The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
CLIFTON ORLANDO SOLOMON PLAINTIFF
v. Civil No. 4:16-cv-04054
CORPORAL GRIFFIN;
STEVEN KING; WARDEN
BRAZELL; SHERIFF RON
STOVALL; and CORPORAL
T. HANNING DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a civil rights action filed pro se by Plaintiff, Clifton Orlando Solomon, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
Corporal Griffie,1 Warden Brazell, Ron Stovall, and Corporal T. Hanning. (ECF No. 29). Plaintiff
has filed a Response. (ECF No. 40). The Court finds this matter ripe for consideration.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on June 29, 2016. (ECF No. 1). On July 27, 2016, Plaintiff
filed a Supplement to his Complaint clarifying his claims. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff is suing
Defendants Griffie, Brazell, Stovall, and Hanning in both their individual and official capacities.2
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and states “I am seeking that all be removed
from Miller county Jail and make this a better Jail.” (ECF No. 1).
On March 24, 2016, Plaintiff was arrested and booked into the Miller County Detention
Center (“MCDC”). At the time Plaintiff filed his Complaint he was a pre-trial detainee. Plaintiff
alleges his constitutional rights were violated when Defendant Griffie, without just cause, ordered
a lock down of Plaintiff’s entire pod for three days without allowing him access to a phone or
1 Plaintiff incorrectly identified Defendant Griffie as “Griffin” in his Complaint.
2 Plaintiff has also named Nurse Steven King as a Defendant in this lawsuit. Defendant King has filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 25) which the Court will address in a separate order.
television. Plaintiff also alleges his rights were violated because the MCDC does not provide
drinking water or exercise equipment during recreational time and there are no MCDC officers
present to protect inmates during the hour of recreation. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that, while a
pre-trial detainee, he was housed with inmates who had been convicted of crimes. Plaintiff claims
that this policy is unconstitutional.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hanning violated his civil rights when he “[i]nterfeared
[sic] with grievance procedure[.]” (ECF No. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff also claims his rights were violated
because “Miller County has the most (Improper grievance procedure) thire [sic] is no change of
command or even a proper procedure that the grievance go through[.]” (ECF No. 11, p. 2). As
for Defendants Brazell and Stovall, Plaintiff claims “[they] support officer who abuse thire [sic]
power while [they] is not on the facility. [They] also has knowledge of officer abuseing [sic] thire
[sic] power in which supports cruel and unusual punishment[.]” (ECF No. 1, p. 7).
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1) there is no individual
capacity liability based on respondeat superior for Defendants Stovall and Brazell; (2) Plaintiff
was afforded his rights to due process; (3) there is no constitutional right to the answering of
grievances; (4) Plaintiff was not subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement; (5)
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (6) there is no basis for official capacity
liability. (ECF No. 29).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when a party moves for summary
judgment, the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Krenik v. Cnty. of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1995). The inquiry performed is
the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for trial—whether, in other words,
there are genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they
may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 (1986); see also Agristor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1987); Niagara of
Wis. Paper Corp. v. Paper Indus. Union-Mgmt. Pension Fund, 800 F.2d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 1986).
A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248. A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a
verdict for either party. Id. at 252.
The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92
F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The
nonmoving party must then demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a
genuine issue for trial. Krenik, 47 F.3d at 957. A party opposing a properly supported motion for
summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. However, “[w]hen
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so
that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Defendants Stovall and Brazell
Plaintiff claims Defendants Stovall and Brazell violated his constitutional rights because
they support other MCDC officers who abuse their power. In order to state a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that each defendant acted under color of state law and that
he or she violated a right secured by the constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (8th Cir. 1999).
The deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for
deprivation of a constitutional right under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986);
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). To establish liability under § 1983, the plaintiff must
“plead that a government official has personally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”
Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 543 (8th Cir. 2014). “A supervisor is not vicariously liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional activity.” White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d
277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994).
