“[T]he real question is simply whether officers’ belief that [the plaintiff] was committing trespass was reasonable under the circumstances, even if it happens to one day be proven technically mistaken.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he real question is simply whether officers’ belief that [the plaintiff] was committing trespass was reasonable under the circumstances, even if it happens to one day be proven technically mistaken.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
DELTA DIVISION
BRANDON ARCHIBALD PLAINTIFF
v. CASE NO. 2:22-CV-00074-BSM
THOMAS BRACEY, et al. DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 18 ] is granted, and Brandon
Archibald’s federal and state constitutional and statutory claims are dismissed with prejudice.
Archibald’s state tort claims are dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
While driving on I-55 in Mississippi, Archibald was passed at a high rate of speed by
an unmarked black sport utility vehicle (SUV). Compl. ¶ 2, Doc. No. 1; Deposition of
Brandon Archibald, at 11-12, Doc. No. 20-1. Believing the occupants of the SUV were
Southaven, Mississippi police officers, Archibald trailed them. Archibald Dep. at 12-14.
After exiting the freeway, the SUV pulled next to Archibald, who was filming, and a
uniformed passenger rolled down his window. Archibald asked for the names and badge
numbers of the occupants of the SUV, but the officers drove away without responding. Id.
at 14-15; Southaven Video, Doc. No. 20-2. Archibald reviewed his video recording and
realized that the officers in the SUV were not Southaven police officers, but were West
Memphis, Arkansas police officers. Archibald Dep. at 15-17.
A few days later, Archibald and his brother went to the West Memphis Police
Department. Compl. ¶ 9; Archibald Dep. at 18-19. Archibald pushed the button on the
police department’s door for service, and was advised that the supervisor was on his way.
Archibald Dep. at 19. Archibald was not permitted to enter the building but a few minutes
later, Sergeant Thomas Bracey came out to meet with Archibald while Archibald’s brother
filmed the meeting. Id. Archibald asked for Bracey’s name and badge number, and both
were provided. Id. at 20-21. Archibald showed Bracey the video of his encounter with the
black SUV. Id. at 24-25; Video of Conversation with Sergeant Bracey, Doc. No. 20-4.
Soon-thereafter, Captain Jimbo Presley came out of the police department and identified
himself as the person in the SUV. Archibald Dep. at 26; Video of Brandon Archibald Arrest,
Doc. No. 20-5. Presley told Archibald that “[we] ain’t dealing with that” and walked back
into the police department. Presley told Bracey to come back into the department with him.
Archibald Arrest Video.
When Bracey entered the door of the police department, Archibald stopped the door
from closing. Deposition of Thomas Bracey, at 36 & 41, Doc. No. 20-3; Archibald Arrest
Video. Archibald asked Presley for his name and badge number, and Presley complied.
Archibald Arrest Video. Archibald then said that he wanted to file a police report, and
Presley told him to file one with the Southaven Police Department. Id. Bracey then told
Archibald several times to remove his foot from the door so that it could close or he would
be arrested for trespassing. Id. Archibald failed to comply and was therefore arrested for
trespassing. Id. Bracey initially charged Archibald with trespassing but changed the charge
to disorderly conduct. Bracey Dep. at 34-35.
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After pleading not guilty to disorderly conduct, Archibald was called by Michael
Stephenson, West Memphis’s city attorney, and informed that West Memphis’s Chief of
Police, Michael Pope, had been the passenger in the SUV. Archibald Dep. at 39-40.
Stephenson told Archibald that he would dismiss the case against Archibald if he would sign
a release. Id. at 40. Although Archibald refused to sign a release, Stephenson dismissed the
charges. Id.
Archibald is suing Bracey and Presley in their individual and official capacities, and
the city of West Memphis, Arkansas for: (1) violating the First and Fourth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, Article 22 of the Arkansas Constitution, and Ark. Code Ann.
section 21-1-106; (2) municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. section 1983; and (3) malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, and false imprisonment. Compl. ¶¶ 20-31. Defendants are
moving to dismiss, or alternatively, for summary judgment. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Doc. No.
18.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is treated as a motion for summary judgment because
the parties rely on exhibits outside the complaint. See Abramson v. Mitchell, 459 F.2d 955,
957 (8th Cir. 1972). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). Once the
moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the non-moving
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in his pleadings. Holden v. Hirner,
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663 F.3d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 2011). Instead, the non-moving party must produce admissible
evidence demonstrating a genuine factual dispute requiring a trial. Id. All reasonable
inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Holland v.
Sam’s Club, 487 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007).
III. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is granted on all of Archibald’s federal and state constitutional
claims, and on all federal and state statutory claims, because defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Archibald’s state tort claims are dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
A. Individual Capacity Claims
Summary judgment is granted on Archibald’s individual capacity claims.
1. First Amendment Claim
Summary judgment is granted on Archibald’s First Amendment claim because it is
arguable that the officers had probable cause to charge him with trespassing and disorderly
conduct. To prove his claim, Archibald must prove that (1) he engaged in a protected
activity, (2) Defendants took adverse action against him that would chill a person of ordinary
firmness from engaging in the activity, (3) the adverse action was motivated by Archibald’s
exercise of the protected activity, and (4) the officers lacked probable cause or arguable
probable cause. See Just v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 7 F.4th 761, 768 (8th Cir. 2021). The
only element in dispute is whether the officers had arguable probable cause to charge
Armstrong. Arguable probable cause is a low standard because it “is a mistaken but
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objectively reasonable belief the suspect committed a criminal offense.” Dowell v. Lincoln
Cnty., Mo., 762 F.3d 770, 777 (8th Cir. 2014). Defendants met this standard because
criminal trespass is simply unlawfully remaining on another person’s property, Ark. Code
Ann. section 5-39-203, and disorderly conduct is engaging in “tumultuous” behavior while
intending to cause “public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm,” Ark. Code Ann. section 5-
71-207.
It was reasonable for the officers to believe that Archibald was trespassing when he
repeatedly failed to comply with their request that he remove his foot from the doorway to
the police department so that the officers could secure the door. This is true even if the
officers were mistaken. See Reform Am. v. City of Detroit, Mich. 37 F.4th 1138, 1155 (6th
Cir. 2022) (“[T]he real question is simply whether officers’ belief that [the plaintiff] was
committing trespass was reasonable under the circumstances, even if it happens to one day
be proven technically mistaken.”) (citing Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60-62
(2014)). Moreover, it was also reasonable for the officers to believe that Archibald was
engaging in disorderly conduct when he failed to comply with their request that he stop
physically obstructing the doorway to the police department so they could secure the door.
2. Fourth Amendment Claim
The officers are immune from Archibald’s Fourth Amendment claim because they did
not deprive him of a clearly established right when they charged him with a misdemeanor
violation. See Pollreis v. Marzolf, 66 F.4th 726, 729-30 (8th Cir. 2023). Archibald’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from illegal search and seizure was not violated because the
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officers had arguable probable cause to arrest him for trespassing and disorderly conduct.
See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); Brown v. City of St. Louis, Mo.,
40 F.4th 895, 901 (8th Cir. 2022).
3. Article 22 Claim
Archibald’s claim under Article 22 of the Arkansas Constitution is dismissed because
there is no Article 22 of the Arkansas Constitution.
4. Ark. Code Ann. Section 21-1-106 Claim
Archibald argues that a reasonable fact-finder could determine that he was arrested
for videotaping his interactions with the police in violation of Ark Code. Ann. section 21-1-
106, which guarantees the right to record in public places. Pl’s Br. Supp. Resp. Mot. Summ.
J. 7, Doc. No. 27. Summary judgment is granted because the video evidence clearly shows
that Archibald was arrested for impeding the doorway, and not for videotaping the officers.
B. Claims Against the City
Summary judgment is granted on Archibald’s claims against the City of West
Memphis and his official capacity claims against the officers.
1. Claims against the City of West Memphis
Summary judgment is granted on Archibald’s claims against the City because he has
failed to show that his rights were violated as a result of a “policy or custom” of the City.
Calgaro v. St. Louis Cnty., 919 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2019). This is true because the
officers have been absolved of liability. Sinclair v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 268 F.3d 594,
596 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Consequently, there is no municipal liability. Id.
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2. Official Capacity Claims
Summary judgment is granted on Archibald’s claims against the officers in their
official capacities because these claims are in all respects claims against the City, which are
examined identically to those referenced in the previous section. Banks v. Slay, 875 F.3d
876, 878 (8th Cir. 2017).
C. State Tort Claims
Archibald’s remaining state tort claims are dismissed without prejudice because the
balance of factors to be considered in whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—points towards declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, summary judgment is granted on all of Archibald’s federal and state
constitutional and statutory claims, and those claims are dismissed with prejudice. His state
tort claims are dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of August, 2023.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE