The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
NIMER SHIHEIBER PLAINTIFF
v. Case No. 4:15-cv-4043
GRIFFIN THERMAL PRODUCTS, INC. DEFENDANT
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and, Alternatively,
for New Trial on Damages. (ECF No. 77). Defendant has filed a response in opposition. (ECF
No. 78). Plaintiff has filed a reply. (ECF No. 79). The Court finds this matter ripe for
consideration.
BACKGROUND
This case originated as a negligence and conversion action. Plaintiff is a mechanic and
inventor who constructed a cardboard mockup of a new automotive radiator design. Defendant is
in the business of buying, selling, and manufacturing automotive radiators. Plaintiff shipped the
mockup prototype to Defendant with the intention that Defendant fabricate a radiator based on
Plaintiff’s design. Defendant admits that it received then subsequently lost Plaintiff’s cardboard
mockup.
The trial in this matter was held on July 25, 2016. At trial, Plaintiff argued that the fair
market value of his prototype was at least several hundred thousand, if not millions of dollars.1
Meanwhile, Defendant contended that the cardboard prototype, by virtue of being constructed of
1 Plaintiff has repeatedly conflated the fair market value of the actual lost prototype with any value his design has as
intellectual property. The Court notes that Plaintiff has not actually lost any idea or concept, but rather, a cardboard
and tape mockup of a new potential radiator design.
cardboard, was essentially worthless.2 On July 26, 2016, the jury awarded Plaintiff $1.00 in
nominal damages and $63,000.00 in compensatory damages.
On August 19, 2016, Defendant filed its Motion for a New Trial or Remittitur, arguing that
there was not substantial evidence on which a jury could base an award of $63,000.00. The Court
found that there was no evidence to support an award of $63,000.00 because Plaintiff had argued
for a much higher amount and Defendant had argued that the prototype had little to no value.
Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant’s motion and ordered a new trial on damages.
A second trial on damages was held on February 21, 2018. Plaintiff and Defendant made
similar arguments as to the fair market value of the prototype. After deliberation, the jury awarded
Plaintiff $100.00 in damages.
On March 9, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant motion, arguing that he is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, or in the alternative, a new trial on damages because Defendant failed to
introduce any “competent evidence” of the prototype’s value and because the Court erred on
several evidentiary rulings. (ECF No. 77, pp. 3-7). Defendant opposes the motion.
DISCUSSION
The Court now addresses whether Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or,
alternatively, to a new trial on damages.
I. Whether Plaintiff is Entitled to Judgement as a Matter of Law or Alternatively to
a New Trial on Damages
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when “the court finds that a reasonable jury
would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50(a)(1). Post-verdict judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only where the evidence
2 Damages in a conversion action are the fair market value of the converted property. McQuillan v. Mercedes-Benz
Credit Corp., 331 Ark. 242, 250, 961 S.W.2d 729, 733 (1998).
is entirely insufficient to support the verdict. Belk v. City of Eldon, 228 F.3d 872, 877-78 (8th Cir.
2000). Moreover, a new trial should be only granted to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Id.
A. Judgment as a Matter of Law
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to judgement as a matter of law because Defendant did
not produce any “competent evidence” of the prototype’s fair market value at trial. Specifically,
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s witness was not qualified to estimate the value of the prototype
because the witness did not buy or sell prototypes and only dealt in finished products. Plaintiff
further contends that the jury’s award was improperly based on evidence that Plaintiff declared
that the prototype was worth $100.00 when Plaintiff declined to purchase shipping insurance from
the United Parcel Service (“UPS”).
Defendant counters that the jury, as the trier of fact, was free to give the appropriate weight
to witness testimony. Defendant also responds that Plaintiff has brought forward no authority
showing that the jury should not have been allowed to consider Plaintiff’s declaration on the
shipping insurance form and that facts about shipping insurance were in evidence when the jury
reached its verdict.
Upon consideration, the Court agrees with Defendant. The jury heard testimony from both
the Plaintiff and the Defendant’s witness as to the fair market value of the prototype. Defendant
established that its witness had been in the radiator business for several years, and the witness then
testified that the prototype radiator had no fair market value other than the value of the salvaged
materials. It was for the jury, as the trier of fact, to decide how much weight to give to the witness’
credentials and testimony. Regarding Plaintiff’s UPS insurance argument, Plaintiff has cited no
binding authority, and the Court is unaware of any authority, providing that the jury should not
have been allowed to consider how much Plaintiff declared the prototype was worth when he
declined to take out shipping insurance with UPS. Moreover, all of the facts about shipping
insurance and the $100.00 declaration were in evidence and properly before the jury. Therefore,
the jury had sufficient evidence to reach its verdict that Plaintiff’s prototype was worth $100.00.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
B. New Trial on Damages
Plaintiff also contends that the Court made erroneous evidentiary rulings that warrant a
new trial on damages. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Court erred when it: (1) did not allow
evidence about patents and intellectual property when Defendant opened the door to these lines of
questioning; (2) prohibited Plaintiff from mentioning patents and using a completed radiator
constructed of aluminum as a demonstrative exhibit at trial; and (3) “made it easy” for Defendant
to argue that the prototype was simply a cardboard box. (ECF No. 77).
The Court has reviewed the rulings made on motions in limine and the evidentiary rulings
made at trial. Upon review, the Court finds that Defendant did not open the door to lines of
questioning about patents or intellectual property. Additionally, evidence of patents, intellectual
property, and of the completed aluminum prototype would have only served to confuse and
mislead the jury about the nature of this case and what the prototype was worth at the time of
conversion.3 Finally, as to Plaintiff’s contention that the Court “made it easy” for Defendant to
argue that the prototype was simply a cardboard box, the evidence in this case clearly demonstrated
that prototype was exactly that—a mockup made out of cardboard and tape. Therefore, the Court
finds that no miscarriage of justice has occurred, and that Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial.
3 The Court again notes that this was an action for conversion and negligence, not an intellectual property dispute.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Law and, Alternatively, for New Trial on Damages (ECF No. 77) should be and hereby is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 19th day of February, 2019.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
Chief United States District Judge