Opinion

Rodgers v. Allen

Court
District Court, E.D. Arkansas
Filed
Mar 13, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.1%

holding that “the extent of any resulting injury, while material to the question of damages and informative as to the likely degree of the force applied, is not in and of itself a threshold requirement for proving” an excessive force claim

How later courts described this case

  • holding that “the extent of any resulting injury, while material to the question of damages and informative as to the likely degree of the force applied, is not in and of itself a threshold requirement for proving” an excessive force claim
  • holding that, in an excessive force case, there must be “a reliable inference of wantonness,” and not “a mere dispute over the reasonableness of particular use of force or the existence of arguably superior alternatives”
  • holding that the County cannot be held liable under § 1983 if the individual defendants are not liable

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

DALON V. RODGERS PLAINTIFF

ADC #164397

v. No: 4:21-cv-00174-PSH

CHARLES ALLEN, et al. DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Dalon V. Rodgers filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 on March 3, 2021, while incarcerated at the Pulaski County Detention Facility

(“PCDF”) (Doc. No. 2).1 He subsequently filed an amended complaint (Doc. No.

8), which was served on Defendants Lieutenant Charles Allen, Deputy Terri Reed,

and Lieutenant Nicole Nelson (the “Defendants”). See Doc. No. 11. Rodgers

alleged that on February 1, 2021, Allen used excessive force on him by tightening

his handcuffs to the point where he began bleeding despite his compliance with

Allen’s orders. Doc. No. 8 at 4. Rodgers further alleges that Allen instructed Nelson

and Reed to hold his arms steady while Allen continued to tighten his right handcuff

and that Nelson and Reed did so. Id. at 4-5. He claims that Allen continued twisting

1 Rodgers is currently incarcerated at the Arkansas Division of Correction’s

Grimes Unit. See Doc. No. 9.

his cuffs for 7-8 minutes while Nelson and Reed held him down. Id. at 5. Rodgers

claims the handcuffing incident left him with visible cuts resulting in permanent

scars and numbness. Id.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, a brief in support, and a

statement of facts asserting that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on

the merits of Rodgers’ claims (Doc. Nos. 27-29). Although Rodgers was notified of

his opportunity to file a response, he did not do so. See Doc. No. 32. He also failed

to file a statement setting forth disputed facts he believes must be decided at trial as

required by Local Rule 56.1. Because Rodgers failed to controvert the facts set forth

in the Defendants’ statement of facts, Doc. No. 29, those facts are deemed admitted.

See Local Rule 56.1(c). The Defendants’ statement of facts, and the other pleadings

and exhibits in the record, establish that the material facts are not in dispute, and

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is

proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for

summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir.

2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, and must instead

demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann

v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party’s allegations

must be supported by sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in

his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. Id. (citations

omitted).

An assertion that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must be

supported by materials in the record such as “depositions, documents, electronically

stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for

purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials

. . .”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may also show that a fact is disputed or

undisputed by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible

evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). A dispute is genuine if

the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either

party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Othman v.

City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). Disputes that are not

genuine or that are about facts that are not material will not preclude summary

judgment. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 2010).

In Reed v. City of St. Charles, Mo., 561 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2009), the Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the requirement that facts be viewed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party when considering a motion for summary

judgment. The Court stated, “[i]f ‘opposing parties tell two different stories,’ the

court must review the record, determine which facts are material and genuinely

disputed, and then view those facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving

party—as long as those facts are not so ‘blatantly contradicted by the record . . . that

no reasonable jury could believe’ them.” Id. at 790 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550

U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).

III. Facts2

On or about September 3, 2020, Plaintiff, Dalon V. Rodgers, was booked into

the PCDF on multiple charges, including a six-month parole revocation. Doc. No.

29-2, Rodgers’ Arrest and Booking, at 1.

The Handcuffing Incident

Rodgers alleges that Defendants exercised excessive force against him

because Allen tightened his handcuffs while Reed and Nelson held him down during

an incident that occurred on February 1, 2021. Doc. No. 8 at 4-5. PCDF records

and body camera footage show the incident at issue actually occurred on January 29,

2 These facts are taken from the Defendants’ statements of facts (Doc. No. 29), and

the documents and records attached, including relevant video of the incident in question.

