The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HARRISON DIVISION
DAVID A. STEBBINS PLAINTIFF
V. CASE NO. 3:17-CV-03092
STATE OF ARKANSAS;
ARKANSAS REHABILITATION SERVICES;
and AMY JONES DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff David A. Stebbins filed a lawsuit against the State of Arkansas, Arkansas
Rehabilitation Services (“ARS”), and Amy Jones, the District | Manager of ARS, on July
27, 2016, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The
case was transferred to this District, at Defendants’ request, on October 13, 2017. See
Doc. 89. Before the case was transferred, however, Mr. Stebbins had filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 79), Brief in Support (Doc. 80-1), Statement of Facts (Doc.
81-1), and Supplement (Doc. 83); and Defendants had collectively filed a Response
(Doc. 84), Brief in Support (Doc. 85), Response to Statement of Facts (Doc. 86), and
Statement of Facts (Doc. 87). In the Motion, Mr. Stebbins requests summary judgment
on all claims he asserted in the original Complaint, namely: (1) violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) for discrimination and retaliation, and (2) a
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for First Amendment retaliation. The Motion became ripe
shortly after the case was transferred, when Mr. Stebbins filed his replies to Defendants’
responses. See Docs. 93-96, 99."
' Mr. Stebbins filed yet another Supplement in Reply (Doc. 103) on November 2, 2017,
which was not a proper filing, as it was filed too late, see Local Rule 7.2(b), but has
nonetheless been considered by the Court.
On December 4, 2017, Defendants filed their own Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 109), Brief in Support (Doc. 110), and Statement of Facts (Doc. 111). Mr.
Stebbins responded to Defendants’ Motion, see Docs. 126-128, on January 2, 2018,
and at the same time filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 123), Brief in
Support (Doc. 124), and Statement of Facts (Doc. 125) against all Defendants. Mr.
Stebbins explains in his second Motion for Summary Judgment that he does not intend
it to supersede his first Motion; instead, he contends that both Motions “argue
completely separate grounds for this relief’ and “may be granted or denied
independently of one another.” (Doc. 123, p. 1).
On January 5, 2018, Defendants filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment.
See Docs. 131-133. This second Motion addresses only Mr. Stebbins’s claim for
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), which the Court had allowed Mr.
Stebbins to add to his Complaint as a separate cause of action on December 7, 2017,
just after Defendants filed their first Motion for Summary Judgment. See Doc. 113.
Also on January 5, Defendants filed a Response to Mr. Stebbins’s second Motion for
Summary Judgment, see Doc. 136, as well as a Brief in Support and Statement of
Facts, see Docs. 137, 138. Mr. Stebbins then filed a Reply and other documents □□
support of his second Motion for Summary Judgment (Docs. 149-152). Soon after, on
January 29, 2018, Mr. Stebbins filed a Response and supporting documents as to
Defendants’ second Motion for Summary Judgment, see Docs. 157-159, and
Defendants filed a Reply to Mr. Stebbins’s Response, see Doc. 160.
At this point, it is clear from the procedural history cited above that all parties
believe the issues in this case may be resolved on summary judgment. Mr. Stebbins
has filed two Motions, asserting alternative bases for the Court to find in his favor on all
claims; and Defendants have also filed two Motions, the first concerning the ADA and
First Amendment claims, and the second concerning the RA claim.
The Court has carefully evaluated all four Motions and agrees that Mr. Stebbins's
claims may be decided as a matter of law, in view of the undisputed facts. Accordingly,
for the reasons explained herein, Mr. Stebbins’s first and second Motions for Summary
Judgment are DENIED, and Defendants’ first and second Motions for Summary
Judgment are GRANTED.
