“[A]s a general rule, a prisoner's transfer or release from a particular prison moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to his incarceration there.”
How later courts described this case
- “[A]s a general rule, a prisoner's transfer or release from a particular prison moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to his incarceration there.”
- noting that a defendant can defend a retaliation claim by showing that an action was taken against an inmate because of a rule violation
- “Because Zajrael is no longer subject to the policies that he challenges, there is no live case or controversy.”
- inmate had sufficiently stated a claim of coercion when his parole opportunities were tied to participation in certain faith-based substance treatment programs
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
JONATHAN ROBERT
JENNINGS WALKER PLAINTIFF
v. Case No. 6:20-cv-6114
SHERIFF JASON WATSON, et al. DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation issued by the Honorable Barry A.
Bryant, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas. ECF No. 211.
Plaintiff has filed objections. ECF No. 216. The Court finds the matter ripe for consideration.
I.BACKGROUND
The factual background to this matter is voluminous and has different dimensions that
reflect Plaintiff’s several claims against Defendants. Plaintiff brings three claims under the First
Amendment based on alleged infringement of his free exercise of religion, establishment of
religion, and retaliation for filing an initial lawsuit. Plaintiff brings two claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment based on alleged violations of his right to equal protection and right to
constitutional conditions of confinement. Plaintiff brought a claim under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, alleging infringement on the
exercise of his religion. Plaintiff also brought a claim under Arkansas Code § 20-57-401, alleging
misrepresentations of non-kosher foods as kosher. The Court attempts to provide the most succinct
and clearest recitation of the facts underlying these claims.
On August 6, 2020, Plaintiff became a pretrial detainee at the Clark County Detention
Center (“CCDC”). Upon entry and intake into the CCDC, Plaintiff informed the jail staff that he
was Jewish and required a strict kosher diet. At the time of Plaintiff’s detainment, the CCDC had
a contractual agreement with Tiger Correctional Services (“Tiger”) to provide meals and other
food services for its inmates and detainees. Plaintiff began receiving sack meals on August 9,
2020. There is a documented request by Plaintiff for kosher meals dated August 9, 2020, in which
Plaintiff asserts that the foods he had been served were not compliant with kosher requirements
because of different cross contamination occurring with pork products. The CCDC Jail
Administrator at that time, Michael Lesher, responded stating that pork products were not being
served at the CCDC. Plaintiff also asserts that the sack meals contained meat and dairy products
within the same meal, which is also in violation of kosher requirements. Plaintiff asserts that at
the onset of his detainment the bagged of chips in the sacked meals was the only food he could eat
for a roughly ten-day period.
Tiger was not informed of Plaintiff’s request for kosher meals until August 16, 2020. Tiger
staff then began serving Plaintiff a Common Fare diet that a registered dietician had informed them
was kosher compliant. Plaintiff first received a Common Fare meal on August 16, 2022.
Thereafter, in preparing Plaintiff’s meals, CCDC staff attempted to comply with what they
believed were kosher requirements. These efforts included giving Plaintiff disposable utensils that
were never in contact with non-kosher foods, washing cookware used to prepare Plaintiff’s meals
in a dedicated sink, and serving Plaintiff’s meals in disposable styrofoam trays that were never in
contact with non-kosher food.
Tiger began serving Plaintiff prepacked meals from HMR1 around mid-October 2020.
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Tiger believed these pre-packaged foods were kosher compliant after consulting with a registered
dietician who stated that the HMR meals were kosher. Plaintiff raised complaints regarding the
1 “HMR” refers to HMR Weight Management Services Corp., a company that sells pre-packed meals. See HMR
Food, https://www.hmrprogram.com/ (last accessed Sept. 30, 2022).
HMR meals, asserting that these meals violated certain kosher principles, such as having meat and
dairy items in the same meal. Plaintiff began receiving different pre-packaged foods on November
21, 2020, which Plaintiff does not dispute complied with kosher requirements. However, Plaintiff
asserts that between November 21, 2020, and May 9, 2021, various other food items provided to
supplement the pre-packed kosher items were not kosher compliant. From October 2020 until
April 2021, Plaintiff filed multiple grievances complaining that the food he was receiving was not
kosher compliant. Plaintiff asserts that he began to receive genuine kosher compliant foods on
May 10, 2021. Plaintiff also asserts that he was informed by CCDC Jail Administrator Michael
Lesher that kosher foods could not be delivered or dropped off at the CCDC. According to Fred
Phillips, who became CCDC Jail Administrator on January 1, 2021, Plaintiff is the only known
inmate under the present Clark County administration to request a kosher diet.
Fred Phillips asserts that after he became Jail Administrator, the CCDC consulted with an
individual they believed could inform them of proper kosher dietary requirements. Fred Phillips
also asserts that CCDC staff would purchase food at local grocery stores in an attempt to provide
Plaintiff with kosher food items when Tiger was unable to provide kosher compliant meals.
Around mid-January 2021, Plaintiff received access to a microwave meant for his personal use to
avoid cross-contamination with other food items. Plaintiff asserts that there were occasions when
other individuals used the microwave when he was not present.
