Klingensmith v. Cruz

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

TYLER B. KLINGENSMITH PLAINTIFF

V. CASE NOS. 5:19-CV-5185

§:20-CV-5015

DEPUTY ADRIAN CRUZ; LIEUTENANT

ROBIN HOLT; DEPUTY JOSEPH ALLEN;

DEPUTY MEGAN RUTLEDGE; DEPUTY

NICHOLAS GUERRERO;

LIEUTENANT RANDALL MCELROY;

SERGEANT JOE ADAMS; DEPUTY ANTHONY COBB;

SERGEANT BRADY; DETECTIVE MARK JORDAN;

JOHN DOE CAPTAIN; SERGEANT COGDILL;

BENTON COUNTY; JOHN DOE

SERGEANT WHO TOOK PICTURES;

and SERGEANT W. GUENTHER DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER

Currently before the Court are two Reports and Recommendations (“R&Rs”)

(Docs. 242 & 243) submitted on the same day, January 31, 2022, by the Honorable

Christy Comstock, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.

The first R&R (Doc. 242) recommends granting a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

195) filed by separate Defendant Mark Jordan, who is a detective working for the

Bentonville Police Department. The second R&R (Doc. 243) recommends granting a

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 199) filed by the rest of the Defendants, all of

whom are employed by Benton County, Arkansas: Deputy Adrian Cruz, Lieutenant

Robin Holt, Deputy Joseph Allen, Deputy Megan Rutledge, Deputy Nicholas Guerrero,

Lieutenant Randall McElroy, Sergeant Joe Adams, Deputy Anthony Cobb, Sergeant

Trey Bandy, Sergeant Kenneth Cogdill, and Sergeant W. Guenther.

Plaintiff Tyler B. Klingensmith brought multiple claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against these Defendants for incidents that allegedly occurred when he was a

pretrial detainee housed at the Benton County Detention Center (“BCDC”). Since the

two cases he filed in this Court involve overlapping facts and claims, the Court

consolidated the cases on April 24, 2020. (Doc. 127).

For simplicity’s sake, the Court has grouped Mr. Klingensmith’s claims into the

following three categories: (1) conspiracy to violate his Fourth and Fifth Amendment

rights by falsifying arrest warrants, questioning him about pending criminal charges in

violation of his Miranda rights, and illegally searching his cell phone and Twitter account

as part of the criminal investigation (Claims 2, 3, 4, 13, 14, 15, and 16); (2) interfering

with his Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests while he was

incarcerated in the BCDC (Claim 5); (3) failing to protect him from an assault by another

inmate in the BCDC (Claims 6, 8, 9, and 12); and (4) retaliating against him for filing

grievances by placing him in lockdown in the BCDC and withdrawing certain privileges.

On February 28, 2022, Mr. Klingensmith filed Objections (Doc. 246) to the first

R&R concerning Detective Jordan’s Motion for Summary Judgment. On March 14,

2022, Mr. Klingensmith filed Objections (Doc. 247) to the second R&R addressing the

Benton County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court is well

persuaded that Magistrate Judge Comstock carefully considered the voluminous record

in this case and, wherever possible, gave Mr. Klingensmith the benefit of the doubt as a

pro se filer. Her two R&Rs, together, total 54 pages. Mr. Klingensmith’s two sets of

Objections total 96 pages.

The Court has reviewed the Objections and performed a de novo review of the

record prior to making its findings below. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the

court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”). The Objections,

though lengthy, are not substantive. They fail to engage with the R&Rs’ legal reasoning

and confront the burden of proof Mr. Klingensmith must meet on summary judgment.

Mr. Klingensmith’s Objections restate the factual claims he asserted on summary

judgment. He generally claims that at least some plausible, non-speculative evidence

exists to prove that all Defendants worked in concert to deprive him of his constitutional

rights while he was housed at the BCDC as a pretrial detainee. This Opinion will

therefore briefly address the four categories of claims Mr. Klingensmith filed and then

address why the Court believes the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations

are correct, despite Mr. Klingensmith’s Objections.

The first category of claims broadly concerns Mr. Klingensmith’s conspiracy

theories. He contends Detective Jordan conspired with various jailers at the BCDC to

violate Mr. Klingensmith’s constitutional rights and make his life at the BCDC as difficult

as possible as he awaited trial on various criminal charges. It is undisputed that Mr.

Klingensmith eventually pleaded guilty to Stalking in the Second Degree, Terroristic

Threatening in the First Degree, Financial Identity Fraud, Unlawful Distribution of Sexual

Images or Recordings, and Violation of an Order of Protection. See Doc. 242, p. 9. He

is now serving ten years in state prison for those crimes. The Court agrees with the

Magistrate Judge that any constitutional claims Mr. Klingensmith might have otherwise

asserted as to the pretrial investigation of criminal charges against him either were

waived when he pleaded guilty or are now barred pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994). To the extent any of these claims is not Heck-barred, Mr.

Klingensmith’s factual allegations—including those referenced in his Objections—are

merely speculative and do not meet his burden of proof on summary judgment. As the

Magistrate Judge notes, he spills tremendous amounts of ink “groundlessly concluding

but not establishing” the existence of a civil conspiracy between and among law

enforcement officers to convict him of crimes—even though he eventually pleaded guilty

to those same crimes. (Doc. 243, p. 26). .

The second category of claims relates to the Benton County Defendants’ alleged

interference with Mr. Klingensmith’s FOIA requests. He fails to acknowledge in his

Objections that a “[vjiolation of the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act is not

cognizable under § 1983.” (Doc. 243, p. 29). In light of this, there is no need for the

Court to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence in support of these claims.

Moving on to the third category, Mr. Klingensmith asserts that certain jailers at

BCDC not only failed to protect him from two assaults by an inmate, but went so far as

to “orchestrate” the inmate’s attacks. (Doc. 247, p. 12). Mr. Klingensmith offers no

proof beyond mere speculation that the Benton County Defendants conspired against

him and wished him ill; in fact, the undisputed proof of record concerning the jailers’

immediate response to these attacks shows just the opposite. Nevertheless, Mr.

Klingensmith believes his jailers should have guaranteed his safety at all times. He

reasons that because he was attacked twice by the same inmate, that fact alone should

establish a violation of his constitutional rights. Unfortunately for Mr. Klingensmith, the

law is not what he believes it to be.

To establish a failure-to-protect claim, a prisoner must cite at least some proof

that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his health and safety. See Doc. 242,

pp. 29-30 (setting forth the correct legal standard). Deliberate indifference, in turn,

requires a showing that officials knew of and disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety.” /d. at p. 30 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).

As the Magistrate Judge explains, Mr. Klingensmith can cite to no evidence that his

jailers “recklessly disregard[ed] a known, excessive risk of serious harm.” (Doc. 243, p.

33 (quoting Davis v. Oregon Cnty., 607 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2010)). The fact that Mr.

Klingensmith was attacked twice by the same person does not, in and of itself,

constitute sufficient proof to save this claim from summary judgment.

The first attack was a “surprise attack” that jailers could not have foreseen. It is

undisputed that Mr. Klingensmith and his attacker, Robert Brinegar, were immediately

separated and placed in separate housing pods. See Doc. 243, p. 11; see also Jackson

v. Everett, 140 F.3d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[Blecause prisons are dangerous

places, housing the most aggressive among us and placing violent people in close

quarters, . . . prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from claims arising out of

a surprise attack by one inmate on another.” (cleaned up)).

The second attack was described by Deputy Adrian Cruz in his incident report,

and Mr. Klingensmith does not dispute the facts in this report. (Doc. 243, p. 15). It

appears Mr. Klingensmith asked Deputy Cruz for permission to take a quick shower

following a haircut. Deputy Cruz allowed him to shower in pod E-103, even though Mr.

Klingensmith was being housed in pod E-102. /d. Mr. Klingensmith’s pod was being

cleaned by the other inmates at the time, and pod E-103 was on lockdown with all

inmates in their cells. /d. Inmate Brinegar was housed in pod E-103, and it appears he

noticed Mr. Klingensmith showering and seized the opportunity to attack him a second

time. Brinegar asked Deputy Cruz for permission to leave his cell briefly “to grab his

medical cream that the nurse left for him.” /d. It is undisputed that Deputy Cruz was

unaware at the time that Mr. Klingensmith and Brinegar were under a “keep separate”

order. /d. It is further undisputed that Brinegar attacked Mr. Klingensmith quickly and

unexpectedly, and Deputy Cruz immediately “ran up the stairs and took control of

Inmate Brinegar and put him on the ground.” /d. For these reasons and those set forth

in the R&R, the Court finds Mr. Klingensmith failed to meet his burden to establish a

cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect with respect to the second

attack.1

The fourth and final category of claims is about retaliation. Once again, Mr.

Klingensmith’s Objections fails to grapple with his burden of proof on summary

judgment. As to Detective Jordan, Mr. Klingensmith merely suspects that this officer

conspired with certain jailers to make Mr. Klingensmith’s pretrial incarceration difficult.

There is only speculative evidence to support that contention. As to the Benton County

Defendants, it is undisputed that Mr. Klingensmith was placed on disciplinary lockdown

' Even if Mr. Klingensmith had met his burden, the Court agrees with the Magistrate

Judge that Deputy Cruz is deserving of qualified immunity for the second attack.

According to the Supreme Court, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk

to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably

to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.

Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). It is undisputed here that

Deputy Cruz had no actual knowledge that Brinegar posed a substantial risk to Mr.

Klingensmith’s safety. There is also no dispute that Deputy Cruz responded quickly and

reasonably to the attack.

(or administrative segregation) for five separate rule violations he committed at the

BCDC from March 29 to June 1, 2018. Though Mr. Klingensmith disputes his jailers’

accounts of his conduct and notes that other inmates found him to be “nice,” (Doc. 246,

p. 30), a jailer will prevail on a retaliation claim as long as he submits “some evidence

the inmate actually committed a rule violation.” (Doc. 243, p. 34) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). As the R&R explains, “[A] report from a correctional officer,

even if disputed by the inmate and supported by no other evidence, legally suffices as

‘some evidence’ upon which to base a prison disciplinary violation, if the violation is

found by an impartial decisionmaker.” /d. (emphasis added) (quoting Hartsfield v.

Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 2008)). Though Mr. Klingensmith speculates he

was locked down and deprived of certain privileges without good cause, he presents no

plausible evidence that filing grievances or engaging in other protected activities

motivated Defendants’ disciplinary actions in any way.

Accordingly, Mr. Klingensmith’s Objections (Docs. 246 & 247) are OVERRULED,

and the Reports and Recommendations (Docs. 242 & 243) are APPROVED AND

ADOPTED IN THEIR ENTIRETY.

IT IS ORDERED that the Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 195 & 199) are

GRANTED, and all claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for the reasons

explained in the R&Rs. Judgment will enter concurrently with this Order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED on this lé day of March, 2022.

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