Evins v. Adams

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

HERMAN DAVID EVINS PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:18-cv-4095

CAPTAIN ADAMS, Miller County

Detention Center (“MCDC”); MRS.

WATSON, MCDC; and CORRECTION

OFFICER BROWN, MCDC DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by pro se Plaintiff, Herman David Evins, under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 29).

Plaintiff has filed a response.1 (ECF No. 39). The Court finds this matter ripe for consideration.

I. FACTUAL BACKROUND

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC”) Delta

Regional Unit. His claims in this action arise from an alleged incident that occurred on April 16,

2018, and the disciplinary process that followed while he was incarcerated in the Miller County

Detention Center (“MCDC”). (ECF No. 1, p. 3). Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

the relevant facts are as follows.

Plaintiff was booked into MCDC custody on January 26, 2018. (ECF No. 31-2, p. 2). On

February 26, 2018, Plaintiff’s probation was revoked, and he was scheduled for transfer to the

ADC. (ECF No. 1, p. 3).

On April 16, 2018, Defendant Brown reported an incident stating:

1 Plaintiff’s response is not verified, but he submitted a verified complaint. (ECF No. 1). A verified complaint is the

equivalent of an affidavit for summary judgment purposes. See Roberson v. Hayti Police Dept., 241 F.3d 992, 994-

95 (8th Cir. 2001).

While serving chow to Max Bravo inmate Evins Herman walked up to receive his

trey during chow inmate Evins began being disrespectful stating ‘the portions are

not big enough and the trey was to small’ also stated ‘I do not want that trey’ I

Officer Brown said ‘ok’ and shut the door to Max Bravo inmate Evins walked back

up to the Max Bravo door and struck the glass with a closed fist. I officer Brown

removed inmate Evins form Max Bravo and placed him in Hand Restraints while

he was cursing me. I Officer Brown then escorted Inmate Evins to Max Alpha cell

806 while he continued to curse me. I then secured him in Max Alpha cell 806

without further incident pending disciplinary.

(ECF No. 31-5, p. 3). On April 17, 2018, Plaintiff responded to Officer Brown’s report stating,

“There was a misunderstand w/officer over refusal of a trey. I did not refuse and the officer

wouldn’t listen.” (ECF No. 31-5, p. 4).

On April 24, 2018, the Miller County disciplinary committee found Plaintiff guilty by

admission of refusing the food tray and disrespecting an officer with inappropriate language. The

sanction for these violations was thirty days in segregation. The committee found:

After hearing this inmate’s statement, Cpt. Adams explained that by him walking

away from the tray that was offered to him and he didn’t take it, that was in fact

refusing the tray. And that by cussing at the officer that was being disrespectful.

Therefore this inmate is found GUILTY by his own admission. Sanction is for 30

days.

(ECF No. 31-5, pp. 5-7).

On May 8, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a grievance stating:

[A]pril 16, 2018 I was not given a tray. On [t]he grounds that I refused to take a

tray they handed me, Yet I as at the door when they closed it on me trying to get a

tray. When I argued with officer Brown, He cuffed me and put me in the hole with

no tray. I went to disiplenary court and there again he focus was more on me

argueing with Brown over not getting a tray than me not getting one. Thanks for

your time and consideration.

(ECF No. 31-3, p. 28). In response, Administrator G. Officer stated, “The Disciplinary committee

will review our request. We will consider your request upon completion of that review. We will

take into consideration the nature of our misconduct when determining whether a reduction is

warranted.” In addition, Defendant Adams also responded stating, “You were in line to get a tray

and you didn’t like the one offered to you and walked away. That is refusing. We covered this in

disciplinary court.” Id.

It is the written policy of the MCDC that proper order be maintained in the facility and that

approved disciplinary procedures be followed when inmates attempt to disrupt order and security.

(ECF No. 31-6, p. 1). The purpose of this policy is to establish guidelines for acceptable behavior

and a system of prohibitions, penalties, and correctional measures that deal with conduct that

causes or threatens to cause harm to self, others, property, or is disruptive of institutional

operations. Id.

The MCDC maintains a list of prohibited acts, their corresponding disciplinary actions,

and the method of establishment and loss of inmate privileges. A list of inmate rules, regulations

and sanctions is posted in each housing area. (ECF No. 31-6, p. 9). Under the rules and sanctions

list, disrespect of officials, employees, or other persons of constituted authority expressed by

means of words, gestures, and the like is a rule violation under Section 1. The maximum

disciplinary sanction is thirty days. Id. at p. 11.

The MCDC also has established procedures which are followed in the event an inmate is

accused of violating the facility’s rules. (ECF No. 31-6, pp. 3-8). The procedures include the

completion of a disciplinary report by the charging officer, an investigation—which includes

witness statements, the charging officer’s account of the incident, and the accused inmate’s

account of the incident, and a review and decision by a disciplinary committee. The accused

inmate is given a written statement of the charge and twenty-four hours advance notice of the

disciplinary hearing. The accused inmate is present at the disciplinary hearing unless documented

security issues require his/her exclusion. Id.

It is also the policy of the MCDC to provide inmates with three nutritious meals per day

that are developed by a certified dietician, prepared under sanitary conditions, at a reasonable cost,

and in such a manner that meets established government health and safety codes. (ECF No. 31-6,

p. 31). According to the MCDC’s Inmate Handbook, meals are regulated as follows:

All meals will be served in the day room in the cells when appropriate. Each inmate is

entitled to one tray only. Each inmate is responsible for getting up and receiving their own

food tr[a]y. You may not allow another inmate to get a tray for you. Food trays will be

returned immediately after consuming the meal. No food trays are to be kept in the housing

area. All menus are reviewed by the Miller County Sheriff’s Office/Detention Division’s

registered dietician to ensure the meals meet the recommended daily dietary allowances of

up to 2700 calories a day. Three meals will be served each day.

(ECF No. 31-6, p. 18).

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 12, 2018. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges Defendants

Brown, Adams, and Watson neglected their duties and abused their authority. Plaintiff claims that

on April 16, 2018, he “was not given a tray of food at dinner [by Brown]. I did not get to eat

dinner. Making me fearful that upsetting a guard might cause me to go hungry. Giving false

statements. I was also handcuffed and taken to a lockdown cell. For argueing with officer [Brown]

about not getting my tray.” Id. at pp. 4-5. Plaintiff also claims:

After proving Officer Brown made some false allegations…in disiplenary court…

defendants Cpt. Adams and Mrs. Watson stayed focused on my argueing with

Brown about not getting my tray, instead of me not getting my tray. Because I

argued with Officer Brown about not getting my tray, I was sentenced to 30 days

lockdown. I thought Adams and Watson were suppose to help protect my right to

eat.

Id. at pp. 6-7.

Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their individual capacity only. He seeks compensatory and

punitive damages and asks for, “the dismissal of officers involved so they can’t intimidate any

more of the inmates.” Id. at p. 9.

On March 14, 2019, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment arguing

they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1) there is no constitutional injury caused by a

missed meal; (2) Plaintiff was provided due process of law; and (3) Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity. (ECF No. 29).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record “shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Once

a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the

non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine

issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.

1999).

The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). “A case founded on speculation or suspicion is

insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d

621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is

blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not

adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Missed Meal

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brown neglected his duty and abused his authority when

he refused to give Plaintiff a tray of food at dinner on April 16, 2018. The Eighth Amendment to

the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. This

prohibition is violated if an inmate is not provided with meals adequate to maintain his health. See

Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 449 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that prisoners have a right to

nutritionally adequate food); Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 508 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding

that prisoners are guaranteed a reasonably adequate diet). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment

claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendant Brown was deliberately indifferent to his dietary needs.

Wishon, 978 F.2d at 449.

The law is clear that one missed meal does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation. See Williams v. Harness, No. 99-1326, 2000 WL 573448, at *1 (8th Cir. May 10, 2000)

(unpublished per curiam) (holding that denial of one meal does not give rise to a constitutional

violation); Jaros v. Ill. Dept. of Correction, 684 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that occasional

missed meal that did not endanger the inmate did not state a claim); Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d

346, 352 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that when an inmate misses one meal it does not rise to the level

of a cognizable constitutional injury). Accordingly, Defendant Brown is entitled to summary

judgment on this claim.

B. Due Process

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Adams and Watson neglected their duties and abused their

authority during his disciplinary hearing when they sentenced him to thirty days in lockdown for

refusing his food tray. Plaintiff also claims that the accusations made against him by Defendant

Brown, which resulted in the lockdown and disciplinary hearing, were false. The Court construes

these allegations as claims based on denial of due process.

In order to prevail on a due process claim, Plaintiff must first demonstrate that he was

deprived of life, liberty, or property by government action. Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 846

(8th Cir. 2003). As noted by the Supreme Court in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995),

although “prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate, lawful incarceration

brings about the necessary limitation of many privileges and rights justified by the consideration

underlying our penal system.” Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of

misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law. Id.

“To prevail on such a claim based on prison housing, an inmate must show that the segregation

created an ‘atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life’ to demonstrate that his liberty interest was curtailed.” Rahman X v. Morgan, 300 F.3d 970,

973 (8th Cir. 2002) (alteration omitted) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484).

The record reflects that Plaintiff was placed in lockdown in the Max Alpha area of the

MCDC on April 16, 2018, after Plaintiff hit a window with his fist and began using disrespectful

language towards Defendant Brown. Plaintiff remained in lockdown for thirty days and then

returned to the general population. Plaintiff has not described any conditions of his confinement

during the time he was in lockdown to demonstrate he was subjected to a dramatic departure from

the basic conditions of his confinement. Moreover, simply being placed in disciplinary segregation

is not an “atypical and significant hardship…in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”

and thus, is not the type of deprivation that creates a protected liberty interest. See Phillips, 320

F.3d at 847 (“We have consistently held that a demotion to segregation, even without cause, is not

itself an atypical and significant hardship.”).

The Eighth Circuit has also held that much longer periods in segregation than that

experienced by Plaintiff, with loss of privileges, does not implicate a liberty interest triggering due

process protections. See Orr v. Larkins, 610 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding that inmate

was not deprived of liberty interest during nine months in administrative segregation); Rahman X,

300 F.3d at 974 (finding inmate’s placement in administrative segregation for twenty-six months

without a disciplinary charge or conviction and during which inmate could not watch television in

his cell did not “demonstrate that his liberty interest was curtailed”); Furlough v. Brandon, 2009

WL 4898418 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 15, 2009) (holding that plaintiff failed to state a due process claim

after being assigned to administrative segregation for nearly nine months).

Even if Plaintiff’s placement in punitive segregation for thirty days at the MCDC infringed

upon Plaintiff’s liberty interests, the Court finds that Plaintiff was provided procedural due process

in connection with his disciplinary confinement. Once an inmate has shown he has a viable liberty

interest, correctional facilities must follow certain procedures to conduct an impartial due process

hearing on a disciplinary matter. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). These procedures

include written notice of the charges, a brief period to prepare, a written statement of the evidence

relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action, and the ability for the inmate to call witnesses

and present documentary evidence. Dible v. Scholl, 506 F.3d 1106, 1110 (8th Cir. 2007).

In this case, Plaintiff was given sufficient notice of the disciplinary charges against him

and adequate notice of the upcoming hearing. Plaintiff not only attended the hearing but presented

a statement in support of his position. Finally, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Brown filed “false”

charges against him fails to state a constitutional claim. See Daniels v. Ferguson, 2008 WL

698485, *9 (W.D. Ark. March 13, 2008) (“To the extent [Plaintiff] contends his Due Process rights

were violated because the disciplinary charges were fabricated or the events simply never

occurred, courts have held that a prisoner enjoys no constitutional guarantee to be free from false

charges that may lead to punishment.”) (citing Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir.

1986) and Glick v. Sargent, 696 F.2d 413, 414 (8th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s due process claims.2

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29) is

hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Captain Adams, Mrs. Watson, and

Officer Brown are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A judgment of even date shall issue.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 7th day of June 2019.

/s/ Susan O. Hickey

Susan O. Hickey

Chief United States District Judge

2 Because there was no violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, it is unnecessary for the Court to address the issue

of qualified immunity.