“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender”
How later courts described this case
- “If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
NORTHERN DIVISION
MARK W. MCCOY PLAINTIFF
v. CASE NO. 3:20-CV-00345-BSM
MIRANDA BLEVINS, individually and
in her official capacity and JAMES MOODY,
individually and in his official capacity DEFENDANTS
ORDER
The motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Miranda Blevins and James
Moody [Doc. No. 16] is granted because Blevins and Moody had probable cause to arrest
Mark McCoy and are therefore immune from suit.
I. BACKGROUND
Van Hutchinson called 911 to report that a man had assaulted him with a weapon.
Defs.’ SUMF ¶ 1, Doc. No. 18. The Jackson County Sheriff’s Office responded by sending
deputy James Moody and others to Hutchinson’s home. Id. Hutchinson told the deputies that
plaintiff Mark McCoy had struck him on the head with a pistol. Id. ¶ 2. Hutchinson showed
them a recent injury behind his left ear. Id. The deputies called Miranda Blevins, a sheriff’s
office investigator, and relayed what they had learned. Id. Blevins asked the deputies to go
to McCoy’s home to get his side of the story. Id. ¶ 3. When the deputies spoke with McCoy,
he denied striking Hutchinson, so Blevins asked the deputies to bring both men to the
sheriff’s office for questioning. Id.
Blevins interviewed Hutchinson and McCoy at the sheriff’s office. Id. ¶ 4.
Hutchinson repeated that McCoy had struck him with a pistol. Id. McCoy admitted to
having the gun, but again denied striking Hutchinson. Id. Blevins contacted the prosecutor’s
office to share what she had learned from the interviews. Id. ¶ 5. The deputy prosecutor told
Blevins to let Hutchinson go and to complete an affidavit of probable cause for McCoy. Id.
The deputy prosecutor also told Blevins to charge McCoy with battery in the second degree
and aggravated assault. Id. Later that evening, Hutchinson went to the emergency room and
was diagnosed with a concussion. Id. ¶ 5, Ex. 3. Blevins sent her completed affidavit to the
prosecutor who then obtained a warrant for McCoy’s arrest. Id. ¶ 7.
McCoy sued Hutchinson for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and for
harassment and threats. See Notice of Removal, Doc. No. 1. The state court granted
McCoy’s motion for summary judgment against Hutchinson because Hutchinson failed to
appear at his deposition and the hearing. Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at Ex. B, Doc. No. 23.
McCoy then amended his complaint to add claims against Blevins and Moody for arresting
him without probable cause. See Doc. Nos. 1, 2, 6. Blevins and Moody removed the case
to federal court, but the claims against Hutchinson were remanded to state court for the
determination of damages. Doc. Nos. 1, 7. Defendants now move for summary judgment
on the basis that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Doc. No. 16. McCoy contends that
there are genuine disputes of material fact because Hutchinson’s unanswered requests for
admissions were deemed admitted by the state court’s order granting summary judgment.
See Pl.’s Br. Supp. Resp. Mot. Summ. J., Doc. No. 25.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). Once the moving party
demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the non-moving party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials in his pleadings. Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336,
340 (8th Cir. 2011). Instead, the non-moving party must produce admissible evidence
demonstrating a genuine factual dispute requiring a trial. Id. All reasonable inferences must
be drawn in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Holland v. Sam’s Club, 487 F.3d
641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007). The evidence is not weighed, and no credibility determinations are
made. Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2008).
III. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is granted because Blevins and Moody had probable cause to
arrest McCoy, which entitles them to qualified immunity.
A. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for damages “insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person [in their positions] would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity is a question of law. McClendon v. Story Cty. Sheriff’s
Office, 403 F.3d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 2005); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). To
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determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, courts must consider
whether: (1) the facts alleged by plaintiff establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory
right; and (2) if so, was that right clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged
misconduct. Wright v. United States, 813 F.3d 689, 695 (8th Cir. 2015).
A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates an individual’s constitutional
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Hannah v. City of Overland, Mo., 795
F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir. 1986). An officer who arrests someone with probable cause,
however, is not liable for false arrest simply because the innocence of the suspect is later
proved. Id. (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967)). The probable cause inquiry
is based on the facts known at the time of the arrest. Davenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152
(2004) (internal citation omitted); see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354
(2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even
a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth
Amendment, arrest the offender”).
Summary judgment is appropriate because Blevins and Moody had probable cause to
arrest McCoy. Hutchinson told defendants that McCoy struck him on the side of the head
with a pistol, and his account was corroborated by a visible injury that required medical
treatment. While McCoy denied assaulting Hutchinson, he admitted to having a gun during
a physical altercation between them. Further, the prosecutor’s office made the decision to
charge McCoy and to obtain a warrant for his arrest, not the defendants. These facts clearly
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show that Blevins and Moody had probable cause to arrest McCoy.
McCoy contends that summary judgment is not appropriate because certain facts
favorable to him were deemed admitted when Hutchinson failed to answer McCoy’s requests
for admission and summary judgment was granted in state court. See Doc. Nos. 23, 24, 25.
For example, McCoy asserts it has already been judicially established that he acted lawfully
at all times and that Hutchinson caused him to be arrested without probable cause. Pl.’s Br.
Supp. Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 1–2. He argues that these facts were deemed admitted in the
state court’s summary judgment order, and that this order remains in force following removal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1450. Id. at 1–3. McCoy’s argument fails for a number of
reasons.
To begin with, the order McCoy cites does not deem any facts admitted. See Pl.’s
Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at Ex. B. The order grants McCoy’s motion for summary judgment and
sanctions, and notes that “even if there were genuine issues of material fact, the Court would
strike Defendant’s Answer for failure to appear at his deposition hearing and this hearing.”
Id. The order does not mention McCoy’s requests for admissions, much less deem them
admitted. Id. For that reason alone, McCoy’s argument fails and summary judgment is
granted because there is no genuine dispute that defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity.
Even if McCoy could show that his requests to Hutchinson were deemed admitted,
his ability to use those admissions against Blevins and Moody is doubtful. McCoy states his
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requests were deemed admitted pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 36, which
states that “[a]ny admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose of the pending
action only and is not an admission by him for any other purpose, nor may it be used against
him in any other proceeding.” It is not clear that this case is the same pending action under
Rule 36 when Blevins and Moody were not parties at the time the summary judgment order
was issued, and when there has subsequently been removal and a partial remand resulting in
two simultaneous cases. Further, facts deemed admitted as to one defendant for failure to
respond to plaintiff’s request for admissions are not necessarily binding on innocent co-
defendants. See Jordan v. Cent. Transp., LLC, No. 4:17-cv-4011, 2019 WL 885916, at *2
(W.D. Ark. Feb. 22, 2019) (internal citations omitted); see also Riberglass, Inc. V. Techni-
Glass Indus., Inc., 811 F.2d 565 (11th Cir. 1987).
Finally, even if McCoy could establish that his requests to Hutchinson were deemed
admitted and binding on Blevins and Moody, those admissions would not create a genuine
dispute of material fact. See Defs.’ Reply Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 5–6, Doc. No. 26. This
is because even if Hutchinson lied to defendants about his altercation with McCoy, there is
nothing in the record to suggest defendants should have known Hutchinson’s story was false.
On the contrary, Hutchinson’s account was corroborated by his physical injury, and
defendants had probable cause to arrest McCoy based on the facts known at the time. See
Davenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152. This is true even it were judicially established that McCoy was
innocent of any wrongdoing. See Hannah, 795 F.2d at 1389.
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B. Official Capacity Claims
McCoy also sues Blevins and Moody in their official capacities. See Am. Compl.,
Doc. No. 2. Official capacity suits are treated as a suit against the entity of which an officer
isanagent. Monell v. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n.55 (1978). Municipalities can
be held liable for constitutional rights violations committed by their agents. Monell, 436 U.S.
at 690. Summary judgment is also granted on McCoy’s official capacity claims because he
has failed to show that defendants violated his constitutional rights. See Sanders v. City of
Minneapolis, 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 2007).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 16]
is granted, and McCoy’s claims are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of February, 2022.
Biro Bs mn 22a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE