Dr.
Terrell diagnosed Fields with a psychotic disorder, NOS, and he
24 recommended that the court find Fields not competent to stand trial.
25
On April 26, 2012, the court found Fields incompetent to stand
trial.
26
27 On June 1, 2012, the court committed Fields to Atascadero State
Hospital and he was admitted there on August 2, 2012. In the
28 admission report, psychiatrist Aliuddin Khaja, M.D., noted that
1 Fields reported symptoms that were not typical for psychiatrically
ill patients. Dr. Khaja also noted that Fields’s memory/cognitive
2
deficits and his spelling and mathematical skills did not seem to
correspond to his reported education level and were not consistent
3
with a mentally ill patient. Fields’s initial diagnosis was
4 malingering, polysubstance dependence, and antisocial personality
disorder.
5
Dr. B. Tehrani subsequently performed a malingering evaluation
6
using . . . measures that were intended to detect malingering. Three
7 of these measures indicated Fields was feigning or exaggerating
symptoms. Further, the level of psychiatric impairment reported by
8 Fields would generally be observed in a patient who was floridly
psychotic and had major neurological or intellectual impairment or
9 amnesiac disorder at the same time. However, Fields’s history and
presentation were not consistent with someone with that level of
10
impairment and he was able to function without difficulty and get
11 his needs met on a daily basis in his unit.
12 The results of the SIRS also indicated malingering because “Fields
endorsed an unlikely number of symptoms with extreme or
13 unbearable severity suggesting a strong likelihood he was
exaggerating the severity of his impairment” and “[a]ccording to his
14
test scores, he endorsed probable and definite feigning.” Further,
15 his performance on the ILK indicated a below chance performance,
which implicated feigned deficits in legal knowledge.
16
An assessment report by the hospital filed on September 12, 2012,
17 noted the observations and conclusions of Drs. Khaja and Tehrani
and it reviewed the reports of the other doctors who examined
18
Fields. The report also noted that unit staff and Fields’s treatment
19 team had not observed Fields exhibiting any overt psychiatric
symptoms and that his behavior appeared to be well organized and
20 due to manipulative personality traits and not from a genuine
thought or mood disorder. Additionally, Fields’s behavior was goal
21 oriented and not impulsive or disorganized as would be true of a
person with a genuine thought disorder. Based on the
22
psychological tests and inconsistencies in Fields’s behavior, the
23 treatment team diagnosed Fields with malingering. The report
recommended that Fields be “returned to court as competent to
24 stand trial.”
25
On September 19, 2012, the court considered the report from
Atascadero State Hospital, found Fields competent, and reinstated
26
criminal proceedings.
27
28
1 Fields’s Plea and Sentencing
2
On December 12, 2012, the district attorney filed a first amended
information charging fields with inflicting corporal injury on a
3
cohabitant with a prior conviction (count 1/§ 273.5, subd. (e)(1)),
4 mayhem (count 2/§ 203), battery with serious bodily injury (count
3/§ 243, subd. (d)), assault with a deadly weapon (count 4/§ 245,
5 subd. (a)(1)), criminal threats (count 5/§ 422), and misdemeanor
vandalism (count 6/§ 594, subd. (a)(2)). The information also
6
alleged a great bodily injury enhancement involving domestic
7 violence in count 1 (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), a serious felony
enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)), a prior prison term enhancement (§
8 667.5, subd. (b)), and that Fields had a prior conviction within the
meaning of the three strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(e)). That same
9 day, Fields pled no contest to the six counts and admitted the
enhancements and the three strikes allegations.
10
11 On January 22, 2013, defense counsel filed a sentencing
memorandum arguing, in pertinent part, that the court should strike
12 the three strikes allegations because: 1) Fields’s criminal conduct
resulted from substance abuse; 2) Drs. Seymour and Terrell
13 diagnosed Fields as suffering from a mental condition that
significantly reduced his culpability for his offenses; and 3) Fields
14
had never received any treatment for his psychiatric problems.
15
On January 29, 2013, at Fields’s sentencing hearing, the court
16 granted the defense’s request to take judicial notice of the prior
psychological evaluations that were performed on Fields. The court
17 also noted that it had reviewed those reports including the one from
Atascadero State Hospital. Defense counsel argued that Fields’s
18
recent criminal activity stemmed from a mental or psychotic
19 disorder that decreased his culpability and he asked the court to
grant Fields probation or, alternatively, strike his strike conviction.
20 The court denied both requests.
21 Thereafter, in case No. F11903982, the court struck the prior prison
term enhancement in that case and sentenced Fields to an aggregate
22
18-year-term.
23
In case No. F09905868, after finding that Fields violated his
24 probation based on his plea to the charges in case No. F11903982,
the court lifted the stay on the previously imposed sentence and
25
imposed a consecutive one-year term in that case, bringing his total
aggregate term in both cases to 19 years.
26
27 After the court sentenced him, Fields complained that the court was
not taking his drug problem into consideration, stating:
28
1 “My only argument in my own defense at this point is I don’t feel
the Court is taking into consideration the drug problem. Not the
2
mental problem. Clearly I could not speak to the Court as I am
today if I had some substantial mental health problem. The Court
3
found me incompetent to stand trial because of my behavior. But
4 the drug problem I don’t feel is being taken into ... strong enough
consideration. I personally know, despite what the People feel
5 about me, I know who I am, I know what I’m capable of, and I
know that my problems that I suffered from were drug problems.”
6
7 See People v. Fields, No. F066617, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7029, at *3-16 (Cal. Ct. App.
8 Oct. 2, 2014).
9 In its decision of petitioner’s second appeal, the Court of Appeal supplemented its opinion
10 with the following:
11 Appellate Opinion
12
On October 2, 2014, this court filed an unpublished opinion in
Fields’s appeal from his convictions and sentence in case Nos.
13
F11903982 and F09905868. We rejected his argument that the
14 court abused its discretion when it denied his request to dismiss the
prior strike conviction or place him on probation:
15
“Fields’s probation report indicates that Fields had a dismal
16
criminal record that began in 1996 when he was convicted of
17 exhibiting a deadly weapon other than a firearm. In 2000 he was
convicted of being drunk in public and resisting arrest, in 2001 of
18 battery on a spouse, in 2005 of assault with a deadly weapon and
child abuse, in 2008 of battery on a cohabitant, and in 2009 of
19 possession of a controlled substance.
20
“Additionally, he served a prison term on his assault conviction,
21 violated his parole for that offense once, and committed his most
recent offenses while on probation for possession of cocaine base.
22 Further, his assault and child endangerment offenses involved
Fields chasing and ramming his car into one driven by his ex-
23 girlfriend with her male friend and two children ages one and three
inside as both cars traveled at a high rate of speed. The chase ended
24
when Fields clipped the rear of his ex-girlfriend’s car while
25 traveling approximately 85 miles an hour causing her car to spin
two times and flip three times. The court could reasonably
26 conclude from Fields’s prior record, which appeared to be
escalating in violence, and the circumstances of his brutal attack on
27 victim Doe that left her blind in one eye, that Fields should not be
deemed to be outside the spirit of the three strikes law.
28
1
“Moreover, there is no merit to Fields’s contention that he was
2
suffering from drug psychosis syndrome and that the court failed to
give full weight to this factor. In ruling on Fields’s Romero motion,
3
the court considered numerous reports of psychological evaluations
4 that were performed on Fields. The court’s conclusion that Fields
was malingering his mental symptoms was supported by several of
5 these reports and by Fields’s admission at his sentencing hearing
that he did not have any ‘substantial mental health problem.’
6
Additionally, Fields did not claim he was suffering from any type
7 of psychosis or other mental illness when he committed any of his
offenses that involved violence. Accordingly, we conclude the
8 court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Fields’s Romero
motion.”
9
This court also rejected Fields’s argument that his defense counsel
10
was prejudicially ineffective for failing to investigate his purported
11 psychotic condition, because the expert reports had concluded he
was feigning psychotic symptoms.
12
Resentencing Hearing
13
On March 24, 2015, Judge Harrell convened the resentencing
14
hearing and stated the matter had been remanded to correct Fields’
15 sentence so it would comply with section 654, and recalculate his
presentence custody credits.
16
The court stated that the original sentence was based on Fields’s
17 criminal history and his conduct in this case. It intended to correct
Fields’s sentence but it would not otherwise impose a lesser term.
18
Defense counsel advised the court that Fields wanted “all rights he
19 had at the previous sentencing hearing,” including “a probation
report, a psychological evaluation, and appointment of experts for
20 new psychological evaluations.” Fields also wanted to withdraw
his plea because of his alleged mental condition. The prosecutor
21 objected to these requests, and argued there was no basis to
withdraw his plea.
22
23 The trial court denied Fields’s requests. “First concerning the
request for a resentencing report, or a new probation report, the
24 Court does not see the need for that. The Court of Appeal made it
very clear in their opinion the issues that this Court must address.
25
They even address the issue of presentencing credits that the
probation report neglected to bring to the Court or counsel’s
26
attention. So the Court sees no need for a new sentencing report.”
27
The court also found Fields was previously evaluated by experts
28 during the competency proceedings, it had considered those reports,
1 and he was not entitled to a new psychological evaluation. The
court found a motion to withdraw his plea was untimely.
2
The court’s findings and orders
3
4 The court said it had reviewed the original probation report, and
read the appellate opinion. The court also took into consideration
5 the numerous psychological evaluations prepared prior to his plea.
The court believed that no one spoke on Fields’ behalf at the first
6
sentencing hearing. It acknowledged Fields now had a strong
7 support system but further stated: “The difficult concept for the
Court to deal with is that it seems other people suffer as a result of
8 his issues, not once, not even twice, but several times, based upon
the criminal history.” The court understood it had discretion to
9 select a term other than the aggravated term, but selected the
aggravated term because of Fields’s criminal history and the
10
viciousness of the crime. The court reaffirmed the findings it made
11 at the original sentencing hearing about the seriousness of Fields’s
offenses. The court declined to impose lesser terms “and run the
12 risk of having someone else being hurt as significantly as the victim
in this case.” The court noted that Fields had been given an
13 opportunity when he was previously placed on probation and
parole, but that “did not bear any fruit whatsoever,” and when this
14
case occurred, he “did or nearly did put a woman’s eye out.”
15 The court imposed the aggravated term of eight years for the
mayhem count, doubled because of the strike prior, for a term of 16
16 years for the principal term in case number F11903982. The term
of imprisonment on the remaining felony counts was stayed
17 pursuant to section 654. Fields was sentenced to time served for the
misdemeanor vandalism count. The trial court also imposed a five-
18
year term for the prior serious felony conviction but stayed the prior
19 prison term enhancement. The total term imposed was 21 years in
prison.
20
In case No. F09905868 the trial court reduced the conviction to a
21 misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47 and sentenced Fields to
time served.
22
23 People v. Fields, No. F071381, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6050, at *2-16 (Cal. Ct. App.
24 Aug. 18, 2016).
25 II. Discussion
26 a. Standard of Review
27 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates
28 federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75
1 (2000). Section 2254 of Title 28, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
2 Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), governs a state prisoner’s habeas petition. See Harrington v. Richter,
3 562 U.S. 86, 97 (2011). To decide a § 2254 petition, a federal court examines the decision of the
4 last state court that issued a reasoned opinion on petitioner’s habeas claims, see Wilson v. Sellers,
5 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). In general, § 2254 requires deference to the state-court system that
6 produced the petitioner’s conviction and sentence.
