immunity applies even when judge’s facial expressions and body language indicated he was racially biased--it is the function the Judge is performing that is at issue and not the conduct itself
How later courts described this case
- immunity applies even when judge’s facial expressions and body language indicated he was racially biased--it is the function the Judge is performing that is at issue and not the conduct itself
- judge absolutely immune from claims that he discriminated against the Plaintiff on the basis of race
- “Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FEB 09 2018
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOUGLAS YOUNG, Clerk
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS By Deputy Clesk
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
TOREY BRETT LOGAN PLAINTIFF
V. CASE NO. 3:18-CV-03002
JUDGE DALE RAMSEY;
ROBERT ALLEN, Public Defender;
JUDGE SCOTT JACKSON; and
DEVON STILL, Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Torey B. Logan, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
He proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The case is before the Court for pre-
service screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). The PLRA
modified the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, to require the Court to screen complaints for
dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of
it, if it contains claims that: (a) are frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state claims upon which
relief may be granted; or, (c) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
|. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an African-American male, was incarcerated in the Carroll County
Detention Center when he filed this case. According to the allegations of the Complaint
(Doc. 1), Plaintiff was arrested on October 23, 2017, on the charge of theft by receiving,
a Class A felony, for having purchased a non-operational Dodge Neon valued at $400.
Plaintiff claims that there are multiple witnesses who confirmed that Plaintiff purchased the
vehicle as scrap metal, not knowing that it was stolen. Plaintiff believes he was arrested
without probable cause.
On October 25, 2017, Plaintiff had his initial bond hearing before Judge Dale
Ramsey. Plaintiff's bond was set at $150,000. According to Plaintiff, James Carr, the man
who sold him the stolen Dodge Neon, was charged with theft, a Class C felony. Carr also
had an initial bond hearing that day, and Plaintiff believes that Carr's bond was set at
$5,000. The Complaint contains no information regarding the criminal history of either
Plaintiff or Carr, or their ties to the community or other matters considered when setting
bond.
On November 13, 2017, Plaintiff had his initial arraignment before Judge Scott
Jackson. Plaintiff asked his public defender, Robert Allen, to request a bond reduction.
Plaintiff states the public defender reluctantly did so, and the request was opposed by the
prosecuting attorney, Devon Still. Judge Jackson denied the bond reduction. On
December 11, 2017, the theft by receiving charge against Plaintiff was dropped.
Plaintiff contends that the bond amount that was set in his case was “3000% higher
than the standard bond for similar charges of other inmates.” (Doc. 1 at 8). He believes
he was the “victim of racial discrimination” and points out that Judges Ramsey and Jackson
are Caucasian. /d. Plaintiff maintains that he was “falsely imprisoned for over 60 days due
to racial discrimination.” /d. As relief, he asks that his trial be reset to a different
venue—which is a moot issue in light of the fact that the charges against him were
dropped; that Defendants be charged with racial discrimination and hate crimes for
incarcerating him without probable cause and without reasonable bail; and that
Defendants lose their licenses to practice law in Arkansas and every other state.
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ll. DISCUSSION
Under the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen a case prior to service of process
being issued. A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The Court
bears in mind, however, that when “evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted
sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
.... to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v.
Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007)).
Plaintiff has asserted no plausible claims. First, Judges Ramsey and Jackson are
immune from suit. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“Judicial immunity is an
immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages”). Here, the challenged
actions were judicial in nature—the setting of bond and the denial of a reduction in bond.
Judicial immunity applies “even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and
corruptly.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); see Estate of Keys v. Union Planters
Bank, N.A., 578 F. Supp. 2d 629, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (judge absolutely immune from
claims that he discriminated against the Plaintiff on the basis of race); see also Cooper v.
Rapp, 702 F. App’x 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2017) (immunity applies even when judge’s facial
expressions and body language indicated he was racially biased--it is the function the
Judge is performing that is at issue and not the conduct itself); Shanks v. Otsego Cnty.
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New York, 2017 WL 4220463, *6 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2017) (judge was absolutely immune
from claims that he was guilty of abuse of power, malicious prosecution, false
imprisonment, and racial discrimination so long as he was acting within the jurisdiction of
the court). Furthermore, the Court notes that under Arkansas law, a defendant may appeal
a denial of bail by filing a writ of certiorari. See, e.g., Larimore v. State, 3 S.W.3d 680, 682
(Ark. 1999).
Second, the public defender, Robert Allen, is not subject to suit under § 1983. To
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant, while acting under
color of state law, deprived him of a federal right. In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
325 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a public defender does not act under color of
state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to indigent
defendants in state criminal proceedings. Plaintiff's allegations against Robert Allen are
clearly based on his actions as counsel for Plaintiff in his criminal proceeding. DuBose v.
Kelly, 187 F.3d 999, 1002-03 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[C]onduct of counsel generally does not
constitution action under color of law’). Therefore, the claims against Robert Allen are
subject to dismissal.
Third, the prosecuting attorney, Devon Still, is inmune from suit. The United States
Supreme Court, in /mbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976), established the absolute
immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “in initiating
a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” /d. at 427. This immunity extends to
all acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” /d.,
at 430; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Brodnicki v. City of Omaha,
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75 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1996). This is true even if allegations of vindictive prosecution are
alleged. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1448 (8th Cir. 1987).
lll. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the claims asserted are subject to dismissal because they
are frivolous, fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted, or are against
Defendants immune from suit. Therefore, this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). th
IT {S SO ORDERED on this | day of Februafy, 2018. atl
_/UMOTHY L, BROOKS
et UNIFED-STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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