The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
BOBBY FRANKLIN MCREYNOLDS PLAINTIFF
v. Civil No. 4:16-cv-04122
PRESTON GLENN, Jail Administrator,
Nevada County Jail; DR. ELKINS,
Nevada County Jail; and SHERIFF
DANNY MARTIN, Nevada County Jail DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a civil rights action filed pro se by Plaintiff, Bobby Franklin McReynolds, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 80) and Defendants Preston Glenn, Dr. Darrell Elkin1 and Danny Martin’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 97). Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiff’s motion on
November 20. 2017. (ECF No. 88). Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendants’ motion on April 11,
2018. (ECF No. 102). The Court finds this matter ripe for consideration.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC”) –
Randall L. Williams Correctional Facility, in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. This case arises from incidents
which occurred while Plaintiff was being held at the Nevada County Jail (“NCJ”) in Prescott,
Arkansas.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the relevant facts are as follows. Plaintiff
was booked into the NCJ on November 23, 2016, where he remained until he was released to the
ADC on December 8, 2016. (ECF No. 80, p. 7). During this time, Defendant Glenn was the Jail
1 Defendant Elkin is incorrectly referred to as Dr. Elkins in the case caption.
Administrator for the NCJ. Defendant Elkin was the medical doctor for the NCJ. Defendant
Martin was the Sheriff of Nevada County.
On November 30, 2016, Plaintiff slipped and fell while exiting the shower at the NCJ
injuring his head, knee, shoulder and back. Plaintiff was immediately transported by ambulance
to Wadley Regional Medical Center in Hope, Arkansas. (ECF No. 98, p. 2). Plaintiff was
examined by a physician and discharged from the hospital later that day with a prescription for a
pain reliever and instructions to continue his regularly scheduled medical care. (ECF No. 99-2).
No x-rays were taken of Plaintiff’s injuries, and he was not given any medical restrictions from
the physician at the hospital. When Plaintiff returned to the NCJ he was assigned to a top bunk
on the second floor of B Pod. Plaintiff asked Defendant Glenn to move him to a bottom bunk but
was told there were no other bunks available. For approximately eight days Plaintiff was required
to go up and down stairs, and climb up to and down from his top bunk. Plaintiff also asked for a
“second [medical] opinion” and was seen by Defendant Elkin five days after his request. (ECF
No. 80, p. 3).
Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint in the Eastern District of Arkansas on December 8,
2016. (ECF No. 2). The case was then transferred to the Western District of Arkansas on December
21, 2016. (ECF No. 5). On February 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. 2 (ECF
No. 21). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Glenn “would not help me, get any relieve when I go
back to the jail, he keeped me upstairs (B) Pod top Rack. He would not help me at the time I got
back from Whattley Medical Center…I’m suing him for…dellberate indifference.” Id at p. 2.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Martin, as sheriff, “knows what goes on at his jail at all times.
2 Plaintiff also named Dr. Christopler Wattingny and Wadley Regional Medical Center as defendants in the
Amended Complaint. On June 21, 2017, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against the hospital. (ECF No. 70).
On October 19, 2017, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Wattingny. (ECF No. 78).
Sueing him also for…dellberate indifference.” Id. With respect to Defendant Elkin, Plaintiff
alleges he “seen me 3 to 4 days later, said he would get permission from (ADC) but he did not and
I stayed hurting and criple within much pain.” Id. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages. He is
suing Defendants in both their individual and official capacities.
Plaintiff filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on October 27, 2017. (ECF No. 80).
However, he did not submit a separate statement of undisputed facts with the motion. Instead,
Plaintiff submitted discovery answers he received from Defendants. Plaintiff argues he is entitled
to summary judgment because Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on March 28, 2018, arguing that they are
entitled to summary judgment because the facts, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, do
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and because Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity. (ECF No. 97).
Plaintiff filed his Response to Defendants’ motion on April 11, 2018. He does not dispute
that he was sent back to the NCJ without medical restrictions.3 However, as evidence that he was
injured, Plaintiff submits medical records from treatment he received at the ADC after leaving the
NCJ. An ADC Condensed Health Services Encounter dated January 5, 2017 reveals that an x-ray
was done on Plaintiff’s left knee, left hand, and right shoulder on or about December 30, 2017.
The notes from Elliot Wagner, M.D. from January 2, 2017, state in part:
KNEE EXAM 3V AP LAT OBLIQUE, LEFT
Results: There is a fracture involving left proximal fibula with minimal
displacement. The joint shows no dislocation. There is associated joint effusion.
Conclusion: Old healing left knee fracture as described above.
3 It is clear from the pleadings that Plaintiff was not satisfied with the treatment he received from Dr. Wattingny at
Wadley Medical Center and disagreed with his medical conclusions.
(ECF No. 102, p. 5). Dr. Wagner also notes that there were no fractures to Plaintiff’s fingers, left
hand, or right shoulder. Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with
the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602,
607 (8th Cir. 1999).
The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). “A case founded on speculation or suspicion is
insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d
621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Inadequate Medical Care
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Glenn, Elkin and Martin were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs after he returned to the NCJ from the hospital on November 30, 2016. The
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment prohibits deliberate indifference
to the serious medical needs of prisoners. Luckert v. Dodge County, 684 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir.
2012).
The deliberate indifference standard includes “both an objective and a subjective
component: ‘The [Plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered [from] objectively serious
medical needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those
needs.’” Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dulany v. Carnahan, 132
F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997)). In order to show he suffered from an objectively serious medical
need, Plaintiff must show he “has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” or has an
injury “that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). In order for Plaintiff to establish the subjective prong of deliberate indifference,
“the prisoner must show more than negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere
disagreement with treatment decisions does not give rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
Deliberate indifference is akin to criminal recklessness, which demands more than negligent
misconduct.” Popoalii v. Correctional Med. Servs, 512 F.3d 488, 499 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
There is no question that Plaintiff has established that he suffered from a serious medical
condition requiring treatment by a physician at a local hospital on November 30, 2016. However,
Plaintiff has presented no evidence to show that any Defendant knew of and disregarded his
medical needs. Rather, the summary judgment evidence shows Plaintiff was taken to the hospital
immediately after falling. Plaintiff was placed in the upper tier of the NCJ and assigned to a top
bunk for a total of eight days before he was transferred to the ADC. It was only after he left the
NCJ that Plaintiff received an x-ray on or about December 30, 2016, which revealed he had “old
healing” from a left knee fracture. Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff fractured his knee when
he fell at the NCJ, there is no way that Defendants could have known this information between
November 30, 2016 and December 8, 2016.
Although Plaintiff communicated to Defendants Glenn and Elkin that he was in pain and
did not want to be assigned to a top bunk or placed in a cell on the top floor, the record demonstrates
that Plaintiff was not given any instructions from the hospital requiring such restrictions. It is not
an Eighth Amendment violation when Defendants, in exercising their professional judgment,
refuse to implement an inmate’s requested course of treatment. Vaughn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904,
908-09 (8th Cir. 2009). Likewise, Defendant Elkin’s failure to order x-rays does not establish a
constitutional violation. Mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of
a constitutional violation. See Phillips v. Jasper Cnty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995)). Finally, Plaintiff’s claim that, as
sheriff, Defendant Martin knew what was going on in the jail does not subject him to liability
under § 1983. Despite a government official’s title, he is only liable for his own misconduct.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
The Court finds there is no evidence to support Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Because Plaintiff has failed to
establish a violation of a constitutional right, it is not necessary for the Court to address the issue
of qualified immunity.
B. Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff also sues Defendants in their official capacities. Official capacity claims are
“functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels
Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). In other words, Plaintiff’s official capacity
claims against Defendants are treated as claims against Nevada County. See Murray v. Lene, 595
F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2010). “[I]t is well established that a municipality [or county] cannot be
held liable on a respondeat superior theory, that is, solely because it employs a tortfeasor.”
Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013). To establish liability
on the part of Defendants under section 1983, “plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation
was committed pursuant to an official custom, policy, or practice of the governmental entity.”
Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff has not
alleged that any policy, practice, or custom of Nevada County contributed in any way to the alleged
violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims
against all Defendants fail as a matter of law. Id.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 80) is
DENIED and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 97) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A judgment of even date shall issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 27th day of April, 2017.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
United States District Judge