The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
JOHNNIE ROCHELL, JR. PLAINTIFF
Vv. CASE No. 5:16-CV-5093
DETECTIVE CODY ROSS DEFENDANT
OPINION AND ORDER
Currently before the Court are Defendant Detective Cody Ross’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Doc. 76) and Brief in Support (Doc. 77). Detective Ross asks that the
Court reconsider its Order of October 25, 2017 (Doc. 69), in which it dismissed with
prejudice Plaintiff Johnnie Rochell, Jr.’s official-capacity claim against former defendant
Springdale, Arkansas, and Mr. Rochell’s claim against Detective Ross for false arrest. The
Court preserved for trial Mr. Rochell’s individual-capacity claims against Detective Ross for
excessive force and for false imprisonment, finding that Detective Ross was not entitled
to qualified immunity on either of those claims.
The Motion for Reconsideration does not mention the Court's decision to preserve
the excessive-force claim for trial, so the Court interprets that omission to mean that
Detective Ross does not request reconsideration of that decision. Instead, the Motion
focuses exclusively on the false imprisonment claim. Detective Ross's first argument in
support of reconsideration is that the undisputed facts in the summary judgment record
showed, at most, that he was merely negligent with respect to Mr. Rochell’s false
imprisonment, and there was no evidence that Detective Ross engaged in the type of
intentional or willful conduct necessary to create a genuine, material dispute of fact as to
whether he committed this tort. Second, Detective Ross argues that because the Court
found that he was entitled to qualified immunity for the false arrest claim, that same
immunity should also shield him from liability for false imprisonment. The Court will
address both of his arguments in turn.
Before launching into the analysis, the Court first observes that a motion for
reconsideration may be made pursuant to either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or
Rule 60(b). “Rule 59(e) motions serve the limited function of correcting manifest errors of
law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel
Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 752, 761 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Metropolitan St.
Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotations
omitted)). Rule 60(b) provides that a party may be relieved from an order of the Court
under certain enumerated circumstances, including the existence of “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” or “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (6).
In considering Detective Ross's arguments, the Court finds that no manifest errors
or law were made. There remains a genuine, material dispute of fact that he willfully or
intentionally committed the tort of false imprisonment, for the reasons set forth in detail in
the Court's Order on summary judgment. As the Court’s Order made clear, when
Detective Ross arrived at the police station and commenced the booking process for Mr.
Rochell, Detective Ross was presented, for the first time, with a copy of an ACIC report,
the contents of which formed the sole basis for arresting Mr. Rochell for being a felon in
possession. The report contained information about another person entirely, Mr. Johnny
Wayne Russell, Jr., who was clearly identified by name at the top of the form, as well as
by race. And, of critical importance here is the fact that Mr. Russell is Caucasian, and Mr.
Rochell is African-American.
Despite being presented with evidence that Mr. Rochell’s criminal history had
possibly been confused with that of a white man named Johnny Russell, Detective Ross
proceeded to have Mr. Rochell booked and incarcerated in the county jail without
investigating the obvious factual inconsistencies on the face of the first page of the ACIC
report. These circumstances create a genuine, material dispute of fact that Detective Ross
willfully or intentionally failed to conduct further investigation in favor of simply allowing Mr.
Rochell to be incarcerated—for reasons the Court can only speculate about—and despite
the fact that: (1) Mr. Rochell adamantly denied that he was a felon, and (2) Detective Ross
admitted in his deposition that after he arrived at the police station and saw the report, he
suspected that “there may have been some validity to [Mr. Rochell’s denials],” (Doc. 69,
p. 23), but made the decision to disregard his suspicion and send Mr. Rochell to jail.
Detective Ross contends that the facts in the summary judgment record point to his
mere negligence, but the Court disagrees. The Order on summary judgment explained
that an officer cannot rest on a defense that he was “merely negligent” when other
evidence indicates his plain incompetence; and here, the factual record creates a triable
issue of fact that Detective Ross's “skills in analyzing ACIC reports and performing follow-
up database searches [were] substandard and not commensurate with the skills typically
possessed by a reasonable officer.” /d. at 25 n.5.
Detective Ross's second argument is that the qualified immunity he received for
falsely arresting Mr. Rochell should extend to the claim for false imprisonment. The Court
disagrees for the reasons carefully explained in its Order on summary judgment. Detective
Ross was entitled to qualified immunity for false arrest because he reasonably relied on
a police dispatcher’s confirmation that Mr. Rochell was a convicted arsonist. Although the
dispatcher was wrong, and the ACIC report she ran on Mr. Rochell was erroneous, the law
is clear that “[e]ven when a suspect tells the arresting officers that their information is faulty
and that he has not been convicted of a felony, it is ‘objectively reasonable for the officers
to rely on [the suspect's] criminal history as reported and confirmed to them by a police
dispatcher.” /d. at 22. Because Detective Ross reasonably relied on the dispatcher’s
report relayed over the phone at the scene of the arrest, he was entitled to qualified
immunity.
That qualified immunity evaporated, however, at the moment Detective Ross arrived
at the police station and was given a copy of the ACIC report. At that point, he was no
longer entitled to blindly rely on the dispatcher’s representations. He was required to use
his own knowledge and experience as a detective to examine the report and form his own
conclusions. The first entry in the report named a Caucasian male, Johnny Russell, who
was not the same person Detective Ross had arrested. This facial error or inconsistency,
when considered alongside Mr. Rochell’s adamant denial about having a felony record and
Detective Ross’s admitted suspicion that Mr. Rochell was telling the truth, formed a
sufficient basis for the Court to conclude that a reasonable officer in Detective Ross’s
position would have conducted some amount of inquiry and investigation before
imprisoning Mr. Rochell. Moreover, as previously mentioned, Detective Ross’s apparent
lack of knowledge and training on the topic of generating/analyzing ACIC reports revealed
his incompetence in this particular area and further justified the denial of qualified
immunity. See id. at 25.
For all these reasons, the Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 76) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this | day of December, 20
“
OOKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE