referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
How later courts described this case
- referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 MICHAEL DEWAYNE ALLEN, No. 2:20-CV-0055-DMC-P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 CSP – SACRAMENTO,
15 Defendant.
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17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1).
19 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
21 § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,
24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain
25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This
26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the
28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it
1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege
2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the
3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is
4 impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague
5 and conclusory.
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7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
8 Plaintiff names as the sole defendant “C.S.P. – Sacramento.” See ECF No. 1, pg.
9 7 (Civil Cover Sheet). According to plaintiff, he was pepper-sprayed at California State Prison –
10 Sacramento “while in a catonic [sic] state, and not decontaminated.” See id. at 3-4. Plaintiff does
11 not name the individual(s) allegedly responsible.
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13 II. DISCUSSION
14 Plaintiff’s compliant suffers from two defects. First, the only named defendant is
15 immune under the Eleventh Amendment. Second, plaintiff has not stated facts to establish a
16 causal link between any individual and the alleged constitutional violation.
17 A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
18 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought
19 against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v.
20 Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition
21 extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t
22 of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th
23 Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state
24 agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782
25 (1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
26 The Eleventh Amendment also bars actions seeking damages from state officials
27 acting in their official capacities. See Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1995); Pena
28 v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The Eleventh Amendment does not,
1 however, bar suits against state officials acting in their personal capacities. See id. Under the
2 doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for
3 prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities. See
4 Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997). The Eleventh Amendment also does
5 not bar suits against cities and counties. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690
6 n.54 (1978).
7 Here, plaintiff names as the only defendant California State Prison – Sacramento,
8 which is immune from suit. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to name non-immune
9 defendants.
10 B. Causal Link
11 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual
12 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See
13 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A
14 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of
15 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform
16 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
17 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
18 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See
19 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth
20 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional
21 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
22 Here, plaintiff has not named the individual(s) responsible for the constitutional
23 violation alleged in the complaint. As discussed above, the only defendant named is immune
24 from suit. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend.
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1 III. CONCLUSION
2 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
3 amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire
4 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is
5 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See
6 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to
7 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended
8 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if
9 plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make
10 plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be
11 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
12 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the
13 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See
14 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
15 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
16 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
17 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
18 Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the
19 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at
20 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply
21 with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).
22 See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
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1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
2 1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and
3 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of
4 | service of this order.
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7 | Dated: January 22, 2020 Ssvcqo_
8 DENNIS M. COTA
9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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