referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
How later courts described this case
- referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
- holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 GERIOLD B. LEVI, No. 2:19-CV-1162-TLN-DMC-P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 RICK HILL, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1).
19 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
21 § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,
24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain
25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This
26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the
28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it
1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege
2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the
3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is
4 impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague
5 and conclusory.
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7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
8 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Rick Hill, the prison warden; (2) J.
9 Crawford, a prison Sergeant; and (3) Buchanan, a correctional officer. See ECF No. 1, pg. 2.
10 Plaintiff allege defendant Buchanan assaulted him and that defendant Crawford assisted. See id.
11 at 3. According to plaintiff, defendant Hill “allowed this all to take place at his prison.” Id.
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13 II. DISCUSSION
14 The court finds plaintiff has stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive
15 force claim against defendants Crawford and Buchanan based on plaintiff’s allegation they
16 assaulted him. Plaintiff has not, however, stated a claim against defendant Hill, the prison
17 warden, based on his vague allegation defendant Hill allowed the violation to occur.
18 Supervisory personnel, such as the prison warden, are generally not liable under
19 § 1983 for the actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.
20 1989) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only
21 liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed
22 the violations. See id. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant
23 can be liable based on knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct
24 because government officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his
25 or her own conduct and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
26 (2009). Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a
27 repudiation of constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may,
28 however, be liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See
1 Redman v. Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
2 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such
3 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.
4 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.
5 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in
6 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th
7 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
8 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676.
9 As currently set forth, plaintiff’s claim against defendant Hill is based on nothing
10 more than a theory of respondeat superior, which is not actionable under § 1983. Plaintiff’s
11 allegation that defendant Hill allowed the alleged violation to occur is too vague to show
12 defendant Hill’s personal involvement. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend.
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14 III. CONCLUSION
15 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
16 amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
17 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an
18 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,
19 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the
20 prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An
21 amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
22 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the
23 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See
24 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
25 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
26 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
27 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
28 / / /
1 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended
2 | complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the court will issue findings and
3 || recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such
4 | further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.
5 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff may file a first amended
6 | complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.
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9 | Dated: August 16, 2019 Ssvcqo_
10 DENNIS M. COTA
11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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