Brown v. Tolliver

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

CARLTON L. BROWN PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 1:20-cv-01048

CROSSETT POLICE DEPARTMENT;

Detective Division; DETECTIVE TERESA

TOLLIVER, Crossett Police Department;

DETECTIVE GUY HUGHES, Crossett Police

Department; FRANK SPAIN, Deputy

Prosecuting Attorney; THOMAS DEAN,

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney; and

ROBERT GIBSON, III, Deputy Prosecuting

Attorney DEFENDANTS

ORDER

This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff

proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. This case is before the Court for preservice screening

under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A, the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 28, 2020. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2) was granted by the Court. (ECF No. 3).

Plaintiff’s Complaint states three claims. (ECF No. 1).

Each of Plaintiff’s claims concerns his rape charges and ultimate conviction in the Circuit

Court of Ashley County, Arkansas. 1 Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages as relief for his claims.

(ECF No. 1 at 7).

Plaintiff previously filed an almost identical action, Brown v. Crossett Police Dept., et al.,

20-cv-01017, on April 28, 2020. The action was stayed and administratively terminated on May

13, 2020, pursuant to the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 59 (1971).

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Under the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of process being

issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are

frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted

sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537,

541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). However, a pro se

Plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334,

1337 (8th Cir. 1985).

1 Plaintiff was convicted of the offense of rape in the Circuit Court of Ashley County, Arkansas, State of Arkansas v. Carlton

Brown, 02CR-19-266. Carlton Brown v. State of Arkansas, CR-20-582, is currently pending in the Arkansas Court of Appeals.

The appeal is from Plaintiff’s rape conviction in the Circuit Court of Ashley County, Arkansas. The Court will take judicial notice

of the proceedings in the Circuit Court of Ashley County, Arkansas, and in the Arkansas Court of Appeals. Fed. Evid. R. 201.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Prosecuting Attorneys

Plaintiff’s third claim is stated against Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys Thomas Dean, Frank

Spain, and Robert Gibson, III. Plaintiff’s claim against these Separate Defendants is subject to

dismissal. A prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit for any conduct undertaken in his or her

role as advocate for the state. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Absolute prosecutorial

immunity protects the prosecutor as a key participant in the criminal justice process, such that the

prosecutor need not be inhibited from performing his or her functions by a constant fear of

retaliation. Id. at 428. This is true no matter the underlying motive of the prosecutor or the

propriety of the actions taken. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d. 1437, 1446 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that

allegations that a prosecutor proceeded with a prosecution based on an improper motive did not

defeat absolute prosecutorial immunity); Schenk v. Chavis, 461 F.3d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 2006)

(“Actions connected with initiation of prosecution, even if those actions are patently improper are

immunized.”) (internal quotation omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s claim against Separate Defendants

Dean, Spain, and Gibson concern their actions as a deputy prosecutor for Ashley County,

Arkansas. Accordingly, the claims against these Separate Defendants are dismissed with

prejudice.

B. Remaining Claims

As set forth above, Plaintiff previously filed an almost identical action, Brown v. Crossett

Police Dept., et al., 20-cv-01017, on April 28, 2020. The action was stayed and administratively

terminated on May 13, 2020, pursuant to the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37, 59 (1971). The instant action adds two additional claims concerning testimony given

during the jury trial on his rape charges which was held after the earlier action in this Court was

dismissed.

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants involve his allegations that he was falsely arrested

and was maliciously prosecuted for rape. Under the abstention doctrine articulated in Younger,

Plaintiff’s claims, which challenge the validity of the pending state criminal proceedings against

him, are barred. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 59 (1971).

The Younger doctrine “directs federal courts to abstain from accepting jurisdiction in cases

where granting [equitable relief] would interfere with pending state proceedings” involving

important state interests. Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of Fort Smith, Ark., 163 F.3d 475, 477 n.1 (8th

Cir. 1998). The Younger abstention doctrine reflects the public policy that disfavors federal court

interference with state judicial proceedings and is based on the principles of comity and federalism.

See Ronwin v. Dunham, 818 F.2d 675, 677 (8th Cir. 1987).

Three factors must be determined affirmatively to result in abstention under Younger: (1)

there must be an ongoing state judicial proceeding, which (2) implicates important state interests,

and (3) that proceeding must afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal questions

presented. Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 1996). If all three factors are met, the

federal court must abstain unless it detects “bad faith, harassment, or some extraordinary

circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v.

Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982). This bad faith exception “must be construed

narrowly and only invoked in extraordinary circumstances.” Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768,

778-79 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

For Younger purposes, the State’s trial-and-appeals process is treated as a unitary system,

and for a federal court to disrupt its integrity by intervening mid-process would demonstrate a lack

of respect for the State as sovereign. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New

Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989). Accordingly, “a necessary concomitant of Younger is that a

party . . . must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court,

unless he can bring himself within one of the exceptions2 specified in Younger.” Huffman v.

Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975).

The Court finds that the Younger abstention doctrine applies to this case because Plaintiff’s

claim involves an ongoing state judicial criminal proceeding against Plaintiff, the state clearly has

an important interest in enforcing its criminal laws, and Plaintiff has given no indication that he

cannot raise his constitutional claims during the state criminal proceedings. Conley v. Hiland, No.

4:15-cv0359-SWW, 2015 WL 4096152, at *1 (E.D. Ark. July 7, 2015). There is no indication of

bad faith or any other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate. Thus,

Younger bars Plaintiff’s claims.

Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages in this action, so traditional abstention practices

favor a stay of this case rather than outright dismissal, and no exceptions apply requiring dismissal.

Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of Fort Smith, Ark., 163 F.3d 475, 477 n.1 (8th Cir. 1998). However,

because this case is almost entirely duplicative of the previously filed action, the Court will dismiss

this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits federal courts to dismiss duplicative

complaints as frivolous or malicious. See Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1992)

(dismissing inmate’s § 1983 action as frivolous where issues in instant complaint could be

addressed in inmate’s other pending action).

2 The exceptions as defined in Younger are: (1) the prosecution acted in bad faith; (2) the prosecution is part of a

pattern of harassment against an individual; or (3) the law being enforced is unconstitutional.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Claims (ECF No. 1) against Separate Defendants

Prosecuting Attorneys Thomas Dean, Frank Spain, and Robert Gibson, III, are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

In addition, the Court’s previous Order (ECF No. 4) directing the Clerk to collect the filing

fee of $350.00, should be, and hereby is, STRICKEN.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 14th day of December, 2020.

/s/ Susan O. Hickey

Susan O. Hickey

Chief United States District Judge