Brown v. Robinson Nursing and Rehabilitation Center LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

PAMELA BROWN *

PLAINTIFF *

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V. * CASE NO. 4:18CV00319 SWW

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ROBINSON NURSING; *

REHABILIATION CENTER, LLC; *

TRINITY COURT, INC.; and *

MICHAEL MORTON *

DEFENDANTS *

OPINION AND ORDER

Pamela Brown brings this slip-and-fall action pursuant to the Court’s diversity

jurisdiction, seeking damages for injuries she allegedly sustained during her

residency at a long-term care facility operated by Defendant Robinson Nursing and

Rehabilitation Center, LCC (“Robinson”). In addition to Robinson, Brown sues

Trinity Court, Inc. (“Trinity”), the owner of the building that houses Robinson’s

facility, and Michael Morton, a member of Robinson and shareholder of Trinity. Ms.

Brown brings negligence and strict liability claims against each Defendant.

Before the Court are separate motions for summary judgment by Trinity and

Morton (Docs. 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43), Ms. Brown’s responses in opposition (Docs.

52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57), and Defendants’ replies (Docs. 59, 60). Also before the Court

is Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss Ms. Brown’s claim for strict liability and her

purported “claim” for res ipsa loquitur (Docs. 44, 45) and Brown’s response in

opposition (Docs. 50, 51). After careful consideration, and for reasons that follow,

the motions are granted. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Trinity and

Morton on all claims, Brown’s claim for strict liability is dismissed, and her

negligence claim against Robinson remains.

I. Background

The following facts are taken from Brown’s amended complaint. Doc. 34-1.

On December 12, 2016, Brown resided at Robinson’s long-term care facility, and

she slipped and fell on a puddle of water in her room. Immediately before Brown

fell, a staff member had transported her to her room in a wheelchair. Upon arriving

in Brown’s room, the staff member stopped the wheelchair, without engaging the

brakes, so that Brown could rise and transfer to her walker. When Brown got up

from the wheelchair and grabbed her walker, it slipped on water on the floor, and

she fell, sustaining physical injuries.

Brown alleges that the water on the floor came from a leaky air conditioning

unit in her room. She charges that Defendants caused her fall and injuries by: (1)

failing to maintain a safe facility for business invitees; (2) failing to warn her of a

dangerous condition, and (3) hiring incompetent employees that they failed to

supervise. Doc. 34 at 4-5.

II. Discussion

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Claims for Failure to State a Claim1

Defendants argue that Brown fails to state a plausible claim for strict liability

and that she cannot rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to prove negligence. The

Court agrees.

Strict liability is imposed where a product is so unreasonably dangerous that

the person who supplied it can be liable for damages without fault. Brown alleges

that “Defendants’ flooring . . . and air condition units were unreasonably dangerous

and defective” because Defendants failed to service the air conditioning units, warn

against dangerous flooring, and provide reasonable safeguards. Doc. 34 at 11.

Brown’s alleges fault on Defendants’ part, which denotes negligence, not strict

liability. In addition, Brown fails to allege that Defendants were “in the business of

manufacturing, assembling, selling, leasing, or otherwise distributing” the flooring

or air conditioning units at issue, as required under Arkansas’s product liability

1 When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the

Court must take as true the alleged facts and determine whether they raise more than

a speculative right to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56

(2007). The Court does not, however, accept as true any allegation that is a legal

conclusion. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint must set

forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

statute. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-116-101(a). In sum, Brown fails to allege facts

stating a plausible claim for strict liability under Arkansas law, which governs the

substantive issues in this diversity case.

“Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine that, when applied, allows the jury to infer

negligence from the plaintiff's testimony of the circumstances surrounding the

accident.” Stalter v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Arkansas, 282 Ark. 443, 446 (1984)

(citation omitted). The doctrine is applicable only if the plaintiff establishes: (1) the

injury was caused by an instrumentality under the control of the defendant; (2) the

accident ordinarily would not happen in the absence of the defendant's negligence;

and (3) there is no evidence of other causes of the accident. Id. at 447. If the doctrine

applies, the defendant shoulders the burden to offset the inference. Id.

The Arkansas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur is inapplicable in slip-and-fall cases. Alexander v. Town & Country

Discount Foods, Inc., 316 Ark. 446 (1994) (citations omitted). “The reason the

doctrine is not applicable to slip and fall cases is that the sole cause of the injury is

not necessarily a negligent act by the defendant. There are possibilities of negligence

by third parties as well as the plaintiff. Alexander, 316 Ark. at 447. Brown cannot

rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to prove negligence in this case.

B. Trinity’s Motion for Summary Judgment2

It is undisputed that Trinity owns the owns the building that houses

Robinson’s long-term care facility, and Trinity leases the building to Robinson.

Accordingly, to succeed with her negligence claim against Trinity, Brown must

establish that Trinity had a duty of reasonable care because Trinity either: (1) agreed

to maintain the leased property and received consideration for that agreement; or (2)

by its own conduct, assumed the duty to maintain the leased property. See Ark. Code

Ann. § 18-16-110; Propst v. McNeill, 326 Ark. 623, 624–25(1996). Brown must

also show that Trinity failed to perform its agreed or assumed duty in a reasonable

manner, proximately causing her damages. Ark. Code Ann. 18-16-110(2).

2 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As a prerequisite to summary judgment, a

moving party must demonstrate “an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving

party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the non-moving

party must “do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986).

The non-moving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his

pleading but must come forward with ‘specific facts showing a genuine issue for

trial. Id. at 587. “[A] genuine issue of material fact exists if: (1) there is a dispute

of fact; (2) the disputed fact is material to the outcome of the case; and (3) the dispute

is genuine, that is, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party.” RSBI

Aerospace, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1995).

Brown does not allege in her amended complaint that Trinity agreed to

maintain Robinson’s facility or that it assumed such a duty, but she states that Trinity

and Morton “owned and/or operated” Robinson’s long-term care facility. Doc. 34 at

3-4.

Trinity argues that Brown is unable to establish that it had a duty of care or

that it breached such a duty. Trinity submits Morton’s affidavit, stating that he is a

member of Robinson and a shareholder of Trinity. Doc. 41-1at 1. Morton testifies

that Robinson is the licensed operator of the long-term care facility where Brown

resided on December 12, 2016 and that Robinson’s administrator is responsible for

the management and operation of the facility. Id. In addition, Morton testifies that

the only involvement Trinity has with Robinson is collecting monthly lease

payments. Id. at 2. He states that neither he nor Trinity was involved with the

nursing or custodial care provided to Brown or the housekeeping and maintenance

services provided to the facility during Brown’s residency. Id.

Brown argues that questions remain regarding the relationship between

Trinity and Robinson because Trinity failed to provide a lease agreement to support

its motion. Doc. 53, at 3-4. In addition, she notes that Trinity did not offer the name

of its premises liability insurance policy, and she speculates that Trinity and

Robinson have the same policy or similar policies.

Trinity’s motion for summary judgment is properly supported with Morton’s

sworn testimony that Trinity had no role in maintaining Robinson’s long-term care

facility. Accordingly, Brown must designate specific facts creating a triable

controversy, and she has failed to do so. The Court therefore finds that Trinity is

entitled to summary judgment in its favor.

C. Morton’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Under Arkansas law, a member or manager of a limited liability company is

not personally liable for the company’s debts, solely by reason of acting as a member

or manager. See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-38-304 (effective July 28, 2021). Instead, a

member may be held personally liable for his own acts, and under appropriate

circumstances, the business entity form may be disregarded when illegally abused

to the injury of a third person. K.C. Properties of N.W. Arkansas, Inc. v. Lowell Inv.

Partners, LLC, 373 Ark. 14, 32, 280 S.W.3d 1, 15 (2008). Likewise, shareholders

are not generally liable for the acts of their corporation, but they may be liable for

their own acts or omissions. Scott v. Cent. Arkansas Nursing Centers, Inc., 101 Ark.

App. 424, 435, 278 S.W.3d 587, 595–96 (2008) (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 4–27–

622(b) (Repl.2001); McGraw v. Weeks, 326 Ark. 285, 294, 930 S.W.2d 365, 370

(1996) (holding that a corporate employee may be sued if he is “personally involved

in the events surrounding an injury”)).

Morton submits his affidavit, testifying that he was not involved in the day-

to-day housekeeping and maintenance operations at Robinson’s facility, nor was he

involved or responsible for hiring, training, or supervision of Robinson’s staff. Doc.

38-2 at 2. Morton further testifies that Trinity and Robinson maintain separate bank

accounts and to do not commingle funds. Id. Morton argues that Brown is unable to

establish that he was personally involved in events surrounding her fall, and in the

absence of such evidence, he is entitled to summary judgment in his favor.

Brown argues that fact questions remain regarding the relationship between

Trinity and Robinson, but she fails to come forward with any facts or evidence

showing that such is the case or that Morton had any role in operating Robinson’s

facility. The Court therefore finds that Morton is entitled to summary judgment in

his favor.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, motions for summary judgment by Separate

Defendants Michael Morton (Doc. 38) and Trinity Court, Inc. (Doc. 41) are

GRANTED. It is further ordered that Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims based

on strict liability and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor (Doc. 44) is GRANTED.

Plaintiff may proceed with her remaining negligence claim against Defendant,

Robinson Nursing and Rehabilitation Center LLC.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 26th day of January, 2022.

Susan Webber Wright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE