The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
STEPHANIE L. ADCOCK PLAINTIFF
v. No. 4:21-cv-669-DPM
SAINT JEAN INDUSTRIES, INC. DEFENDANT
ORDER
1. In response to Adcock’s complaint alleging sex
discrimination and related claims arising out of her work at a foundry
in Heber Springs, Saint Jean seeks judgment on the pleadings. FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(c).
When evaluating this kind of motion, “a court must accept as true
all factual allegations set out in the complaint, and must construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all
inferences in [her] favor. Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate
only when there is no dispute as to any material facts and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Wishnatsky v. Rovner,
433 F.3d 608, 610 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted); see also
Henson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 3 F.Ath 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2021).
Some older precedent obligates the movant to clearly establish the
absence of disputed material facts and the entitlement to judgment on
the law. E.g., Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th
Cir. 1999). Other precedent speaks in terms of proof, rather than
pleading: this kind of threshold judgment will be affirmed “only if [the
plaintiff] can prove no set of facts in support of her claim that would
entitle her to relief.” Williams v. Bradshaw, 459 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir.
2006). One of Saint Jean’s core defenses is a lack of timely exhaustion,
which creates a limitations bar. That kind of issue can be addressed in
a Rule 12(c) motion. Levitt v. Merck & Co., 914 F.3d 1169, 1171 (8th Cir.
2019).
As part of its argument, Saint Jean offers Adcock’s EEOC charge.
The Court agrees that this document is embraced by the complaint and
can be considered now. Porous Media, 186 F.3d at 1079. The Court
disagrees, however, with the employer’s arguments that Adcock’s
complaint unfairly and unexpectedly expands the issues raised in that
charge. The charge, construed liberally, must give fair notice of the
alleged wrongs; it need not specify each and every supporting fact.
Stuart v. General Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 2000). Adcock’s
charge provided adequate notice to Saint Jean and her claims
reasonably relate to it. Ibid.
2. Taking the record in the light most favorable to Adcock, here
is what happened to her. The Court presents the facts in a timeline
because one of Saint Jean’s main arguments is that Adcock didn’t file
her EEOC claim soon enough to preserve all her claims.
e 3 October 2018 Adcock reported to work at
Saint Jean’s foundry as a
heat treat manager
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e 23 October 2018 Supervisor forced Adcock to
have sexual intercourse during a
lunch trip on his boat
e December 2018 Supervisor threatened to fire
Adcock because she rejected his
unwanted sexual attention
e October 2018-April 2019 Every work day, supervisor
came into Adcock’s office,
kissed her on the forehead, and
told her he loved her
e April 2019 Supervisor threatened sexual
assault in manufacturing oven
at the foundry
e Before July 2019 Supervisor conditioned a pay
raise on Adcock’s wearing her
hair a certain way
e Before July 2019 Adcock told co-worker about
sexual assault and harassment,
and co-worker reported it to
human resources
e July 2019 Saint Jean placed Adcock on
paid leave
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e July 2019 Saint Jean’s investigation began
e 26 July 2019 Adcock returned to work. Saint
Jean reassigned her to the
purchasing department in a non-
managerial position
e 27 July 2019 180 days before Adcock filed
her EEOC charge
e 29July 2019 Saint Jean’s human_resources
manager told Adcock that his
investigation revealed that she
was “flirtatious and sexually
inappropriate with others” and
that her supervisor was an
“excellent manager”
e 6 August 2019 Adcock collapsed at work, hit
her head, and was sent to
hospital for drug screening
e Before 18 October 2019 Supervisor transferred to facility
in France
e 18 October 2019 Supervisor returned to foundry
e After 18 October 2019 Adcock requested FMLA leave
e 2 November 2019 Adcock received certified letter
from Saint Jean requesting
additional medical certification
for FMLA leave
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e 29 November 2019 Adcock admitted herself for
inpatient treatment at Conway
Behavioral Health
e January 2020 Adcock resigned
e 23 January 2020 Adcock filed EEOC charge
These facts in this sequence inform Adcock’s many federal and state
claims and the Court’s consideration of Saint Jean’s motion.
3. | Adcock claims sexual harassment in her supervisor’s many
actions and, taking events as a whole, a hostile work environment.
Accepting all her allegations as true at this point in the case, she has
solid claims for a jury to resolve. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742 (1998) (quid pro quo harassment); Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (hostile environment). There is, however, a
timeliness hurdle.
In general, because Arkansas has no state anti-discrimination
commission, an employee must file an EEOC charge within 180 days
after the particular unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1). Consider, once again, the timeline. Each of the
supervisor's harassing actions occurred before the filing period began.
They are not actionable as stand-alone events. National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). They could be
actionable as part of a hostile work environment on a continuing
violation theory. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 120; Rowe v. Hussmann Corp.,
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381 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2004). If there was an act contributing to “the
same actionable hostile work environment practice...” during the
filing period, then Adcock’s claim can proceed. Rowe, 381 F.3d at
779 (quotation omitted). She points to Saint Jean’s investigation, which
she says was neither reasonable nor in good faith. But that
investigation occurred a few weeks outside the filing period. Her
demotion from heat treat manager to purchasing assistant on her return
to work likewise occurred one day outside the filing period.
That leaves the HR manager’s statements about his investigation,
which Adcock says blamed the victim rather than the harasser. Those
statements were within the filing period. The HR manager’s words
were connected with the supervisor’s harassment. They were Saint
Jean’s explanation of the company’s response to Adcock’s experience
with her supervisor.
The Court confronts three difficulties here.
First, the parties have not made focused arguments about what
seems to be the dispositive event on exhaustion and _ therefore
limitations.
Second, the post-Morgan precedent is mixed. Some decisions
emphasize a similarity point: later conduct doesn’t qualify as
continuing the hostile work environment if that conduct is different
than the earlier harassment. E.g., Rowe, 381 F.3d at 779-81; Jenkins v.
Mabus, 646 F.3d 1023, 1027 (8th Cir. 2011). Other decisions emphasize
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that a hostile environment is the sum of many parts, which may include
a variety of connected conduct resulting in an unlawful employment
practice. E.g., Jensen v. Henderson, 315 F.3d 854, 859 (8th Cir. 2002). The
issue shades into the adequacy of the employer’s remedy and alleged
retaliation. Burkhart v. American Railcar Industries, Inc., 603 F.3d 472,
476 (8th Cir. 2010).
Third, the record is thin. The Court, for example, doesn’t have the
whole story about Saint Jean’s investigation and remedy. From
Adcock’s perspective, neither was adequate and both continued the
hostile work environment. Saint Jean notes its prompt corrective
action, which removed Adcock from her harasser’s reach.
The precedent involves rulings on summary judgment and after
trial, not Rule 12(c) motions. More facts, and pointed briefing, will
ameliorate these difficulties. The Court can then better address the
important exhaustion/limitations issue. Saint Jean’s motion for
judgment on Adcock’s federal and state claims for a hostile work
environment is therefore denied without prejudice.
4. Onretaliation, Saint Jean argues that Adcock didn’t charge
an adverse employment action with the EEOC within the limitations
period. Saint Jean is correct that any retaliation claim based on a
discrete adverse employment action not within the filing period is time
barred. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113; Betz v. Chertoff, 578 F.3d 929, 937-
38 (8th Cir. 2009). ‘Ye Court has already concluded, however, that
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Adcock’s EEOC charge reasonably relates to the claims in this case.
Adcock pleads that, within the 180-day period, Saint Jean treated her
differently than other employees because she reported that she had
been sexually assaulted once and sexually harassed for many months
by her supervisor. She points to the exchange with the HR manager.
And she gives examples of disparate treatment.
Materially adverse employment actions are not as limited as Saint
Jean argues. Jackman v. Fifth Judicial District Department of Correctional
Services, 728 F.3d 800, 804-05 (8th Cir. 2013). Circumstances amounting
to constructive discharge, for example, can produce a material
employment disadvantage sufficient to constitute an adverse action.
Ibid; see also Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th
Cir. 1999). A hostile work environment can also satisfy the materially
adverse action element of a retaliation claim. Mahler v. First Dakota Title
Limited Partnership, 931 F.3d 799, 807 (8th Cir. 2019). Whether Adcock
has pleaded a hostile work environment retaliation claim is another
unclear and unargued issue. More ventilation, with the benefit of
discovery, will help here, too. Saint Jean therefore is not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on retaliation at this point.
5. On the tort of outrage, Saint Jean’s motion focuses too
narrowly on the supervisor’s October 2018 sexual assault. It may be
that the supervisor’s assault cannot be imputed to the company under
a theory of respondeat superior. E.g., Regions Bank & Trust v. Stone County
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Skilled Nursing Facility, Inc., 345 Ark. 555, 566-67, 49 S.W.3d 107, 114-
15 (2001). But his many other harassing actions during Adcock’s first
few months at the foundry — threatening termination, daily unwanted
touching and kissing, threatening sexual assault in the manufacturing
oven, and refusing to give Adcock a raise because of her hair style — □□□
fall far short of what is acceptable in a civilized society. Rorie v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 151 F.3d 757, 762 (8th Cir. 1998). Arkansas law makes
it difficult to prevail on an outrage claim in the employment context,
Burkhart, 603 F.3d at 478, but Adcock has provided a sufficient record
for the claim to go forward.
kee
Saint Jean’s motion, Doc. 4, is denied without prejudice.
So Ordered.
WPY4rstall f°
D.P. Marshall Jr.
United States District Judge
Hl Moa 2022
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