|. BACKGROUND
According to Mr. Stebbins, he is an individual with several disabilities, including
Asperger Syndrome and depression. He receives Social Security Disability benefits. At
some point in 2015, or perhaps earlier, he decided he wanted to enroll in college and
earn a computer science degree. He had previously taken several college courses at
other institutions. See Doc. 109-2, p. 54. On December 1, 2015, he visited the
Harrison office of ARS, a state agency that provides vocational services and other
assistance to disabled citizens of Arkansas. Mr. Stebbins met with a counselor and
completed an application for ARS services. In the application, Mr. Stebbins asked for
very specific relief: funds to attend Arkansas Tech University in Russellville, Arkansas. □□
After the initial meeting, ARS worked to obtain copies of Mr. Stebbins’s medical
records in order to verify his disabilities and need for services. Mr. Stebbins signed a
release form for his medical records, id. at 10, 13, and provided his ARS counselor with
some hospital records and the names of two of his doctors. From December 3 to
December 9, 2015, Mr. Stebbins called and emailed ARS staff members multiple times,
trying to find out the status of his request for funds. ARS contends his phone calls with
staff demonstrated extreme agitation, anger, yelling, and overt hostility. The staff
documented these exchanges in their notes, see id. at 35-47, 52-53, 59, but Mr.
Stebbins denies that his calls were as hostile or negative as the staff has characterized
them.
At some point in early December, Ms. Amy Jones, the ARS District | Director,
feared for her Harrison office staffs safety because of the nature of Mr. Stebbins's
repeated telephone contacts. Ms. Jones directed her staff to keep the doors to the
lobby and office locked at all times, and to call the police if Mr. Stebbins appeared at the
office in person. A staff member from ARS called the Harrison Police Department on
December 8 to document an allegedly rude and threatening telephone call with Mr.
Stebbins. See id. at 45. Another staff member called the police on December 9 to
report Mr. Stebbins’s “extremely hostile” telephone call. See id. at 48. After that, Ms.
Jones determined that she “did not feel comfortable” arranging a face-to-face interview
between Mr. Stebbins and another ARS. staff member to discuss his application. See
id. at 46. By then, it had only been a little more than a week since Mr. Stebbins first
visited the office.”
? Mr. Stebbins does not dispute that he was advised in writing that it could take up to 60
° gather all of his medical records and assess his application for services. See id.
On December 15, 2015, ARS’s Licensed Psychological Examiner, Leslie S.
Johnson, completed a review of Mr. Stebbins’s mental health treatment records in order
“to assist in determining [the] feasibility of VR ["Vocational Rehabilitation’]
services/training.” /d. at 56. Ms. Johnson had at her disposal all the medical treatment
records that ARS was able to gather from Mr. Stebbins’s healthcare providers. From
reviewing these records, she noted that Mr. Stebbins had advised a nurse that he had
been “kicked out of the U of A for making threatening statements.” /d. He had also
admitted that he had been arrested for assaulting his father. He had attempted to
commit suicide by drinking bleach. /d. He also reported feelings of frustration, anger,
and depression. /d. The most recent medical records are dated April 26, 2015, around
the time of his attempted suicide. Mr. Stebbins was admitted briefly to St. Bernards
Medical Center for psychiatric treatment, with further instructions for follow-up care.
See id. at 32-33. Ms. Johnson further noted that Mr. Stebbins’s doctors described him
as “impulsive, lack[ing] insight, paranoid, irritable and agitated.” fd. at 56. Although he
had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder, Asperger's Disorder, Delusional
Disorder, and Cluster B personality disorder traits (including narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorders), he admitted to ARS that he was “not currently in treatment for his
mental health issues.” /d.
In the course of reviewing the medical file, it appears Ms. Johnson also
performed a public-records search and discovered that Mr. Stebbins had filed multiple
3 Ms. Jones had made a written request for the records review on December 14, 2015.
‘See id. at 55. .
lawsuits “against his parents, Wal-Mart, the U of A, and federal judges.” /d. She
surmised that the “[clauses of action were mainly civil rights and discrimination.” /d.
She prepared a written recommendation as to Mr. Stebbins’s request for ARS funds,
concluding that his various psychological conditions, as reflected in his treatment
records, were “likely to be manifested in a vocational setting” in several negative ways,
id. at 57. She then went on to explain that his medical records “indicated a history of
physical aggression and threatening statements,” which suggested to her that Mr.