During Christmas season, CCDC permits local churches to provide holiday meals and host
prayer and church services within the CCDC common day room. No inmate is denied participation
in the meal or church service and no inmate is forced to participate. Plaintiff asserts that he was
forced to hear the Christmas services due to his proximity to the day room. CCDC staff assert that
no denomination is prevented from donating meals and that meals from Tiger are still available
during the Christmas season. Plaintiff asserts that on December 25, 2020, he only received
breakfast from Tiger and that the only available lunch meal was the non-kosher Christmas meal
brought in by local volunteers. CCDC staff assert that other food apart from the Christmas meal
is available to inmates on Christmas day.
On September 28, 2020, Plaintiff’s wedding ring was confiscated by CCDC staff. Plaintiff
asserts that other inmates were permitted to keep jewelry items on their person. CCDC staff assert
that CCDC policy prohibits jewelry, thus Plaintiff’s ring should have been confiscated during
intake but was overlooked.
Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by an Arkansas Department of Corrections inmate
who was temporarily housed in the CCDC in November 2020. Plaintiff states that he reported the
assault the day after the incident, while Michael Lesher disputes that Plaintiff immediately reported
the assault. Michael Lesher states that at the time Plaintiff reported the assault, he had no apparent
physical injuries or physical markings. Plaintiff contends that he had internal injuries. Plaintiff
made a medical request and was eventually seen by Dr. Elkins on multiple occasions after his
request. Michael Lesher states that he consulted with the Criminal Investigation Department
regarding this assault and that the conclusion was that there was not enough evidence to bring any
charges against the inmate Plaintiff alleges assaulted him. Michael Lesher founded this decision
on the lack of apparent injuries, witnesses to the assault, or other proof.
In January 2021, Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch after he refused to eat numerous
consecutive meals. Plaintiff was placed in a particular cell and was on suicide watch for
approximately four to five hours in order to ensure that he was not a danger to himself. After
determining Plaintiff was not a danger to himself, CCDC staff took him off suicide watch but kept
him in that particular cell for seven days.
Plaintiff was transferred out of the CCDC on April 14, 2022, and is now an inmate in the
Arkansas Department of Corrections.
On October 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint. ECF No. 1. The Court
subsequently granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 3. Plaintiff
eventually submitted his Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 140) against Defendants Sheriff
Jason Watson, Chief Deputy Raymond Funderburk, Jail Administrator Michael Lesher, Jail
Sergeant Clay Atkins, Jail Administrator Fred Phillips, Halbert Torraca, James Gainous, Brenda
Piggee, and Tiger Correctional Services, Inc.2 The Second Amended Complaint is the operative
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complaint in this matter. In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks a mix of compensatory and punitive
damages along with certain injunctive relief and declaratory judgments. Id. at p. 13.
On December 13, 2021, Defendants Sheriff Jason Watson, Chief Deputy Raymond
Funderburk, Jail Administrator Michael Lesher, Jail Sergeant Clay Atkins, and Jail Administrator
Fred Phillips filed their motion for summary judgement. ECF No. 160. That same day, Defendants
Halbert Torraca, James Gainous, Brenda Piggee, and Tiger Correctional Services, Inc. filed their
motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 164. On February 11, 2022, Plaintiff responded in
opposition to both motions. ECF No. 181. Defendants have replied. ECF Nos. 189 and 192.
On June 6, 2022, Judge Bryant issued the instant report and recommendation,
recommending that Defendants’ motions for summary judgment be granted and Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 140) be dismissed with prejudice. ECF No. 211, p. 27. On July
25, 2022, Plaintiff filed his objections. ECF No. 216.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
2 Plaintiff also brought claims against Defendant Joyce Lamilla, which the Court previously dismissed without
prejudice. ECF No. 209.
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hess v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., 898 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is a “threshold
inquiry of . . . whether there is a need for trial—whether, in other words, there are genuine factual
issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they reasonably may be
resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A
fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. See id. at 248. A dispute
is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either
party. See id. at 252.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider all the evidence and
all reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. See Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Co-Op, 446 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 2006). The
moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747
(8th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party must then demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the
record that create a genuine issue for trial. See Krenik v. Cnty. of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th
Cir. 1995). However, a party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion “may not
rest upon mere allegations or denials . . . but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. A party that fails to respond to any basis of a
motion for summary judgment effectively waives any argument in opposition to that aspect of a
motion for summary judgment. See Department of Labor v. EJ’s Cleaning Services, Inc., 2020
WL 1432048 at *1 (E.D. Ark. March 19, 2020) (citing Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd.
of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009)).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color
of law, of a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of
the United States. In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant
acted under color of state law and that he violated a right secured by the Constitution. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.1999).
“Qualified immunity shields public officials from liability for civil damages if their conduct did
not ‘violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” Dillard v. O’Kelly, 961 F.3d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted).
Claims brought pursuant to § 1983 can be against a defendant in their individual or official
capacity. Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998). “Claims against individuals in
their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which they work; they require
proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff's rights, and the only type of
immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.” Id. Individual capacity claims are those
which are alleged against the individual actions of a defendant during the course of their duties.
Id. “To establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [a plaintiff] must allege specific
facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional
rights.” Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). A
defendant’s general responsibility of supervising a prison or detention facility is insufficient to
establish individual involvement for a § 1983 claim. See Ouzts v. Cummins, 825 F.2d 1276, 1277
(8th Cir.1987).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has filed various objections to Judge Bryant’s recommendation. The Court finds
that the objections are specific enough to trigger a de novo review of Judge Bryant’s
recommendations. See Griffini v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1994) (specific objections
shift a court’s review from one which scrutinizes for plain error to one in which the issues are
reviewed de novo); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Some of the objections are an overarching
critique of Judge Bryant’s report and recommendation, while others are directed at the conclusions
regarding Plaintiff’s claims. The Court will address the broad objections first, and then proceed
to address the objections Plaintiff directed at Judge Bryant’s recommendations regarding his
claims.
A. Plaintiff’s General Objections
Plaintiff has submitted broad and overarching objections to Judge Bryant’s objectivity and
his recitation and assessment of the factual record. ECF No. 216, p. 12-36. Plaintiff asserts that
Judge Bryant has displayed clear bias against him throughout this matter and states that this is
exhibited in the determination that the Defendants’ version of facts is the most persuasive. Id. at
p. 12-13. Plaintiff declares that he wants to rescind his consent to having a magistrate judge
preside over this matter and that Judge Bryant does not have any authority to preside over his case.
Id. at p. 13-16. Plaintiff also objects to Judge Bryant’s recitation of the factual background in the
report and recommendation. Id. at p. 17-36. Plaintiff specifically objects to Judge Bryant’s
statement that not all the exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s response were relevant, and then describes
the relevance of roughly twenty-three of the exhibits he attached to his response. Id. at p. 18-25.
Plaintiff also objects to Judge Bryant citing to the Defendants’ exhibits, depositions, and
statements more often when reciting the factual background of this matter, asserting that he has
presented facts and exhibits that contradict that recited record. Id. at p. 26-36.
The Court is not persuaded by these general objections. Plaintiff has misconstrued adverse
rulings and the application of law unfavorable to his positions as evidence of bias. Also, as the
Court similarly determined in an earlier order (ECF No. 113, p. 2-3), Plaintiff has not presented
“extraordinary circumstances” that would justify revoking a referral to a magistrate judge under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b)(3). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s objection to Judge
Bryant’s synthesis of the record is not persuasive. Some of the exhibits Plaintiff attached to his
response, such as the food regulations from the Idaho Department of Correction (ECF No. 183-2)
are indeed of little relevance. As for the general summation of the record, which was extensive,3
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the Court finds that Judge Bryant is accurate in reciting the undisputed material facts for this
matter. For any facts that Plaintiff asserts are material and specifically attempts to dispute, the
Court will address them when analyzing Judge Bryant’s recommendations for Plaintiff’s claims.
B. Claim Objections
1. RLUIPA Claim
Plaintiff brings a claim pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, against all Defendants in their official capacities. ECF No.
140, p. 6. Plaintiff supports this claim by asserting that the CCDC’s failure to provide him with
kosher meals have hindered him from practicing his religious beliefs. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the
custom or policies that violated his rights were the “Arkansas Jail Standards Policy (AJSP) § 12-
1001 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc; Clark County Detention Center Policy (CCDCP) 017 (IV)(A);
AJSP § 6-1001 et seq.” Id. at p. 7.
Judge Bryant recommends that all Defendants be granted summary judgment for Plaintiff’s
RLUIPA claim. ECF No. 211, p. 15. Judge Bryant notes that only injunctive relief is available
for official capacity claims under RLUIPA. Id. Therefore, Judge Bryant determines that Plaintiff’s
claim became moot when he was transferred out of the CCDC because the relief he requested no
3 Plaintiff’s filings in response to the motions for summary judgment total nearly 1000 pages of arguments and
exhibits. ECF Nos. 181, 182, 183.
longer applies to his current situation. Id. Judge Bryant concludes that Defendants should be
granted summary judgment for this claim. Id.
Plaintiff’s objection contends that he only requested declaratory relief for this claim. ECF
No. 216, p. 36-37. Plaintiff also asserts that Judge Bryant’s recommendation of summary
judgment for this claim is improper because a moot claim is not determined on the merits and
therefore not subject to a summary judgment outcome. Id. at p. 37.
The Court finds that Judge Bryant’s determination that this claim is moot is correct. The
Eighth Circuit has held that RLUIPA claims do not permit claims for monetary damages and that
injunctive relief is the only relief available for official capacity claims under RLUIPA. See Van
Whye v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639, 652-55 (8th Cir. 2009). Once an inmate is transferred out of the
facility that is the subject of his RLUIPA claim, that claim becomes moot. See Zajrael v. Harmon,
677 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Because Zajrael is no longer subject to the policies that he
challenges, there is no live case or controversy.”); see also Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186
(4th Cir. 2009) (“[A]s a general rule, a prisoner's transfer or release from a particular prison moots
his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to his incarceration there.”). Plaintiff
is correct in his assertion that a moot claim is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
not subject to summary judgment on the merits. See Ali v. Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722, 723-24 (8th
Cir. 2005) (noting that a moot matter is no longer a live Article III case or controversy that a court
has jurisdiction over and must be dismissed). Therefore, the ultimate result for Plaintiff’s RLUIPA
claim must be dismissal without prejudice because the claim is now moot due to Plaintiff’s
relocation out of the CCDC.
2. Free Exercise Claim
Plaintiff brings a claim for violation of his right to “free exercise” of his religion against
all Defendants in their individual and official capacities. ECF No. 140 at p. 8. Plaintiff asserts
that Defendants attempted to hinder the exercise of his Jewish faith by intentionally depriving him
of a kosher diet and forcing him to participate in Christian activities. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the
customs or policies that violated his rights were the “CCDFP 017(IV)(A); AJSP § 8-1001 & 1002;
AJSP § 10-1008 to 1011; AJSP § 12-1001 et seq.; 1st Amendment to the [United States]
Constitution; Article 2 § 24 to the [Arkansas] Constitution; AJSP § 6-1001 et seq.” Id. at p. 9.
Judge Bryant recommends that all Defendants be granted summary judgment for Plaintiff’s
claim under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. ECF No. 211, p. 16-18. Judge
Bryant first notes that free exercise claims in the prison context require a showing of greater than
intermitted denial of an inmate’s ability to practice their religion. Id. at p. 16-17. Judge Bryant
further notes that the Eighth Circuit has determined that § 1983 claims alleging a deprivation of
the right to free exercise generally require showing that there was a standing policy that violates
the right to free exercise. Id. at p. 17. Turning to the factual record, Judge Bryant determines that
Defendants made good faith efforts to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious dietary requirements and
that Plaintiff has failed to show that their failures to adhere to kosher requirements were pursuant
to any policy or the result of their intentional mistakes that created a de facto policy of refusing to
adhere to religious dietary requirements. Id. at p. 17-18. Judge Bryant concludes that Plaintiff has
failed to show that there is a genuine dispute as to the material facts for his free exercise claim and
that all Defendants are entitled to summary judgement on this claim. Id. at p. 18.
Plaintiff’s objection argues that Judge Bryant erred in concluding that there is no genuine
dispute as to his free exercise claim. ECF No. 216, p. 37-39. Plaintiff first contends that Judge
Bryant’s reliance on Mbonyunkiza v. Beasley, 956 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 2020) is a mistake because
of the factual differences between that matter and his case. Id. at p. 37-38. Plaintiff notes that the
inmate in Mbonyunkiza alleged only four instances in which his religious dietary requirements
were not respected, while Plaintiff contends that he spent nearly nine months in the CCDC unable
to practice his religion because of the food he was served. Id. Plaintiff then reiterates his general
arguments that Defendants burdened and restricted his religion. Id. at p. 38-39.
“Prison inmates retain constitutional rights protected by the First Amendment, including
the right to free exercise of religion.” Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897, 902 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing
O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, (1987)). The threshold issue for a free exercise claim under
§ 1983 is whether the governmental regulation or policy “infringes upon a sincerely held religious
belief.” Murphy v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 372 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2004) (quotations
and citations omitted). The challenged activity that an inmate claims infringes upon or
substantially burdens the free exercise of his religion must be a statute, regulation, or policy. See
Mbonyunkiza, 956 F.3d at 1054-55. Negligent acts or mistakes are not subject to free exercise
claims under § 1983 unless the failures and mistakes are so pervasive that they can support an
inference that there was a de facto policy of ignoring an inmate’s right to free exercise of his
religious beliefs. See id. at 1055.
The Court agrees with Judge Bryant’s conclusion. Plaintiff never alleges that there is an
official policy or regulation at the CCDC that infringes on his free exercise of religion and its
dietary requirements. See Mbonyunkiza, 956 F.3d at 1054-55. Also, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
factual allegations about the individual actions of Defendants do not create a genuine question of
fact as to whether there was a de facto policy within the CCDC to deny him his right to exercise
his religion. See id. Instead, the Court finds that the CCDC made substantial efforts to
accommodate Plaintiff’s kosher dietary needs, which were novel and demanding requirements for
the CCDC. These efforts included the changed procedures for preparing and delivering Plaintiff’s
food, attempting to find outside pre-packaged foods that would adhere to kosher requirements,
consulting with individuals that Defendants believed could guide them on what foods complied
with kosher demands, and obtaining a microwave for Plaintiff to prepare food without “cross-
contamination” with non-kosher foods. While these efforts could be seen as bumbling,
inconsistent, and oftentimes ignorant of who needed to be consulted for an accurate determination
of kosher requirements, they do not indicate that there is a genuine question as to whether
Defendants’ actions amount to a de facto policy of infringing on Plaintiff’s right to free exercise.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that there is a genuine dispute as to
whether Defendants imposed any policy that infringed upon his right to freely exercise his religion.
Therefore, all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
3. Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiff brings a claim for violations of his right to “equal protection” against all
Defendants in their individual and official capacities. ECF No 140, p. 7. Plaintiff asserts that he
has been treated in a lesser manner as an inmate because of his religious beliefs when compared
to similarly situated inmates. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the customs or policies that violated his
rights were the “AJSP § 8- 1001 to 1002; AJSP § 12-1001 et seq.; AJSP § 10-1001 et seq.; 14[th]
Amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S Constitution); Article 2 § 3 to the Arkansas
Constitution (AR Constitution).” Id. at p. 8.
Judge Bryant recommends that Defendants be granted summary judgment for Plaintiff’s
equal protection claim. ECF No. 211, p. 18-20. Judge Bryant notes that an equal protection claim
in this context requires affirmative evidence that any differing treatment was motivated by an intent
to discriminate based on Plaintiff’s religion. Id. at p. 19. Applying that requirement to the record,
Judge Bryant determines that Plaintiff has failed to put forth evidence that Defendants acted with
discriminatory purpose in any differing treatment between Plaintiff and similarly situated inmates.
Id. at p. 19-20.
