The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
CHARLINE WRIGHT PLAINTIFF
v. CASE NO. 4:21-CV-00357-BSM
WATSON CHAPEL SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANT
ORDER
The Watson Chapel School District’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 13]
is granted, and this case is dismissed with prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
Charline Wright is suing the Watson Chapel School District for race, sex, and age
discrimination, and retaliation, because her contract was not renewed in 2020 as a part of the
Watson Chapel School District’s reduction in force (RIF), and because she did not receive
additional compensation for two classes she taught. Compl., Doc. No. 1. Wright is a black
woman who began working for the district as a part-time math teacher in 2017. Pl.’s Resp.
to Def.’s SUMF at ¶¶ 1, 4–5, Doc. No .19. Eight months later, she was given a position as
a supplemental services tutor. Id. In early 2018, the district created a second math specialist
position in the secondary school. Id. at ¶ 7. In June 2018, the district hired Jerry Guess as
its superintendent, who almost immediately recommended that the district hire Wright to fill
the newly created math specialist position. Id. at ¶ 6–9. The school board approved Guess’s
recommendation and hired Wright in July to fill the position for the 2018–2019 school year.
Id. at ¶ 9.
At the time the district hired Guess, it was being monitored for fiscal distress by the
Arkansas Department of Education. Id. at ¶ 23; Guess Aff. at ¶ 11, Doc. No. 14-2.
Consequently, after serving as superintendent for less than one year, Guess recommended a
district-wide RIF for the 2019–2020 and 2020–2021 school years. Guess Aff. at ¶ 16. When
the 2020–2021 RIF plan was approved, the district’s secondary school had one literacy
instructional facilitator and two math facilitators. Guess Aff. at ¶ 29–32. The two math
positions included one position that existed before 2018 and Wright’s position which was
created in 2018. Id. Guess determined that, based on seniority, the newly created math
facilitator position should be eliminated. Id. The more senior math facilitator position was
also held by a black woman. Id.; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SUMF at ¶ 36.
In Wright’s 2019–2020 teaching contract, her position was characterized as a “math
focus teacher” and she received an additional stipend of $2,500 for performing the additional
duties as an “instruction specialist.” Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SUMF at ¶ 19. Starting in January
2020, Wright was given the added duty of teaching two additional math classes after another
teacher resigned. Id. at ¶¶ 105–106. Although Wright agreed to take on this responsibility,
she did not ask for additional compensation until June 1, 2020, after she had been notified
that she was being recommended for non-renewal. Id. at ¶¶ 65, 96, 117–119.
On April 27, 2020, Guess notified Wright that, due to the RIF, her contract would not
be renewed for the 2020–21 school year. Id. at ¶ 65. This is when she questioned why she
was not given additional compensation for the two additional classes she was teaching. Id.
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at ¶¶ 65, 96. She also complained that most of the employees in the district who received
stipends were white. Id. at ¶¶ 124–127. Guess notified Wright that he would treat her
correspondence as a formal grievance. Id.
In June 2020, the school board accepted Guess’s recommendation to not renew
Wright’s contract and in July 2020, the school board denied Wright’s grievance. Id. at ¶¶ 71,
128. Wright was 62 years old at the time her contract was not renewed. Id. at ¶ 1. One year
after her non-renewal, Guess offered Wright a position as a math teacher at the district’s
junior high school, which Wright declined because the math teacher position was lower
paying than the math instructional specialist position. Id. at ¶¶ 89–91.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). Once the moving party
demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the non-moving party must
produce admissible evidence demonstrating a genuine factual dispute requiring a trial.
Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 2011). Id. All reasonable inferences must be
drawn in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Holland v. Sam’s Club, 487 F.3d
641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007). The evidence is not weighed, and no credibility determinations are
made. Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2008).
III. DISCUSSION
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Summary judgment is granted on all claims because Wright has failed to make out a
prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation because she has not shown that other
similarly situated employees were treated differently.
The McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework applies to all of Wright’s claims
because there is no direct evidence of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). This requires her to establish a prima facie case. If Wright can make
out a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the district to provide a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action taken against Wright. Id. If the
district articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, then Wright must show that the
district’s stated reasons for its actions are pretext for discrimination. Id.
A. Race Discrimination Claims
Wright argues that she was the victim of race discrimination because: (1) she was not
given additional compensation for teaching two additional math classes, and (2) after she was
non-renewed, a white woman filled her position. Compl. ¶ 43–58. For Wright to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination, she must show that (1) she is a member of a protected
class; (2) she was meeting her employer’s legitimate job expectations; (3) she suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside the protected class
were treated differently. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792 at 802. To qualify as a
similarly situated employee, the comparitor must be similar to Wright in all relevant respects.
Ridout v. JBS USA, LLC, 716 F.3d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir. 2013).
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1. Additional Compensation Claim
The district concedes that Wright meets elements one and two of the McDonnell
Douglas test, but argues that she has failed to make out a prima facie case because she cannot
satisfy elements three and four. Def.’s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 16, Doc. No. 15. This is
the case because her assignment to teach additional classes was not an adverse employment
action, and because she cannot show that similarly situated employees were treated
differently. Id.
Although Wright argues in support of her claim that more white employees received
stipends than black employees, this is not sufficient to show that she was denied pay for the
two extra classes due to her race. This is the case because Wright admits that stipends are
paid when a teacher performs additional duties outside of teaching, Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s
SUMF at ¶¶ 111–112, and teaching additional classes is not a duty outside of teaching that
would have qualified Wright for a stipend.
