The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
NORTHERN DIVISION
WALTER T. GUFFEY JR. PLAINTIFF
Reg. #23544-009
v. No: 3:20-cv-00178-PSH
KENDRA ROBERTS, et al. DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Walter T. Guffey, Jr. filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 on July 1, 2020, and an amended complaint on August 14, 2020 (Doc. Nos.
2 & 10), while incarcerated at the Greene County Detention Center (“GCDC”).1
Guffey sued numerous defendants in both their official and individual capacities, but
was only allowed to proceed against defendants Nurse Practitioner Kendra Roberts,
Brent Cox, Pulaski County Medical Administrator Bertha Lowe, and Supervisor
Jamie Trowbridge in their individual capacities (the “Defendants”). See Doc. No.
18. Guffey alleges that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs while he was incarcerated as a federal pre-trial detainee at the Pulaski
County Regional Detention Center (“PCRDF”) and the GCDC between April 6,
1 Guffey is currently incarcerated in the Memphis Federal Corrections Institution.
See Doc. No. 46.
2019, and July 31, 2020. Id. at 5-15. Specifically, he claims that the Defendants did
not ensure that he had a urinary stent removed for more than a year despite the
surgeon’s post-operative instructions to remove the stent after one week. Id.
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment, brief in support, and
statement of undisputed facts filed by Brent Cox (Doc. Nos. 57-59). Guffey filed a
response to Cox’s motion (Doc. No. 67). Cox’s statements of facts, and the other
pleadings and exhibits in the record, establish that the material facts are not in
dispute, and Cox is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
II. Legal Standard
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is
proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir.
2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, but must
demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann
v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party’s allegations
must be supported by sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in
his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. Id. (citations
omitted). An assertion that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must
be supported by materials in the record such as “depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials . . .”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may also show that a fact
is disputed or undisputed by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). A dispute is
genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict
for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case.
Othman v. City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). Disputes
that are not genuine or that are about facts that are not material will not preclude
summary judgment. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th
Cir. 2010).
III. Facts
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Cox submitted the affidavit
of Robert Case (“Case Affidavit”) (Doc. No. 59-1) and a transcript of Guffey’s
deposition testimony (“Guffey Deposition”) (Doc. No. 59-2). Guffey filed a number
of grievances and medical requests as well as his post-operative discharge
instructions (Doc. No. 67 at 5-22). Having reviewed Cox’s statements of facts,
Guffey’s response, and the other pleadings and exhibits, the Court finds the
following facts relevant to Guffey’s claims against Cox to be undisputed.
On February 27, 2019, Plaintiff Walter T. Guffey, Jr. was placed into USMS
Custody in the Van Buren County Jail in Clinton, Arkansas. Doc. No. 10, Amended
Complaint, at 5. On March 26, 2019, Guffey became ill and was sent to Ozark
Health Center in Van Buren County, with blood in his stool and urine. Id. Ozark
Health Center was unable to treat him, so he was sent by ambulance to the
Emergency Room at Baptist Health Hospital in Pulaski County. Id. At the hospital,
a stent was placed in Guffey’s left ureter. Id. at 6; Doc. No. 67 at 15. Guffey was
discharged from Baptist Health Hospital on April 6, 2019. Doc. No. 67 at 13-16.
Dr. Ahmed Tarek Abdelal’s discharge instructions stated “[patient] will need to see
a urologist as an outpatient for further treatment of the left uretic stone and for
removal of stent (either Arkansas Urology or UAMS or any other specialty place).
Make appt. after one week.” Id. at 15. The After Visit Summary stated, “Schedule
an appointment with Gail Reede Jones, MD as soon as possible for a visit in 1
week(s).” Id. at 16.
Because Van Buren County Jail was unable to care for Guffey, the USMS
transferred him to PCRDC on April 6, 2019. Doc. No. 10 at 6. Guffey was then
transported to the GCDC on or around August 30, 2019, and he provided Defendant
Jami Trowbridge, a nurse practitioner, with his discharge instructions and After Visit
Summary. Doc. No. 10 at 9. He claims while he was incarcerated at the GCDC, he
submitted “sick after sick call about needing surgery and having the same medical
problems that sent me to ER in ‘Baptist Health Hospital’, blood in urine with
infection and very painful urination.” Id. at 11.
Defendant Brent Cox was the jail administrator at GCDC while Guffey was
incarcerated there. Doc. No. 10 at 3; Guffey Deposition at 37. According to Guffey,
Cox’s only involvement in this matter was to review and sign a grievance submitted
by Guffey in January of 2020, regarding his need to have the stent removed. Guffey
Deposition at 37-38. Guffey claims that Cox signed the grievance “Dr. Brent Cox,”
and he believed Cox, as medical doctor, would be able to help get the stent removed.
Id. at 15, 37. Guffey stated he does not know what kind of doctor Cox is, but now
understands he may not be a medical doctor. Id. at 37, 40. Guffey testified that he
received a response to the grievance in February 2020, stating that Cox would look
into the matter. Id. at 38. He testified that this was the only communication he had
with Cox. Id. at 39. The parties did not produce a copy of any grievance signed by
Cox, and Guffey testified he does not have a copy. Id. at 37-38.
IV. Analysis
Cox argues he is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Guffey’s
claims against him in his individual capacity because he cannot establish a
constitutional violation. Qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person [in their positions]
would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified
immunity is a question of law and is appropriately resolved on summary judgment.
McClendon v. Story County Sheriff’s Office, 403 F.3d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 2005);
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court
must consider two questions: (1) do the facts alleged by plaintiff establish a violation
of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) if so, was that right clearly established
at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Wright v. United States, 813 F.3d
689, 695 (8th Cir. 2015). Courts may exercise “their sound discretion in deciding
which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first
in light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Pretrial detainees’ claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Hartsfield v. Colburn,
371 F.3d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 2004). Pretrial detainees are entitled to at least as much
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as under the Eighth Amendment. See
id. (citing Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir.
1999)); see also Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151, 152–53 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)
(applying deliberate indifference standard to pretrial detainee’s claims of inadequate
medical care).2 To succeed with an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care
claim, a plaintiff must allege and prove that: (1) he had objectively serious medical
needs; and (2) prison officials subjectively knew of, but deliberately disregarded,
those serious medical needs. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir.
1997). Additionally, the Eighth Circuit has held that a “prisoner must show more
than negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement with
treatment decisions does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Estate of
Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995).
To the extent Guffey seeks to hold Cox accountable due to his supervisory
position as jail administrator, his claims fail as a matter of law. The law is clear that
respondeat superior is not a recognized basis for § 1983 liability. See Keeper v.
King, 130 F.3d 1309 (8th Cir. 1997). Further, Guffey has not come forward with
any proof that Cox was involved in or directly responsible for the delay in having
Guffey’s urinary stent removed. A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983
2 In Spencer, the Eighth Circuit explained that it had never articulated an exact
standard for evaluating medical treatment claims brought by pretrial detainees. 183 F.3d
at 905. The Court acknowledged that pretrial detainees’ claims may be subject to an
objective reasonable test rather than the subjective deliberate indifference standard. Id.
The Eighth Circuit addressed this issue again in Bailey v. Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589, 593
(8th Cir. 2016), where it declined to address the proper constitutional standard
unnecessarily, but noted that when that case was decided it was not clearly established
that a pre-trial detainee was entitled to more protection than that provided by the Eighth
Amendment.
unless he was personally involved in or had direct responsibility for the
constitutional violation. See Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.
2006) (“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct
responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
Guffey testified that Cox’s only involvement was to review a grievance
concerning the need to remove the urinary stent, although such a grievance has not
been offered as evidence in this matter. Even if the Court accepts that allegation as
true, Cox’s review of one grievance concerning the stent is insufficient to show that
he was deliberately indifferent to Guffey’s medical care. Rather, to the extent Cox
failed to follow-up or take action in response to Guffey’s grievance, his actions were
at most negligent.3 And as noted above, mere negligence does not amount to a
constitutional violation. Additionally, Cox’s mere participation in the administrative
grievance procedure is insufficient to establish liability under § 1983. See Rowe v.
Norris, 198 F. App’x 579, 580 (8th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, Cox is entitled to
summary judgment.
3The Court makes no finding regarding whether Cox was negligent.
V. Conclusion
Cox 1s entitled to qualified immunity because Guffey has not established that
his constitutional rights were violated by Cox. Accordingly, Cox’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. No. 57) is granted, and Guffey’s claims against Cox are
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 26" day of October, 2022.
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