Stebbins was “not currently appropriate for vocational rehabilitation services.” Id. She
strongly recommended that he be referred “to a local mental healthcare provider” for
“treatment and the support of a therapeutic relationship,” since he was not currently
receiving any health care for his multiple mental health issues. /d. The final paragraph
of her recommendation was as follows:
In order for Mr. Stebbins to be appropriate for ARS services he should be
able to demonstrate a period of stable functioning. He will also need to
provide documentation from his mental healthcare providers that his
symptoms are well-managed and they agree he is ready for training,
school or work.
Id.
After receiving Ms. Johnson's report, Ms. Jones reviewed it, as well as the other
documents in Mr. Stebbins’s file, and made the final decision to deny his request for
benefits, at least for the time being. She made a note to the file, dated December 16,
2015, in which she explained that she made this decision “[b]ased on the [sic] Mr.
Stebbins interaction with myself and staff, past records and history, and Mr. Stebbins
refusal for treatment... .” /d. at 59. The same day, Ms. Jones sent Mr. Stebbins a
letter, see id. at 60, in which she excerpted portions of Ms. Johnson's written
recommendation and informed him that he was ineligible for vocational rehabilitation
services. The letter explained that if he disagreed with this decision, he could file a_.
request for administrative review, and if still not satisfied, he could then request a
hearing. /d. The following day, December 17, Ms. Jones sent Mr. Stebbins a second
letter that clarified that her decision to deny him benefits was not permanent. /d. at 62.
She explained that ARS “will reassess” his need for services if he supplied
“documentation of treatment, stability and recommendations from providers that you are
ready for training, school or work . .. .” /d.
Mr. Stebbins concedes that he did not appeal ARS's eligibility determination
within the agency, nor did he otherwise attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Instead, he filed this lawsuit. He contends that when Defendants denied him vocational
funds to attend college, they did so because of his disabilities—because he has
Asperger's Syndrome and depression, among other diagnoses. He therefore believes
Defendants violated both the ADA and the RA by discriminating and retaliating against
him for his disabilities. He also maintains that Defendants’ decision to deny him tuition
assistance was in retaliation for him exercising his First Amendment right to file civil
lawsuits, since Ms. Johnson’s report and recommendation referenced the fact that he
had, in fact, filed various civil lawsuits. Below the Court will consider the parties’ cross-
motions for summary judgment, bearing in mind the appropriate guiding legal standard.
ll. LEGAL STANDARD
A party moving for summary judgment must establish both the absence of a
genuine dispute of material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586-87 (1986); Nat’! Bank of Commerce of EI Dorado, Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d
602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999). The same standard applies where, as here, the parties have
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. When there exists no genuine issue as to
any material fact, “summary judgment is a useful tool whereby needless trials may be
avoided, and it should not be withheld in an appropriate case.” United States v. Porter,
581 F.2d 698, 703 (8th Cir. 1978). Each motion should be reviewed in its own right,
however, with each side “entitled to the benefit of all inferences favorable to them which
might reasonably be drawn from the record.” Wermager v. Cormorant Twp. Bd., 716
F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Canada v. Union Elec. Co., 135 F.3d 1211,
1212-13 (8th Cir. 1998). In order for there to be a genuine issue of material fact, the
non-moving party must produce evidence “such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th
Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
Il. DISCUSSION
A. Discrimination and Retaliation under the ADA
As previously mentioned, Mr. Stebbins admits he has “a variety of disabilities,
including, but not limited to, Asperger Syndrome and Depression.” (Doc. 80-1, p. 4).
Defendants do not challenge this and agree Mr. Stebbins is disabled. But a claim of
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disability discrimination under Title Il of the ADA requires more than just proof of a
disability, coupled with proof that a public entity ruled in a manner adverse to the
disabled person. There must be proof of a nexus—that the adverse decision was made
because of the disability. A prima facie case of ADA disability discrimination therefore
requires: (1) proof of an individual's qualifying disability; (2) proof that the disabled
individual was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's
services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the entity;
and (3) proof that the exclusion or denial was “by reason of the individual's disability.”
