Bible v. Johnson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

WILLIAM CRAIG BIBLE PLAINTIFF

V. CASE NO. 5:16-CV-5336

AARON JOHNSON;

JURENAL RUBIO;

SHERIFF MEYER GILBERT;

CAPTAIN LYNN HAHN; and

LIEUTENANT ROBIN HOLT DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff William Craig Bible filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. He

proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. The case is before the Court on the Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 20) filed by the Defendants on June 19, 2017.

Additionally, Defendants filed a Brief in Support (Doc. 21), a Statement of Facts in

Support (Doc. 22), and a Supplement to the Statement of Facts in Support (Doc. 23).

Plaintiff responded to Defendants’ Motion on August 18, 2017 (Doc. 29). The Motion is

now ready for decision.

Plaintiff claims that while incarcerated at the Benton County Detention Center,

(“BCDC”), he was subjected to the use of excessive force. Specifically, Plaintiff

contends that Deputies Aaron Johnson and Jurenal Rubio used excessive force while

moving him to a lock down cell and that Defendants Sheriff Meyer Gilbert, Captain

Lynn Hahn, and Lieutenant Robin Holt are responsible in their supervisory and official

capacities. In his Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 29),

Plaintiff requests that his suit be dismissed against all Defendants except his excessive

force claim against Defendant Johnson. The Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's request

to dismiss Defendants Rubio, Gilbert, Hahn, and Holt, and will address summary

judgment as it pertains to Defendant Johnson only.

I. BACKGROUND

In September 2016, Plaintiff waived his right to a final revocation hearing and

was in the BCDC awaiting transport to the Arkansas Community Correction Facility.

Plaintiff was in convicted status at the time of the events at issue in this case. (Doc. 1

at 4; Doc. 21 at 4; Doc. 22-2 at 6). On October 16, 2016, Plaintiff was standing at the

door of D149 waiting in a line to receive medications and have his blood sugar taken

by the nurse. (Doc. 22-4 at 22, 23). Defendant Johnson came into the pod where

Plaintiff was standing, and Plaintiff witnessed Defendant Johnson reprimand another

inmate for a commissary violation. /d. Plaintiff thought Defendant Johnson was giving

the other inmate a hard time. /d. at 16, 17). Plaintiff told Defendant Johnson that it

was “petty,” referring to how Defendant Johnson was treating the other inmate. (Doc.

1 at 4, Doc. 22-4 at 17). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Johnson got upset with him

and told him to get his stuff ready because he would be going to lockdown when

Defendant Johnson returned. The reason given for the punishment was Plaintiff's

interference with facility operations and staff duties. (Doc. 22-4 at 17; Doc. 22-2 at 15,

16). Plaintiff responded, “okay,” got his medicine, sat down, and did not think anything

more of the incident. (Doc. 22-4 at 17).

When Defendant Johnson returned, he instructed Plaintiff to get his stuff, as he

was being taken to the lockdown cell. Plaintiff asserts that he then told Defendant

Johnson “the other day, a guy stood in there and cussed you out, threatened - - told

you to take your badge off, threatened you. You didn’t do anything to him. You're

going to lock me up for saying petty? This is petty.” (Doc. 22-4 at 17). Defendant

Johnson did not fully understand what Plaintiff was saying, but heard Plaintiff say

“take off your badge” and took that as a threat. (Doc. 22-2 at 16). Plaintiff states that

Defendant Johnson then grabbed him by the throat and “slammed him off the glass

window.” (Doc. 1 at 5, 22-4 at 18).

The video of the incident is without sound but shows Defendant Johnson

directing Plaintiff through a doorway between Pod D, Control B and the Pod D

hallway. (Doc. 22-5). Plaintiff, who is carrying his belongings and appears to be

smiling, can be seen talking to Defendant Johnson as Plaintiff approaches the door.

Id. Plaintiff briefly pauses in the doorway while he continues talking, and then

something precipitates an aggressive reaction by Defendant Johnson. In a single

swift movement, Defendant Johnson pulls Plaintiff from the doorway, applies one

hand to the front of Plaintiff's neck, and pins the back of Plaintiff's head against the

glass wall of the control room. /d. Defendant Rubio then joins Defendant Johnson

and they spin Plaintiff around to secure his arms behind his back. During this process

the Plaintiffs chest and the side of his face are mashed against the glass wall. /d.

The use of force as just described occurs within a period of 22 seconds. During this

time, two other officers are standing in the pod control room watching these events

from just a few feet away. /d. Then, while holding both of Plaintiff's arms behind his

back, Defendants Johnson and Rubio walk Plaintiff out of the control room and down

the hall. fd. They all stop about halfway down the hall and Plaintiff is then positioned

(without noticeable force) against the side wall. Johnson and Rubio then escort

Plaintiff back to the control room, where Plaintiff is released and permitted to recover

his belongings (that had fallen to the floor during the ruckus). /d. This is where the

footage ends. The video does not suggest that Plaintiff was physically aggressive or

combative at any point. /d. According to Plaintiff, his shoulder began hurting, which

he attributed to his arms being restrained behind his back. He took naproxen for the

pain. Plaintiff does not allege any other injuries, damages, or impairments.

ll. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record "shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Once a party moving for summary judgment has

made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth

specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material

fact exists.” Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.

1999).

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.". Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must

show there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." Nat’! Bank, 165

F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). "A case

founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary

judgment." /d. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When

opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the

record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version

of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). In this particular case, the incident that is the subject of the

Complaint was captured on video. The Supreme Court has recognized that a video

recording may so contradict the evidence of one party or the other as to eliminate any

genuine dispute about what occurred. /d. at 380. In such a circumstance, the Court

must view the facts in the light depicted by the video. /d. at 381.

lll. DISCUSSION

Defendant Johnson has moved for summary judgment on the following grounds:

1) The force used against Plaintiff was reasonable; and 2) Defendant Johnson is

entitled to qualified immunity.

A. Section 1983 in General

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color

of law, of a citizen's "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws" of the United States. In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff

must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law and that he violated a

right secured by the Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v.

Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999). The deprivation must be intentional;

mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right

under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474

U.S. 344 (1986).

B. Official Capacity Liability

Plaintiff has asserted an official capacity claim. Defendant argues that Plaintiff

has not pointed to any unconstitutional county policy or custom. The Court agrees.

An official capacity claim “is functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing

governmental entity.” Veafch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th

Cir. 2010). In other words, the official capacity claim is treated as a claim against

Benton County. See Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2010).

“A municipality can be liable under § 1983 only if a municipal policy or custom

caused a plaintiff to be deprived of a federal right.” Alexander v. Hedback, 718 F.3d

762, 766 (8th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). “A governmental policy involves a

deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various

alternatives by an official who has the final authority to establish governmental policy.”

Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, 503 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations

and citations omitted). A “custom involves a pattern of persistent and widespread...

practices which become so permanent and well settled as to have the effect and force

of law.” Id.

“[O]ur first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability under § 1983 is the

question whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom

and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

385 (1989). “Moreover, the plaintiff must show not only that a policy or custom

existed, and that it was causally related to the plaintiff's injury, but that the policy itself

was unconstitutional.” Luckert v. Dodge Cnty., 684 F.3d 808, 820 (8th Cir. 2012)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff makes no such

showing. There is no basis on which Benton County may be held liable.

C. Excessive Force Claim against Defendant Johnson

“When confronted with a claim of excessive force alleging a violation of the

Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is ‘whether force was applied in a good-

faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause

harm.” Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hudson v.

McMilliam, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992)). “[E]very malicious push or shove does not amount

to a deprivation of constitutional rights.” Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir.

1993). “Whether a situation justifies the use of force to maintain or restore discipline is

a fact specific issue that turns on the circumstances of the individual case or the

particular prison setting.” Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108, 1113 (8th Cir. 2006)

(internal quotations omitted). The Court must consider such factors as the need for the

application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that

was used, the extent of the injury inflicted, the threat to the safety of the staff and

inmates, and any attempt to temper the severity of the response. Whitley v. Albers,

475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986). In Wilkins v. Gaddy, 590 U.S. 34 (2010), the Supreme Court

held that “the extent of any resulting injury, while material to the question of damages

and informative as to the likely degree of force applied is not in and of itself a threshold

requirement for proving this type of Eighth Amendment claim.” Williams v. Jackson,

600 F.3d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 2010), Crumley v. St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th

Cir. 2003) (“not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the

peace of a judge’s chambers, violates” the Constitution) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

In Scott v. Churchill, the Sixth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment was not

violated when a correctional officer grabbed an inmate’s neck and threatened him, but

the inmate suffered no physical injury as a result. 225 F.3d 659 (6th Cir. 2000). “Every

malevolent touch by a prison guard does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment cause

of action, and the prisoner must allege that he sustained more than de minimis injury

in order to state a viable excessive force claim.” /d. (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 9 (1992)). Similarly, in Norton v. City of Marietta, the Tenth Circuit held that

“grabbing [an inmate] around the neck” and “twisting and hurting it” was not

“objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation.” 432 F.3d 1145,

1156 (10th Cir. 2005).

In reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, including the video

evidence, the Court finds no genuine issue of material fact to suggest Defendant

Johnson exercised force maliciously or sadistically, in order to cause harm. See, e.g.,

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (prison officials given wide-ranging discretion

to utilize judgment in application of force to maintain institutional security); Travillion v.

Leon, 248 Fed. App’x 353, 356 (3d Cir. 2007) (no Eighth Amendment violation stated

when jailer pulled inmate out of his seat, twisted his arms, and put him in handcuffs

before escorting him to disciplinary housing unit); Tatum v. Shoemaker, 2012 WL

899633, at *10 (W.D. Va. March 16, 2012) (no Eighth Amendment violation for

tightening handcuffs and twisting plaintiffs arms to escort him to a different area of the

jail).

Something unexpected was said in the doorway to spark Johnson’s sudden use

of force to restrain Plaintiff. Accepting Plaintiff's version of what was said as true, but

taking into account the added context of the video evidence, it appears that Johnson

heard Plaintiff say “take off your badge’—which Plaintiff admits he stated, though not

in the sense Johnson assumed—and Johnson, misconstruing the comment, moved to

restrain Plaintiff because of an erroneous belief that Plaintiff was threatening him. See

Doc. 22-2, p. 16. The Plaintiffs neck, head, and body were forcefully positioned

against the glass wall for a total of 22 seconds. But contrary to Plaintiff's allegations,

the video does not show Plaintiff's head or body being “slammed” off the glass wall.

The forceful maneuvering that did occur was done in an effort to restrain Plaintiff's

arms behind his back. The scope of force that was exercised, in terms of the

measures taken, the intended purpose, and the duration applied, was no greater than

reasonably necessary to restrain Plaintiff's arms behind his back. Relatively speaking,

Johnson’s use of force was de minimis in nature and commensurate with the

legitimate purpose of maintaining or restoring discipline.’ As the force Johnson used

did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, the claim against him will be

dismissed. In the absence of an actionable constitutional violation, there is no need

for the Court to consider qualified immunity.

—

Plaintiff also confirmed in his deposition that he suffered no long-term or serious injury to

his shoulder as a result of the incident:

And you know, really, | know that was put in there and all [referring to the

shoulder injury mentioned in the Complaint], but my main deal is, I’m not

concerned—my shoulder feels better now. I’m not so concerned about that.

What I’m concerned about is what's on that video and where he grabbed me

by the throat and slammed me off that wall and they did me the way they did

me. There was no reason to do that. | showed no aggression. |’m holding

a mat.

(Doc. 22-4 at 47).

IV.CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 20) is

GRANTED, and the case is PISMISSER WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED on this 2 _™ day of ruary, 2018.

IM@THY. BROOKS

UNITED’ STAT ISTRICT JUDGE

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