The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
HARMON WILLIAMS PLAINTIFF
v. Civil No. 4:20-cv-04079
DETECTIVE REYN BROWN, et al. DEFENDANTS
ORDER
This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. This case is before the Court for preservice screening
under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from
a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on September 15, 2020. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2) was granted by the Court. (ECF No.
3). An Amended Complaint was filed on October 5, 2020. (ECF No. 9).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint states two claims. (ECF No. 9). In Plaintiff’s first claim,
he names as Defendants Terry Crabtree, Daniel Hampton, Reyn Brown, Daniel Oller, and Stephen
Eulick.1 The allegations in Plaintiff’s first claim concerns an incident which occurred on October
15, 2019. Plaintiff states that his work supervisors, Separate Defendants Terry Crabtree and Daniel
Hampton, contacted his parole officer, Separate Defendant Stephen Eulick, and that he was
1 Separate Defendant Oller is a police officer with the Hope Police Department and Separate Defendant Reyn Brown
is a Detective with the Hope Police Department. While not specifically stated, Defendant indicates that both of these
Defendants were at the scene of the incident on October 15, 2019.
unlawfully detained and eventually arrested for possession of meth “off false accusations,” a “false
investigation,” and with “no probable cause.” (ECF No. 9 at 6).
In his second claim, Plaintiff names Sgt. Casey Singleton, Sergeant of Patrol at the Hope
Police Department, and Detective Daniel Lauterbach, Detective of the Hope Police Department,
as Defendants. (ECF No. 9). Plaintiff argues that on July 1, 2020, he was “picked up” by the
above-mentioned officers who claimed that Plaintiff had evaded parole. (ECF No. 9 at 9-10).
Plaintiff further states that he is currently serving a six-month sentence for parole violation. (ECF
No. 9 at 12). Plaintiff indicates that he was deprived of due process and equal protection when his
parole was revoked without due process of law. (ECF No. 9 at 12).
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages with respect to both claims. (ECF No.
9 at 14).
II. APPLICABLE LAW
Under the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it
does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted
sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537,
541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). However, a pro se
Plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334,
1337 (8 Cir. 1985).
III. DISCUSSION
A. First Claim - Separate Defendants Terry Crabtree and Daniel Hampton
Plaintiff seeks to state a claim against Separate Defendants Terry Crabtree and Daniel
Hampton, who are both private citizens and were allegedly Plaintiff’s supervisors at his place of
employment, Tyson Feed Mill. Neither Crabtree nor Hampton are subject to suit under § 1983. A
§ 1983 complaint must allege that the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived plaintiff
of “rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42
U.S.C. § 1983; see also DuBose v. Kelly, 187 F.3d 999, 1002 (8th Cir.1999). Crabtree and
Hampton are not state actors. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed
with respect to all claims against Separate Defendants Terry Crabtree and Daniel Hampton.
B. First Claim – Separate Defendants Reyn Brown, Daniel Oller, and Stephen Eulick
As mentioned earlier, Plaintiff’s first claim concerns an October 15, 2019 incident that led
to criminal charges for possession of methamphetamine. A criminal case for possession of a
controlled substance is currently pending against Plaintiff in Hempstead County, Arkansas. State
of Arkansas v. Harmon Williams, Case No. 29CR-19-355. The Court will take judicial notice of
the proceedings in the Circuit Court of Hempstead County, Arkansas. Fed. Evid. R. 201.
Plaintiff’s claim of false arrest, as set forth in his first claim, challenges the validity of the
pending state criminal proceedings against him and is barred under the abstention doctrine
articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 59 (1971). The Younger doctrine “directs federal
courts to abstain from accepting jurisdiction in cases where granting [equitable relief] would
interfere with pending state proceedings” involving important state interests. Night Clubs, Inc. v.
City of Fort Smith, Ark., 163 F.3d 475, 477 n.1 (8th Cir. 1998). The Younger abstention doctrine
reflects the public policy that disfavors federal court interference with state judicial proceedings
and is based on the principles of comity and federalism. See Ronwin v. Dunham, 818 F.2d 675,
677 (8th Cir. 1987).
Three factors must be determined affirmatively to result in abstention under Younger: (1)
there must be an ongoing state judicial proceeding which (2) implicates important state interests,
and (3) that proceeding must afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal questions
presented. Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 1996). If all three factors are met, the
federal court must abstain unless it detects “bad faith, harassment, or some extraordinary
circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982). This bad faith exception “must be construed
narrowly and only invoked in extraordinary circumstances.” Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768,
778-79 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court finds that the Younger abstention doctrine applies to this case because Plaintiff’s
claim involves an ongoing state judicial criminal proceeding against himself, the state clearly has
an important interest in enforcing its criminal laws, and Plaintiff has given no indication that he
cannot raise his constitutional claims during the state criminal proceedings. Conley v. Hiland, No.
4:15-cv0359-SWW, 2015 WL 4096152, at *1 (E.D. Ark. July 7, 2015). Further, Plaintiff does not
allege bad faith or any other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.
Thus, Younger bars Plaintiff’s claims.
In general, the Younger doctrine “directs federal courts to abstain from granting injunctive
or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending judicial proceedings.” Night Clubs, Inc.,
163 F.3d at 481 (emphasis in original). However, in cases where damages are sought in the federal
suit, “traditional abstention principles generally require a stay as the appropriate mode of
abstention.” Id. This is true “[a]s long as there may be issues which will need to be determined
in federal court.” Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Stroud, 179 F.3d 598, 604 (8th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages in this action, so the traditional abstention practices
favor a stay of this case rather than outright dismissal, and no exceptions2 apply requiring
dismissal. See Night Clubs, Inc., 163 F.3d at 481. Accordingly, the Court will stay and
administratively terminate this claim against Separate Defendants Reyn Brown, Daniel Oller, and
Stephen Eulick until the final disposition of Plaintiff’s pending state criminal charges in
Hempstead County Circuit Court, case number 29CR-19-355.
C. Second Claim
Under Heck v. Humphrey, Plaintiff’s second claim is barred. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994). Plaintiff argues that on July 1, 2020, he was “picked up” by Sgt. Casey Singleton and
Detective Daniel Lauterbach who claimed that he had evaded parole since he was released from
jail over the October 15, 2019 arrest. (ECF No. 9 at 9-10). Plaintiff further states that he is currently
serving a six-month sentence for parole violation. (ECF No. 9 at 12). Plaintiff indicates that his
constitutional rights were violated when his parole was revoked without due process of law. (ECF
No. 9 at 12). As stated earlier, Plaintiff seeks damages for the alleged constitutional violation.
As established by the United States Supreme Court, a claim for damages for an “allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” is not cognizable until “the conviction
or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by
a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
2 The Younger exceptions are as follows: (1) the state court proceeding was brought in bad faith or with the purpose
of harassing the federal plaintiff; (2) the state statute is “flagrantly and patently violative of expressive constitutional
prohibitions in every clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might
be made to apply it; or (3) application of the doctrine was waived. Younger, 401 U.S. at 49.
Here, Plaintiff states that he is serving a six-month sentence for a parole violation. There
is no indication that Plaintiff’s parole violation has been overturned. Thus, Plaintiffs claim is
barred. See e.g., Newmy v. Johnson, 758 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, this claim
against Separate Defendants Sgt. Casey Singleton and Detective Daniel Lauterbach should be
dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s first claim against Separate
Defendants Terry Crabtree and Daniel Hampton should be, and hereby is, DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff’s first claim, as stated against Separate Defendants Reyn Brown, Daniel Oller, and
Stephen Eulick, involving the incident on October 15, 2019, should be and hereby is STAYED
and ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATED. Once Hempstead County Circuit Court case
number 29-CR-19-355 has concluded, Plaintiff may file a motion to reopen this claim, along with
a copy of the final disposition of the charges in case number 29-CR-19-355.
Finally, Plaintiff’s second claim, as stated against Sgt. Casey Singleton and Detective
Daniel Lauterbach involving his parole revocation following an incident on July 1, 2020, should
be and hereby is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-
(iii)(IFP Action, or any portion thereof, may be dismissed because it fails to state a claim or states
a claim that is not presently cognizable).
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 4th day of January 2021.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
Chief United States District Judge