Watkins v. Smith (125)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

ALVIS JACKSON WATKINS, JR. PLAINTIFF

V. CASE NO. 5:22-CV-5027

CORPORAL SHANNON SMITH (Badge #125),

Washington County Sheriff’s Department DEFENDANT

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 52) filed in this

case by the Honorable Christy Comstock, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western

District of Arkansas. The R&R recommends that the Court grant the Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 36) and Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) filed by

Defendants Corporal Shannon Smith and Washington County, Arkansas. Plaintiff Alvis

Jackson Watkins, Jr., filed objections to the R&R. See Doc. 54. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1), the Court has reviewed the record de novo to resolve the pending objections.

For the reasons stated below, the R&R is ADOPTED IN PART AND NOT ADOPTED IN

PART, and the Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplemental Motion are GRANTED

IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court incorporates by reference the R&R’s thorough recitation of the disputed

and undisputed facts but briefly summarizes them here. On October 12, 2021, Mr.

Watkins was driving a car on West Double Springs Road in Washington County,

Arkansas, when the car’s transmission began having mechanical issues. Mr. Watkins

1

decided to back the car into a driveway to wait for a friend to tow it. As he was backing

in, Corporal Smith arrived, exited his vehicle, and approached the car to see if Mr. Watkins

required any assistance. Corporal Smith calmly ordered Mr. Watkins to stop the car. Mr.

Watkins did not comply and instead backed down the driveway while revving the engine

and unsuccessfully trying to place the vehicle into park. Corporal Smith drew his service

weapon and again ordered Mr. Watkins to stop the vehicle and put his hands up. The

vehicle came to a standstill after backing into a fence, and Corporal Smith holstered his

firearm and drew his taser. He ordered Mr. Watkins to exit the car, and Mr. Watkins

eventually complied. Mr. Watkins exited the car while holding a flashlight and a set of

scales in his right hand. Corporal Smith, seeing Mr. Watkins as a threat, fired his taser,

which lodged two barbs into Mr. Watkins’s skin and delivered an electric shock. Mr.

Watkins was transported to the hospital and then arrested for possession of drug

paraphernalia, obstruction of governmental operations, no insurance, driving on a

suspended license, and criminal mischief.

Mr. Watkins brought this case pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Corporal

Smith used excessive force when he tased Mr. Watkins, wrongfully entered private

property to arrest him, and lacked probable cause to arrest him. Mr. Watkins sues

Corporal Smith in both his individual and official capacities.

II. OBJECTION ONE

In Mr. Watkins’s first objection, he asks the Court to preserve for trial his claim that

Corporal Smith unlawfully entered onto private property to interrogate and arrest him. The

Magistrate Judge recommends this claim be dismissed with prejudice for several reasons,

2

and Mr. Watkins fails to engage with that reasoning. Upon consideration, the Court agrees

with the Magistrate Judge that Mr. Watkins lacks standing to assert a privacy right under

the Constitution on behalf of the owner of the private property in question. It is undisputed

that Mr. Watkins did not own the property where the arrest took place, nor did he have

any social or familial relationship with the owners. As Mr. Watkins lacks standing to assert

this claim, the R&R correctly recommends dismissal, and Mr. Watkins’s first objection is

OVERRULED.

III. OBJECTION TWO

The second objection pertains to Mr. Watkins’s excessive-force claim against

Corporal Smith in his individual capacity. The R&R recommends granting Corporal Smith

summary judgment on this claim because his use of force was objectively reasonable and

he is entitled to qualified immunity. Mr. Watkins’s objection focuses on his history of heart

problems, and he notes that he specifically informed Corporal Smith about his heart

condition before Corporal Smith tased him. Mr. Watkins believes he did nothing to

provoke the tasing and was doing nothing unlawful at the time, so it was objectively

unreasonable for Corporal Smith to have tased him.

“Courts conduct a two-part inquiry to determine whether qualified immunity

protects a government official from liability: (1) whether the facts taken in the light most

favorable to [the plaintiff] make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2)

whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Buckley v.

Ray, 848 F.3d 855, 863 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing Truong v. Hassan, 829 F.3d 627, 630 (8th

Cir. 2016)). Whether Corporal Smith’s use of force violated Mr. Watkins’s Fourth

3

Amendment right to be free from excessive force depends on the reasonableness of the

force used. The reasonableness of the force is evaluated by looking “to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Baude v.

Leyshock, 23 F.4th 1065, 1073 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064,

1074 (8th Cir. 2017)).

In recommending that Corporal Smith be granted qualified immunity, the R&R

reasons:

With Watkins revving the engine, refusing to obey commands, and having

no knowledge that Watkins would not be able to engage the transmission

in drive or park, it was reasonable for Corporal Smith to fear for his own

safety. Further, when Watkins did finally exit the car, he had items in his

right hand – one of which went flying with enough force to travel

approximately thirty feet before landing; applying common sense suggests

this was not merely loss of grip of an item and provided further justification

for the use of reasonable force. Construing the facts in the light most

favorable to Watkins and judging the situation from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene, the Court concludes Corporal Smith did

not use excessive force in deploying the taser as it was objectively

reasonable for him to interpret Watkins’ actions as a realistic threat to his

personal safety. The circumstances were “tense, uncertain, and rapidly

evolving.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397; see also Procknow v. Curry, 826 F.3d

1009, 1014 (8th Cir. 2016) (consideration should be given to the timing,

warnings, and physical capacity of the subject); Lawyer v. City of Council

Bluffs, 361 F.3d 1099 (8th Cir. 2004) (objectively reasonable for officer to

deploy pepper spray when driver began to roll up the window onto the

officer’s arm). Corporal Smith is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

(Doc. 52, pp. 16–17).

4

To resolve this objection, the Court has reviewed the entire summary judgment

record, including the dashcam footage of the incident, Mr. Watkins’s deposition testimony,

and Corporal Smith’s affidavit. It is undisputed that:

• Corporal Smith was not investigating Mr. Watkins for the commission of any

crime nor arresting him prior to the tasing;

• Mr. Watkins’s car was on private property;

• Corporal Smith could tell that the car was having mechanical problems, see

Doc. 47, p. 5;

• Mr. Watkins did not comply with Corporal Smith’s orders to turn off the car;

• Mr. Watkins repeatedly revved the car’s engine;

• Mr. Watkins backed the car into a fence where it came to a stop;

• Mr. Watkins eventually complied with Corporal Smith’s order to exit the car; and

• Mr. Watkins was holding a flashlight and a set of scales in his right hand when

he exited the car.

The Court highlights the following disputes of fact between their two accounts.

Mr. Watkins disputes Corporal Smith’s claim that the officer was trapped between

the front of the car and a fence when Mr. Watkins was revving the car’s engine, putting

the officer in danger and requiring him to draw his firearm. Mr. Watkins claims that there

were fences to the officer’s left and right but “nothing was behind Officer Smith” at that

point in time. (Doc. 38-8, pp. 52–53). After Corporal Smith drew his taser, Mr. Watkins

claims he voluntarily opened the car door and stepped out while pleading with Corporal

Smith not to tase him because he has a heart condition. Id. at p. 34. Mr. Watkins further

5

claims that he was so nervous and scared that he lost his grip on the scales as he exited

the car and they flew out of his hand into a field. Id. at 36. Mr. Watkins claims the scales

flew to his right, away from Corporal Smith, who was positioned to Mr. Watkins’s left.

(Doc. 17, p. 3). He insists that he did not intentionally throw the scales but remembers

them ending up about 30 feet to his right. (Doc. 38-8, p. 37). He asserts that he was not

acting aggressively, had both hands in the air, and was no longer holding the scales when

Corporal Smith tased him. Id.

Corporal Smith claims that he opened the car door because Mr. Watkins was

uncooperative, at which point Mr. Watkins jerked away from the officer, causing him to

pull his taser. (Doc. 38-11, ¶ 18). Corporal Smith further claims that, after he opened the

door, Mr. Watkins continued yelling and trying to operate the car and that he ordered Mr.

Watkins to get on the ground seven or eight times while warning that he would use his

taser. Id. at ¶ 21. In his preliminary report written on October 12, 2021, the day of the

incident, Corporal Smith wrote that Mr. Watkins exited the car with an object in his hand

and “appeared to draw it back like he was going to use as a weapon at which point I

deployed Taser and he threw the object falling to the ground.” (Doc. 38-2, p. 3 (all errors

in original)). In an incident report written on March 22, 2022, (Doc. 38-5, p. 2), and in his

affidavit prepared for this litigation, Corporal Smith further explained that as Mr. Watkins

exited the car he brought his right arm towards Corporal Smith “in a chopping or throwing

motion” with the scales “protruding from his hand,” (Doc. 38-11, ¶ 22). As Mr. Watkins’s

arm came toward the officer, he dropped the flashlight, and the scales flew past the officer

“as if [they] had been thrown.” Id. at ¶ 24. Corporal Smith, feeling under attack by an

6

unknown silver object, fired his taser to defend himself. Id. at ¶ 23. Corporal Smith asserts

that Mr. Watkins complained of a heart condition only after being tased. Id. at ¶ 27.

Corporal Smith’s reports and affidavit leave ambiguous the exact timing of when

the scales left Mr. Watkins’s hand—before Corporal Smith fired the taser, after he fired,

or at the same moment he fired—and whether it was the throwing of the scales that in

part necessitated the tasing or instead the tasing that caused the scales to go flying. In

any event, Corporal Smith disputes Mr. Watkins’s account that the scales flew out of his

hand away from the officer and that he was no longer holding the scales, had both his

hands in the air, and was not otherwise acting threateningly at the moment Corporal Smith

fired his taser.

In the dashcam video, which contains partial audio of the tasing but no video,

Corporal Smith tells Mr. Watkins in the moments before firing his taser to “get out or I’m

gonna tase you” and to “get on the ground” about eight times in rapid succession. (Doc.

38-6, 17:31:00–17:31:16). Mr. Watkins states, among other things, “I’ve haven’t done

nothing,” “I’m going [to the ground],” and “don’t do it, man.” Id. at 17:31:03–17:31:17. The

engine noise obscures some of Mr. Watkins’s statements. After he is tased, Mr. Watkins

states that he has a bad heart. Id. at 17:31:27. A little over one minute passes between

Corporal Smith exiting his patrol vehicle and tasing Mr. Watkins.

Given the state of the evidence in the summary-judgment record, the Court cannot

agree with the R&R that there is no genuine, material dispute of fact that Corporal Smith’s

use of his taser under these circumstances was objectively reasonable. The following

questions of fact are genuinely disputed and must be answered by a finder of fact:

7

1. Was Corporal Smith “in a position with a barbed wire fence behind [him],

leaving [him] with no escape route” when he drew his firearm? (Doc. 38-11,

¶ 11).

2. Did Mr. Watkins state that he had had a bad heart prior to Corporal Smith tasing

him?

3. Did Corporal Smith or Mr. Watkins open the car door?

4. Did Mr. Watkins jerk away from the officer after the door was opened?

5. Was Mr. Watkins making “a chopping or throwing motion” in the direction of

Corporal Smith as he exited the car?

6. Did Mr. Watkins throw the scales?

7. Did the scales fly toward or away from Corporal Smith when they left Mr.

Watkins’s hand?

8. Were the scales still in Mr. Watkins’s hand at the moment Corporal Smith tased

him?

9. Were Mr. Watkins’s hands raised at the moment Corporal Smith tased him?

Were a finder of fact to answer these questions—particularly question five—in

Corporal Smith’s favor, his use of force would be objectively reasonable. He was faced

with an uncooperative individual who had previously threatened the officer with a vehicle

and who was now threatening him with a metal object. Conversely, if these questions

were answered in Mr. Watkins’s favor, a finder of fact could conclude that Mr. Watkins

did not pose “an immediate threat to” Corporal Smith. Westwater v. Church, 60 F.4th

1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 2023). Under Mr. Watkins’s version of events, he was not suspected

8

of any crime and was being compliant, albeit belatedly, pleading to not be tased, had lost

his grip on a set of scales that flew away from the officer, and had his hands up.

The R&R’s conclusion that a reasonable officer would feel Mr. Watkins was a

threat to the officer’s safety is understandable. Mr. Watkins revved his vehicle’s engine

instead of complying with Corporal Smith’s reasonable orders to turn off the vehicle, and

“a vehicle can constitute a ‘deadly weapon,’” United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790, 795

(8th Cir. 2012). The entire interaction was short, lasting approximately one minute, and

escalated in a matter of seconds. Moreover, Mr. Watkins confusingly asserts that the

scales landed 30 feet away from him even though he did not throw them. This seems

unlikely, but the Court cannot resolve this question nor the other outstanding factual

disputes that will determine the degree of threat Mr. Watkins posed at the moment

Corporal Smith fired his taser.

Accordingly, the Court cannot decide at this stage whether Corporal Smith’s use

of force was objectively reasonable. See Westwater, 60 F.4th 1124 at 1130 (reversing

the district court’s finding that an officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable because

the plaintiff’s testimony, “if credited by a reasonable fact-finder,” would have established

that the plaintiff was not presenting a threat nor a risk of flight to the officer). The Court

now turns to the clearly-established prong of the qualified-immunity inquiry.

Were a finder of fact to resolve the factual disputes in favor of Mr. Watkins, at the

moment Corporal Smith tasered Mr. Watkins in October 2021, it would have been clearly

established that such an action would violate Mr. Watkins’s right to be free from excessive

force. The Eighth Circuit has held that, as early as 2005, “the law was sufficiently clear to

9

inform a reasonable officer that it was unlawful to Taser a nonviolent, suspected

misdemeanant who was not fleeing or resisting arrest, who posed little to no threat to

anyone’s safety, and whose only noncompliance with the officer’s commands was to

disobey two orders to end her phone call to a 911 operator.” Brown v. City of Golden

Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 499 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Thompson v. City of Monticello, 894

F.3d 993, 1000 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that “it was clearly established that intentionally

tasering, without warning, an individual who has been stopped for a nonviolent

misdemeanor offense and who is not resisting or fleeing arrest while his hands are visible

violates that individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force”);

Shekleton v. Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361, 366 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding it was excessive

force for an officer to tase “an unarmed suspected misdemeanant, who did not resist

arrest, did not threaten the officer, did not attempt to run from him, and did not behave

aggressively towards him”); De Boise v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 2014)

(“[N]on-violent, non-fleeing subjects have a clearly established right to be free from the

use of tasers . . . .”).

Corporal Watkins was neither investigating nor arresting Mr. Watkins for the

commission of a crime at the moment he tased him. Mr. Watkins was eventually charged

with possession of drug paraphernalia based on Corporal Smith finding a meth pipe in

the car and recovering the set of scales after he tased Mr. Watkins. Corporal Smith argues

that he had reason to “believe that Watkins had committed the offense of Criminal

Mischief which involves causing damage to the property of another person without legal

justification.” (Doc. 47, p. 13). But Corporal Smith did not learn who owned the property

10

until after he fired his taser. As to Mr. Watkins’s initial refusals to comply, Corporal Smith

does not argue that those refusals constituted a crime on their own, but rather that

“[b]ased on Smith’s observations and his subsequent knowledge of Watkins’s outstanding

warrants and license suspension, he had probable cause to believe that Watkins’s efforts

to avoid contact with Smith constituted the offense of refusal to submit to arrest.” (Doc.

47, p. 15 (emphasis added)). Finally, Corporal Smith argues that a reasonable officer

would have interpreted Mr. Watkins’s initial revving of the car engine as an attempt to

flee. However, Corporal Smith also argues that when he initiated his encounter with Mr.

Watkins, he was performing a “community caretaking function,” which by definition is

“totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the

violation of a criminal statute.” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).1

1 To the extent Mr. Watkins makes a claim for wrongful seizure based on Corporal Smith

pointing his firearm at Mr. Watkins and ordering him to turn off his vehicle, Corporal Smith

is entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. It is undisputed that Corporal Smith initially

approached Mr. Watkins’s vehicle to offer assistance, and it was only after Mr. Watkins

continued revving his vehicle’s engine and did not comply with Corporal Smith’s orders

that the officer drew his firearm. The community caretaking exception to the probable

cause and reasonable suspicion requirements has been used to justify officers’ seizure

of motorists who have disabled vehicles. See, e.g., United States v. Salgado, 761 F.3d

861, 865 (8th Cir. 2014).

The Court recognizes, however, that this area of law is somewhat unsettled. The

Supreme Court recently reversed the First Circuit’s “freestanding community-caretaking

exception that applies to both cars and homes,” emphasizing that the community

caretaking exception is “not an open-ended license to perform [these tasks] anywhere.”

Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1600 (2021). Caniglia held that the community

caretaking exception is not “a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and

seizures in the home,” distinguishing the home from officers “responding to disabled

vehicles or investigating accidents” on “public highways.” Id. at 1598. Here, Mr. Watkins

was in a disabled vehicle, which favors application of the exception, but he was not on a

public roadway. It is not clear whether the community caretaking exception would justify

an officer entering private property—without knowing whether the motorist owned the

11

In addition, under Mr. Watkins’s version of events, he raised his hands before

being tased and was not advancing on the officer with a metal object. While Mr. Watkins

did not comply with Corporal Smith’s initial orders, he insists that he was in the process

of complying when he was tased. “Even previously-resisting suspects have a

constitutional right to be free of a gratuitous application of a Taser once they have stopped

all resistance.” Masters v. City of Indep., 998 F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).

Moreover, “a reasonable officer is not permitted to ignore changing circumstances.” Id.

(quoting Neal v. Ficcadenti, 895 F.3d 576, 581 (8th Cir. 2018)). While Mr. Watkins’s initial

noncompliance and revving of the car engine may have made a reasonable officer feel

threatened when standing in the vehicle’s path—particularly if a barbed wire fence was

blocking the officer’s escape route—the ultimate question here is whether a reasonable

officer would have felt threatened by Mr. Watkins “at the precise moment” the officer fired

his taser. Cole ex rel. Est. of Richards v. Hutchins, 959 F.3d 1127, 1133 (8th Cir. 2020).

In October 2021, it was clearly established that it was excessive force to tase a

person who was not suspected of committing any crimes, had refused some commands

but was not resisting arrest or fleeing, and was not posing an immediate threat to the

officer. See Brown, 574 F.3d at 499. Because there are genuine disputes of material fact

property or not—to investigate a disabled vehicle and then drawing his firearm to seize

the motorist because the motorist revved the vehicle’s engine. Cf. United States v.

Woodard, 5 F.4th 1148, 1152 (10th Cir. 2021) (“The Fourth Amendment imposes

‘heightened requirements on police who seize vehicles from private property.’” (quoting

United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1249 (10th Cir. 2015)). Nevertheless, even

assuming the community caretaking exception would not justify Corporal Smith’s seizure

of Mr. Watkins, it is not clearly established that a seizure under such circumstances is

unconstitutional, and Corporal Smith is entitled to qualified immunity.

12

as to how uncooperative Mr. Watkins was and whether he physically threatened Corporal

Smith in the moments prior to Corporal Smith discharging his taser, Corporal Smith is not

entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.2

Mr. Watkins’s second objection is therefore SUSTAINED, and the Court denies

Corporal Smith summary judgment on Mr. Watkins’s excessive-force claim against the

officer in his individual capacity.

IV. OBJECTION THREE

The third objection concerns the R&R’s recommended dismissal of Mr. Watkins’s

official-capacity claims. In support of this objection, he argues that Corporal Smith’s use

of his taser violated the Washington County Sheriff’s Department’s policies. The R&R

recommends summary judgment in favor of Washington County on this claim because

Corporal Smith committed no underlying constitutional violation. While the Court

disagrees with the R&R’s excessive-force conclusion, the Court agrees that Washington

County is entitled to summary judgment.

An official-capacity claim requires the plaintiff to establish (1) a constitutional

violation (2) that results from (a) official county policy; (b) an unofficial custom, or (c)

failure to train or supervise. See Robbins v. City of Des Moines, 984 F.3d 673, 681–82

2 Corporal Smith also suggests that Mr. Watkins’s claim should fail because he has

shown only a de minimis injury from being tased. See Doc. 37, pp. 13–15. This argument

cites solely to caselaw that predates the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Chambers v.

Pennycock, where the court clarified that “there is no uniform requirement that a plaintiff

show more than de minimis injury to establish an application of excessive force.” 641 F.3d

898, 907 (8th Cir. 2011). In any event, Mr. Watkins testified to receiving more than de

minimis injuries from his tasing, including two scars from the taser barbs and chronic

numbness in his face, left hand, and left leg.

13

(8th Cir. 2021). Mr. Watkins has not presented any evidence that Corporal Smith’s actions

resulted from the Washington County Sheriff’s Department’s policies, customs, or failure

to train. Assuming Mr. Watkins is correct that Corporal Smith’s taser use violated the

Sheriff’s Department’s policies, that fact suggests that it was Corporal Smith’s deviation

from policy, rather than the policy itself, that caused Mr. Watkin’s injuries.

Accordingly, the third objection is OVERRULED.

V. OBJECTION FOUR

The fourth and final objection concerns Mr. Watkins’s claim that Corporal Smith

lacked probable cause to arrest him. The R&R recommends staying this claim under

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), pending resolution of Mr. Watkins’s criminal case

for possession of drug paraphernalia in the Circuit Court of Washington County,

Arkansas, case number 72CR-21-2512. However, since the filing of the R&R, that case

has now concluded. On April 18, 2023, Mr. Watkins pleaded guilty to failure to appear for

a court date and was sentenced to 36 months in the Arkansas Department of Corrections.

His original charge for possession of drug paraphernalia on October 12, 2021, was

dismissed nolle prosequi. Mr. Watkins’s objection to the Court staying his probable-cause

claim is therefore MOOT, and the Court will address the merits of the claim in the first

instance.

“An officer may carry out a warrantless arrest” of an individual who is outside their

home “if he has probable cause to believe that a person is committing or has committed

‘even a very minor criminal offense.’” Gerling v. City of Hermann, 2 F.4th 737, 742 (8th

Cir. 2021) (quoting Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001)). Officers are

14

entitled to qualified immunity if they have arguable probable cause to carry out an arrest,

and “[a]rguable probable cause exists where an officer arrests a suspect on the mistaken

belief that the arrest is supported by probable cause if the officer’s mistake is objectively

reasonable.” Id. (citing Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 523 (8th Cir. 2011)).

Corporal Smith argues that he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Watkins had

committed the following crimes: criminal mischief in damaging the property owner’s fence;

obstructing governmental operations by refusing to give his name to Corporal Smith;

driving with a suspended license; possession of drug paraphernalia; and refusal to submit

to arrest.

It is a Class D felony in Arkansas to possess drug paraphernalia with the purpose

to inhale methamphetamine. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-443(a)(2). Although the charge was

later dismissed, Mr. Watkins admitted during his deposition that on October 12, 2021, he

possessed illegal drug paraphernalia—a pipe used to smoke methamphetamine and

scales used to weigh drugs. See Doc. 38-8, pp. 43–44, 52 (“The paraphernalia in my car

was breaking the law, but [Corporal Smith] didn’t know that I had that on me.”). It is

therefore undisputed that Corporal Smith had at least arguable probable cause to believe

Mr. Watkins had committed a crime, and Corporal Smith could carry out a warrantless

arrest of Mr. Watkins. Corporal Smith is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

II. CONCLUSION

Having resolved all pending objections, IT IS ORDERED that the Report and

Recommendation (Doc. 52) is ADOPTED IN PART AND NOT ADOPTED IN PART.

15

Corporal Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36) and Supplemental Motion

(Doc. 46) are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:

(1) Mr. Watkins’s Fourth Amendment claim based on Corporal Smith’s entry

onto the driveway of a third party is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

(2) Mr. Watkin’s excessive-force claim against Corporal Smith in his individual

capacity is preserved for trial;

(3) Mr. Watkins’s official-capacity claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

and

(4) Mr. Watkins’s claim that Corporal Smith lacked probable cause to arrest him

is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The Court will separately issue a scheduling order setting Mr. Watkins’s excessive-force

claim for trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED on this 9" day of June, 2023.

~ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

16