The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
LASHUNDRA BRADLEY,
Individually and as Administrator of
the Estate of Anthony Corel Bradley PLAINTIFF
v. Case No. 4:21-cv-4046
MILLER COUNTY, ARKANSAS, et al. DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Before the Court is Separate Defendants Jeffie Walker, Casey Powell, Casey Brown, Alan
“Keith” Moore, Chance Patterson, and Miller County, Arkansas’ (“County Defendants”) Motion
for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 14. Plaintiff has responded. ECF No. 33. The matter is ripe
for consideration. The Court finds that the instant motion must be denied in its current form and
that County Defendants will have an opportunity to renew their request for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her complaint against all Defendants1 on July 7, 2021. ECF No. 2. Plaintiff
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brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arkansas’ wrongful death tort. Plaintiff, as
administrator of the estate of Anthony Corel Bradley (“Mr. Bradley”), alleges that County
Defendants violated Mr. Bradley’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during his
confinement in the Miller County Detention Center (“MCDC”) from July 6, 2018, to July 8, 2018.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants subjected Mr. Bradley to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement by not providing obviously necessary medical care and being knowingly indifferent
to a medical emergency, which ultimately led to Mr. Bradley’s death on July 8, 2018.
1 Plaintiff also brings claims against Defendants Southern Health Partners, Inc., Steve King, Chelsey Foster, Loni
Redfearn, and Steve Foltz. Southern Health Partners, Inc. provided day-to-day medical services in the MCDC, and
these individual Defendants were in its employ at the time relevant to this action.
On July 19, 2022, County Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment.
County Defendants filed the instant motion on the dispositive motion deadline set by the Court in
an earlier scheduling order (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff filed an initial “Response” to the instant
motion, but it functioned more as a request for a continuance of the trial and all pre-trial deadlines
because of personal and professional difficulties that had overtaken counsel for Plaintiff. ECF No.
19. Plaintiff later filed a separate motion requesting a continuance and a restart of discovery in
this matter. ECF No. 20. The Court granted Plaintiff’s request, continuing the trial and resetting
discovery for this matter. ECF No. 24. Plaintiff never filed a dispositive motion by the prior June
19, 2022, dispositive motion deadline. Upon a motion by County Defendants requesting
clarification regarding the still-pending nature of the instant motion (ECF No. 26), the Court set a
deadline for Plaintiff to file a substantive response to County Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 28). On January 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed her response in opposition. ECF No.
33.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hess v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., 898 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is a “threshold
inquiry of . . . whether there is a need for trial—whether, in other words, there are genuine factual
issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they reasonably may be
resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A
fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. See id. at 248. A dispute
is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for
either party. See id. at 252.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider all the evidence and
all reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. See Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Co-Op, 446 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 2006). The
moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747
(8th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party must then demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the
record that create a genuine issue for trial. See Krenik v. Cnty. of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th
Cir. 1995). However, a party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion “may not
rest upon mere allegations or denials . . . but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. A party that fails to respond to any basis of a
motion for summary judgment effectively waives any argument in opposition to that aspect of a
motion for summary judgment. See Department of Labor v. EJ’s Cleaning Services, Inc., 2020
WL 1432048 at *1 (E.D. Ark. March 19, 2020) (citing Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd.
of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009)).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court finds that it must deny County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The
fundamental shortcoming in County Defendants’ motion is their insertion of two completely
different factual circumstances in their brief in support. ECF No. 16. In attempting to dispute the
adequacy of Plaintiff’s claims, County Defendants cite to facts from a different matter involving a
death in confinement in Washington County:
The Plaintiff’s only claim(s) against the Separate County Defendants arises under
42 U.S.C. §1983, where the Plaintiff alleges that her decedent (and son) was denied
appropriate medical care during his incarceration at the Washington County jail on
September 24-25, 2016, which allegedly caused him to commit suicide. Doc. # 79.
For the reasons discussed herein, however, the Plaintiff cannot prove deliberate
indifference by any of the Separate Washington County Defendants and certainly
cannot establish the violation of clearly established law. As such, the Separate
Washington County Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and summary
judgment as a matter of law.
Id. at p. 4. Noting that evaluating motions for summary judgment are factually intensive and that
the motion must be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the disparate facts2 utilized by
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County Defendants precludes the Court from finding that they have borne their burden of showing
that there is no genuine issue of any material fact for this matter.
However, the Court must also take note of its prior order continuing the trial and discovery
deadlines. ECF No. 24. At the time of that order, Plaintiff had not filed a dispositive motion by
the prior deadline. Under the reset deadlines, Plaintiff would have an opportunity to file a
dispositive motion while County Defendants, who complied with the previous deadline, would no
longer be able to file a dispositive motion after the Court’s denial of the instant motion.
Accordingly, due to considerations of fundamental fairness, County Defendants will be permitted
to renew their motion for summary judgment any time before the June 20, 2023, dispositive motion
deadline in the most recent scheduling order (ECF No. 25) put forth by the Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 14) is hereby DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. County Defendants may renew their
motion for summary judgment any time before the current dispositive motion deadline.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of February, 2022.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
Chief United States District Judge
2 Plaintiff noted in her response that the inclusion of the facts from the Washington County matter seem to be the
result of a “hasty copy/paste job.” ECF No. 34, p. 3.