2021. Doc. No. 29-5, January 29, 2021 Incident Report. Rodgers also grieved the

incident that day. Doc. No. 29-3, Standard Grievance. The incident report prepared

by defendant Deputy Terri Reed states as follows:

At approximately 0345, Inmate Rodgers, Dalon (#09801-20) began

banging on his glass, demanding to see a sergeant. When I told him the

sergeant was on the way, he said “Fuck the sergeant, get a nurse down

here.” I then asked him what was wrong and he said he was having

trouble breathing. At 0358, Nurse Millikan and Sergeant D. Bilbruck

came to see Inmate Rodgers. While the nurse was trying to assess him,

he became angry and refused to “cuff up” (submit to restraints). He then

requested the Lieutenant. Sergeant Bilbruck told him he doesn’t get to

see the lieutenant just because he wants to. Inmate Rodgers held down

his food trap and wouldnt’ [sic] allow us to close it. Sergeant Bilbruck

secured the sub day room door and then left the unit. Soon after he left,

Inmate Rodgers popped out of his cell, I then radioed for a supervisor.

Lieutenant Nelson, Lieutenant Allen, Sergeant Bilbruck, Sergeant

Evans, Deputy Buckner, Deputy Goshen, Deputy McCann and Nurses

Millikan and Jackson came into the unit. Inmate Rodgers was then

placed in handcuffs. He then began to threaten Lieutenant Allen. Inmate

Rodger’s room was searched because there was the smell of marijuana.

His commissary was taken and items of contraband were found in his

room. He had 2 pills, extra sheets, extra blankets, a torn sheet, and trash.

Inmate Rodgers room was also cleaned. He was then strip searched.

The cell door was secured, the restraints were removed, and the food

trap secured without further incident.

Doc. No. 29-5. Rodgers’ grievance states:

On 1-29-21 At approximately 4:15 a.m Lt. C. Allen responded to T Unit

where I am currently being held due to me popping the cell lock because

the Deputy T. Reed working the unit refused to let me clean my cell ,

Upon Lt. C. Allen arriving in the sub-day T-333 he asked me to cuff up

after I cuffed up I was talking to Lt. Nelson about the situation with me

[sic] clean my cell while Lt. C. Allen was still holding the handcuff in

a tightly manner twisting my wrist. No code blue was called or spray

was used and due to the policy if any inmate shows any signs of

aggression that give protcols [sic] to use the OC spray! I would like this

incident investigated!

Doc. No. 29-3.

Body camera footage from Axon Body 2 X81468099, Axon Body 2

X81468513, and Axon Body 2 X81465835 shows the following. See Doc. No. 29-

7, Video Footage. Jail officials approached Rodgers while he was outside of his cell

and restrained him with handcuffs without resistance at 10:16. At 10:17, defendant

Lieutenant Charles Allen led Rodgers to a bench where he sat down. Rodgers

claimed he had COVID-19, complained about his cell conditions, and suggested that

he wanted his cell to be cleaned. Rodgers stated, “You can let my hands go, I ain’t

gonna do nothing brother.” Allen held Rodgers’ handcuffs and responded, “You

done popped out your cell brother, that’s a whole different.” Rodgers responded

“alright” and began to argue with jail officials.

Meanwhile, the jail official wearing body camera Axon Body 2 X81468513

left the scene at 10:17 and stated “Rodgers popped out.” That jail official returned

to the scene at 10:18 with defendant Deputy Terri Reed,3 who was carrying a broom.

Reed and other jail officials cleaned Rodgers’ cell and removed items. By 10:19,

Rodgers was standing and resisting directions to sit down. During his struggle with

officers, the camera Axon Body 2 X8146535 was knocked off the jail official

3 Nelson and Reed can be identified by the names on their uniforms.

wearing it. Allen and another officer4 held Rodgers’ arm while he protested to items

being removed from his cell and argued with defendant Lieutenant Nicole Nelson

who was standing nearby. The jail official equipped with the body camera Axon

Body 2 X81468099 left the scene at 10:20 to get “tether and shackles.”

At 10:21, the jail official wearing body camera Axon Body 2 X81468513

exited Rodgers’ cell, while Rodgers complained that officers were twisting his

wrists. That body camera shows Allen and another jail official holding Rodgers

while he is seated in a forward leaning position with his face looking at the ground.

Rodgers asked one of the jail officials restraining him “Can you let my wrist go,

please sir. Please can you let my wrist go.” Allen asked, “Are we done with the

threats, Mr. Rodgers?” Rodgers responded, “Yes sir, yes, yes sir.” Rodgers was

lifted back up by jail officials. Allen stated he smelled marijuana. Rodgers then

stated “Can you let my wrist go. Please, bro?” Rodgers continued to be restrained

by jail officials and stopped complaining about his wrists. A jail official applied a

handcuff tether to Rodgers’ handcuffs at 10:22. Allen stated, “I’ll help you out the

best I can man, always have and I always will, but you ain’t gonna threaten me man.”

4 This officer appears to be the officer wearing Axon Body 2 X8146535 because

he is not seen in that video but appears to be the person holding onto Rodgers. He is

identified as Deputy Buckner in Nelson’s affidavit. See Doc. No. 29-9 at ¶ 3 & 8. At no

point did Terri or Nelson restrain or touch Rodgers according to the video footage.

Allen again stated he smelled weed before Rodgers was pulled to a standing position

by jail officials. Allen instructed other jail officials to search his cell.

Rodgers was seated again by jail officials at 10:22 while his cell was searched;

he is seen a forward leaning position. Rodgers was asked about and offered a Covid

test by Nelson multiple times, but he did not respond. He continued to lean over and

was instructed to stand up at 10:24, when jail officials led him into his cell. Rodgers

continued to be argumentative and was strip searched. Afterwards, he was led to the

door of his cell, his restraints were removed, and his cell was locked at 10:28.

Each of the Defendants provided an affidavit describing the handcuffing

incident seen in the video footage. In her affidavit, Nelson explained that she arrived

at Rodgers’ cell on January 29, 2021, because he had manipulated the locking

mechanism on his door and let himself out. Doc. No. 29-2 at ¶ 2. Nelson spoke with

Rodgers while he was restrained by Allen and Buckner, and then ordered the

cleaning and search of his cell. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. She explained that Rodgers became

argumentative and combative after she told him his commissary would be taken from

his cell. Id. at ¶ 5. According to Nelson, Rodgers stood up from the bench he was

seated on and refused orders to sit down. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. Nelson explained that Allen

and Buckner restrained Rodgers to prevent Rodgers from entering his cell during the

search because that would pose a security threat; she stated that force was no longer

applied once he became compliant. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. She did not witness Allen use an

excessive amount of force on Rodgers while he was restrained and did not witness

any blood or injury to Rodgers’ wrists. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 15. According to Nelson,

Rodgers did not inform her he was injured or needed medical attention for his wrists

after the January 29 incident. Id. at ¶ 16. She stated she did not have any physical

contact with Rodgers and did not hold his arms down. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.

Reed described the same events in her affidavit. Doc. No. 29-10 at ¶¶ 7-8,

10-14. She also had no physical contact with Rodgers and did not hold his arms

down. Id. at ¶¶ 16-17. Reed likewise did not witness Allen use excessive force on

Rodgers and did not observe any blood or injury to Rodgers’ wrists. Id. at ¶¶ 14 &

18. She also stated that Rodgers did not tell her he was injured or request medical

treatment. Id. at ¶ 19.

Allen also described the same events in his affidavit. Doc. No. 29-11 at ¶¶ 2-

7. He further explained that Rodgers grew increasingly upset when he was told that

his commissary would be taken and after Rodgers refused Allen’s orders to sit down,

Allen attempted to perform a wrist lock on Rodgers to gain control of him. Id. at ¶

5. According to Allen, the wrist lock was unsuccessful so he twisted Rodgers’ arms

to gain control of him and prevent him from entering his cell while his cell was

cleaned and searched. Id. Allen stated that once he gained control of Rodgers and

Rodgers was seated, he released the pressure on his arms. Id. at ¶ 8. Allen stated

that he did not further tighten Rodgers’ handcuffs during this encounter, as Rodgers

alleged in his complaint. Id. at ¶ 9. According to Allen, he used “only the force

reasonably necessary to control [Rodgers] and to prevent him from possibly

attempting to enter his cell while PCRDF staff members searched it.” Id. at ¶ 10.

Like Nelson and Reed, Allen did not witness any blood on Rodgers’ wrists or

observe any injury to his wrists, and Rodgers did not inform Allen that he was

injured or needed medical attention during the encounter. Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.

Rodgers’ Medical Treatment

From January 29, 2021, until Rodgers’ release to the Arkansas Division of

Corrections (ADC) on March 9, 2021,5 PCDF medical personnel conducted

segregation rounds five times. Doc. No. 29-4, Jail Medical File Information, at 1-

4. Rodgers did not request medical services during those rounds. Id. On March 10,

2021, Rodgers was examined by medical personnel at the ADC. Doc. No. 29-8,

ADC Medical Records, at 2-6. The Initial Report of Physical Examination noted

that Rodgers’ skin was “Normal,” he voiced no complaints, and no restrictions were

placed on him. Id. From March 10, 2021, – June 25, 2021, Rodgers filed three

medical requests. Id. at 10, 13 & 27. He did not complain of any injury to his wrists,

but complained of dry skin on March 16, 2021, complained of a runny nose, sore

5 Doc. No. 29-2 at 2.

throat, and headache on April 27, 2021, and requested an eye exam on June 4, 2021.

Id.

IV. Analysis

A. Individual Capacity Claims

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to

Rodgers’ individual capacity claims because he cannot prove they violated his

constitutional rights.6 The Court agrees for the reasons described below.

Rodgers’ claims of excessive force are analyzed under the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because Rodgers was

incarcerated on a parole revocation at the PCDF when the handcuffing incident

happened. See Dodd v. Latimore, 2018 WL 4346686 at *1 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 30,

2018); see also, Moore v. Shock, 2014 WL 5474613 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 29, 2014).

“Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in

violation of the Eighth Amendment, the ‘core judicial inquiry’ is whether the force

6 Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for damages

“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person [in their positions] would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To determine whether a defendant is entitled to

qualified immunity, the Court must consider two questions: (1) do the facts alleged by

plaintiff establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) if so, was that

right clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Wright v.

United States, 813 F.3d 689, 695 (8th Cir. 2015). Courts may exercise “their sound

discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should

be addressed first in light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously

and sadistically to cause harm.” Jones v. Shields, 207 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7). See also Whitley v. Albers, 475

U.S. 312, 322 (1986) (holding that, in an excessive force case, there must be “a

reliable inference of wantonness,” and not “a mere dispute over the reasonableness

of particular use of force or the existence of arguably superior alternatives”). Factors

which inform this inquiry include the need for the application of physical force; the

relationship between the need for physical force and the amount of force applied;

and the extent of injury suffered by the inmate. Jones v. Shields, 207 F.3d at 495.

Unless “‘it appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain . . .

the case should not go to the jury.’” Johnson v. Bi-State Justice Ctr./Arkansas Dep’t

of Corr., 12 F.3d 133, 136 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322).

A plaintiff need not allege significant injuries to state an excessive force

claim.7 However, the extent of a plaintiff’s injuries may constitute evidence of the

7 See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 1178-79 (2010) (abrogating the de

minimis injury rule in excessive force cases, and clarifying that the extent of the

injury is only one factor to be considered when resolving the “core judicial injury”

of “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,

or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm”); Williams v. Jackson, 600 F.3d 1007,

1012 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that “the extent of any resulting injury, while material

to the question of damages and informative as to the likely degree of the force

applied, is not in and of itself a threshold requirement for proving” an excessive

force claim).

amount and type of force used, and a greater than de minimis use of force is required.

“Even where the force is unjustified, ‘not every push or shove violates the

Constitution, but any use of force greater than de minimis, or any use of force that is

‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind,’ does.” Burt v. Nurse R.N., No. 4:19-CV-

00040-SMR-CFB, 2019 WL 8752341, at *2 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 27, 2019) (citing Irving

v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2008)).

The Court has carefully reviewed the video recordings of the handcuffing

incident, and finds that the Defendants’ version of what happened is corroborated by

the video, while Rodgers’ version of what happened is blatantly contradicted by the

video. Importantly, defendants Reed and Nelson did not apply any force to Rodgers

whatsoever. They were present during the incident but were not involved in

handcuffing him or holding him down. Because Reed and Nelson did not apply

force to Rodgers, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Rodgers correctly identified Allen as one of the officers who held him down

and twisted his arm at one point. However, Rodgers’ version of what happened is

contradicted by the video recordings. First, Rodgers claimed his wrists were twisted

for 7-8 minutes. While the entire incident lasted 11 minutes, Rodgers only

complained about his wrists for a period of 2-3 minutes. He stood up and resisted

directions to sit down at 10:19 but became compliant by 10:22 and stopped

complaining about his wrists. There is no indication in the video recordings that

Rodgers was uncomfortable or experiencing pain at any other time during this

incident. Further, the video shows that Rodgers was belligerent and refusing orders

to sit down when Allen attempt to perform a wrist lock and twisted his arms.

Accordingly, the video corroborates Allen’s statement that he used force on Allen

to gain control of him and prevent him from entering his cell while staff members

searched it. Allen’s actions did not constitute excessive force, but constituted a good

faith effort to maintain and restore discipline.

Finally, there is no evidence that Rodgers suffered more than de minimus

injuries during this incident. He alleged he suffered permanent scars and numbness

as a result of the handcuffing incident, but his medical records do not show that he

ever requested medical treatment for his wrists or complained of any injuries to

them. The record contradicts Rodgers’ claims of injuries and supports Allen’s

statement that he did not use an excessive amount of force, but only that reasonably

necessary to bring Rodgers under control.

As stated above, if opposing parties tell two different stories, as is the case

here, the Court is required to view genuinely disputed material facts in a light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, as long as those facts are not so blatantly

contradicted by the record that no reasonable jury could believe them. The Court

finds that the facts alleged by Rodgers are so blatantly contradicted by the record

that no reasonable jury could believe them. The Court is therefore not required to

view the facts in a light most favorable to Rodgers, and declines to adopt his version

of the facts for purposes of ruling on this motion. See Boude v. City of Raymore,

855 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2017). The Defendants did not violate Rodgers’

constitutional rights, and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Rodgers’

excessive force claims.

B. Official Capacity Claims

Rodgers’ official capacity claims also necessarily fail because he has not

established that the Defendants are individually liable for an underlying substantive

claim. See Alexander v. Dallas Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 21-1397, 2021 WL 5121257, at

*1 (8th Cir. Nov. 4, 2021); Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, Ark., 503 F.3d 667, 674

(8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the County cannot be held liable under § 1983 if the

individual defendants are not liable). Moreover, Rodgers has not alleged that the

conditions he described were caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of

Pulaski County.8

8 Official capacity claims are “functionally equivalent to a suit against the

employing governmental entity.” Veach v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257

(8th Cir. 2010). Thus, a suit against a defendant in his official capacity is in essence a

suit against the County or city itself. See Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2010);

Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1998). A municipality cannot be held liable on

the basis of respondeat superior, or simply by virtue of being the employer of a

tortfeasor. Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201 (8th Cir. 2013).

Accordingly, the Defendants, as county employees, can only be held liable in their

official capacities in this case if Rodgers can establish that a constitutional violation was

committed pursuant to “an official custom, policy, or practice of the governmental

entity.” Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 2009).

V. Conclusion

The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 27) is granted.

Judgment is awarded in favor of Defendants, and Rodgers’ claims are dismissed with

prejudice.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED this 13" day of March, 2023.

rote

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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