Boivin v. Huckabee-Sanders

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

MATTHEW BOIVIN PLAINTIFF

ADC #110905

v. No: 4:24-cv-00034-BRW-PSH

SARAH HUCKABEE-SANDERS, et al. DEFENDANTS

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

INSTRUCTIONS

The following Recommendation has been sent to United States District Judge

Billy Roy Wilson. You may file written objections to all or part of this

Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the

factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this

Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you

may waive the right to appeal questions of fact.

DISPOSITION

Plaintiff Matthew Boivin filed a pro se complaint on January 18, 2024, while

incarcerated at the Arkansas Division of Correction’s Cummins Unit (Doc. No. 2).

The Court granted Boivin in forma pauperis status (Doc. No. 3). The Court has

reviewed Boivin’s complaint and finds that he does not describe facts sufficient to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

I. Screening Standard

Federal law requires courts to screen prisoner complaints. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

1915(e)(2). Claims that are legally frivolous or malicious; that fail to state a claim

for relief; or that seek money from a defendant who is immune from paying damages

should be dismissed before the defendants are served. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

1915(e)(2). Although a complaint requires only a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, the factual allegations set forth

therein must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007) (“a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]to

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do. . . .”). A complaint must contain enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, not merely conceivable.

Twombly at 570. A pro se plaintiff’s allegations must be construed liberally, Burke

v. North Dakota Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1043-1044 (8th Cir. 2002),

and the Court must weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the

facts alleged are clearly baseless. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33

(1992) (explaining that clearly baseless facts include those that are fanciful,

fantastic, and delusional).

II. Analysis

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the

conduct of a defendant acting under color of state law deprived him of a right,

privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or by federal law.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Boivin alleges that he was assaulted by another inmate on July

31, 2023. Doc. No. 2 at 5. He claims that defendant Lieutenant Jane Doe questioned

him about the incident afterwards, told him to write a statement, and left to review

the security footage. Id. at 5-6. Boivin then describes a grievance he wrote about

the incident, and states that defendant Warden Gary Mussellwhite found it to be with

merit but resolved. Id. at 6-7. Boivin claims he has heard of several other violent

incidents in the prisons and some deaths. Id. at 7-8. Finally, he complains that

defendant Governor Sarah Huckabee-Sanders is attempting to add more beds to the

prisons despite current understaffing and overcrowding. Id. at 8. Boivin claims

these circumstances put him at risk of further assault. Id. The Court has liberally

and carefully reviewed Boivin’s complaint and finds that he fails to describe

sufficient facts to state a claim for relief for the reasons explained below.

Failure-to-Protect Claim. Boivin attempts but fails to state an Eighth

Amendment failure-to-protect claim. An inmate has a constitutional right to be free

from attacks by others. See Robinson v. Cavanaugh, 20 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 1994).

To succeed on a failure-to-protect claim, Boivin must show that there was a

substantial risk of serious harm to him and that defendants were deliberately

indifferent to that risk. See Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 447 (8th Cir. 2008).

Specifically,

This claim has an objective component, whether there was a substantial

risk of serious harm to the inmate, and a subjective component, whether

the prison official was deliberately indifferent to that risk. Curry v.

Crist, 226 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2000). To be liable, “the official must

both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128

L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). . . .

Vandevender v. Sass, 970 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2020). An inmate’s complaints

regarding a “general fear for his safety” do not establish that a defendant “acted with

deliberate indifference by not placing him in protective custody.” Robinson v.

Cavanaugh, 20 F.3d at 895; see also Jones v. Wallace, 641 Fed. Appx. 665

(unpublished) (a general fear of another inmate is not sufficient to put guards on

notice of a specific threat or danger).

Boivin does not allege that the defendants were aware of any facts suggesting

that he was in danger of an attack from specific inmates before July 31, 2023.

Rather, he alleges that he was attacked because the doors to six barracks were opened

simultaneously without officer supervision, and more than two minutes passed after

he was attacked with no security response. Id. He claims this amounted to “gross

negligence.” Id. Negligence claims are not actionable under § 1983.1 And Boivin

does not allege how any named defendant was personally responsible for leaving the

doors open without supervision, or even describe how long those doors were left

open without supervision. A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 unless

he was personally involved in or had direct responsibility for the constitutional

violation. See Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006). For these

reasons, Boivin fails to describe sufficient facts to state a constitutional claim that

any defendant was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to

him before he was attacked in July of 2023. His failure-to-protect claims should

therefore be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

Overcrowding/Understaffing. Boivin also fails to describe any specific facts

from which a defendant could infer that he is currently at risk of an attack because

of overcrowding. His general allegations that the prison is overcrowded and

understaffed, without more, are insufficient to state a constitutional claim. Doc. No.

2 at 4. Boivin provides no specific facts regarding current staffing, the number of

1 See Crow v. Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598, 602 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that

intentional conduct, rather than negligence, is required to sustain a § 1983 claim under both

the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to pre-trial detainees);

see also Jackson v. Everett, 140 F.3d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1998) ( . . . “‘deliberate

indifference includes something more than negligence but less than actual intent to harm’;

it requires proof of a reckless disregard of the known risk.”) (quoting Newman v. Holmes,

122 F.3d 650, 653 (8th Cir. 1997)).

beds in the prison currently, or the number of vacant staff positions. His allegations

that the prison is currently overcrowded and understaffed are simply too conclusory

to state a claim for relief. Moreover, Boivin does not allege how any named

defendant was personally responsible for the alleged overcrowding or understaffing

that he claims currently exists. See Mayorga v. Missouri, supra.2 Accordingly,

Boivin fails to state a viable claim for relief based on his allegations that the prison

is currently overcrowded and understaffed.

Grievance Process. Boivin sues Mussellwhite because he found Boivin’s

grievance concerning the July 2023 attack with merit but resolved, which Boivin

claims “misrepresents the situation.” See Doc. No. 2 at 4. Participation in the

administrative grievance procedure alone is insufficient to establish liability under §

1983. See Rowe v. Norris, 198 F. App’x 579, 580 (8th Cir. 2006) (unpublished).

Because Boivin sues Mussellwhite solely based on his involvement in the grievance

process, his claim should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.

III. Conclusion

2 See also Northup v. Bell, No. 6:11CV222, 2012 WL 2814307, at *12 (E.D. Tex.

June 12, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:11CV222, 2012 WL 2813973

(E.D. Tex. July 9, 2012) (“In the absence of any evidence that understaffing resulted from

the deliberate indifference of any of the defendants named in connection with this claim,

Northup has failed to show a constitutional violation and his claim on this point is without

merit.”).

For the reasons stated herein, Boivin’s claims should be dismissed without

prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. It is therefore

recommended that:

1. Boivin’s claims be dismissed without prejudice.

2. Dismissal of this action count as a “strike” within the meaning of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g).

3. The Court certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma

pauperis appeal from the order adopting this recommendation would not be taken in

good faith.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED this 6" day of February, 2024.

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