Folkerts v. City of Waverly, 707 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 2013).
First, the Court agrees with Defendants that Mr. Stebbins’s lawsuit was
premature. He should have pursued the administrative appellate options that ARS
offered him, and he should not have jumped immediately to filing suit—as he has a
habit of doing, unfortunately. But setting aside whether Mr. Stebbins’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is, in itself, a reason to dismiss the case, and evaluating the
case on the merits, the Court finds that there is clearly no proof in the summary
judgment record that ARS declined Mr. Stebbins's application for funds for college in
violation of the ADA. Certainly, Mr. Stebbins identified his disabilities to ARS; and
certainly, the agency was aware that he suffered from those disabilities when it made
the decision to decline his request for college tuition. However, there is no evidence in
the summary judgment record that his application was declined due to his disabilities.
It is abundantly clear from the tenor and content of Mr. Stebbins’s briefing on
summary judgment that he believes he is entitled to receive ARS funds—for the college
of his choice and in the amount he designates—simply because he is disabled. That is
incorrect. ARS is vested by the State of Arkansas with the discretion to decide who is a
proper recipient of services, and what services are appropriate for each individual. The
Arkansas Code at Section 25-30-201(a) states that ARS’s mission is “to provide
increased employment of individuals with disabilities,” and ARS is empowered to
accomplish that end by providing “individualized training, independent living services,
education and support services, and meaningful opportunities for employment... .”
The goal of the agency, therefore, is to increase employment opportunities for disabled
Arkansans. Further, Section 20-79-213(a) of the Arkansas Code sets up eligibility
standards for receiving ARS funds, thus tasking the ARS with being a responsible
steward of the funds that are allocated to it by the legislature. According to the
legislature, ARS services should only be provided to those disabled Arkansans “whose
rehabilitation the Director of the Arkansas Rehabilitation Services determines, after full
investigation, can be satisfactorily achieved ... .” Ark. Code Ann. § 20-79-213(a)(1).
In the case at bar, there is no genuine, material dispute of fact that ARS
performed its required “full investigation” of Mr. Stebbins’s case and, only after that,
denied Mr. Stebbins’s specific request for immediate funding to attend college. The
agency did not decline his request for services outright. Instead, its denial letter
explained that Mr. Stebbins could later become eligible for services if he demonstrated
a period of stable functioning, as confirmed by a healthcare provider. Obviously, Mr.
Stebbins disagrees with ARS’s decision, but he fails to provide any evidence to suggest
that ARS has done something illegal here. Mr. Stebbins complains that his application
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was not fairly decided because it was based on a records review only, rather than an in-
person psycho-social evaluation by ARS staff. He also complains that ARS is wrong,
and he does not need mental health treatment, but even if he did, ARS should be
required to pay his Arkansas Tech tuition right now, and permit him to seek out mental
health treatment later—a suggestion he calls a “reasonable accommodation.” Finally,
he complains that ARS’s work-focused eligibility standards are unfair and “inherently
discriminatory,” see Doc. 124, p. 13, and that, in any event, he has met those
requirements because he believes that he can succeed right now in school and
eventually become gainfully employed.
Unfortunately, all of Mr. Stebbins’s complaints above are just that: complaints.
He is not happy with ARS’s decision, but he has no evidence that ARS denied his
application due to an illegal reason. To put it bluntly, the only evidence he has is his
own suspicion that the reasons given could not possibly be the true reasons..
ARS is under no obligation to abandon all eligibility requirements in Mr.
Stebbins’s case or any other. The documents submitted to the Court on summary
judgment include Mr. Stebbins’s entire ARS case file, the affidavits of Ms. Johnson and
Ms. Jones, and a few written discovery requests and responses. Mr. Stebbins has
pointed to nothing in this great pile of evidence that indicates that ARS denied him
funding for a discriminatory reason. He has failed to meet proof with proof, and thus,
will not be permitted to bring his complaints to a jury, simply because he finds ARS’s
decision to be wrong and unfair. His ADA discrimination claim is DISMISSED.
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With respect to the ADA retaliation claim, it also merits immediate dismissal. In
order to prove ADA-based retaliation, Mr. Stebbins must demonstrate that he was
retaliated against by ARS for engaging in activities that are protected by the ADA. Mr.
Stebbins asserts that he was denied benefits because he filed various civil lawsuits in
the past against a number of defendants in a number of different courts, and at least
some of those lawsuits happened to contain ADA-based discrimination claims. This
connection between filing lawsuits with ADA claims and ARS’s decision to deny benefits
is entirely speculative, and is once again only supported by Mr. Stebbins’s conjecture,
and nothing more. The ADA retaliation claim is DISMISSED.
B. Retaliation Due to Exercise of First Amendment Rights
Mr. Stebbins's next claim is that ARS denied him benefits—not for the reasons
stated in their denial letters—but in retaliation for Mr. Stebbins exercising his First
Amendment right to file lawsuits. To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Stebbins must prove that: (1) he engaged in an activity
protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered an adverse action that would chill a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity; and (3) the adverse action
was motivated “at least in part” by the exercise of the protected activity. Revels v.
Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004).
Once again, Defendants have presented voluminous proof that the reason why
ARS denied Mr. Stebbins’s claim for benefits was due to the fact that he was not
receiving any mental health treatment for existing, serious mental health conditions, and
that the lack of any treatment jeopardized his ability to succeed both in school and later
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in the workforce. Rather than deny him benefits in perpetuity, the agency advised him
that it would reconsider his request if he sought treatment and had a doctor certify that
he was prepared to effectively put to use the vocational assistance and training that
ARS could provide.
In response to Defendants’ proof, Mr. Stebbins has highlighted a single sentence
in Ms. Johnson’s report that alludes to his civil litigation history, and from there, Mr.
Stebbins has extrapolated that the true reason why ARS denied him benefits was
because of his penchant for filing civil lawsuits. In context, the sentence in question
immediately follows Ms. Johnson's discussion of Mr. Stebbins’s medical records, which
note his various mental health symptoms, including paranoia, irritability, agitation, and a
feeling that “he is chronically targeted by the government and law enforcement... .”
(Doc. 109-2, p. 56). The next sentence then states, without further commentary: “A
search of public records revealed multiple lawsuits filed by Mr. Stebbins against his
parents, Wal-Mart, the U of A, and federal judges. Causes of action were mainly civil
rights and discrimination.” /d.
The Court finds that no jury issue is created by the fact that Ms. Johnson, in the
course of evaluating Mr. Stebbins’s history, performed a public-records search and
uncovered Mr. Stebbins’s extensive litigation history. Once again, there is no evidence
to support his speculation that the litigation history must have influenced the final
decision. Ms. Johnson’s recommendation does not mention lawsuits as a reason to
deny benefits. Moreover, Ms. Jones’s letters to Mr. Stebbins similarly fail to mention
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lawsuits. As there is no genuine, material dispute of fact as to whether ARS engaged in
First Amendment retaliation, the claim is DISMISSED.
C. Discrimination under the RA
According to the Eighth Circuit, “the substantive standards of § 504 of the RA
and the ADA are the same.” Loye v. Cnty. of Dakota, 625 F.3d 494, 496 (8th Cir. 2010).
Therefore, the RA discrimination claim is DISMISSED for the same reasons that the
ADA discrimination claim is dismissed. Mr. Stebbins can point to no genuine, material
dispute of fact to support his claim that the reason why he was denied benefits was a
discriminatory reason in violation of the RA.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff David A. Stebbins’s Motions for
Summary Judgment (Docs. 79, 123) are DENIED, and Defendants State of Arkansas,
Arkansas Rehabilitation Services, and Amy Jones’s Motions for Summary Judgment
(Docs. 109, 131) are GRANTED. The case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and
judgment will enter accordingly. AN,
IT 1S SO ORDERED on this gS day / ay, 2018. wf
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MITED/STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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