Plaintiff objected to Judge Bryant’s determination for this claim. ECF No. 216, p. 39-42.
First, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ failures to consult with properly accredited experts on
kosher dietary requirements demonstrates their discrimination. Id. at p. 39. Plaintiff also argues
that various incidents demonstrate discriminatory intent, such as the confiscation of his wedding
ring, the additional food other inmates received, allowing non-kosher food to be donated while not
requiring kosher foods also be donated, and the microwave meant to be exclusive to Plaintiff being
used by others. Id. at p. 40-41. Plaintiff also asserts a variety of antisemitic slights and slurs that
he observed CCDC staff make, though he cites to nothing in the record to support these assertions.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment asserts that no State shall
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend
XIV, § 1. “The Equal Protection Clause requires that the government treat all similarly situated
people alike.” Barstad v. Murray County, 420 F.3d 880, 884 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”).
The Fourteenth Amendment requirement to treat similarly situated people alike “extends to prison
inmates.” Rouse v. Benson, 193 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 1999). Differing treatment of similarly
situated individuals “is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an
element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th
Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted); see also Personnel Adm’r of Mass v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273
(1979). “Discriminatory purpose can be proved with various kinds of direct and circumstantial
evidence but is most often proved with evidence that similarly situated inmates were treated
differently.” Lewis, 486 F.3d at 1028. (citation omitted).
The Court agrees with Judge Bryant’s conclusion. Plaintiff has not presented the
affirmative evidence necessary to show that any differing treatment he encountered in the CCDC
was motivated by his religion. The issue Plaintiff raised regarding inadequate research on kosher
foods only suggests ignorance on Defendants’ part instead of any malice. As the record indicates,
the CCDC did not have experience with kosher diet requirements or have a significant amount of
kosher food available. Therefore, the Court views the extra food Plaintiff asserts that other inmates
received as simply the result of having more non-kosher food available. Regarding Plaintiff’s
assertion that the CCDC specifically prohibited the donation or outside delivery of kosher food,
the Court finds that the exhibit Plaintiff cites to support that assertion (ECF No. 183-27) does not
actually suggest a prohibition. Rather, Plaintiff’s grievance about outside food deliveries to other
inmates is answered by CCDC staff who inform Plaintiff that no inmate is receiving outside food
deliveries, whether kosher or not. ECF No. 183-27, p. 2. Also, Plaintiff does not cite to any
compelling evidence in the record to support his assertions regarding other inmates being allowed
to keep their jewelry or the antisemitic remarks from CCDC staff. Plaintiff’s grievance regarding
his ring (ECF No. 183-29) is answered by CCDC staff stating that the rule against jewelry was
enforced against Plaintiff once they realized there was a policy violation. Also, the grievances
filed by Plaintiff regarding the microwave (ECF No. 183-28) indicate that CCDC staff were not
aware of who was improperly using the microwave and were responsive to Plaintiff’s requests to
keep it exclusive to him. Rather than demonstrate unequal treatment motivated by discrimination
purpose, the Court finds that the record only demonstrates that the CCDC staff attempted to
accommodate Plaintiff even though his religious requirements were atypical and more demanding
that what is typically necessary for other inmates. Because the Court finds that there is no genuine
question as to whether any differing treatment was the result of purposeful discrimination based
on Plaintiff’s religion, all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. See Lewis,
486 F.3d at 1028.
4. Establishment Clause Claim
Plaintiff brings a claim for violation of his right to be free from an “establishment of
religion” and is against all Defendants in their individual and official capacities, with the exception
of Defendant Sergeant Clay Atkins, who was not named in this claim. ECF No. 140, p. 9. Plaintiff
asserts that these Defendants attempted to hinder the practice of his religion, forced him to
participate in Christian religious acts, and gave greater accommodation to the religious beliefs of
other similarly situated inmates. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the customs or policies that violated his
rights were the “CCDFP 017; AJSP § 12-1001 et seq.; 1st Amendment to the [United States]
Constitution; AJSP § 6-1001 et seq.; Article 2 § 24 to the [Arkansas] Constitution.” Id. at p. 10.
Judge Bryant recommends that these Defendants be granted summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s establishment clause claim. ECF No. 211, p. 20-21. Judge Bryant determines that
Defendants have provided evidence to negate any suggestion by Plaintiff that he was forced to
participate in any Christian activities at the CCDC or that the CCDC has a policy of preferential
treatment of Christianity. Id. This is based on Defendant Michael Lesher’s sworn statement (ECF
No. 160-4) that no inmate is forced to participate in any Christian services and that there is no rule
prohibiting non-Christian religious groups from donating food or attempting to conduct services
at the CCDC. After finding that the Plaintiff’s evidence for this claim consists of simple assertions
of Plaintiff’s perception of coercion, Judge Bryant concludes that Plaintiff has not presented a
genuine question as to whether Defendants coerced him into participating in Christian activities.
Id. at p. 21.
Plaintiff’s objection argues that the record clearly indicates that Defendants exhibited a
favoritism for Christianity and hostility toward his faith. ECF No. 216, p. 42-44. Plaintiff
reiterates his allegations of the CCDC not permitting donations of kosher foods and harassing
statements of CCDC staff. Id. at p. 43-44. Plaintiff also asserts that the CCDC allowing Christian
worship services in the common room and accommodating Christian donations and decorations is
clear evidence of Defendants coercing him into participating in Christian religious services. Id. at
p. 44.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment “erects a barrier between government
and religious entities ‘depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.’” American
United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509 F.3d 406,
423 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1984)). The Establishment
Clause does not create a complete and arbitrary separation of church and state, but “affirmatively
mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.”
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (citations omitted). However, “the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise
act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’” Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678). For claims that the state is
coercing an incarcerated individual to subscribe to a religion, a three-step inquiry is conducted:
“first, has the state acted; second, does the action amount to coercion; and third, is the object of
the coercion religious or secular?” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 543 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotations
and citations omitted).
The Court agrees with Judge Bryant’s conclusion. As to the first inquiry from Jackson,
the Court finds that Plaintiff has not created a genuine question that the Defendants ever
affirmatively acted in any way. 747 F.3d at543. Rather, permitting volunteers to donate food or
hold Christian services appears to be a permissible passive accommodation to the religious beliefs
of other inmates and not an active step undertaken by Defendants. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673.
However, even if accepting donations is viewed as an active step, the second Jackson consideration
indicates that there is no genuine question as to the coercive impact of any alleged act by these
Defendants. Plaintiff was not required to participate in any services and could go to his cell if a
service was occurring. Also, Plaintiff has not indicated that any of his benefits were revoked
because of his failure to participate in Christian activities. See Jackson, 747 F.3d at 542-43 (inmate
had sufficiently stated a claim of coercion when his parole opportunities were tied to participation
in certain faith-based substance treatment programs).
Plaintiff’s claim seems to be founded on his disappointment over the lack of Jewish
services or kosher donations occurring. However, this absence seems to track with a lack of
matching Jewish volunteer efforts at the CCDC and does not indicate that these Defendants
prohibited the Jewish equivalent of the Christian volunteer efforts. This is not surprising
considering the CCDC’s genuine lack of experience with kosher dietary requirements and the lack
of previous Jewish inmates. Defendant Michael Lesher indicates that the CCDC would permit
equivalent Jewish volunteer services if any were ever presented. In sum, the Court finds that the
record shows that these Defendants accommodated what was available and volunteered regarding
Christian inmates but were not hostile to Judaism or Plaintiff’s religious beliefs. Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 673. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not put forth facts that create a genuine
dispute as to whether these Defendants acted in a manner to coerce Plaintiff to subscribe to a
particular religion. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. Therefore, all Defendants, with the exception of
Sergeant Clay Atkins, who was not named in this claim, are entitled to summary judgment on this
claim.
5. Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff brings a claim for violations of his right to be free from “retaliation” against
Defendants Sheriff Jason Watson, Chief Deputy Raymond Funderburk, Jail Administrator Miachel
Lesher, Jail Sergeant Clay Atkins, Jail Administrator Fred Phillips, and Brenda Piggee in their
individual and official capacities. ECF No. 140, p. 10. Plaintiff asserts that these Defendants
retaliated against Plaintiff’s initial filing of § 1983 claims by denying him kosher food,
confiscating his wedding ring, allowing Plaintiff to be assaulted, refusing medical care and not
filing charges against his assailant. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the customs or policies that violated
his rights were the “1st Amendment to the [United States] Constitution; Article 2 § 13 to the
[Arkansas] Constitution.” Id. at p. 11.
Judge Bryant recommends that these Defendants be granted summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. ECF No. 211, p. 21-22. Judge Bryant determines that Plaintiff has
produced no proof beyond speculation and general coincidental timing that these Defendants took
adverse action against him because he filed his initial § 1983 complaint regarding kosher foods.
Id. at p. 22.
Plaintiff’s objection contends that he has presented adequate proof to indicate that these
Defendants acted adversely against him for his decision to file § 1983 claims. ECF No. 216, p.
44-47. Plaintiff generally rehashes the failures of these Defendants to provide him with kosher
food as proof of their retaliatory motivations. Id. at p. 45-46. Plaintiff also points to the instance
he was placed on suicide watch, the confiscation of his wedding ring, and the failure to bring
charges against the inmate he alleges assaulted him as proof that these Defendants intended to
retaliate against him. Id. at p. 46-47.
An inmate’s filing of a grievance or a lawsuit is a protected First Amendment activity and
actions taken in retaliation for either are actionable under § 1983. See Gonzalez v. Bendt, 971 F.3d
742, 744-45 (8th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). To establish a claim for First Amendment
retaliation, Plaintiff must show “(1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) [Defendants] took
adverse action against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the
activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected
activity.” Id. at 745 (quotation omitted). “The retaliatory conduct itself need not be a
constitutional violation; the violation is acting in retaliation for ‘the exercise of a constitutionally
protected right.’” Spencer v. Jackson County Mo., 738 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotation
omitted). “The key question is whether the actions were taken in retaliation for engaging in
protected activity” and a plaintiff must show that the adverse action was “motivated at least in
part” by filing a lawsuit. Id. The timing of alleged adverse events is not sufficient alone to create
a genuine question for a retaliation claim and defeat summary judgment. See Turner v. Mull, 784
F.3d 485, 493 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
The Court agrees with Judge Bryant’s conclusion. As to Plaintiff’s contentions regarding
kosher food, the Court has already determined that any failures were the result of bumbling but
good faith efforts to adapt to novel requirements. Also, these Defendants have demonstrated that
their actions regarding Plaintiff’s wedding ring were pursuant to prison policies and resulted from
Plaintiff’s actions. See Spencer, 738 F.3d at 911 (noting that a defendant can defend a retaliation
claim by showing that an action was taken against an inmate because of a rule violation).
Similarly, Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch for his own decision to not eat the food available
to him. Further, Plaintiff’s grievances regarding his assault (ECF No. 183-30) all indicate that
CCDC staff attempted to comply with Plaintiff’s requests in a good faith manner in investigating
the assault and determining if charges against the assailant were warranted. The mere fact that
these incidents occurred after Plaintiff filed his lawsuit is not sufficient to create a genuine question
as to the retaliatory motive of these Defendants. See Turner, 784 F.3d at 493. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has not put forth proof to create a genuine question as to whether any of
the alleged adverse actions taken by these Defendants were motivated by Plaintiff’s exercise of a
protected right. See Gonzalez, 971 F.3d at 745; Spencer, 738 F.3d at 911. Therefore, Defendants
Sheriff Jason Watson, Chief Deputy Raymond Funderburk, Jail Administrator Miachel Lesher,
Jail Sergeant Clay Atkins, Jail Administrator Fred Phillips, and Brenda Piggee are entitled to
summary judgment for this claim.
6. Due Process Claim
Plaintiff brings a claim for violations of his right to “due process” against all Defendants
in their individual and official capacities. ECF No. 140, p. 11. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants
violated his right to due process by not providing kosher food, allowing him to be assaulted by
another inmate, refusing medical treatment and not filing charges against his assailant, and keeping
him in the same suicide watch cell for seven days. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the customs or policies
that violated his rights were the “CCDCP 11; CCDCP 18; AJSP § 8-1001 et seq.; AJSP § 10-1001
et seq.; AJSP § 12-1001 et seq.; 14th Amendment to the [United States] Constitution; Article 2 §
8 to the [Arkansas] Constitution.” Id. at p. 12.
Judge Bryant recommends that Defendants be granted summary judgment for Plaintiff’s
due process claim. ECF No. 211, p. 23-26. Judge Bryant determines that Plaintiff has failed to
present proof that Defendants recklessly disregarded the known risk Plaintiff alleges was present
because of the inmate who assaulted him. Id. at p. 24. Similarly, Judge Bryant determines that
Plaintiff has not shown that he was denied medical care. Id. at p. 24-25. Rather, Judge Bryant
determines that Plaintiff simply disagrees with the conclusions of the medical personnel that
examined him and with the quality of care after the alleged assault. Id. As to placing Plaintiff on
suicide watch, Judge Bryant notes that segregating a pretrial detainee that has displayed self-
harming behaviors is not unconstitutional. Id. at p. 25-26.
Plaintiff’s objection argues that Judge Bryant misapplies Eighth Amendment standards to
this claim when Plaintiff’s status as a pretrial detainee should be analyzed under the Fourteenth
Amendment. ECF No. 216, p. 47-49. Plaintiff cites to Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389,
396-98 (2015) to argue that there is no subjective mental state requirements for his due process
claim because the only test is whether actions taken were “objectively reasonable.” Id. at p. 47-
48. Plaintiff also contends that he has not been permitted to obtain evidence that would show that
Defendants should have been aware that the inmate who assaulted him posed an unreasonable risk
to his safety. Id. at p. 48-49. Plaintiff also disputes that the medical treatment he received was
adequate because the treatment was not from an actual physician. Id. at p. 49.
Due process claims related to conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees are analyzed
under the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Eighth Amendment, though this results in little
functional difference because the protections under each are the same. See Holden v. Hirner, 663
F.3d 336, 340-41 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 550 (8th Cir. 2007)).
For a due process claim alleging that prison officials failed to protect a detainee from another
inmate, a detainee must show that 1) he was “incarcerated under conditions imposing a substantial
risk of serious harm” and 2) the prison official were “deliberately indifferent” to the detainee’s
health or safety. Holden, 663 F.3d at 342. The second factor for failure to protect is subjective
and requires proving that a prison official both “knew of and disregarded ‘an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety.’” Id. (quotation omitted). For a due process claim alleging
unconstitutional conditions of confinement regarding a lack of medical care, a detainee must show
that he had an objectively serious medical condition and that prison officials knew of the condition
but deliberately disregarded the condition. See Christian v. Wagner, 623 F.3d 608, 613 (8th Cir.
2010). The medical condition must be one diagnosed by a physician as necessitating treatment or
obvious enough that a lay person would understand the need for the aid of a physician. See id.
The Court agrees with Judge Bryant. Plaintiff has failed to present a genuine question as
to either the failure to protect aspect of his due process claim or the denial of medical care aspect
of his due process claim. As to Plaintiff’s citation to Kingsley, that opinion determined that
excessive force claims filed by detainees need only show that the force used was objectively
unreasonable. 576 U.S. 396-97. That is not the kind of claim Plaintiff has made. Regarding the
assault, Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that any Defendant knew that the other inmate
posed a specific danger to Plaintiff or that the inmate had made any threats against Plaintiff. See
Holden, 663 F.3d at 341 (noting that officials’ lack of knowledge was indicated through lack of
knowledge of prior incidents and detainee not previously reporting threats from other inmate).