7 Under AEDPA, a petitioner may obtain relief on federal habeas claims that have been
8 “adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings” only if the state court’s adjudication
9 resulted in a decision (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
10 established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “based
11 on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
12 proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Murray v. Schriro, 882 F.3d 778, 801 (9th Cir. 2018). A state
13 court’s decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if it reaches a conclusion “opposite
14 to” a holding of the United States Supreme Court or a conclusion that differs from the Supreme
15 Court’s precedent on “materially indistinguishable facts.” Soto v. Ryan, 760 F.3d 947, 957 (9th
16 Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The state court’s decision unreasonably applies clearly established
17 federal law when the decision has “no reasonable basis.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 188
18 (2011). An unreasonable determination of facts occurs when a federal court is “convinced that an
19 appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude
20 that the finding is supported by the record.” Loher v. Thomas, 825 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir.
21 2016). A federal habeas court has an obligation to consider arguments or theories that “could
22 have supported a state court’s decision.” See Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 138 S. Ct. 2555, 2557 (2018)
23 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)). One rule applies to all state prisoners’
24 petitions adjudicated on the merits: the petitioner must show that the state court’s decision is “so
25 lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law
26 beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.
27 If obtaining habeas relief under § 2254 is difficult, “that is because it was meant to be.”
28 Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. As the Supreme Court has put it, federal habeas review “disturbs the
1 State’s significant interest in repose for concluded litigation, denies society the right to punish
2 some admitted offenders, and intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises
3 of federal judicial authority.” Id. at 103 (citation omitted). Our habeas review authority serves as
4 a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for
5 ordinary error correction through appeal.” Id. at 102-03 (emphasis added).
6 As petitioner has entered a plea, his habeas review is limited in scope. Generally, a
7 petitioner may not collaterally attack alleged pre-plea constitutional violations if he enters a
8 voluntary and intelligent guilty plea. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 265-67 (1973);
9 Journigan v. Duffy, 552 F.2d 283, 287 (9th Cir. 1977).2 However, a petitioner may challenge the
10 voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea or counsel’s ineffectiveness in advising the
11 petitioner to enter a plea. See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267; Journigan, 552 F.2d at 287 n.6.
12 This court reviews the last reasoned opinions—in this case, that of the Court of Appeal on
13 petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims and that of the state superior court on
14 petitioner’s sentencing claim.3 Because petitioner’s claims were rejected on the merits, the
15 deferential standard of § 2254 applies to his claims.
16 b. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
17 A doubly deferential standard governs a federal habeas petitioner’s claim of ineffective
18 assistance of counsel. The two-step inquiry from Strickland v. Washington guides the analysis for
19 an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. See 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, a criminal
20 defendant must show some deficiency in performance by counsel that is “so serious that counsel
21 was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id.
22 Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance caused him prejudice. Id. This
23
2 In California, a no contest plea to a felony charge is “considered the same as a plea of guilty”
24 and has the same legal effect as a guilty plea “for all purposes.” Cal. Penal Code § 1016; see
Jennings v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 894, 896 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007).
25 3 The California Supreme Court summarily rejected all petitioner’s claims. “[W]hen the relevant
state-court decision on the merits . . . does not come accompanied with . . . reasons [for its
26
decision,] . . . the federal court should ‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related
27 state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the
unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802
28 (1991).
1 requires petitioner to show “that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive [the petitioner] of a
2 fair trial.” Id. On habeas review, when filtered through Section 2254(d)’s fairminded-jurist
3 standard, the Strickland requirements become even more deferential, and we must ask “whether
4 there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.”
5 Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. If there is even one reasonable argument that counsel did not violate the
6 Strickland standard—even if the state court has not identified the argument—then the petitioner
7 cannot obtain habeas relief. See id. at 106.
8 1. Drug-induced Psychosis
9 Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to fully investigate
10 and present mitigating evidence at sentencing that he was suffering from drug-induced psychosis
11 at the time of the crime. ECF No. 1 at 5. The Court of Appeal found that petitioner’s counsel’s
12 actions were reasonable because there was no evidence in the record that petitioner was suffering
13 from drug-induced psychosis at the time of the crimes. See Fields, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub.
14 LEXIS 7029, at *20-24. The California Supreme Court summarily denied review. ECF No. 29 at
15 19.
16 First, petitioner’s claim fails as a factual matter because his counsel raised drug-induced
17 psychosis as a mitigating factor at sentencing. Petitioner’s counsel filed a sentencing
18 memorandum that argued that the court should strike the three strikes allegations because
19 petitioner’s substance abuse and mental conditions reduced his culpability for his offenses. Id. at
20 *13. Counsel argued at sentencing that petitioner’s “recent criminal activity does stem from some
21 sort of mental disorder or psychotic disorder,” and that petitioner “was not somebody who was in
22 control of his actions at the time of what he did.” ECF No. 30-8 at 64-65. Counsel specifically
23 stated, “my client is asking me to take into consideration the drug-induced psychosis at the time
24 of the crime . . . I have asked the court to put that in the probation report. And we are asking the
25 court to take that into consideration, if that has not already been taken into consideration.” Id. at
26 68. The court then stated it considered “whatever mental issues may exist for Mr. Fields, as well
27 as drug use.” Id. at 73.
28
1 Second, to the extent that petitioner argues that his counsel’s performance was deficient
2 for a failure to fully investigate drug-induced psychosis, his claim also fails. An attorney’s
3 “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options
4 are virtually unchallengeable and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are
5 reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations
6 on investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. A “particular decision not to investigate must
7 be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of
8 deference to counsel’s judgments.” Id. at 691. “When a defendant has given counsel reason to
9 believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure
10 to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.” Id. Reasonableness
11 turns on whether the evidence known to the attorney at the time the decision was made would
12 have led a reasonable attorney to investigate further. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527
13 (2003).
14 Here, although there is evidence in the record that petitioner suffers from mental health
15 and substance abuse issues, there was little or no evidence in the record that petitioner was
16 suffering from a drug-induced psychosis at the time of the crime. Petitioner was evaluated by
17 seven different doctors, four of whom found him to be malingering. See Fields, 2014 Cal. App.
18 Unpub. LEXIS 7029, at *5-9. A fifth doctor did not conclude that petitioner was malingering, but
19 her findings were consistent with malingering. Id. at *6. Although two doctors found that
20 petitioner suffered from psychosis, neither found that he suffered from drug-induced psychosis
21 and one specifically ruled out drug-induced psychosis. Id. at *5-6. At sentencing, the trial court
22 found it significant that many of the doctor’s reports stated that petitioner was malingering. ECF
23 No. 30-8 at 61-62. Moreover, petitioner himself did not raise drug-induced psychosis at
24 sentencing, but rather stated that he had “drug problems.” Id. at 80. Petitioner stated that
25 although he was “heavily on crystal meth and cocaine and alcohol” at the time of the crime, he
26 believed that the victim was injured severely “due to [his] actions.” Id. at 31-32.
27 We cannot find that the counsel’s actions fell below the standards set by Strickland. The
28 dearth of evidence in the record supporting a theory of drug-induced psychosis coupled with
1 petitioner’s own statements at sentencing demonstrate that any decision by counsel to forego in-
2 depth investigation of drug-induced psychosis was reasonable. Moreover, counsel himself raised
3 drug-induced psychosis at sentencing. Because the Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary
4 to or an unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court authority, or
5 based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, petitioner’s claim does not merit habeas
6 relief.
7 2. Coerced Plea
8 Petitioner claims that his trial counsel’s advice led him involuntarily to enter a plea of no
9 contest. ECF No. 1 at 12. Petitioner specifically claims that his trial counsel was coercive when
10 the attorney refused to enter a plea of guilty by insanity, as requested by petitioner, and when his
11 counsel advised petitioner that the plea of no contest might lead to a more lenient sentence. Id. at
12 12-13. On collateral review, the state superior court denied the claim on the merits, finding that
13 trial counsel acted reasonably, and the California Supreme Court summarily denied relief. ECF
14 No. 29 at 21-22.
15 A guilty plea must be intelligent, voluntary, and “done with sufficient awareness of the
16 relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748,
17 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). The plea should “represent a voluntary
18 and intelligent choice among the alternative choices of action open to the defendant.” Parke v.
19 Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992). “Where . . . a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea
20 process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on
21 whether counsel’s advice ‘was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
22 cases.’” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
23 771 (1970)). “It is only when the lawyer’s errors were ‘so serious that counsel was not
24 functioning as the counsel guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment’ that Strickland’s first prong
25 is satisfied.” Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). A
26 petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
27 would not have pleaded guilty.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
28
1 Here, there is no evidence that petitioner’s counsel’s actions fell below the Strickland
2 standard. Counsel’s advice before the plea hearing regarding leniency was well within the range
3 of competent legal representation. See Naranjo v. Kernan, No. 15CV2666 AJB (BGS), 2017
4 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51549, at *27 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2017) (finding no deficiency where counsel
5 advised petitioner that a rejection of the plea offer and subsequent conviction might lead to a life
6 sentence); Brady, 397 U.S. at 751 (A guilty plea is not compelled “whenever motivated by the
7 defendant’s desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider
8 range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by
9 law for the crime charged.”).
10 At the plea hearing, petitioner’s counsel expressed that he did not doubt petitioner’s
11 mental competency to proceed with the plea hearing, but did alert the court that the petitioner
12 “had some things he wanted to tell” the court. ECF No. 30-8 at 19-20. Petitioner’s trial counsel
13 explained to the court that petitioner had not taken his medication that morning, but that petitioner
14 had told him it “does not affect what he is about to do today.” Id. at 23. The trial court asked
15 petitioner a series of questions to ensure that the plea was knowing and voluntary, and all of
16 petitioner’s answers indicated that he was aware of the decision he was making. The trial court
17 specifically asked petitioner, “Are you entering this plea knowingly and voluntarily?” to which
18 petitioner answered, “Yes, I am.” ECF No. 30-8 at 24-38. Petitioner stated, “I would have to say
19 I understand what I’m pleading myself—exposing myself to, yes, I do.” Id. at 33. After he
20 entered his plea, petitioner thanked the court, saying “I would just like to thank you, because you
21 helped me, you know, understand a lot of things . . . it was clear when you presented it to me.”
22 Id. at 40.
23 Although petitioner claims the he “informed counsel that he wished to plead guilty by
24 reason of insanity” and “counsel refused to enter that plea,” ECF No. 1 at 13, there is no evidence
25 in the record that petitioner’s counsel prevented petitioner from speaking freely to the judge at
26 any time during the hearing. In the event that petitioner’s counsel advised him that a plea of
27 guilty by reason of insanity would be against his interest, such advice would have only served to
28
1 assist petitioner in reaching his decision. Ultimately, it was petitioner who entered his plea of no
2 contest, and it appears that this plea was knowing and voluntary.
3 Petitioner has not pointed to any specific actions or failures to act by his trial counsel that
4 would lead us to believe his attorney’s performance fell below constitutional standards. Because
5 the state superior court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
6 established United States Supreme Court authority, or based on an unreasonable determination of
7 the facts, petitioner’s claim does not merit habeas relief.
8 c. Sentencing Decisions
9 Petitioner claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to grant his
10 Romero motion and therefore refused to strike his prior conviction for sentencing purposes.4 ECF
11 No. 1 at 15. He specifically argues that the trial court erred when it did not consider mitigating
12 factors in denying the Romero motion, such as petitioner’s mental health. Id. Petitioner also
13 contends that the trial court abused its discretion at his resentencing hearing when it imposed a
14 harsher sentence than his original sentence, failed to consider his good behavior in prison as a
15 mitigating factor, and rejected his request for a supplemental probation report. Id. at 20. The
16 Court of Appeal denied these claims on the merits, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial
17 court’s decisions, and the Supreme Court summarily denied review.5 ECF No. 29 at 24.
18 When a state courts rests its decision on its interpretation of state law, we are bound by
19 that court’s decision. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Estelle v. McGuire, 502
20 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991) (“Federal habeas relief does not lie for errors of state law.”). Habeas relief
21 is unavailable for alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state sentencing laws by
22 either a state trial court or appellate court. See Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir.
23 2002). So long as a state sentence “is not based on any proscribed federal grounds such as being
24 cruel and unusual, racially or ethnically motivated, or enhanced by indigency, the penalties for
25 4 A Romero motion is a request to the trial court to strike prior felony convictions in a case
brought under California’s three strikes law. See People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th
26
497, 508 (Cal. 1996).
27 5 The Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claims related to his first sentencing in Fields, 2014
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7029, at *16-20, and rejected his claims related to his second
28 sentencing in Fields, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6050, at *16-27.
1 violation of state statutes are matters of state concern.” Makal v. State of Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030,
2 1035 (9th Cir. 1976).
3 Here, petitioner fails to state a federal claim for relief, but rather contests the decisions
4 made at sentencing on state law grounds. Whether to strike prior felonies in response to a
5 Romero motion lies within the trial court’s discretion. See People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13
6 Cal. 4th 497, 508 (Cal. 1996); Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002) (vacated and
7 remanded on other grounds in Mayle v. Brown, 538 U.S. 901 (2003)) (finding a petitioner’s claim
8 that he should be resentenced in light of Romero was not cognizable on federal habeas review).
9 The remaining sentencing decisions disputed by petitioner were also firmly within the discretion
10 of the trial court. See Souch, 289 F.3d at 623. The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial court’s
11 denial of petitioner’s Romero motion and related sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion
12 under California state law and found none. See Fields, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7029, at
13 *16-20. Therefore, we are bound by the Court of Appeal’s determination and decline to grant
14 petitioner relief.
15 d. Motion to Reduce Restitution
16 Petitioner seeks a reduction in his court-ordered restitution to the minimum amount
17 allowed by law. ECF No. 1 at 32. Petitioner disputes the trial court’s interpretation of California
18 state law and claims that the court failed to consider certain factors when determining restitution.
19 Id. at 37. However, “[f]ederal habeas relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle, 502 U.S.
20 at 71-72. Therefore, we decline to review the trial court’s restitution determination and deny his
21 motion. .
22 III. Certificate of Appealability
23 A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute right to appeal a district
24 court’s denial of a petition; he may appeal only in limited circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253;
25 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). Rule 11 Governing § 2254 Cases requires a
26 district court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when entering a final order adverse to a
27 petitioner. See also Ninth Circuit Rule 22-1(a); United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th
28 Cir. 1997). A certificate of appealability will not issue unless a petitioner makes “a substantial
£000 VV EMT NE RAT MMC St POO Te OY 40 VI LOU
1 | showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires
2 | the petitioner to show that “jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of
3 | his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to
4 | deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; accord Slack v.
5 | McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the
6 | denial of a constitutional right. Thus, we recommend that the court not issue a certificate of
7 | appealability.
8 | IV. Findings and Recommendations
9 The court should deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, and decline to
10 || issue a certificate of appealability. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the
11 | USS. District Court judge presiding over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of
12 || the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California.
13 | Within thirty days of the service of the findings and recommendations, the parties may file
14 | written objections to the findings and recommendations with the court and serve a copy on all
15 || parties. That document must be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and
16 | Recommendations.” The district judge will then review the findings and recommendations under
17 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
18 | V. Order
19 Petitioner’s motion to reduce his restitution is denied. ECF No. 1 at 32.
20
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CN prs senn □□□ _
Dated: _ June 5, 2020
23 UNIT#D STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
24
25 | No. 206.
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