Opinion

Holcombe v. Midwest Outdoor Concepts, LLC

Court
District Court, W.D. Arkansas
Filed
Apr 25, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.2%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

CANDY HOLCOMBE PLAINTIFF

V. CASE NO. 5:22-CV-5161

MIDWEST OUTDOOR CONCEPTS, LLC;

TOP SHOT SERVICES, LLC;

and JOSEPH HATFIELD DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Memorandum Brief in Support

(Docs. 37 & 38) filed by Plaintiff Candy Holcombe. Defendants Midwest Outdoor

Concepts, LLC, Top Shot Services, LLC, and Joseph Hatfield jointly filed a Response in

Opposition (Doc. 39), Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 43), and Defendants filed a response to

the Reply (Doc. 44). Plaintiff seeks $9,787 in attorneys’ fees and $609 in costs accrued

by her counsel at the Sanford Law Firm. The Court finds this matter ripe for decision and

GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 37).1

I. BACKGROUND

On August 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act

(“FLSA”) and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (“AMWA”) against all three Defendants.

Plaintiff’s original complaint (Doc. 2) also included a discrimination claim under the

Arkansas Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”) against all Defendants, including separate Defendant

Joseph Hatfield. Defendants Hatfield and Top Shot each filed a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim (Docs. 10 & 11). On October 12, Plaintiff filed an Amended

1 Plaintiff also requests oral argument in this matter. The Court finds the briefing adequate

and agrees with Defendants that oral argument is unnecessary.

Complaint (Doc. 18) dropping the ACRA claim against Hatfield and a separate response

in opposition (Doc. 19) to Top Shot’s motion to dismiss. The Amended Complaint

rendered moot all pending motions. Top Shot then renewed its motion to dismiss (Doc.

24), and Plaintiff resubmitted her response in opposition (Doc. 26). The Court denied the

motion on November 18, 2022. See Doc. 30. Following an early settlement conference,

the parties filed a joint notice of liability settlement (Doc. 35) on January 19, 2023.

The parties could not come to an agreement on Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and

costs. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party and entitled to

recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. The only dispute is what amount is

reasonable. Plaintiff’s original request was for $10,177.10 in fees and $834.30 in costs.

After considering Defendants’ Response in Opposition (Doc. 39), Plaintiff voluntarily

reduced her request to $9,787.10 in fees and $609 in costs. The parties agree $609 in

costs is appropriate. As to Plaintiff’s fee request, only a few arguments remain for the

Court to resolve.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In determining a reasonable attorneys’ fee award in FLSA and AMWA cases, the

starting point is the lodestar, which multiplies the number of hours reasonably expended

by a reasonable hourly rate. Then, “in extraordinary circumstances” the Court may adjust

the lodestar, but “there is a strong presumption that the lodestar is sufficient.” Perdue v.

Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 546 (2010). In determining whether such

extraordinary circumstances exist, the Court “may consider other factors identified in

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974), though

it should note that many of these factors usually are subsumed within the initial calculation

of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate.”2 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 434 n.9 (1983).

“The purpose of the FLSA attorney fees provision is to insure effective access to

the judicial process by providing attorney fees for prevailing plaintiffs with wage and hour

grievances.” Morales v. Farmland Foods, Inc., 2013 WL 1704722, at *5 (D. Neb. Apr. 18,

2013) (citing Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126, 1134 (6th Cir. 1994)). “A reasonable fee

is one that is adequate to attract competent counsel, but does not produce windfalls to

attorneys.” Vines v. Welspun Pipes, Inc., 2020 WL 3062384, at *3 (E.D. Ark. June 9,

2020) (quoting Hendrickson v. Branstad, 934 F.2d 158, 162 (8th Cir. 1991)) (modifications

adopted). “An attorney fees award under a fee-shifting statute should be comparable to

what is traditionally paid to attorneys who are compensated by a fee-paying client.”

Morales, 2013 WL 1704722, at *7 (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 287 (1989)).

“Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee

request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer

in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.”

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

A district court has discretion to determine the number of hours to be awarded

when conducting the lodestar calculation. See Fires v. Heber Springs Sch. Dist., 565 F.

2 The Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of

the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion

of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary

fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or

the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience,

reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature

and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar

cases. 488 F.2d at 717–19.

App’x 573, 576 (8th Cir. 2014) (reviewing the district court’s decision to classify hours as

excessive for abuse of discretion and “giving due deference to the district court’s unique

understanding of the legal and factual issues implicated by this matter and counsel’s

handling of them”). In exercising this discretion, the court “should weigh the hours claimed

against [the court’s] own knowledge, experience, and expertise of the time required to

complete similar activities.” Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 867 F.2d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir.

1989) (quotation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Reasonable Hourly Rate

Although Defendants do not articulate a rate challenge, the Court has an

independent responsibility to ensure the rates are reasonable in the current market area.

Plaintiff recognizes that this Court and others have regularly reduced the Sanford Law

Firm’s requested rates. See Doc. 38, p. 15. Attorney Josh Sanford, the named partner

of the firm and its senior attorney, requests a rate of $383. This rate is not the prevailing

rate for an attorney of Mr. Sanford’s ability and experience in this subject matter, or in

other matters of similar complexity. The Court therefore reduces his rate to $300.

Similarly, the Court reduces the requested rate for Patrick Wilson and Vanessa Kinney

from $300 to $250 and Rebecca Matlock from $250 to $225. The paralegal rate of $100

is reduced to $75 and the law clerk rate of $75 is reduced to $25. Requested rates for

the remaining attorneys are reasonable.

B. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s attorneys should have never billed $886

related to the unsupported ACRA claim against Joseph Hatfield, including work on

Hatfield’s motion to dismiss, the first amended complaint, and Defendants’ answers.

Plaintiff concedes this billing was inflated and reduced their request by $390. In reviewing

the parties’ thorough briefing on this issue, the Court agrees with Defendants that all

billing related to the ACRA claim is unreasonable. In addition to Plaintiff’s agreed

reduction, the Court strikes 1.1 hours of Vanessa Kinney’s time, 0.2 hours of Josh

Sanford’s time, and 0.3 hours of Patrick Wilson’s time from the bill.3

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff should not have billed for work on unsent

discovery requests. The Court agrees and strikes 0.9 paralegal hours from the bill.

Defendants’ final argument is that attorney Vanessa Kinney billed for duplicative

work. On November 4, 2022, Kinney claims she reviewed Top Shot’s renewed motion to

dismiss and drafted her renewed response to the motion, billing 1.3 hours for that work.

In comparing Plaintiff’s original response to the renewed response, the Court found the

documents practically identical. The Court finds billing 1.3 hours of work for this task was

unreasonable, and that 0.5 hours of work—at most—was required. Therefore, the Court

strikes 0.8 of Kinney’s time from the bill.

In sum, the Court approves of the following total rates and hours:

Attorney Rate Hours Value Claimed

Josh Sanford $300 7.5 $2,250

Patrick Wilson $250 3.3 $825

Vanessa Kinney $250 9.4 $2,350

Rebecca Matlock $225 2.5 $563

Courtney Lowery $190 2.2 $418

Samuel Brown $150 1 $150

Paralegal $75 10.7 $803

Law Clerk $25 .2 $5

TOTAL $7,363

3 Defendants also request a $250 reduction for “duplicative efforts” of attorney Wilson,

who withdrew from this matter in November 2022. (Doc. 39, p. 8). The Court finds that

reductions related to the ACRA claim have eliminated any duplicative billing from Wilson.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 37) is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Sanford Law Firm is entitled to $7,363

in fees and $609 in costs from Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED on this 25" day of April, 2023.

AIG a a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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