Also, Plaintiff’s contentions regarding the violent history of the other inmate cannot save his claim
because a “history of violence alone is insufficient to impute to prison officials subjective
knowledge of the inmate's danger to harm other inmates.” Id. As the Court determined earlier,
Plaintiff’s grievances regarding his assault (ECF No. 183-30) indicate that CCDC staff responded
to the assault in a good faith manner.
For the medical treatment aspect of this claim, Plaintiff has not alleged, let alone provided
proof, that his medical condition after the assault was objectively serious. Rather, Plaintiff focuses
entirely on the access to and quality of any treatment he did receive. Without any genuine dispute
regarding the objectively serious nature of his medical state, Plaintiff cannot prevail on this claim.
See Christian, 623 F.3d at 613.
Finally, Plaintiff cannot prevail on his claim regarding his time in the separate cell after the
conclusion of his hours on suicide watch. Plaintiff has not alleged that he was deprived of any
right because he was kept in that separate cell. A due process claim cannot succeed if it fails to
allege the deprivation of a right. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249-51 (1983) (a detainee
failing to allege that he has a protected interest in a particular cell cannot make a due process claim
against the decision of officials to place him where they have discretion). Accordingly, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that there is a genuine dispute regarding any of the facts that
are material to his due process claim. Therefore, all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
on this claim.
C. Official Capacity Claims and Qualified Immunity
Judge Bryant recommends that all Defendants be granted qualified immunity against
Plaintiff’s claims because there have not been any violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
ECF No. 211, p. 26-27. Plaintiff’s objection generally argues that he demonstrated that his
constitutional rights were violated and that his rights were clearly established. ECF No. 2016, p.
52-54.
The Court agrees with Judge Bryant. As determined above, Plaintiff has failed to present
a genuine dispute as to the alleged violations of any of his constitutional rights. Without a
constitutional violation, officials acting under color of law are entitled to qualified immunity
against claims brought against them in their individual capacity. See Dillard, 961 F.3d at 1052.
All claims against Defendants in their official capacities would fail regardless of the
outcome of the individual capacity claims. Examining all of Plaintiff’s official capacity claims in
his Second Amended Complaint, Defendant lists various state and federal statutes, CCDC and
Arkansas corrections policies, and clauses of the Arkansas and United States Constitutions as the
customs or policies that violated his rights. ECF No. 140, p. 6-11. However, Plaintiff only
references these policies to assert that Defendants violated the policies during Plaintiff’s time at
the CCDC. ECF No. 140, p. 6-11. This is a fundamental flaw in Plaintiff’s official capacity claims
because the claims need to allege that a statute or policy itself is the source of the violation of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Gorman, 152 F.3d at 914. Examining Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint, his response to the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and his
objections to the instant report and recommendation, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not allege
that there was an official policy or custom that resulted in the alleged deprivations of his
constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court finds that every official capacity claim brought by
Plaintiff fails to provide “proof that a policy or custom” of the CCDC violated his rights.
Accordingly, the official capacity claims should be dismissed even if the Court found that
violations of his constitutional rights occurred.
D. Remaining State Law Claim
Plaintiff brings a claim for false representation of kosher food under Arkansas Code § 20-
57-401 against all Defendants in their individual and official capacities, with the exception of
Defendant Atkins, who is not named in this claim. ECF No. 140, p. 12. Plaintiff asserts that these
Defendants knowingly provided Plaintiff with foods that they knew were not kosher and presented
the foods as if they were kosher. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the customs or policies that violated his
rights were the “CCDCP 11; AJSP § 6-1002(d); Arkansas Code 20-57-401.” Id. at p. 13.
Judge Bryant recommends that the Plaintiff’s state law claim be dismissed. ECF No. 211,
p. 26. Judge Bryant determines that the Arkansas statute under which Plaintiff brought his claims
for misrepresenting kosher foods, Arkansas Code Ann. § 20-57-401, is a criminal statute that does
not create a private right of action. Id. Alternatively, Judge Bryant determines that the Court
should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claim because all of the
constitutional or federal law claims over which the Court had original jurisdiction will be
dismissed. Id. After rehashing the allegations supporting his claim under the Arkansas statute,
Plaintiff’s objection argues that the Court should remand the state law claim to state court instead
of dismissing the claim. ECF No. 216, p. 50-52.
The Court agrees with Judge Bryant’s recommendation to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim. “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. The Court determined above that the RLUIPA claim should be dismissed as moot and
that Defendants should be granted summary judgment regarding the constitutional claims. With
no claims remaining over which this Court has original jurisdiction, the Court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claim. 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). As to Plaintiff’s request that the Court “remand” the state law claim, there is no court
to which this claim can be remanded. The state law claim was originally brought in this Court
through Plaintiff’s complaints. This matter was not removed from a state court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1441. Accordingly, there is no remand to a state court possible for this claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court adopts Judge Bryant’s Report and Recommendation
(ECF No. 211) in part. The Court adopts Judge Bryant’s recommendation for summary judgment
regarding Plaintiff’s constitutional claims and recommendation to decline supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim. However, the Court does not adopt the
recommendation for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim because this claim is
moot. Therefore, Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgement (ECF Nos. 160 and 164) are
hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff’s constitutional claims against Defendants are hereby DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim is MOOT and hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to Arkansas Code Ann. § 20-57-401, which is hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 140) is hereby
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 30th day of September, 2022.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
Chief United States District Judge