explaining that clearly baseless facts include those that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional
How later courts described this case
- explaining that clearly baseless facts include those that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional
- “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . .”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
MICHAEL J. ABSHURE PLAINTIFF
#264866
v. No: 4:23-cv-01090-BSM-PSH
BROWN, et al. DEFENDANTS
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
INSTRUCTIONS
The following Recommendation has been sent to United States District Judge
Brian S. Miller. You may file written objections to all or part of this
Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the
factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this
Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you
may waive the right to appeal questions of fact.
DISPOSITION
Plaintiff Michael J. Abshure, an inmate at the Pulaski County Detention
Facility (“PCDF”), initiated this lawsuit by filing a pro se complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 on November 16, 2023 (Doc. No. 1). The Court granted Abshure in
forma pauperis status and instructed him to file an amended complaint to clarify and
narrow his claims (Doc. No. 4). The Court warned Abshure that an amended
complaint would render his original complaint without legal effect and that only
claims properly set out in his amended complaint would be allowed to proceed. Id.
He subsequently filed an amended complaint (Doc. No. 5). The Court has screened
Abshure’s amended complaint and finds that he does not describe facts sufficient to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
I. Screening Standard
Federal law requires courts to screen prisoner complaints. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
1915(e)(2). Claims that are legally frivolous or malicious; that fail to state a claim
for relief; or that seek money from a defendant who is immune from paying damages
should be dismissed before the defendants are served. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
1915(e)(2). Although a complaint requires only a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, the factual allegations set forth
therein must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (“a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. . . .”). A complaint must contain enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, not merely conceivable.
Twombly at 570. A pro se plaintiff’s allegations must be construed liberally, Burke
v. North Dakota Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1043-1044 (8th Cir. 2002),
and the Court must weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the
facts alleged are clearly baseless. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33
(1992) (explaining that clearly baseless facts include those that are fanciful,
fantastic, and delusional).
II. Analysis
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the
conduct of a defendant acting under color of state law deprived him of a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or by federal law.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his amended complaint, Abshure sues Deputy Brown from the
Pulaski County Sheriff’s office who transported him to a court proceeding on
September 11, 2023. Doc. No. 5 at 1-2, 4-5. He claims Deputy Brown, the driver
of the transport vehicle, ran into the back of another car in an intersection and then
hit the brakes hard. Id. at 4. Abshure claims he suffered extreme back and neck
pain. Id. He claims he was examined at the hospital a few days later and given a
pain shot, and he received some pain medication after returning to the PCDF but it
was eventually discontinued. Id.
Abshure’s claim against Deputy Brown fails as a matter of law because it
sounds in negligence, which is not actionable under § 1983. See Crow v.
Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598, 602 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that intentional conduct,
rather than negligence, is required to sustain a § 1983 claim under both the Eighth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to pre-trial detainees).
Accordingly, Abshure’s claims against Deputy Brown related to the vehicle accident
should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
Additionally, Abshure describes no involvement on the part of defendant
Sheriff Higgins. And while he complains that his pain medication was eventually
discontinued at the PCDF, he does not name any defendants who were personally
responsible for his medical treatment. A defendant may not be held liable under §
1983 unless he was personally involved in or had direct responsibility for the
constitutional violation. See Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.
2006) (“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct
responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Accordingly, Abshure’s claims against Sheriff Higgins as well as his
claims regarding his medical treatment should be dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
III. Conclusion
It is therefore recommended that:
1. Abshure’s claims be dismissed without prejudice.
2. Dismissal of this action count as a “strike” within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g).
3. The Court certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma
pauperis appeal from the order adopting this recommendation would not be taken in
good faith.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED this 30th day of January, 2024.
UNITED STATES 2 JUDGE