In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants Stovall or Brazell were personally
involved in any of the alleged violations of his rights. He only claims these Defendants had
knowledge of other’s actions and “supported” them—this is insufficient to establish § 1983
liability. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against Defendants Stovall and
Brazell fail as a matter of law.
B. MCDC Grievance Procedure and Defendant Hanning
Plaintiff claims the entire grievance procedure at the MCDC is “improper” because there
is no real chain of command and grievances are not processed or answered as they should be.
Plaintiff complains that “the grievance are elctronicly [sic] stored in a system call (Jailmail) this
system allow all staff of Miller County (Access) to view all grievance and medical request as well
e.mail [sic] message[.]” Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Hanning violated his constitutional
rights when he allegedly “interfered” with Plaintiff’s grievance procedure at the MCDC.
The law is clear that in the context of a prison system, an inmate grievance procedure is
not constitutionally required. See Spencer v. Moore, 638 F.Supp. 315 (E.D. Mo. 1986). If the
county or state elects to provide a grievance mechanism, violations of its procedure do not deprive
prisoners of federal constitutional rights. Moreover, it is well settled that there is no constitutional
right requiring jail officials to answer grievances filed by an inmate. See Buckley v. Barlow, 997
F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the MCDC’s grievance
procedure and Defendant Hanning’s failure to process or timely respond to grievances does not
state a constitutional claim and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
C. Lockdown by Defendant Griffie
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Griffie violated his constitutional rights when he locked down
Plaintiff’s entire pod for three days resulting in the suspension of Plaintiff’s phone and television
privileges.3 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against
deprivations of life, liberty, or property and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection
must establish that one of these interests is at stake. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94
(1980). Prisoners held in lawful confinement have their liberty curtailed by definition, so the
procedural protections to which they are entitled are more limited than in cases where the right at
stake is the right to be free from confinement at all. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
Prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions
they manage. Broad discretionary authority is necessary because the administration of a prison is
“at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
“Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
According to the affidavit of Golden Adams, a Lieutenant at the MCDC, in early May
2016, officers smelled what they suspected to be synthetic marijuana coming from the Max B Pod
where Plaintiff was housed. (ECF No. 31-2). Upon further investigation, MCDC officers
discovered contraband in the pod but were unable to identify who it belonged to because it was in
a common area. The Max B Pod was locked down for five days while MCDC officials, including
3 The loss of phone and television privileges will be addressed in the next section discussing conditions of confinement.
Defendant Griffie, investigated who was responsible for bringing the contraband into the MCDC.
During this time, phone and television privileges were suspended for all inmates in the pod.
Ultimately, MCDC officials were unable to determine who the contraband belonged to. Neither
Plaintiff nor the other inmates in the pod were disciplined and they regained all privileges
following the investigation. (ECF No. 31-2).
The facts are not in dispute. Defendant Griffie assisted in the lockdown of Plaintiff’s pod
based on suspicion of illegal drug use. The lockdown of Plaintiff’s pod was lifted as soon as the
MCDC officers concluded their investigation. Upon consideration, the Court finds that no
reasonable jury could return a verdict for Plaintiff on this claim and that Defendant Griffie’s
involvement in the lockdown was reasonable and necessary under the circumstances in order for
the MCDC to maintain discipline and institutional security. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s individual
capacity claim against Defendant Griffie relating to the lockdown fails as a matter of law as there
is no genuine issue of material fact.
D. Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff claims that between March 24 and May 27, 2016—the date he was transferred to
the Arkansas Department of Correction—he was subjected to the following unconstitutional
conditions of confinement by Defendants Griffie and Hanning: (1) loss of phone and television
privileges for three days during a lockdown of his pod; (2) as a pre-trial detainee he was housed
with inmates who had already been convicted of crimes; and (3) there was no water or exercise
equipment in the MCDC’s recreation area and no MCDC officers were present to protect inmates
during the hour of recreation. (ECF No. 1).
“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety
and general well-being.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998) (citation
omitted). The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit
inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment forbids conditions that involve the “wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain,” or that are “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.”
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
In considering whether conditions of confinement violate an inmate’s constitutional rights,
the Eighth Circuit has adopted the same legal standard for pre-trial detainees as it applies to
convicted inmates. See Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 344 (8th Cir. 2006). A prisoner alleging
an Eighth Amendment violation must prove both an objective and subjective element. See Revels
v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
“The defendant’s conduct must objectively rise to the level of a constitutional violation by
depriving the plaintiff of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. “The defendant's
conduct must also reflect a subjective state of mind evincing deliberate indifference to the health
or safety of the prisoner.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate
indifference is established when the plaintiff shows “the defendant was substantially aware of but
disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. However, courts are not concerned
with de minimis levels of imposition on inmates. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535.
Defendants admit that Plaintiff’s phone and television privileges were suspended during a
lockdown of his pod. They also admit Plaintiff, a pre-trial detainee, was housed with state and
federal inmates who had been convicted of crimes. However, according to the affidavit of Al
Landreth, the Jail Administrator for the MCDC, when classifying inmates the MCDC reviews an
inmate’s arrest records, the Arkansas Crime Information Center history, and criminal backgrounds.
All of the data is used to give an inmate a score of minimum, medium, or maximum. Inmates are
then housed in an area consistent with their score. (ECF No. 31-1, p. 2).
With respect to Plaintiff’s allegations regarding lack of water, Defendants acknowledge
there is no water fountain in the recreation yard but state that inmates are allowed to take a cup of
water outside during the one hour of recreation time. Defendants also state that “[d]uring
recreation, there is a basketball goal and room for inmates to exercise.” (ECF No. 31-1, pp. 1-2).
As for Plaintiff’s allegation that no MCDC officers are present to protect inmates during the hour
of recreation, Al Landreth states that:
During recreation time when inmates go outside, inmates are monitored from the
inside, there is a camera that officers can watch or they are physically watched. An
officer is always watching them. The Plaintiff was not assaulted during his
incarceration at the Miller County Detention Center.
(ECF No. 31-1, p. 2).
Even construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has not shown his
living conditions at the MCDC denied him of the minimal measure of life’s necessities nor has he
demonstrated the issues he complains of posed a substantial risk of serious harm to his health. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). In addition, the Court finds any discomfort Plaintiff
may have suffered between March and May of 2016 to be de minimis, and as a result does not
implicate the Constitution. See Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996). Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims against Defendants in their individual capacities fail
as a matter of law.4
E. Official Capacity Claims
As noted above, Plaintiff is suing Defendants in both their official and individual
capacities. Under section 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his individual capacity, or in his
official capacity, or claims may be stated against a defendant in both his individual and his official
capacities. Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998). Official capacity claims are
4 Because the Court finds there has been no violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, it is not necessary to address
the issue of qualified immunity in relation to any of Plaintiff’s claims.
“functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels
Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). In other words, an official capacity claim
against Defendants is treated as a claim against Miller County. See Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868,
873 (8th Cir. 2010).
“[I]t is well established that a municipality [or county] cannot be held liable on a
respondeat superior theory, that is, solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Atkinson v. City of
Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013). To establish Miller County’s liability
under section 1983, “plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation was committed pursuant to
an official custom, policy, or practice of the governmental entity.” Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d
814, 817 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
In the present case, Plaintiff does not claim that his alleged injuries were inflicted pursuant
to an official custom, policy, or practice. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims fail
because Plaintiff has not shown that a policy, practice, or custom of Miller County, Arkansas,
caused a violation of his constitutional rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29)
should be and hereby is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Griffie, Brazell,
Stovall, and Hanning are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A Judgment consistent with this
opinion shall issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 6th day of February 2018.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
United States District Judge