The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
NORTHERN DIVISION
GREGORY ROSE PLAINTIFF
No. 3:19-cv-293-DPM
OLLIE COLLINS, Chief,
Osceola Police Department; TERRY
HODGES, Detective, Osceola Police
Department; and CHRIS ELLIS,
Detective, Osceola Police Department DEFENDANTS
ORDER
1. On 5 October 2013, Larry Bledsoe got into a fight with Derrico
Davis. Later that day, Gregory Rose struck Bledsoe in the face, causing
him to fall to the ground. Bledsoe got up and went in a house, but was
found unresponsive a short time later. Rose was arrested for first
degree domestic battery. Bledsoe died. Rose was then charged with
second degree murder. All charges against Rose were nolle prossed due
to lack of medical evidence showing which fight caused the injuries
resulting in Bledsoe’s death.
Rose filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three police officers,
the prosecutor, and a District Court judge claiming his arrest, the
charge, and his pretrial detention were unlawful. He also alleged
defamation under Arkansas law. After a preservice dismissal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. Rose v. Galbson,
808 F. App'x 403 (8th Cir. 2020). The case has proceeded thereafter.
Rose's only remaining claims are his pretrial detention and defamation
claims against the officers (Ollie Collins, Terry Hodges, and Chris Ellis)
in their individual capacities. Doc. 13, 15 & 45. The officers seek
summary judgment. Rose wants a trial. Most of the material facts are
undisputed. Doc. 52. But where there is a genuine dispute, the Court
views the record in Rose’s favor. Smith-Bunge v. Wisconsin Cent., Ltd.,
946 F.3d 420, 424 (8th Cir. 2019).
2. The Supreme Court recently clarified that Rose’s pretrial
detention claim is one under the Fourth Amendment for malicious
prosecution. Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1337 (2022). Collins,
Hodges, and Ellis are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim,
however, because Rose’s constitutional right against malicious
prosecution was not clearly established when he was arrested in 2013.
Harrington v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, 678 F.3d 676, 680-81 (8th Cir.
2012); see also Bates v. Hadden, 576 F. App'x 636, 639 (8th Cir. 2014)
(unpublished persuasive authority).
The officers are entitled to qualified immunity on this record in
any event. Rose has presented no evidence from which a reasonable
juror could find that Ellis, Hodges, or Collins set in motion the charges
against Rose without arguable probable cause. Thompson, 142 S. Ct. at
1338; Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir. 2000). It’s
undisputed that Ellis and Hodges spoke with multiple witnesses before
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Rose was arrested. Matthew Beal told Ellis and Hodges that Bledsoe
did not appear to be injured in his fight with Davis and reported that
Rose admitted to hitting Bledsoe, whose health deteriorated soon
thereafter. Davis gave the officers a similar story. Ellis also visited the
hospital, where he was told Bledsoe was not expected to survive. Ellis
included these findings in his affidavit for a warrant, and the District
Court found there was probable cause for Rose’s arrest. In these
circumstances, the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Rose
for battery and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity. Borgman
v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 523-24 (8th Cir. 2011); Engleman v. Deputy
Murray, 546 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir. 2008).
3. All that remains is Rose’s defamation claim. The Court declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that state law matter. Starkey
v. Amber Enterprises, Inc., 987 F.3d 758, 765 (8th Cir. 2021).
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Doc. 51, is granted.
Rose’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims will be
dismissed with prejudice. His defamation claim will be dismissed
without prejudice.
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So Ordered.
NPrga lel, J
D.P. Marshall Jr.
United States District Judge
27 Py 9002
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