“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . .” (alteration in original)
How later courts described this case
- “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . .” (alteration in original)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
JEFF BROWN PLAINTIFF
ADC #080026
v. Case No. 4:22-cv-00356-LPR
SOLOMON GRAVES,1 et al. DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Plaintiff Jeff Brown,2 who is serving a life sentence at the Tucker Unit of the Arkansas
Division of Correction, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he has
wrongly been denied parole.3 On November 8, 2022, I granted Mr. Brown’s motion to proceed in
forma pauperis and initially screened his Complaint.4 While finding that Mr. Brown had not
shown that the Arkansas Parole Board’s parole-eligibility-review procedures violated the law, I
gave him thirty days to file an Amended Complaint should he wish to do so.5 Mr. Brown has filed
his Amended Complaint, which is ripe for screening.6
I. Screening
Before docketing a complaint, or as soon as practicable after docketing, the Court must
review the complaint to identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if it: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
1 The Clerk of the Court is directed to update the docket sheet to reflect that Joe Profiri has replaced Solomon Graves
as the ADC Cabinet Secretary. FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d).
2 Mr. Brown entered a negotiated plea of guilty to first-degree murder on May 18, 1982 and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. See Brown v. State, 2023 Ark. 27.
3 Compl. (Doc. 1).
4 Order (Doc. 6).
5 Id.
6 Am. Compl. (Doc. 9); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.7
Although a complaint requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, the factual allegations must be sufficient to raise the right to relief
above a speculative level.8 A pro se complaint is construed liberally, but it must contain enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, not merely conceivable.9
II. Mr. Brown’s Claims
In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Brown realleges verbatim his initial arguments, adds
individual capacity damages claims against the Defendants, reiterates his belief that he was entitled
to parole when he reached his “minimum flat date,” and reargues that the application of harsher
guidelines to him violated ex post facto laws.10 In screening Mr. Brown’s initial Complaint, I
dismissed his official capacity claims for damages against Defendants, denied his request for
injunctive relief, and rejected his argument that his eligibility for parole in any way guaranteed
parole.11 For the reasons set out in the initial screening order, I again dismiss these claims without
prejudice.12
Just as his official capacity claims were dismissed, so are Mr. Brown’s individual capacity
claims. Mr. Brown has not only failed to demonstrate that he suffered a constitutional violation,
but he has failed to identify how any of the defendants were personally responsible for the alleged
7 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
8 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“[A] plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . .” (alteration in original)).
9 Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
10 Am. Compl. (Doc. 9) at 8.
11 Order (Doc. 6).
12 Id.
violation.13 Accordingly, Mr. Brown’s individual capacity claims for damages are dismissed
without prejudice. In reviewing Mr. Brown’s original ex post facto argument that “a person must
be released when his minimum release date arrives if he is class 2 or above,”14 I found that Mr.
Brown had inadequately shown that he had been subjected to unconstitutionally harsh guidelines.15
Nevertheless, I allowed Mr. Brown a chance to amend his Complaint—instructing him that he
must provide “non-conclusory factual allegations that the Arkansas Parole Board is applying
harsher guidelines than it was in 1982.”16 His amendment fails to state a viable claim.
As a reminder, Mr. Brown has twice appeared before the Arkansas Parole Board—once in
2017 and again on March 5, 2020.17 At each hearing, Mr. Brown received a two-year denial of his
request for parole.18 It is this denial with which Mr. Brown takes issue. Mr. Brown claims that
the Arkansas Parole Board’s procedures—as applied to him—violate the constitution.19 In his
Amended Complaint, Mr. Brown states that, “mandatory parole was the parole boards only legal
option.”20 In short, Mr. Brown believes that the 25-year minimum sentence set out in the Fair
Sentencing of Minors Act was, in fact, a mandatory release date when considered together with
his belief that he had also reached “class 2 or above.”21 Accordingly, because Mr. Brown had
served in excess of 25 years when the Act was passed, he believes his parole hearing was nothing
more than a formality as he was absolutely entitled to immediate release. He further suggests,
13 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); Royster v. Nichols, 698 F.3d 681, 692 (8th Cir. 2012).
14 Order (Doc. 6) at 5.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 6.
17 Am. Compl. (Doc. 9) at 5.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 5–6.
20 Id. at 7.
21 Id. at 8.
with no factual support, that the Arkansas Parole Board must have incorrectly relied on another
parole statute when it denied his parole.22 Mr. Brown, however, has neither shown that his
punishment has increased nor has he made an adequate showing that the Arkansas Parole Board’s
procedures violated his rights.
With the adoption of the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act,23 Mr. Brown became parole
eligible—meaning he would have the opportunity to appear before the Arkansas Parole Board and
be considered for parole—once he served 25 years. That Mr. Brown had served far longer than
25 years when the statute was enacted is of no special benefit to Mr. Brown. The statute provides
the right to a hearing. It does not provide the right to parole. Mr. Brown also has not shown that
the Arkansas Parole Board violated any of its procedures in twice denying Mr. Brown parole.
Despite Mr. Brown’s additional explanations in his Amended Complaint, he offers nothing new to
support his ex post facto argument. Instead, he repeats his belief that the Arkansas Parole Board
misapplied the law to him. Because Mr. Brown did not cure the deficiencies identified with his
original Complaint, it and his Amended Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.24
22 Id. at 7. Mr. Brown suggests the Arkansas Parole Board had to have erroneously relied on Ark. Code Ann. § 16-
93-701. This section of the code establishes the Parole Board’s parameters and authority to grant parole and is
inconsequential to Mr. Brown’s argument that the Board misapplied its procedures to him.
23 Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-621.
24 In an Addendum and Motion for Subpoena, Mr. Brown provides factual support that he was injured by another
inmate and treated for those injuries in an area hospital. Addendum (Doc. 10); Mot. for Subpoena (Doc. 12). These
documents, however, do not pertain to his present parole allegations, and Mr. Brown has offered no explanation for
why he provides them. Mr. Brown cannot circumvent the filing fee requirement by joining unrelated claims. FED. R.
CIV. P. 21. The Clerk is directed to send Mr. Brown a blank § 1983 complaint and IFP application should he wish to
separately pursue claims arising from his injury or treatment. Accordingly, Mr. Brown’s Motion for Subpoena (Doc.
12) is denied as moot.
Ill. Conclusion
It is, therefore, ORDERED that:
1. Mr. Brown’s Complaint and Amended Complaint are DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim.
2. Mr. Brown’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 7) and Motion for Subpoena (Doc.
12) are denied as moot.
3. The Court recommends to future jurists that this dismissal count as a “strike” within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
4. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis
appeal from this Order or the accompanying Judgment would not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 2nd day of June 2023.
keke
LEE P. RUDOFSKY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE