The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
CORTERIOUS Q. BROWN PLAINTIFF
v. Civil No. 4:17-cv-04102
CODY FERGERSON, Detective
Prescott Police Department;
and ALEX GAMBLE, Officer
Prescott Police Department DEFENDANTS
ORDER
This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. The case is before the Court for preservice screening under
the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a),
the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on November 20, 2017, in the Eastern District of
Arkansas. (ECF No. 1). The following day the case was transferred to the Western District,
Texarkana Division. (ECF No. 3). In response to the Court’s order, Plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint on December 15, 2017.1 (ECF No. 7). At the time Plaintiff filed his Amended
Complaint, he was incarcerated in the Nevada County Detention Center.2
According to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, “Det. Cody Fergerson, [a detective with
the Prescott Police Department,] told me that he knew I did not have anything to do with the crime
1 The Court also directed Plaintiff to file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff filed
his motion to proceed IFP, and the Court granted the motion on January 5, 2017. (ECF Nos. 8, 10).
2 On December 27, 2017, mail sent to Plaintiff was returned to the Court as undeliverable with no forwarding address.
(ECF No. 9).
and I have proof to prove my innocents.” ECF No. 7, p. 4. Plaintiff further states that Detective
Fergerson is forcing him to take a lie detector test and that the suspect has confessed that Plaintiff
had nothing to do with the crime. ECF No. 7, p. 4. Plaintiff alleges that Alex Gamble, a Prescott
police officer, has stated that Plaintiff has nothing to do with the crime. ECF No. 7, p. 5. Plaintiff
complains that despite his innocence and Defendants’ knowledge of his innocence, he is still being
detained. ECF NO. 7, p. 4. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Fergerson and Gamble are violating
his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their
individual and official capacities. He is seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
Under the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or, (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it
does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted
sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537,
541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). However, a pro se
plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334,
1337 (8 Cir. 1985).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts a claim of false arrest against Defendants. This claim, which challenges
the validity of the pending state criminal proceedings against Plaintiff, is barred under the
abstention doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 59 (1971).
The Younger doctrine “directs federal courts to abstain from accepting jurisdiction in cases
where granting [equitable relief] would interfere with pending state proceedings” involving
important state interests. Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of Fort Smith, Ark., 163 F.3d 475, 477 n.1 (8th
Cir. 1998). In federal cases like this one where only damages are sought, “traditional abstention
principles generally require a stay as the appropriate mode of abstention.” Night Clubs, Inc., 163
F.3d at 481 (citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730 (1996)). This is true “[a]s
long as there may be issues which will need to be determined in federal court.” Yamaha Motor
Corp., U.S.A. v. Stroud, 179 F.3d 598, 604 (8th Cir. 1999). However, a limited exception applies
to allow dismissal under Younger where an award of damages would require the federal court to
first declare a state statute unconstitutional or to overturn a state court judgment on a matter of
state policy. Night Clubs, Inc., 163 F.3d at 482. The Younger abstention doctrine is a reflection
of the public policy that disfavors federal court interference with state judicial proceedings and is
based on the principles of comity and federalism. See Ronwin v. Dunham, 818 F.2d 675, 677 (8th
Cir. 1987).
Three factors must be determined affirmatively to result in abstention under Younger: (1)
there must be an ongoing state judicial proceeding which (2) implicates important state interests,
and (3) that proceeding must afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal questions
presented. Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 1996). If all three factors are met, the
federal court must abstain unless it detects “bad faith, harassment, or some extraordinary
circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982). This bad faith exception “must be construed
narrowly and only invoked in extraordinary circumstances.” Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768,
778-79 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court finds that the Younger abstention doctrine applies to this case because Plaintiff’s
claim involves an ongoing state judicial criminal proceeding against Plaintiff, the state clearly has
an important interest in enforcing its criminal laws, and Plaintiff has given no indication that he
cannot raise his constitutional claims during the state criminal proceedings. Conley v. Hiland, No.
4:15-cv-0359-SWW, 2015 WL 4096152, at *1 (E.D. Ark. July 7, 2015). There is also no
indication of bad faith or any other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention
inappropriate. Because Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages, traditional abstention practices
generally favor a stay of this case rather than outright dismissal, and no exceptions apply requiring
dismissal. See Night Clubs, Inc., 163 F.3d at 481. Thus, the Court will stay and administratively
terminate this federal case until the pending state criminal charges are resolved. See Yamaha
Motor Corp., U.S.A., 179 F.3d at 603-04; Conley, 2015 WL 4096152, at *1; Dunkin v. Morales,
No. 1:11-cv-0010-JMM, 2011 WL 719016, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 22, 2011).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's case is hereby STAYED and
ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATED. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims in this case
after the state criminal proceedings have concluded, he may file a motion to reopen this case at
that time.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 26th day of February, 2018.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
United States District Judge