The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
JORDAN LEDBETTER, et al. PLAINTIFFS
v. Case No. 4:20-cv-4037
OFFICER DANIEL “FROG” OLLER, et al. DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 21. Plaintiffs
have not filed a response, and the time to do so has passed. See Local Rule 7.2(b). The Court
finds this matter ripe for consideration.
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to June 2019, Special Agent Gary Dorman (“Agent Dorman”) with the Hempstead
County Sheriff’s Office and the Eighth Judicial District North Task Force (“Task Force”)
received information from a cooperating individual that marijuana was being sold by Plaintiff
Aaron Smith (“Smith”) in Hope, Arkansas.1 On June 4, 2019, Agent Dorman and Agent Reyn
Brown (“Agent Brown”) used the cooperating individual to conduct a controlled purchase of one
half ounce of marijuana from Plaintiff Smith at 1604 Shover Road in Hope, Arkansas
(“residence”). On June 5, 2019, Agent Dorman and Agent Brown conduced another controlled
purchase of one ounce of marijuana from Plaintiff Smith at the same residence.
On June 14, 2019, Agent Dorman executed an affidavit for a narcotics search and seizure
warrant for the residence. In the affidavit, Agent Dorman attested that each of the controlled
purchases was recorded on video. He further attested that Plaintiff Smith could be clearly
identified as the individual who handed the baggies of marijuana to a confidential source and
1 Plaintiffs did not file a Separate Statement of Disputed Facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b). Thus, the facts set
forth by Defendants (ECF No. 23) shall be deemed admitted.
then accepted US currency from the confidential source as payment. In the affidavit, Agent
Dorman describes the residence as “a yellow, one story wood frame house with a yellow front
door on the south side of the residence, a small front porch and a brown shingled roof.” On June
14, 2019, Judge W. Randall Wright issued a warrant authorizing the Task Force to search “all
grounds, structures, outbuildings, and vehicles located at the described premises.”
The Task Force met at the Hope Police Department to conduct a verbal operations plan,
which outlined assignments, provided safety information, and developed a specific approach
protocol. The Task Force members were Separate Defendant Sergeant Daniel Oller, Agent
Dorman, Agent Justin Crane, Agent Brown, and Investigator Jeremy McBride. During the
meeting, Defendant Oller advised the Task Force that he had observed Plaintiff Smith carrying a
firearm in the past and had responded to 911 calls regarding Plaintiff Smith exhibiting violent
and threatening behavior while reportedly carrying a firearm. Based on this information, the
Task Force planned to send one officer to the residence in an attempt to lure and detain Plaintiff
Smith outside of the residence to reduce the chance of violence.
On June 14, 2019, at approximately 12:02 p.m., Defendant Oller arrived at the residence
in a marked police vehicle and police uniform and knocked on the front door. Plaintiff Jordan
Ledbetter answered the door. Defendant Oller asked if Plaintiff Smith was at the residence and
Plaintiff Ledbetter stated that he was. Defendant Oller then saw Plaintiff Smith and asked him to
exit the residence. Defendant Oller told Plaintiff Smith that he was under arrest for misdemeanor
battery, signaled the Task Force to execute the search warrant, and placed Plaintiff Smith in
handcuffs.
Agent Dorman then advised Plaintiffs that he had a search and seizure warrant for the
residence. Defendant Oller conducted a preliminary protective sweep of the residence and found
a firearm on top of a dresser in a bedroom. Plaintiffs were detained in the living room while the
Task Force searched the premises.
As a result of the search, Investigator McBride seized one ounce of marijuana contained
in a blue and white ice chest, numerous plastic baggies, one set of black digital scales on the
kitchen counter, one loaded JA 9-millimeter semiautomatic pistol on top of the dresser in the
northwest bedroom, and two 12-gauge shotguns stored in black cases on the floor of the
southwest bedroom. Additionally, Investigator McBride seized a loaded Smith and Wesson 9-
millimeter semi-automatic pistol found in the glovebox of Plaintiff Smith’s truck, which was
approximately 30-40 feet from the back entrance of the residence.
After the search, Agent Dorman read Plaintiff Smith his Miranda rights. Agent Dorman
then offered Plaintiff Smith the opportunity to work with the Task Force as a confidential
informant (“CI”) to reduce the charges against him. Agent Dorman gave Plaintiff Smith two
weeks to consider the CI offer and contact Agent Dorman with a decision. Before this
conversation, Defendant Oller turned off his body camera in order to protect the potential CI.
Plaintiff Smith did not contact any of the Task Force members to accept this offer.
Investigator McBride transported all of the above-mentioned seized items to the
Hempstead County Sheriff’s Office where he conducted an inventory in the presence of Agent
Dorman and Agent Crane. The Hempstead County Sheriff’s Office was ordered by Judge
Culpepper to relinquish possession and control of the firearms to Plaintiff Ledbetter upon receipt
of proof of ownership.
On June 26, 2019, Agent Dorman executed an Affidavit for Warrant of Arrest for
Plaintiffs Aaron Smith Jr. and Jordan Ledbetter based on the items found and seized during the
execution of the search and seizure warrant. That same day, Judge Wright issued a Felony
Warrant of Arrest for Plaintiff Smith based on Agent Dorman’s sworn affidavit. On June 28,
2019, Judge Wright issued a Felony Warrant of Arrest for Plaintiff Ledbetter based on Agent
Dorman’s sworn affidavit. That same day, Officer Malone with the Hempstead County Sheriff’s
Office arrested Plaintiff Smith pursuant to the arrest warrant, and Officer Beccera with the
Hempstead County Sheriff’s Office arrested Plaintiff Ledbetter pursuant to the arrest warrant.
On May 1, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging that their constitutional rights
were violated when Defendant Oller, a police officer employed by Defendant City of Hope,
entered their home and detained them. Defendant Oller allegedly seized several firearms after
illegally searching Plaintiffs’ home and vehicle. On July 20, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. ECF No. 21. On August 5, 2021, the Court issued a Show Cause Order
instructing Plaintiffs to respond to Defendants’ motion. ECF No. 25. As of the date of this order,
Plaintiffs have not filed a response to Defendants’ motion.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The standard for summary judgment is well established. When a party moves for
summary judgment, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Krenik v. Cnty. of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). This
is a “threshold inquiry of . . . whether there is a need for trial—whether, in other words, there are
genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they
reasonably may be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 (1986). A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Id.
at 248. A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return
a verdict for either party. Id. at 252.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider all the evidence
and all reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Co-Op, 446 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir.
2006). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92
F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party must then demonstrate the existence of
specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik, 47 F.3d at 957. However,
a party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion “may not rest upon mere
allegations or denials . . . but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs bring a claim against Defendants for violation of their Fourth Amendment
rights.2 Plaintiffs bring this claim against Defendant Oller in his individual and official capacity.
A. Individual Capacity
Plaintiffs claim that the search and seizure conducted by the Task Force violated their
Fourth Amendment rights. Defendant Oller asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment on
these claims because he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability and the burdens of
litigation unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory
right of which a reasonable person would have known. Truong v. Hassan, 829 F.3d 627, 630 (8th
Cir. 2016) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Evaluating whether a
government official is entitled to qualified immunity requires a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the
2 Plaintiffs do not explicitly state that their claim is a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, but the Court interprets their claim as such as Plaintiffs allege that an unlawful search and seizure
occurred.
facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2)
whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Unless the answer to both of these questions is
yes, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Ehlers v. City of Rapid City, 846 F.3d
1002, 1008 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 564 (8th Cir. 2009)).
Qualified immunity is a legal question for the court, not the jury, to decide in the first instance
based either on the allegations or, if material facts are in dispute, on the facts found by the jury.
Luckert v. Dodge County, 684 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir.2012). See also Littrell v. Franklin, 388
F.3d 578, 584-85 (8th Cir.2004).
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Oller unlawfully detained them, searched their home, and
seized their property. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects the right of people to
be “secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend.
IV.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because search and seizure
were supported by probable cause, meaning that “the totality of the circumstances at the time of
the arrest [were] sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that [Plaintiffs] [had]
committed . . . an offense.” Hoyland v. McMenomy, 869 F.3d 644, 652 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
“Public officials are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they have ‘violated
a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged
conduct.’” City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774
(2015) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In determining whether Plaintiff’s constitutional right was clearly established at the
time of Defendants’ alleged misconduct, the Court looks to the objective legal reasonableness of
the defendants’ actions, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the
time it was taken. Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau, 752 F.3d 1149, 1155 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)). A constitutional or statutory right is clearly
established if “[t]he contours of the right [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640. In
order to overcome qualified immunity, Plaintiff must prove “in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness [of Defendants’ conduct was] apparent. Id. A legal principle must have a
sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent. Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 901 F.3d
963, 971 (8th Cir. 2018)(quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589 (2018)).
Accordingly, “qualified immunity protects officials who make bad guesses in gray areas” and
“gives them breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments.” Id. (citing Littrell v.
Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 2004)); Blazek v. City of Iowa City, 761 F.3d 920, 922 (8th
Cir. 2014)).
The Task Force obtained a search warrant reasonably based on the two controlled buys
conducted on June 4, 2019, and June 5, 2019. The Task Force then executed that search warrant
and Defendant Oller detained Plaintiffs while the Task Force searched the residence. Plaintiffs
have not shown any unreasonable conduct by Defendant Oller during this search. Based on the
record, Defendant Oller detained Plaintiffs while conducting a security sweep of the residence.
Further, the items seized were items related to the sale of marijuana as authorized by the search
warrant and all firearms that were lawfully owned by Plaintiffs were returned upon
demonstration of proof of ownership. The record does not show that Defendant Oller acted
unreasonably at any time.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures was not violated when Defendant Oller detained them, and thus Defendant Oller is
entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, Defendant Oller is entitled to summary judgment in
regard to this individual capacity claim.
B. Official Capacity
Plaintiffs also bring a claim against Defendant Oller in his official capacity. Official
capacity claims are “functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental
entity.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff brings
this claim against Defendant Oller who was employed by the Hope Police Department at the
time of the alleged incident. Thus, Plaintiff’s official capacity claim is against the City of Hope.
When a plaintiff can point to a municipal policy that either “violates federal law, or
directs an employee to do so,” “no evidence is needed other than a statement of the municipal
policy and its exercise” to establish a constitutional violation. Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d
796, 801 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park Minn., 486 F.3d 385, 389-90
(8th Cir. 2007)). However, when a plaintiff alleges an unwritten or unofficial policy, there must
be “evidence of . . . a practice, so permanent and well-settled so as to constitute a custom, that
existed.” Id. (citing Davison v. City of Minneapolis, 490 F.3d 648, 659 (8th Cir. 2007)). To
establish a claim for “custom” liability, Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the existence of a
continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental
entity’s employees; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the
governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and
(3) that plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity’s custom, i.e., that the
custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation. Snider v. City of Cape
Girardeau, 752 F.3d 1149, 1160 (8th Cir.2014) (citing Johnson v. Douglas Cnty. Med. Dep’t,
725 F.3s 825, 828 (8th Cir.2013)).
In the present case, Plaintiffs do not point to a formal, written policy or an informal,
unwritten policy adopted by the City of Hope. Based on the record, there is no evidence of any
pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the City of Hope’s employees, deliberate indifference
to such conduct, or evidence that Plaintiffs were injured because of any custom behind a
constitutional violation. Accordingly, the City of Hope is entitled to summary judgment
regarding this official capacity claim.
IV.CONCLUSION
For reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21) is
GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 7th day of September, 2021.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
Chief United States District Judge