Watkins v. Gilliam

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

LYNNEL ANTWAN WATKINS PLAINTIFF

V. No. 4:23-cv-00013-ERE

GILLIAM, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. Background

Pro se plaintiff Lynnel Antwan Watkins, formerly a pretrial detainee at the

Saline County Detention Facility (“Detention Facility”), filed this lawsuit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1. Mr. Watkins’ complaint alleges that Detention Facility

officials violated his: (1) First Amendment right to association by imposing a $15.50

fee for video visitation; (2) Eighth Amendment right prohibiting cruel and unusual

punishment by imposing a visitation fee; and (3) Fourteenth Amendment rights by

suspending all free visitation without sufficient due process. Defendants Captain

Gilliam, Sergeant Griffin, Sergeant Hallman, and Sheriff Rodney Wright are sued in

both their individual and official capacities for monetary relief.1

Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, a brief in support, and

a statement of undisputed facts arguing that they are entitled to judgment as a matter

1 The Court previously dismissed Mr. Watkins’ claims against the John Doe Defendant,

CEO of City Telecoin Co. Doc. 18.

of law on Mr. Watkins’ legal claims. Docs. 30, 31, 32. Mr. Watkins has not

responded to Defendants’ motion, and the time to do so has passed. Doc. 35. The

motion is now ripe for review.

For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

(Doc. 30) is GRANTED.

II. Discussion:

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in a light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). The moving party

bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material

fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once that has been done, the nonmoving party must

come forward with specific facts demonstrating that there is a material dispute for

trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042

(8th Cir. 2011). A party is entitled to summary judgment if -- but only if -- the

evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute about any fact important to the

outcome of the case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Odom v. Kaizer, 864 F.3d 920, 921 (8th

Cir. 2017).

B. Undisputed Factual Background2

On March 17, 2020, Saline County Judge Arey closed all county buildings,

including the Detention Facility’s visitation room. Doc. 32-6 at 1.

On July 29, 2021, Mr. Watkins was booked into the Detention Facility. Doc.

32-2 at 1.

On September 26, 2022, Mr. Watkins submitted a grievance complaining that,

since he had been incarcerated at the Detention Facility, he had to pay for all video

visitation and Detention Facility staff had denied him all in-person visitation. Doc.

32-3 at 2.

The same day, Defendant Hallman responded by informing Mr. Watkins that

starting that day, inmates would be allowed one fifteen-minute, free video visit each

week. Id.

On November 28, 2022, Mr. Watkins was released from the Detention

Facility. Doc. 32 at 2.

During his detention, Mr. Watkins used the video visitation system

approximately 486 times and incurred charges ranging from $.50 to $7.50 per call.

Doc. 32-5 at 1-17.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, these undisputed facts are taken from Mr. Wakins’ jail file,

including his arrest and booking information, request and grievances, and video visitation log.

Docs. 32-2, 32-3, 32-5.

C. Qualified Immunity for Individual Capacity Claims

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Watkins’

individual capacity claims for money damages.

Qualified immunity shields government employees sued in their individual

capacities “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

“When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at the summary judgment

stage, the plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact

regarding whether the defendant violated a clearly established right.” Henderson as

Trustee for Henderson v. City of Woodbury, 909 F.3d 933, 939 (8th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Bishop v. Glazier, 723 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2013)). “To defeat a claim

of qualified immunity, a plaintiff . . . must . . . show both that the officer’s conduct

violated a constitutional right, and that the constitutional right was clearly

established.” Bishop, 723 F.3d at 961 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001)).

On this record, no reasonable fact finder could conclude that any of Mr.

Watkins’ constitutional rights were violated. As a result, Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity on all of Mr. Watkins’ individual capacity claims.

1. First Amendment Claim

Mr. Watkins complains that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights

when they cancelled all free visitation at the Detention Facility. It is undisputed that,

on March 17, 2020, Saline County Judge Arey closed all county buildings, including

the Detention Facility’s visitation room. Doc. 32-6 at 1. Although inmates were

permitted to participate in video visitation, they had to pay for the video calls. Mr.

Watkins does not complain that he was ever denied the opportunity to engage in

visitation; rather he complains that he was forced to pay for the video visitation.

In Holloway v. Magness, 666 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 2012), an Arkansas Division

of Correction (“ADC”) inmate, filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging that the elevated telephone charges that he was forced to pay to

communicate with his family and friends violated his First Amendment free speech

rights. This Court granted summary judgment in favor of the ADC Defendants. On

appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this Court’s decision.

The Eighth Circuit explained that “[j]ust as ADC had no First Amendment

obligation to provide any telephone service, it had no obligation to provide that

service at a particular cost to users.” Id. at 1079-80. “The Constitution does not

prohibit charging prisoners for essential prison services, at least in the absence of a

showing that the result is a severe deprivation of a fundamental right.” Id. at 1080.

The Court went on to analyze inmate Holloway’s claim as a restriction on his

speech under the First Amendment by using the “four-factor Turner test to determine

whether [it was] reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 1080

(internal citation omitted). The Court explained that: (1) “there [was] a valid, rational

connection between the legitimate government interest in providing telephone

service, and determining what to charge for that service”; (2) “ADC inmates retain

many alternative means of communication with family members and friends in the

outside world”; (3) “the third and fourth Turner factors – the impact of a restriction

on guards and inmates and the presence or absence of alternative restriction – have

little or no bearing on what inmates are charged for telephone service.” Id. at 1080-

81. The Court concluded that inmate “Holloway simply failed to allege and prove

facts showing a significant impact on his right to communicate with the outside

world.” Id. at 1081.

For the same reasons, Mr. Watkins’ First Amendment claims fail as a matter

of law. Mr. Watkins has presented no evidence that his constitutional rights were

violated. The visitation logs show that Mr. Watkins made 486 video calls between

July 29, 2021, and November 8, 2022. Doc. 32-5 at 1-17. While Detention Facility

policy required Mr. Watkins to pay for most of those video calls, there is no evidence

that his right to communicate with the outside world was significantly impacted.

Because Mr. Watkins’ First Amendment claim fails as a matter of law,

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim.

2. Conditions of Confinement Claim

Mr. Watkins also alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment

rights by forcing him to pay for the video calls at issue. Because Mr. Watkins was a

pre-trial detainee during the relevant time period, his conditions of confinement

claim are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Claim. Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Stearns v. Inmate Servs. Corp., 957 F.3d

902, 905 (8th Cir. 2020). Under that standard, the government may lawfully detain

a defendant before trial and subject him to jail restrictions and conditions, “so long

as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise

violate the Constitution.” Stearns, 957 F.3d at 907 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 536–

37). In the absence of any allegations suggesting an express intent to punish, a

plaintiff must allege facts suggesting that “the conditions of confinement were not

reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose or were excessive in

relation to that purpose.” Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39). Whether the

conditions of pretrial detention are punitive and therefore unconstitutional depends

on the totality of the circumstances, including the duration of the allegedly harsh

conditions. Stearns, 957 F.3d at 909.

During his time at the Detention Facility, Mr. Watkins was forced to pay for

video visitation. However, Mr. Watkins has neither alleged nor presented any

evidence that the conditions he experienced at the Detention Facility were

intentionally punitive. There is also no evidence allowing a fact finder to conclude

that Mr. Watkins endured arbitrary or excessive conditions of confinement during

his stay at the Detention Facility.

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Watkins’ conditions of

confinement claim.

3. Due Process Claim

Mr. Watkins’ complaint alleges that “Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights to

due process when they suspended all free visitations for 15 months without a

proper/just cause, hearing or announcement.” Doc. 1 at 9.

Prisoners have a right to procedural due process only if there is a protected

liberty interest at stake. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in the prison context will generally be

“limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant

hardships on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”); Phillips

v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003). As discussed above, inmates do not

have a protected liberty interest in free video visitation. Without any underlying

liberty interest, Mr. Watkins’ Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims

fails as a matter of law, and Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

D. Official Capacity Claims

Mr. Watkins also sues each Defendant in his or her official capacity. By law,

the Court must treat Mr. Watkins’ official-capacity claims against county employees

as claims against Saline County. See Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir.

2010); Jenkins v. Cnty. of Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628, 631-32 (8th Cir. 2009).

In this context, Saline County can be held liable only if an official county policy or

widespread custom was the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional

violation. See Luckert v. Dodge Cnty., 684 F.3d 808, 820 (8th Cir. 2012); Jenkins,

557 F.3d at 633.

Mr. Watkins alleges that Saline County’s policy prohibiting free video

visitation violated his constitutional rights. However, as discussed above, the policy

did not violate Mr. Watkins’ First Amendment rights. The Detention Facility was

not obligated to provide him with free video calls to maintain contact with the

outside world. Mr. Watkins’ official capacity claims fail as a matter of law.

III. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 30) is GRANTED.

2. Mr. Watkins’ claims are DISMISSED, with prejudice.

3. The Clerk is directed to close this case.

SO ORDERED 23 January 2024.

UNI Z STA | ES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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