Smith-Dandridge v. Geanolous

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

JUDY LYNN SMITH-DANDRIDGE

as Administratrix of the Estate of

Andrew Dawson Bell, Deceased PLAINTIFF

v. No. 5:19-CV-05184

OFFICER JARRETT GEANOLOUS, et al. DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Judy Lynn Smith-Dandridge’s motion (Doc. 60) for leave to

file an amended complaint and brief in support (Doc. 61). Separate Defendants Tim Helder, Mike

Arnold, Jeremy Riley, Joseph Standrod, Steven Weir, Calvin Mitchell, Jesse Sorrell, Dustin Carter,

Chad Morgan, Joseph Jennings, Mitchell Smothers, Charles Dominguez, Leigh Brewer, Christy

Hill (collectively referred to as “Washington County Defendants”) filed a motion (Doc. 64) for

judgment on the pleadings and incorporated response to Plaintiff’s motion, and a brief in support

(Doc. 65) of their motion and response. Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 68) and brief in opposition

to Washington County Defendants’ motion (Doc. 69). Washington County Defendants, with leave

of Court, filed a reply (Doc. 72) to Plaintiff’s response. Separate Defendant Maria Sanchez filed

a motion (Doc. 76) to adopt the Washington County Defendants’ motion and briefing and to grant

her judgment on the pleadings, and that motion will be GRANTED IN PART, to the extent that

the Court will consider her to have adopted Washington County Defendants’ position. For the

reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion to amend will be GRANTED and Washington County

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART.

I. Background

On September 24, 2016, Andrew Dawson Bell was arrested by the Fayetteville Police

Department (“FPD”) and booked into the Washington County Detention Center (“WCDC”). Prior

to the September 24 arrest, Bell had been arrested by FPD and booked into WCDC numerous

times. Plaintiff alleges during many of these arrests, prescription drugs were found and the FPD

and WCDC were aware Bell suffered from mental health issues.

As part of WCDC’s booking process, an officer completes an Inmate Medical Form. The

form includes questions regarding the inmate’s physical health, mental health, and drug use. On

the September 24 Inmate Medical Form, Bell was asked if he had a diagnosis for a mental illness

and Bell indicated he had been diagnosed with “bipolar, anxiety disorder, depression, and suicidal

ideations.” (Doc. 17, p. 14). Bell also told the officer he had attempted suicide four times, and

the most recent attempt was a year and a half prior.

Plaintiff alleges WCDC has a Classification and Housing Separation Profile which is used

to determine if an inmate needs to be placed in medium or maximum security instead of general

population. According to Plaintiff, had the Washington County Sherriff Office’s (“WCSO”)

deputies working at WCDC properly recognized, screened, treated, and protected Bell, Bell would

have been placed in medium or maximum security. Instead, Bell was placed in general population.

Fourteen hours after being brought to WCDC, Bell committed suicide.

Plaintiff Judy Lynn Smith-Dandridge, as Administratrix of the Estate of Andrew Bell, filed

a complaint on September 24, 2019 against Jarrett Geanolous, Kurtis Sutley, Brandon Jones, and

John Doe Defendants 1-20 asserting claims under § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. On

December 20, 2019, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint substituting Tim Helder, Leigh Brewer,

M. Arnold, Jeremy Riley, Joseph Standrod, ADO Sanchez, ADO Weir, Calvin Mitchell, J. Sorrell,

A POD Corporal, Dustin Carter, Chad Morgan, Joseph Jennings, Mitchell Smothers, Charles

Dominguez, and Cristy Hill for John Does 1–14. On December 23, 2019, the Court extended the

deadline under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) to serve any unserved defendant to March

19, 2020.

On March 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed her pending motion to file an amended complaint that

would add individual capacity claims against the Washington County Defendants. Washington

County Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the first amended

complaint was barred by the statute of limitations and did not relate back to the filing of the original

complaint. Further, Washington County Defendants argue Plaintiff’s motion to file an amended

complaint should be denied because the statute of limitations has expired.

II. Legal Standard

When considering a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court uses the

same standard applied to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Ashely Cty., Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009). Judgment on the pleadings is

appropriate “only if the moving party clearly establishes that there are no material issues of fact

and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d

1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). The Court must “accept as true all facts pleaded by the non-moving

party and grant all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the non-moving party.”

Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Any

& All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 207 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2000)). “[A] complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). Pleadings

that contain mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause

of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2009).

When considering a motion to amend a complaint, “[t]he court should freely give leave

when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Motions to amend may be denied for undue

delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice, or similar

reasons. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

III. Analysis

Washington County Defendants’ motion and response raise a statute of limitations defense,

arguing not only that the statute of limitations entitles them to judgment on the (currently

operative) pleadings but that leave to amend should be denied because amendment would be futile.

The Court will address each of these issues in turn.

A. Relation Back of First Amended Complaint

Defendants argue the applicable statute of limitations is the two-year statute of limitations

provided under Arkansas law for “[a]ll actions against sheriffs . . . upon any liability incurred by

them in doing any act in their official capacity or by the omission of any official duty . . . .” Ark.

Code Ann. § 16-56-109(a). “This statute applies to deputy sheriffs and jailers as well as sheriffs.”

Spainhour v. Jones, 4:19-cv-00202 KGB, 2020 WL 1312453, at *4 (E.D. Ark. March 18, 2020)

(citing Brown v. United States, 342 F. Supp 987, 995 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff’d in relevant part, rev’d

in part, 486 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1973)). Insofar as it pertains to Plaintiff’s state law claims against

Washington County Defendants, the two-year statutory period applies, but Arkansas’s general

three-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. Ketchum v.

City of W. Memphis, Ark., 971 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992).1 Because the two-year statutory period

1 Washington County Defendants’ argument seems to be that the applicable statute of

limitations to be borrowed from Arkansas law for the federal causes of action is also two years.

This argument is without merit and contrary to decades of binding precedent. See Wilson v.

applies to Plaintiff’s state law claims and the complaint was filed three years after the cause of

action accrued, Plaintiff’s state law claims against Washington County Defendants are dismissed.

Washington County Defendants next argue that even if the three-year statute of limitations

applies, Plaintiff’s claims in the amended complaint against Washington County Defendants are

time barred because they were filed more than three years after the cause of action accrued.

Plaintiff argues the amended complaint and proposed amended complaint both relate back to the

original complaint, and so take its date of filing for limitations purposes.

Under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), an amendment which “changes the party or the naming of the

party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if (1) the amendment asserts a claim or defense

that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the

original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in by the amendment received such notice of the

action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; (3) that the party “knew or should

have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the

proper party’s identity; and (4) the second and third of these requirements were met within the

period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint.” Lee v. Airgas Mid-South,

Inc., 793 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal citations and alterations omitted). Mistake under

Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is “an error, misconception, or misunderstanding; an erroneous belief.” Heglund

v. Aitkin Cty, 871 F.3d 572, 579 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560

U.S. 538, 548 (2010)). Naming a John Doe defendant is not a mistake under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)

because when a plaintiff names a John Doe defendant it is “not the result of a misunderstanding or

misconception; it [is] an intentional misidentification, not an unintentional error, inadvertent

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (holding that the limitations period for a state’s general personal

injury actions, rather than any limitations period specific to particular actors or torts, is the

limitations period used for § 1983 actions) (superseded by statute on other grounds).

wrong action, or ‘mistake.’” Id. Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not relate back to the filing

of her original complaint under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) because the naming of a John Doe defendant is

not a mistake.

However, Plaintiff’s amended complaint does relate back under Rule 15(c)(1)(A). Rule

15(c)(1)(A) provides “an amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading

when . . . the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(A). Arkansas’s limitations law provides that “[f]or purposes of tolling the statute

of limitations any person . . . may file a complaint stating his or her cause of action . . . whenever

the identify of the tortfeasor is unknown.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-125. To do so, “[t]he name

of the unknown tortfeasor shall be designated by the pseudo-name John Doe or, if there is more

than one (1) tortfeasor, John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, etc.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-

125(b)(1). Additionally, the complaint must be accompanied by “an affidavit that the identity of

the tortfeasor is unknown,” made by Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s attorney. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-

125(c).

At first glance, the tolling effected by Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-125 should resolve this

question. “Tolling” a statute of limitations is generally understood to suspend it, or temporarily

stop it from running. See, e.g., Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S. --, 138 S.Ct. 594, 601–03

(2018) (reviewing cases on what it means to “toll” a statute of limitations). If Arkansas shared in

this general understanding, there would then be no statute of limitations issues raised by an

amendment giving the John Doe parties their proper names. The amended complaint would not

need to “relate back” and take the date of the original complaint because the amended complaint

would itself be filed within the statute of limitations.

Arkansas requires more, however. Following Arkansas Supreme Court precedent, an

amendment providing the real identity of a John Doe defendant must also satisfy the relation back

rules of Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). Berryhill v. Synatzke, 432 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Ark.

2014) (holding without explanation that “before a real party can be substituted for a John Doe

defendant in the original complaint, such pleadings must still meet the requirements of [Arkansas]

Rule 15(c).”). Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) is nearly identical to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(c). To avoid statutory absurdity, however, the “but for a mistake” clause in the

Arkansas Rule must be interpreted differently than that clause in the Federal Rule. When a plaintiff

substitutes the real name of a tortfeasor for a John Doe defendant, the “but for a mistake” clause

of Arkansas Rule 15(c) is satisfied if the plaintiff did not know the identity of the tortfeasor at the

time of the original filing and naming them as a John Doe defendant was not a “strategic decision

not to pursue the defendant until after the period of limitations has expired.” Jones v. Young, No.

3:04CV00257 JLH, 2007 WL 2695621, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 10, 2007) (finding amended

complaint identifying defendant relates back to John Doe pleading when Arkansas statute of

limitations applied and plaintiff used Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-125); see also Archer v. Singh, No.

4:06CV001657 JMM, 2008 WL 4368837, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 22, 2008) (ruling plaintiff’s

amended complaint, filed after limitations period expired, which named defendants related back

to original complaint because plaintiff utilized Ark Code Ann. § 16-56-125). To read Arkansas

Rule 15(c) otherwise, and find that the “but for a mistake” clause has the same meaning as that

clause in Federal Rule 15(c) has been given by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, would render

the Arkansas John Doe statute useless. It would be absurd to say in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-125

that plaintiffs could toll the statute of limitations against unknown John Doe tortfeasors and, upon

learning their identities, amend the complaint to substitute in the tortfeasors’ real names, but at the

same time to say that an amended complaint substituting a real name must meet the requirements

of Arkansas Rule 15(c) and using “John Doe” to identify an unknown tortfeasor is not a mistake

under that Rule. This Court must try to give a state’s law the same interpretation that state’s highest

court would give to it. Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc., 601 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2010). The

Arkansas Supreme Court “will not engage in statutory interpretations that defy common sense and

produce absurd results.” Clark v. Johnson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 362 S.W.3d 311, 316 (Ark. 2010).

Accordingly, neither will this Court.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint relates back to the original complaint under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(A). The claims Plaintiff asserts against the Washington County

Defendants involve Mr. Bell’s suicide at WCDC and clearly arise out of the same transaction or

occurrence as the original complaint. Further all the defendants received notice during the

summons period (which this Court extended (Doc. 19) for all unserved defendants under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)), and all will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits. Plaintiff’s

affidavit filed with the original complaint demonstrates the naming of John Doe defendants was

not a strategic decision. Instead, Plaintiff named John Doe defendants because, despite having

records obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request from the Washington County

Sheriff’s Office, Plaintiff could not identify the employee who prepared certain documents.

Washington County Defendants knew or should have known that if Plaintiff had known their

identity, they would have been named in the original complaint. Because Arkansas’s statute of

limitations law allows substitution of a John Doe defendant to relate back to the original pleading,

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations.

B. Proposed Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff requests leave to file a second amended complaint, asserting individual-capacity

claims against Defendants. Washington County Defendants argue the motion should be denied

because Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is time-barred. However, as discussed above

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint relates back to the original complaint. “In order to sue a public

official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously state so in

the pleadings, otherwise, it will be assumed that the defendant is sued only in his or her official

capacity.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999). “Only an

express statement that [public officials] are being sued in their individual capacity will suffice to

give proper notice to the defendants.” Id. The Eighth Circuit has cautioned litigants to “clearly

indicate both the parties being sued and their capacity in the caption.” Jackson v. Crews, 873 F.2d

1105, 1107 (8th Cir. 1989); see also Rollins v. Farmer, 731 F.2d 533, 536 n.3 (8th Cir. 1984) (“if

plaintiff wishes to sue defendants in both capacities, the following language would suffice:

Plaintiff sues each and all defendants in both their individual and official capacities.”).

Plaintiff did not include language in the caption of either the original or amended

complaints stating the defendants were sued in their individual capacities. Further, even though

the “Prayer for Relief” section asks for punitive damages, that is insufficient to meet the Eighth

Circuit’s strict pleading standard for subjecting state actors to individual liability. Although

Washington County Defendants asserted the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in their

answer, the defendants did so with the caveat that Plaintiff did not sue the defendants in their

individual capacities. The Court finds that the individual-capacity claims against defendants have

not been properly pled in the original or amended complaints.

However, Plaintiff has requested leave to file a second amended complaint to properly state

individual-capacity claims. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to

amend his pleadings “when justice so requires.” Determining whether to grant or refuse a request

to amend is in the sound discretion of the court. Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 434 n.3 (8th Cir.

1989). It is not an abuse of discretion to allow plaintiff to amend a complaint to add individual

capacity claims. Murphy v. State of Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 1997); Braswell v.

Washington Cty., Case no. 5:14-CV-05387, 2016 WL 1178795, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 23, 2016).

The motion will be granted and Plaintiff is directed to immediately file the proposed second

amended compliant attached as an exhibit to her motion. Plaintiff is encouraged to promptly serve

Defendants in their individual capacities, which may be expeditiously accomplished if Defendants

waive service or designate the appearing attorneys as agents for service.

When filed, the individual-capacity claims in Plaintiff’s proposed second amended

complaint will relate back to the date of the first amended complaint (which relates back to the

date of the original complaint as set forth above), as per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1),

because the claims arose out same conduct alleged in the original complaint, and the Washington

County Defendants should have known that but for a mistake, these claims would have been pled

by Plaintiff in conformity with the Eighth Circuit’s strict pleading standards. See, e.g., Hayes v.

Faulkner Cnty., Ark., 388 F.3d 669, 675-76 (8th Cir. 2004) (relation back permitted for individual-

capacity claims arising out of conduct set forth in original pleading); Sanders-Burns v. City of

Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 373 (5th Cir. 2010) (relation back permitted where defendants had sufficient

notice of individual-capacity claims in original complaint, had contemplated defense of qualified

immunity in responding to original complaint, and were not prejudiced by amendment); Moore v.

City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 774-75 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (reversing district court’s

decision to deny leave to amend and finding that individual-capacity claims in amended complaint

would have related back to date original complaint was filed).

IV. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 60) is GRANTED and

Plaintiff is directed to immediately file the proposed amended complaint. Once the proposed

amended complaint is filed, the Court will enter an order dismissing the state law claims pled in

the amended complaint against the Washington County Defendants as time-barred. Defendant

Maria Sanchez’s motion (Doc. 76) is GRANTED insofar as she has adopted Washington County

Defendants’ motion. Washington County Defendants’ motion (Doc. 64) for judgment on the

pleadings is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of July, 2020.

/s/P. K. Holmes,

P.K. HOLMES, III

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE