Langley v. Wallace

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

CLINT JEROME LANGLEY PLAINTIFF

OM. CASE NO. 5:19-CV-05029

DETECTIVE ALEX WALLACE;

SERGEANT HENRY BROCKMEYER;

SHERIFF SHAWN HOLLOWAY;

CAPTAIN JEREMY GUYLL;

LIEUTENANT REBECCA HOLT;

DR. BLAIR HOUSTON;

JUDGE ROBIN GREEN;

and JAY SAXTON DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER

The case is before the Court for preservice screening under the provisions of the

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court has the

obligation to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental

entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

1. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on February 13, 2019. At the time, he was incarcerated

in the Benton County Jail and Sheriffs Office awaiting trial on pending criminal charges.

He is currently committed to the custody of the Arkansas Department of Human Services

("DHS”).’ Plaintiff was directed to file a completed in forma pauperis application, which

he did on March 4, 2019. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges several violations of his

1 Plaintiff's pending state criminal case is State v. Langley, Case No. 04CR-18-0608-1

(Benton County Div. |). Plaintiff was found unfit to stand trial, and an order committing

him to the custody of the Arkansas Department of Human Services was entered on

January 28, 2019. Arkansas Court Connect, last accessed Apr. 15, 2019.

constitutional rights. According to Plaintiff, Judge Green, Public Defender Saxton,

Captain Guyll, and Lieutenant Holt violated his First Amendment rights from March □□□ .

2018, through the time he filed his Complaint. He claims that Public Defender Saxton

and Judge Green denied his request for a second opinion on January 2, 2019 and

defamed his character.2 (Doc. 1 at 5). Plaintiff further alleges that Captain Guyll and

Lieutenant Holt deprived him of his right to practice a religious diet. /d. at 8. He does not

identify either the religion or the diet at issue in his Complaint.

Plaintiff also alleges that Detective Wallace violated his Fourth Amendment rights

on March 26, 2018, by providing “a false material statement’ in an affidavit to a judge,

which resulted in a warrant executed by the Centerton SWAT team that defamed his

character. /d. at 6. He contends his Fifth Amendment rights were violated from March

26, 2018, through the time he filed his Complaint by Detective Wallace, Sergeant

Brockmeyer, and Public Defender Saxton. Detective Wallace supposedly conspired with

Sergeant Brockmeyer by “providing false material statements on their police reports

which led to [Plaintiff's] indictment.” /d. at 7. And Saxton, Plaintiff's lawyer, supposedly

accepted those statements as fact.

Next, Plaintiff alleges that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated from March

26, 2018, through the time he filed his Complaint by Judge Green, Public Defender

Saxton, and psychologist Blair Houston. He maintains that Saxton refused to provide him

with effective assistance of counsel, withheld evidence, and tried to coerce him to plead

2 Based on allegations in his Complaint, combined with Plaintiff's state court docket,

Plaintiff appears to be referring to a second opinion on a psychological evaluation of

himself that was conducted by Dr. Blair Houston, which resulted in a determination that

he was unfit to stand trial.

guilty. Saxton also “hushed” him in court proceedings, tried to make him appear

incompetent, and ordered a psychological evaluation for him. /d. at 11. Dr. Houston

allegedly conspired with Saxton. Judge Green allegedly conspired with both Houston

and Saxton and refused to suppress the psychological evaluation results and permit

Plaintiff to seek a second opinion.

- As for Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, he claims Judge Green denied him a

bond reduction; and Sheriff Holloway and Captain Guyll made him drink water daily from

a drinking fountain located in a public restroom and placed him in a cell of approximately

78 square feet with two other inmates, where he had to stay for 24-48 hours at a time and

sleep 8-12 inches from the toilet.

Finally, Plaintiff contends that his Ninth Amendment rights were violated in the jail

when Sheriff Holloway, Captain Guyll, and Lieutenant Holt denied him an initial phone

call on March 26, 2018, and refused to issue him an inmate ID number for a week. The

lack of ID prevented him from utilizing the inmate kiosk grievance system. He also

complains that the jail washes and reuses single-use eating utensils and does not serve

hot meals sufficiently hot and cold meals sufficiently cold. Plaintiff also accuses staff of

not being familiar with jail policies and of using profane language.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of

process being issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it

contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a

pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint,

however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Even a pro se plaintiff must allege specific facts

sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).

lll. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Against Circuit Judge Robin Green

Judge Green, a Benton County Circuit Judge, is immune from suit. Mireles v.

Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from

ultimate assessment of damages.”). See also Duty v. City of Springdale, 42 F.3d 460,

462 (8th Cir. 1994). “Judges performing judicial functions enjoy absolute immunity from

§ 1983 liability.” Robinson v. Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th Cir. 1994). “A judge will not

be deprived of immunity because the action [s]he took was in error, was done maliciously,

or was in excess of [her] authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978).

Judicial immunity is overcome in two situations: (1) if the challenged act is nonjudicial;

and, (2) if the action, although judicial in nature, was taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. It is clear from the allegations of the Complaint that

neither situation applies here. Plaintiff's claims against Judge Green are subject to

dismissal.

B. Claims Against Public Defender Jay Saxton

Plaintiff's claim of inadequate legal assistance against Saxton, a public defender,

is subject to dismissal. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the

defendant, while acting under color of state law, deprived him of a federal right. In Po/k

County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a public

defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional

functions as counsel to indigent defendants in state criminal proceedings. Thus, when

the claim is merely that the public defender failed to adequately represent the client in his

criminal proceedings, it does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983. See also Gilbert

v. Corcoran, 530 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1976) (conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance

of counsel do not state a claim against public defenders under § 1983). Plaintiff's claims

against Defendant Saxton are subject to dismissal.

C. Claims Against Psychologist Blair Houston

The Complaint does not allege that Defendant Dr. Blair Houston is a state actor or

employee, or that Dr. Houston is someone who acted “under color of’ law to deprive

Plaintiff of a constitutional right. The Complaint states only that this Defendant is a

psychologist employed by Ozark Guidance Center who performed a psychological

evaluation on Plaintiff at his attorney's request during the course of state criminal

proceedings. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to plausibly assert that Dr. Houston is a

“person” subject to suit under Section 1983, and all claims against her are dismissed.

D. Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable official capacity claims. Under Section 1983,

a defendant may be sued in either his individual capacity, or in his official capacity, or in

both. In Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998), the Eighth Circuit Court of

Appeals discussed the distinction between individual and official capacity suits. As

explained by the Court in Gorman:

“Claims against government actors in their individual capacities differ from

those in their official capacities as to the type of conduct that is actionable

and as to the type of defense that is available. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.

21, 112 S. Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). Claims against individuals in

their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which

they work; they require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated

the plaintiff's rights, and the only type of immunity available is one belonging

to the entity itself. /d. 502 U.S. at 24-27, 112 S. Ct. at 361-62 (1991).

Personal capacity claims, on the other hand, are those which allege

personal liability for individual actions by officials in the course of their

duties; these claims do not require proof of any policy and qualified

immunity may be raised as a defense. /d. 502 U.S. at 25-27, 112 S. Ct. at

362.”

Gorman, 152 F.3d at 914.

Plaintiff fails to identify any custom or policy of Benton County which violated his

rights; therefore, he fails to state any cognizable official capacity claims.

E. Claims Related to the Pending State Criminal Case

Plaintiff raises a variety of claims regarding alleged wrongdoing committed by

Detective Wallace and Sergeant Brockmeyer in connection with the investigation and trial

of Plaintiff's criminal case. To the extent Plaintiff brings cognizable constitutional claims

under Section 1983 against these two Defendants, this Court must abstain from hearing

any of these claims until the pending criminal trial is fully resolved. Pursuant to Younger

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts are required to abstain from hearing cases

when “(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding which (2) implicates important

state interests, and when (3) that proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise the

federal questions presented.” Norwood v. Dickey, 409 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2005)

(citing Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 1996)). Ongoing state criminal

proceedings implicate the important state interest of enforcing state criminal law, and

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constitutional claims relating to that proceeding should be raised there. Meador v.

Paulson, 385 F. App’x 613 (8th. Cir. 2010); see also Gillette v. N. Dakota Disc. Bd.

Counsel, 610 F.3d 1045, 1046 (8th Cir. 2010). “If all three questions are answered

affirmatively, a federal court should abstain unless it detects ‘bad faith, harassment, or

some extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.” Night

Clubs, Inc. v. City of Ft. Smith, Ark., 163 F.3d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Middlesex

Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982)).

When only equitable relief is sought, Younger “contemplates the outright dismissal

of the federal suit, and the presentation of all claims, both state and federal to the state

courts.” Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) (Section § 1983 case involving

only injunctive relief, and not damages). In cases where damages are sought, the Eighth

Circuit has noted that the Supreme Court instructs that traditional abstention principles

generally require a stay as the appropriate mode of abstention rather than a dismissal.

Night Clubs, Inc., 163 F. 3d at 481. In Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706

(1996), the Court said:

In those cases in which we have applied traditional abstention principles to

damages actions, we have only permitted a federal court to withhold action

until the state proceedings have concluded, that is, we have permitted

federal courts applying abstention principles in damages actions to enter a

stay, but we have not permitted them to dismiss the action altogether.

ld. at 730. Because Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages, it is appropriate to stay

Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Wallace and Brockmeyer until his state case has

concluded.

F. Religious Diet

Plaintiff alleges he was denied a religious diet. He does not, however, provide any

information as to what religious diet he requested or what was objectionable about the

diet he was provided. Such vague allegations cannot support a claim of constitutional

dimension. See Martin, 780 F.2d at 1337 (finding that even a pro se plaintiff must allege

specific facts sufficient to support a claim).

G. Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff alleges claims regarding the conditions of his confinement, including being

forced to drink from a water fountain in a public restroom, to stay a cell with two other

inmates for 24-48 hours per day, and to sleep 8-13 inches from a toilet. He also alleges

that the jail cleans and reuses single-use eating utensils, and that hot food was served

cold while cold food was served warm. Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable conditions of

confinement claims.

“(When the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his

will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility

for his safety and general well-being.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)

(citation omitted). The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the

imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Detention centers

must provide pretrial detainees with “reasonably adequate sanitation, personal hygiene,

and laundry privileges .. .” Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1045 (8th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989)). The Eighth Amendment

also prohibits punishments that deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities. Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Hall v. Dalton,

34 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[I]n this circuit, the standards applied to Eighth

Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims have been the same.”).

A prisoner alleging an Eighth Amendment violation must prove both an objective

and subjective element. See Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). “The defendant’s conduct must objectively

rise to the level of a constitutional violation by depriving the plaintiff of the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities. The defendant’s conduct must also reflect a subjective state

of mind evincing deliberate indifference to the health or safety of the prisoner.” Revels,

382 F.3d at 875 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference

is established when the Plaintiff shows “the defendant was substantially aware of but

disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” /d. The standards against

which a court measures prison conditions are “the evolving standards of decency that

mark the progress of a maturing society.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).

The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit

inhumane ones. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Because a § 1983 action

is a type of tort claim, general principles of tort law require that a plaintiff suffer some

actual injury before he can receive compensation. Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 448

(8th Cir. 2008) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-55 (1978)).

Here, Plaintiff seeks only monetary compensation and fails to allege that he

suffered any injury resulting from any of the alleged conditions; therefore, he fails to state

any cognizable conditions of confinement claims.

H. One-Week Delay of Access to Grievance Process

Plaintiff alleges he was denied an inmate ID for a week, which prevented him from

using the inmate kiosk system to file grievances for that week. This allegation fails to

state a cognizable claim. An inmate has no constitutional right to a grievance procedure.

Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.3d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding prison grievance process

is a procedural right only, and as such “does not give rise to a protected liberty interest

requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment’); Flick v.

Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (“When the claim underlying the administrative

grievance involves a constitutional right, the prisoner's right to petition the government for

redress is the right of access to the courts, which is not compromised by the prison’s

refusal to entertain his grievance.”). As there is no constitutional right to a grievance

procedure, Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims based on the alleged one-week

delay of access to the grievance process at the Benton County Jail.

I. Staff Unfamiliar with Jail Policies

Plaintiff's allegation that jail staff were unfamiliar with jail policies fails to state a

cognizable claim. An internal jail policy or procedure does not create a constitutional

right, nor does the failure to follow such a regulation rise to the level of a § 1983 claim.

See Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1996).

J. Profane Language by Staff

Plaintiff's allegation that jail staff used profane language fails to state a cognizable

claim. Clearly, “[vjerbal threats do not constitute a constitutional violation.” Martin, 780

F.2d at 1339. Similarly, taunts, name calling, and the use of offensive language does not

state a claim of constitutional dimension. McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir.

1993) (inmate’s claims of general harassment and of verbal harassment were not

actionable under § 1983); O'Donnell v. Thomas, 826 F.2d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 1987) (verbal

threats and abuse by jail officials did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation);

Martin, 780 F.2d at 1338-39 (being called an obscene name and threatened with adverse

consequences unless he cut his hair and shaved does not state a claim of constitutional

dimension); Black Spotted Horse v. Else, 767 F.2d 516, 517 (8th Cir. 1985) (use of racially

offensive language in dealing with a prisoner does not, by itself, state a claim).

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K. Defamation

Plaintiff's claims that various Defendants defamed his character are not actionable

under § 1983. See Underwood v. Pritchard, 638 F.2d 60, 62 (8th Cir. 1981)

(‘[D]efamation, per se, is not actionable under section 1983."). “[A] defamed person has

not been deprived of any right, privilege or immunity secured to him by the Federal

Constitution or laws of the United States.” Ellinburg v. Lucas, 518 F.2d 1196, 1197 (8th

Cir. 1975) (citations omitted). See also Waller v. Rice, 2015 WL 2227799, at *2 (W.D.

Ark. May 12, 2015) (“Slander is not a cognizable claim under section 1983.”).

IV. CONCLUSION □

For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's constitutional claims brought

against Defendants Brockmeyer and Wallace concerning Plaintiffs pending state criminal

trial are STAYED and ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATED pending the resolution of the

state criminal case. Plaintiff will have thirty (30) days after the final resolution of his

pending criminal case to file a motion to reopen this case and reassert those claims.

All of Plaintiff's remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for

failure to state a claim, frivolousness, or because defendants named in the claims are

immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § eh

IT IS SO ORDERED on tris 4 day of April, 2019. Jw”

HY L. BRQOKS

ITED,STA DISTRICT JUDGE

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