Wright has also failed to present evidence of a similarly situated white employee who
was treated differently. Although Wright points out that Frances Dutton, who is white, was
paid additional compensation for serving as an Advanced Placement Specialist and
Instructional Specialist, Compl. ¶¶ 45–53; Pl.’s Br. Supp. Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 16, Doc.
No. 20., Dutton is not a similarly situated employee because she was not paid more for
teaching additional classes.
2. White Woman Filled Position Claim
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Summary judgment is appropriate on this claim because Wright has not made out a
prima facie case. This is true because there is not a similarly situated white employee who
was treated differently, and despite her initial allegation that she was replaced by a white
woman, the record clearly shows that Wright’s position was terminated. Wright alleges in
her complaint that Barbara Varnell, a white woman, was assigned to her position when
Wright’s contract was not renewed. Compl. ¶¶ 54–55. In support of its motion for summary
judgment, the district shows that Varnell did not replace Wright. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SUMF
at ¶ 77, 85–86. In response to the motion for summary judgment, Wright admits that Varnell
did not replace her, but that Varnell was moved from the elementary math specialist position
into the secondary literacy position. Id.
B. Age Discrimination Claims
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, Wright must show that she was
(1) at least 40 years old; (2) terminated; (3) meeting district’s reasonable expectations at the
time she was terminated; and (4) replaced by an individual who was substantially younger.
Roeben v. BG Excelsior Ltd. Partnership, 545 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2008). Wright, who
was 63 at the time her position was terminated, supports her age discrimination claim by
arguing that (1) a forty-year old elementary math specialist should have been non-renewed
instead of her, and (2) she was replaced by a younger employee. The district concedes that
Wright meets elements one, two, and three of the prima facie case requirement, but argues
that she cannot meet element four because the district did not replace her position with
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another employee. Doc. No. 15 at 22.
1. Forty-Year Old Should Have Been Non-renewed Claim
Wright alleges that the district discriminated against her based on her age when it did
not renew her contract instead of the contract of Reginald Forte, who was younger. Compl.
¶ 59–63. Summary judgment is appropriate because Forte was a math facilitator at the
elementary school, while Wright was a math facilitator at the secondary school.
Consequently, Wright and Forte were not similarly situated.
2. Wright Was Replaced by Younger Employee Claim
Although Wright alleges in her complaint that she was replaced by Barbara Varnell,
who is younger, as discussed above, Varnell did not replace Wright. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s
SUMF at ¶¶ 77, 85–86. Wright’s position was terminated. Summary judgment is therefore
appropriate.
C. Sex Discrimination Claims
To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, Wright must show that (1) she
was a member of the protected group; (2) she was qualified to perform the job; (3) she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances permit an inference of
discrimination. Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th Cir.
2010). Wright alleges that the elimination of her position is proof of discrimination because
a similar position held by a man in the district was not eliminated. Compl. ¶ 66–68. Again,
the district concedes that Wright meets elements one, two, and three; however, it argues that
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Wright fails to meet the fourth element because nothing in the record supports her claim that
the district discriminated against her because she is a woman. As set forth above, in response
to Wright’s specific allegation that Reginald Forte’s position was not eliminated, the district
points out that Wright and Forte are not similarly situated because Wright was a math
facilitator at the secondary school while Forte was a math facilitator in the elementary school.
Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SUMF at ¶ 129–132. The district further points out that while Forte was
certified in elementary and secondary subjects, Wright was only certified in secondary math.
Id. ¶ 132. Finally, the district points out that Wright was one of two math facilitators in the
secondary school, while Forte was the only math facilitator at the elementary school after
Varnell moved to the secondary literacy position. Def.’s Reply in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at
17–20, Doc. No. 23. Therefore, had the district terminated Forte’s position, it would have
been left with two math facilitators at the secondary school and no math facilitators at the
elementary school. The district is correct, because Wright has failed to show that the male
comparitor is similarly situated to her in all relevant respects. Ridout v. JBS USA, LLC, 716
F.3d at 1085. Consequently, she has failed to make out a prima facie case requirement.
Even if Wright has made out a prima facie case of sex discrimination, the district has
provided a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for eliminating Wright’s position and not
Forte’s position. Had it eliminated Forte’s position, the district would have been left with
two math facilitator positions in the secondary school, and none in the elementary school.
For these reasons, Wright has failed to show that the district’s reason for eliminating her
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position is pretext for sex discrimination.
D. Retaliation Claims
Summary judgement is also granted on Wright’s retaliation claim because no evidence
in the record supports it. To establish a retaliation claim, Wright must show that: (1) she
engaged in protected activity, (2) the district’s adverse employment action caused injury that
would “chill a person of ordinary firmness” from continuing that activity, and (3) there was
a causal connection between the two. Hill v. City of Pine Bluff, 696 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir.
2012). Wright alleges that the district retaliated against her when it did not renew her
contract after she questioned Guess as to why she was not paid for teaching the two
additional math classes. The problem with this argument is that it misstates the sequence of
events. This is the case because Wright was notified on April 27, 2020, that Guess was
recommending her for non-renewal, and it was not until June 1, 2020, that she asked Guess
why she was not receiving additional pay for teaching additional classes. Wright’s retaliation
claim therefore fails because there is no causal connection between her statements to Guess
and her non-renewal.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 13]
is granted, and this case is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 31st day of January, 2023.
Parson 2, Wu Ie
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE